## JOHANN WILHELM BAIER

# COMPENDIUM OF POSITIVE THEOLOGY,

## WITH EXPANDED NOTES,

IN WHICH

BY WHICH
THE ORTHODOX DOCTRINE IS SET FORTH FOR ACADEMIC EDUCATION AND CONFIRMED FROM HOLY SCRIPTURE AND FROM THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS GROUNDED THEREIN —

NEWLY PREPARED FOR PUBLICATION BY

**CARL FERDINAND WILHELM WALTHER,**

DOCTOR AND PROFESSOR OF SACRED THEOLOGY.

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# POSITIVE THEOLOGY

## PART ONE

### Chapter I. ^

OF GOD.

### § 1.

By the name [b] of God [a] we commonly understand the most excellent being of all, [c] of which nothing better can be or be conceived; or the first being, which is in itself the cause of all other beings, and preserves and governs all things.[d]

QUENSTEDT: "The natural definition of the knowledge of God is this: Natural knowledge of God is that by which, from the light of nature, it is made known to us that there is a supreme Deity, and that this same Deity governs the entire universe and all things created by Him with His wisdom and power." " (*Theol. did.-pol*. P. I. c. 6. s. 1. th. 10. f. 366)

a) That which must be treated first concerning God in theology is evident from Proleg. Cap. I. § 3. note c. pp. 7-8, collated with § 17. p. 38 and § 39. p. 76.

GERHARD: "Since *Holy Scripture* is the only and proper principle of theology, we rightly begin with it. Some hold that the explanation of theological passages should begin with the article on God, since He is the principle of being and the author of Holy Scripture itself; but in the treatment of the disciplines, regard is had not so much to the principle *of being* as to the principle *of knowing*, nor so much to the dignity of the subject as to the ease of its transmission and perception." (*Exeges*. l. I. § 1.)

b) *Strictly* speaking, that is. For otherwise the word *God* is used in an *improper* sense, when it is applied to creatures more excellent than others, e.g., *angels* and *magistrates*, and also to the idols of the Gentiles, which are held by the false opinion of men to be gods. See note *a* to the following § 3.

QUENSTEDT: "Whether it is also anywhere in the Scriptures attributed to *the ministers of the Church* or priests (the name of God), is doubtful. In support of the affirmative, some cite the words of Exodus 4:16: ‘You (Moses) shall be to him (Aaron) לֵאלֹהִים, for God.’ From this passage they attempt to prove that priests are also called אֱלֹהִים in the Holy Scriptures, because Moses was a priest. But Moses sustained a twofold person or office, political and ecclesiastical; he is called Elohim not on account of the former, but on account of the latter, i.e., just as Aaron was to be Moses' interpreter, so Moses was to be Aaron's judge and prince. " (L. c. c. 7. s. l. th. 10. f. 388.)

c) For it is clear from experience that all travelers conceive of God only in relation to created things. See *Mus., Introd*. Cap. II. § 12. num. II. p. 76.

d) This pertains to the fact that people, especially in calamities, flee to God, and that they commonly call Him the *Most Excellent,* the *Greatest* [*Optimus*, *Maximus*], see *Seneca, De Beneficiis*, chapters VI and VII; that now, as *a judge,* they call upon Him between themselves and others; now, being conscious of their own guilt, they fear Him as the most holy and most powerful.

## § 2.

Among the names of God, which are several [(a)] in the Scriptures of the Old Testament, the name, that is [(b)] יהוה (YHWH), stands out as essential [(c)] and incommunicable.[(d)]

a) Ten are usually counted. Of these, *four* stand out: אל, אלהים, יהוד and אֲדֹנָי. See *Jerome*, Epistle CXXXVI to Marcella, and *Gerhard,* P. I. LL. *de Nat. Dei*, § 21.

> GERHARD: "Jerome, in his letter to Marcellus, vol. 3, p. 95, collected ten names of God: 1. אל [el], 2. אלהים [elohim], 3. אלהי [elohi], 4. צבאות [sebaoth], 5. עליון [elyon], 6. אשר אהיה [asher ehiyeh] 7. אדני [adonai], 8. יה [yah], 9. יהוה [yahweh], 10. שדי [shadai]… The name Jehovah (for which sometimes in the Scriptures you read Jehovih, Gen. 15:2, etc.) is commonly called *the τετραγράμματον* [Tetragrammaton]*,* because it consists of four integral letters... The Hebrews write that this name is *ἀνεκφώνητον* [unpronounceable], the reason for which Galatinus gives in Book II, Chapter 1, because it denotes the ineffable essence of God... Nor should it be passed over that some conclude this to be the proper name of God, because י serves among the Hebrews for the formation of proper names. Thus from עקב Jacob, from צחק Isaac, etc. They consider it more subtle, or rather forced, what some write, that by י in this name the person of the Father is denoted, by ה the Son, by ו the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, by the other ה the human nature of the Son, which, being assumed into *the Logos*, was thus elevated into the fellowship of the most holy Trinity (on account of the personal union with the *λόγῳ* [Logos]), as Ambrose speaks on the resurrection." (*L. de nat. Dei* § 21.)

b) Which is thought to be derived from that *in Exodus 3:14*: אהיה אשר אהיה. I *am (will be) who I Am (will be).* For although it is derived from the verb הָיָה (hayah) or הָוָה (havah) and the future אהיה (ahiyeh), it is not for that reason the third person of the future, יִהְיֶה (yihyeh) or יֶהֱיֶה (yehehyeh) *'it will be,'* which God speaking to Moses announced in the first person, אֶהְיֶה (*ehyeh) 'I am.'* For both the name is distinguished from the verb by grammarians, and the points of the name Jehovah, by which it is expressed in the Scriptures, are not the points of a verb, but are proper to the name itself. Hence it is more correctly said that the same is יְהוָה, which in *John's* Apocalypse ch. 1, 4, it is proclaimed: *ὁ ὢν, καὶ ὁῆν, καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος;* so that by this name God, or the Messiah, is not expressed precisely under the notion of some *future* thing, but the being that transcends all distinctions of time is denoted: the Being, I say, which exists in the most perfect way. Hence *Plato* and *Philo* likewise retain the simple name *τοῦ ὄντος* [of the One who is], which *Damascene* also employs. By *Junius* He is called *αὐτοὼν* [the very Being]; by *Scaliger αὐταυτὸς* [self-itself]; by blessed *Walther αὐταυτότατος* [the most supremely self-existent].

c) For it denotes an essence not just any, but *κατ' ἐξοχὴν* [par excellence]*;* or that God is such a being as no other is, or could be; a being that cannot but be.

d) Indeed, 1) in the entire Scripture there is no passage in which this name [יהוה] is found attributed in the nominative case to any creature. And when an appearing angel claims this name for himself, the context shows that it is not a created angel who is meant, but the uncreated one, or the Son of God, for example*, Exodus 3:14.* Indeed, 2) God Himself claims that name for Himself *alone*, *Exodus 3:14; Numbers 6:24-26; Isaiah 42:8.* And 3) elsewhere Scripture attributes it to God as *His own*, *Exodus 15:3*; *Isaiah 48*:*2; 54:5.* He also adds 4) that sometimes it is preceded by an *exclusive* particle*, Ps. 83:19; Isa. 37:20.* To which is added 5), that all *the characteristics of a proper name* apply to this name, e.g., *that* it has no plural, *that* it does not admit the demonstrative ה, *that* it admits no suffixes, *that* it is never used in a prepositional phrase. And so taught *Musaeus* in *Coll. MSto contra Socinian. Disp. III. Q. II.* and likewise in *Coll. MSto Qu. Illustr.* (the former of which, on Syncretism and Holy Scripture, are extant in print), ad L. *de Deo* Q. II.

> QUENSTEDT: "The name Jehovah is proper to the one God alone and is incommunicable, both grammatically and logically. In the grammatical sense, since the requisites of a proper name properly pertain to it; in the logical sense, because since it is the name of God, it is so proper to God that it does not apply to any other besides God. Because the name Jehovah is proper to God alone and cannot be shared with any created being, *hence* we rightly assert the divinity of the second and third persons of the Holy Trinity, i.e., of the Son and the Holy Spirit, against heretics." (L. c. c. 7. s. 2. q. 1. f. 391. sq.)
>
> THE SAME: "Those passages in which Jehovah is called the *God of gods* do not have the word *θεον,* but the name Elohim, e.g., El Elohim, Ps. 50:1, which some explain as 'Mighty God'; others by apposition, so that the two are to be considered joined names of God; others by the construction Elohei Elohim, 'God of gods,' as in Deut. 10:17., where, however, neither word is taken properly, and indeed the former in a more eminent and the latter in a more secondary sense, as Socinus would have it (holding that it denotes eminence, as in that: Song of Songs, being of beings, i.e., the most eminent); but the *former* word Elohim is taken *properly, the latter impropriety.* For by the latter, Elohim is understood either *ἀντιφραστικῶς* [by antiphrasis, meaning the exact opposite of its usual meaning] *the* gods of the nations, or *μεταφορικός* [metaphorically] the so-called gods, i.e., magistrates, judges." (L. c. c. 7. s. 2. q. 3. f. 407.)
>
> LUTHER: "First, I let go of the ten names, since that is not new, but also St. Jerome in his letter to Marcella points it out, where he lists them thus: El, Elohim, Elohe, Zebaoth, Eljon, Ehje, Adonai, Ja, Jehovah, Schadai. Others do it differently; I pay no attention to any of it. There are indeed more names of God in Scripture than these, such as Ab, Bore, Or, Chai, etc.: Father, Creator, Light, Life, Salvation, and the like. And what can goodness mean or be, that is not first attributed to God, as that which He has in Himself, as Christ says: "God alone is good"; but we receive from Him all that we are and have. But now we want to discuss the one name, called Jehovah, by which the devil and the Jews practice much sorcery and all kinds of abuse and idolatry. This name Jehovah, according to grammar, comes from the word Haja, or Hava, which in Latin means 'fuit' (was), in the past tense; in German, 'wesen' or 'sein' (to be). And the first part can be the verbal noun suffix, as in the names Josaphat, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and many other names, and it is equivalent to 'ens' in Latin and 'on' in Greek. We Germans must say, "*it is,*" and thus it is Trigrammaton in Latin, Dygrammaton in

Greek, Hexagrammaton in German, or if we want to take the poor ‘IST,’ then it is also Trigrammaton. That they now pretend the name Jehovah is unspeakable, they do not know what they are babbling; if they mean the letters, it cannot be true, for his name is Jehovah. And since it can be written with pens and ink, why should it not also be called forth with the mouth, which is much better than pens and ink? Or why don't they also call it unwritable, unreadable, and unthinkable? In short, it's a rotten thing. But if they do it out of honor, then they should do it for all other names as well, and let those be unspeakable too. For it says: "You shall not misuse the name of God"; therefore, that is also a falsehood. Nowhere does Scripture say that anyone's name is to be unpronounceable; otherwise, all who misuse God's name would be innocent, because they could say they were unable to name it, much less misuse it. It does say, however, that God's essence, power, wisdom, goodness, and whatever else can be said of God are unspeakable, immeasurable, infinite, incomprehensible, etc.—that it is not the letters or syllables, but that which is signified by them, that is unspeakable. Indeed, this is how one must speak of the unspeakable name of God. For He has His being from no one, has neither beginning nor end, but is from eternity, in and of Himself; so that His being cannot be called was, or will be, for He never began, cannot begin to be, nor did he ever cease, cannot cease to be; but with Him it is simply ‘is’, or being—that is, Jehovah. Exodus 3:24 [sic: Exodus 3:14]. When the creature was created, His being already IS, He IS already there with His being. In this way Christ speaks of His divinity, John 8:58: ‘Before Abraham was, I am’; He does not say, 'I was there,' as if He were not there afterward; but, 'I am,' that is, my being is eternal, has not been, will not be, but is a simple I AM. Therefore, just as His 'is,' 'am,' or 'being' is incomprehensible, so it is also inexpressible; for no creature can comprehend that which is eternal. Therefore the angels are eternally blessed, for they can never grow weary of beholding, rejoicing in, or comprehending the eternal essence of God; and if it could be comprehended, it could not be eternal, but would itself have to have a beginning or an end, and could give or preserve no being to anyone, because it would itself be uncertain of its own being. Furthermore, His wisdom, power, goodness, etc., are also eternal and incomprehensible, because they can be nothing other than His divine essence itself. Thirdly, and what is perhaps even greater, in the divine essence there are God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—three persons in one single, eternal, incomprehensible essence. Indeed, to say all this of God—might that be called an incomprehensible, unspeakable name? Who would want to name, conceive, speak, or write of such a wondrous being? In this way, perhaps the ancients called the name Jehovah unspeakable, because it signifies the essence of God, according to grammar, which (as has been heard) is a mere IS, from eternity, and is called three persons." (*Vom Schem Hamphoras* etc. 1543. XX, 2564—66.)

THE SAME.: "I do not claim to be a Hebrew, but it is certain that this word אל has an etymological origin from strength, and it signifies God Himself, when it is a name, as here, and is one of the ten names of God. Just as Adonai, Jehovah, and the Tetragrammaton are proper names of God, so El is nowhere found in the singular except of the true God, as in Psalm 42[:2]: "My soul thirsts for El," that is, the strong one, and Psalm 50: The Lord God of gods has spoken. But nevertheless, whether you call Him 'the Strong One' as an appellative or God, it seems to signify the proper name of God, and amounts to the same thing. I would nevertheless prefer it to be rendered God, even though the word God does not express the appellation of strength, for by this word we understand nothing else , than the very

divinity itself, which is above all things. But the Hebrew אל in the singular signifies God in such a way that it simultaneously signifies the etymology of the origin, namely, the strong. And this strength is not the active one that follows in the word נבויר, but a substantive substance, which is by its nature firmness or solidity, just as a solid stone is called firm, on which one can lean with certainty and safety. Therefore, in our German translation, we rendered it as 'Kraft'. For that which is not weak and languid in itself, but subsists in its own solidity and firmness, is called by that word among the Hebrews. And this is precisely the meaning of this fortitude. God is that strong one, that is, the very substantive firmness, and the unconquerable and stable solidity." (Exeget. opp. lat. Erlang. Vol. XXIII, 426. sq.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis*: 1. Of the *Jews,* who deny that the name Jehovah is proper to God alone, in order to undermine the argument for the divinity of Christ drawn from this name. 2. Of *certain Papists,* like Bellarmine, who assert that the name Jehovah is also attributed to angels. 3. Of *some Calvinists*, who make the name Jehovah *communicable* [*κοινώνητον*], but by *metonymy* [*μετονυμικῶς*]; for although they acknowledge that this name is proper to God, they nevertheless assert somewhere that it was given as a tribute to those who represented God, as Calvin, *Institutes*, bk. 1, ch. 13, § 19. . . 4. The *Socinians,* who hold that the name Jehovah, being simply a designation, is also attributed to creatures. . . Enjedinus, however, flatly denies that the name Jehovah is proper to God, and contends that it is attributed not only to persons, such as angels, priests, and judges, but also to other created things, such as the Ark of the Covenant, Jerusalem, etc. Socinus, however, concedes with his followers that it is the proper name of God, yet in such a way that it also applies to angels who, as it were, sustain the person of Jehovah in some matter. 5. Of the *Arminians and the Innovators,* of whom *the former* in the Apology of the Confession, chapter 3. p. 51. say that nothing is more certain or clearer than that the name Jehovah is also attributed to creatures throughout the Scriptures... These, however, contend that the name Jehovah is attributed to angels as ambassadors of God in the sacred writings, as Calixt and Dreier." (L. c. q. 1. f. 392.)

The SAME: "*Antithesis:* 1. *Socinians,* who a. hold that the name *Elohim* is attributed indiscriminately to creatures and to God; likewise that the name אֱלֹהַ is by its nature common and is attributed to God alone by *κατ' ἐξοχὴν* [*par excellence*]. . . b. Because they utterly deny the mystery of the Trinity, they consistently deny that the word Elohim implies any kind of plurality in the divine essence. . . 2. The *Papists,* such as Thomas, Bellarmine, etc. . . 3. *The Calvinists,* such as Calvin, Peter Martyr, etc. . . 4. Dr. *Calixt sen.* Who all agree in this, that the word Elohim is indeed plural in termination, but singular in meaning, and denotes a single individual, by no means a plurality of persons in the unity of the divine essence." (L. c. q. 2. f. 399.)

# § 3.

Likewise, the Greek name *Θεός* [*Theos*], properly taken,(a) is not so much a name of dignity as it is a name of the divine nature.(b)

a) Elsewhere indeed, in the New Testament Scriptures itself, it is taken of *magistrates (John 10:34; 2 Thess. 2:4),* even of *idols (1 Cor. 8:5),* but *improperly* and by *a* certain *analogy,* true or fictitious, to him who is truly and properly God.

b) For although the name *θευς,* by its original meaning, seems to denote God by some *action* (as either *from ἀπὸ τοῦ θεᾶσθαι,* to *contemplate*,

according to *the Damascene*, Book on Orthodox Faith, *ch*. 12, or *ἀπὸ τοῦ θέειν,* from *running,* either because He penetrates, nourishes, and preserves all things, or *ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖν,* from *placing* [which is explained by *τὸ κατασκευάζειν καὶ ποιεῖν, to create and to make,* because God *is the creator of all things, and the cause of the structure of all things,* i.e., *the maker* and *cause of the structure of all]; or from αἴθειν, to burn,* which is derived from it being like *a consuming fire* [of vices], *Deut. 4:24*; However, it must be admitted that, just as upon hearing the abstract noun *θεότης* [divinity] we first conceive of *the divine nature* or *essence,* so upon hearing the name *Θεός (Theos)* we first of all conceive of the *subsistence which possesses the divine essence or nature.* Thus also *Musaeus* taught Coll. MS. contra Socin. l. c. Q. I. And to this point it pertains, that Scripture distinguishes between *θεόν φύσει*, or *by nature,* and *θεοὺς λεγομένους,* gods *by name* (not in reality, or by nature) *such as* 1 *Cor. 8, 5. Gal. 4, 8.*

GERHARD: "It is more correctly said that the Greek *theos* and the Latin *Deus* are primitive words, for we also call the German word 'Gott' a primitive word." (Exeg. Bk. II, § 11.)

QUENSTEDT: "The Socinians confound appellative and common names. Not all appellative names are common, or apply to many; for sun and light are appellative names, but not common, that is, they do not apply to many." (L. c. q. 3. f. 405.)

## § 4.

That God exists can be proven [(a)] 1. from the contemplation of this universe,[(b)] 2. from the testimony of conscience,[(c)] 3. from the consensus of peoples, both of the Gentiles and of Christians.[(d)]

a) Indeed, among Christians it may seem that it ought to be taken for granted rather than proven; yet, since we must contend not only with atheists but also with others, on account of the corruption of nature, with the doubts of our own minds, the arguments that prove the existence of God are not to be neglected. Cf. *Gerh., Exeg*. L. II. § 58.

b) As Paul writes *in Romans 1:20*: *ἀόρατα τοῦ Θεοῦ, the invisible things of God,* as an existing being, *is perceived through the things that have been made, τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα καθορᾶσθαι.* And otherwise it is clear how, *when we turn our eyes to this universe, we are led quite naturally to a knowledge of its cause, and conceive of some first being, from which it depends in its existence*. See *Mus. Introd*. Ch. II. § 22. p. 74., § 24. p. 81-82., § 25 and 31 p. 82-83., where it is also mentioned how *an exquisite and accurate knowledge of the existence of God is demonstrated by arguments drawn from a more exact consideration of this universe,* e.g., *from movers subordinated to one another to a first mover; from causes subordinated to one another to a first cause; from the governance of this universe to a supreme governor*, etc.

c) Thus Paul *in Romans 2:14-15* teaches that *τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου*, *the work of the law* (that is, those insights into the distinction between what is honorable and what is shameful, with reference to the supreme lawgiver, God) is written (as if with the finger of nature or of God) *on the hearts* not only of the *Jews,* but also of the *Gentiles,* who do not have the written law; *with their conscience bearing witness and their thoughts accusing one another* (so that

the wicked are convicted of their sins and pronounce divine vengeance upon themselves), *or even excusing them* (so that the good are uplifted by the righteousness of their good deeds). See *Mus. Introd*. Cap. II. § 22. p. 57. 58. and *Diss. de Insuffic. Lum. Nat. contra Ed. Herb*. § 71-72. p. 43-44. And to this also pertain, in their own way, the things we said above in Prol. c. I. § 10. concerning *the innate knowledge of God.* For men 1) by nature prescribe to themselves, as it were by the authority of another superior, the things to be done and to be avoided; and thus 2) if they act otherwise, it is because *they hold (κατέχουσι) the truth,* or the true knowledge of things to be done according to the will of a superior, as if imprisoned, in *unrighteousness*, and prevent it from being able to express itself in the direction of moral uprightness and true worship of God*,* according to *Romans 1:18.* and 3) after good deeds they rejoice, after bad ones they are afraid; not thinking about human rewards or punishments: all of this points to an *internal* and naturally *ingrained* sense of the divine (see *Mus. Introd*. l. c. p. 57. 58.). However, this does not mean that we should say that a habitual knowledge is innate to us. *For although* (writes *Scherzer* in *Brev. Huelsem*. Cap. II. p. 85-86.) *the passages Rom. 1:19–20; 2:14 refer this knowledge to φύσιν [nature], they nevertheless do not determine the manner in which it is inherent by nature. Meanwhile*, *since the cause of condemnation (chapters 11 ff.) is referred to the abuse of the τού νού or intellect*, Huelsemann *judged* it *more probable* that *this knowledge is innate in man as a potential* (*i.e., in a proximate and without the aid of a teacher), if the exercise of the intellect is added.* Romans 1. (for thus it is undoubtedly to be read: not 2.), Rom. 1:19-21, 28, 32, 2, 2. sqq. (presumably should read 2:14 sqq.). *Moreover, in the same place, the exercise of the intellect is opposed by voluntary cowardice and unjust detention, which are not innate habits, nor opposed to other habits, but to the power and the act flowing from it, and thus manifestly show that this natural knowledge is in man by power, not by an infused habit, that is, a habit properly so called. For otherwise we teach the same thing: by an innate knowledge, not an actual one before the use of reason, not ἐνεργητικήν [operative], through expressed representations, but ἑκτικήν [possessive], through the implanting of an analogous disposition.* Indeed, if you say that a habitual knowledge is *simply* born with us, then a habit in the proper sense will certainly be understood. But if you call it '*analogous*,' you will indicate that it is not a habit, properly speaking, but something similar to a habit.

d) Not only with respect to the acquired knowledge of what God is, but also with regard to the innate knowledge. See *Mus.* 1. c. p. 58-60.

ANTHITHESIS.

GERHARD: "Concerning this natural knowledge of God*,* 1. certain people *sin by defect,* who plainly deny it, which they do a. *Neoplatonists* (whose *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* [primary falsehood] and origin of error seems to depend on the fact that they deny that the first man was created for immortality and possessed a certain original righteousness, of which the natural cognitions are relics of the divine image). . . *Oostrodus, Inst*. c. 7. p. 10.: 'That men know something about God or about the Godhead, this they have not from nature, nor from contemplation of creation, but from hearsay, inasmuch as God from the beginning revealed Himself to men.' . . b. *Flacius, P. I. Clavi*s under the word *legis* col. 563.: 'That any true principles or knowledge of one God and His governance are still in man must not be conceded.' Col. 566.: 'That man by nature knows no more about God than a brute.' c. *Vorstius* in exeg. apol. c. 1.: 'Innate knowledge is not actual nor habitual, but only potential,

that is, merely the power to know, d. They also err who rashly and indiscriminately pronounce it false and say that if the Gentiles affirm that God is eternal, omnipotent, etc., the apostle explicitly calls it the truth of God. Rom. 1:18. . . 2. *They sin in* excess who hold it to be sufficient for attaining salvation, which *some of the Fathers and Scholastics* do, asserting that men before the promulgation of the Law by Moses could be saved and were saved by natural knowledge. (For as Augustine rightly observes, ep. 49: 'A certain disposition of the mind delights in the virtues of the pagans, so that we are unwilling to condemn them.') *Clement of Alexandria*, Stromata I: 'Philosophy at times justified the Greeks by itself, for there are many paths to salvation.' *Justin,* Apology II: 'Those who lived *μετὰ λόγου* (*according to reason*) are Christians, even if they were not considered to have known God, such as Socrates and Aristides among the Greeks.' Similar statements are found in Irenaeus, Tertullian, Epiphanius, Jerome, Chrysostom, etc. But Augustine, stirred up by the Pelagian controversy, corrected those things which the early writers had inconveniently said. That this was the same opinion of the *Scholastics*, Acosta teaches and refutes it. . . b. *Some of the Papists. Andradia* in *Def. Conc. Trid*. 1. III. p. 292.: 'True faith and true knowledge of God for righteousness and eternal salvation can be had not only from sacred letters and divine oracles, but also from things that are subject to the senses.' . . *Erasmus* in the preface to Cicero's *Tusc. Disp*.:'They will not be too much opposed to the carrying of accounts, who hope that he is leading a quiet life among the gods above.' The same in *coll. relig*.: 'When I read such things, I can hardly restrain myself from saying: 'Saint Socrates, pray for us.' And later: 'But I myself often cannot restrain myself from wishing the holy souls of Moroni and Flaccus well.' . . 3. *Some of the Calvinists. Zwingli*, in his exposition of the Christian faith written for the king, places Numa, Aristides, Socrates, etc., among the blessed in heaven, and asserts that God "wrote something of faith with His own hand on the heart of Seneca," from which arose the joke of Vitus Winshemius: "Beware, hearers, of the heaven of the Zwinglians; I would not willingly live in that heaven, for I would fear Hercules' club.' See also Zwingli's '*elench. contra Anabapt*,' vol. I, p. 35. In the same volume, ep. 1, p. 382, he writes: 'A pagan, if he fosters a pious mind at home, is a Christian, even if he does not know Christ.'; on Prov. vol. 1, p. 358, he writes of Seneca that 'he spoke religiously about the creation and conservation of things, that he had a divine mind.' Zwingli was defended by *Gualterus,* his kinsman, in an apology published in 1545, p. 52, where he attempts to support Zwingli's opinion with certain arguments. . . 4. *The Photinians,* although they completely deny the natural knowledge of God, cannot, however, with their own hypotheses, state anything other than that the Gentiles could have had sufficient knowledge of God for salvation even outside the Church. . . *Catech. Racov*. p. 25-26. to the question: 'What are those things which pertain to the essence of God, and are absolutely necessary for salvation?' answers as follows: 'They are that God exists, that He is the only one, that He is eternal, that He is perfectly just, perfectly wise, and perfectly powerful.' Ostorodus Inst. c. 3. p. 28.: "Besides these, we know of nothing else as necessary to know, as far as the essence of God is concerned." But since all these things can be drawn from natural knowledge, therefore, according to the Photinian hypothesis, the Gentiles were able to obtain from nature the knowledge of those things which are necessary for salvation." (*Exeges*. loc. II. | 63. 81.)

LUTHER: "I remember how Master John Wessel (who had been a preacher in Mainz, and before that had ruled the university of Erfurt with his books, from which I myself also became a Master there) had to be condemned by those desperate, arrogant murderers, called inquisitors of heretical depravity (I should say, inventors), Dominican monks, simply because he would not say: I believe that God exists, but said: I know that God exists. For all the schools held that God's existence is self-evident, as St. Paul also says in Romans 1:19." (*On Councils and Churches*. 1539. XVI, 2743. sq.)

## § 5. ^

However, in order that *what* God is, and *who* He is, may be rightly known, therefore first those things which pertain to the divine *essence* [(a)] and *attributes,*[(b)] then those which pertain to *the* divine *persons,*[(c)] must be distinctly [(d)] considered and proven from the Scriptures.[(e)]

a) By the name of divine *essence* is understood that which is *first* conceived in God and by which God is adequately distinguished from all other things, and which is, in our mode of conceiving, the *principle* and *root* of all the perfections that are attributed to God as *properties*.

b) That is, the perfections which, in our mode of understanding, follow the essence of God, or that which we first conceive in Him, and are thus attributed to God in *the manner of concomitant forms*, although *in reality* they are *neither accidents* nor *do they differ* from the divine essence. They are distinguished from the divine essence and from one another, however, on account of God's infinite perfection and the imperfection of our intellect.

QUENSTEDT: "Essence, substance, spirit, and consequently the other attributes that are attributed to God and to creatures simultaneously, are predicated of God and of rational creatures not *συνωνύμως* [synonymously], univocally, nor *ὁμωνύμως* [homonymously], equivocally, but *ἀναλόγως* [analogously], analogically, so that they apply to God *πρώτως* [primarily] and absolutely, to creatures *δευτέρως* [secondarily] and by dependence; which analogy is properly called that of intrinsic attribution. . . *Univocally*, strictly speaking, they are congruent which have in common equally *the name and the thing* denoted by that name, with no inequality arising from the dependence of one on the other. They are *equivocally* congruent, which have the *name* in common, but not the thing signified by the name. They are *analogically* similar, which have in common *both the name and the thing* designated by the name, *but unequally*, when the name and the thing belong to one *in the first* and absolute sense, and to the other *secondarily* and by dependence." (L. c. c. 8. s. 2. q. 1. f. 422. sq.)

THE SAME: "*The* essence of God is *τὸ πᾶν καὶ οὐδέν,* all and nothing. It is *all*, because the perfections of all things are in it, and whatever is, has its being from it. It is *nothing*, not because of a defect, as if the divine essence were lacking, but because it transcends all things that are." (L. c. s. l. f. 409.)

THE SAME: "Because our finite intellect cannot adequately conceive the infinite and simplest essence of God in a single adequate concept, it apprehends the same essence by means of distinct and inadequate concepts, which inadequately represent the divine essence; which inadequate concepts are called the affections and attributes of God; *affections*, indeed, because they affect and denominate the divine essence; *attributes,* because they are attributed to it by our intellect, even if they are distinguished from the divine essence not really, but only by reason." (L. c.)

CHEMNITZ: *"'An accident does not belong to God*. This rule is found in Cyril, lib. 2. thesauri, c. 2, c. 2. And by *accident* is understood, as Bonaventure explains, that which can be lost, or could have come to a previously existing substance, or can depart while the substance remains, such as the virtues in angels, which the devils lost while the substance remained; or it can at least be increased or diminished, or undergo change, as with the virtues in regenerated men. Therefore, since Augustine says, *"In God there is nothing mutable or capable of being lost,"* nothing is said of Him by way of accident. The true and simple meaning of this rule, then, is that God is always like Himself, not changing either with time or because of our wickedness. Likewise, *one must reason about God not from a similar thing,* but from

*the lesser* to *the greater*. . . Thus, those things that are predicated of God, such as truth, goodness, justice, chastity, mercy, etc., are not in him as virtues are in angels or men. Thus, when it is said: the charity of God, it is not understood to be the kind of charity that is in creatures (which is an accident), mutable and capable of being lost, but it signifies *the essence* that loves us sincerely and ardently. In creatures, the person who has life and wisdom is one thing, and life, , and wisdom, etc., are another thing; *in God, however, there are no things distinct from the essence itself,* but life, wisdom, grace, mercy, goodness, charity, etc., are the very substance of God, and cannot change in Him as they do in men. However, it is objected that certain things are said of God temporally. For example: "*The Word became flesh," "Creator," "*helper in times of need," "a refuge for us." Therefore, these things are predicated of God according to accident. Cyril responds in the aforementioned passage: "Certain things are said of God temporally by relation to creatures, and they are said according to accident, not because anything happens by change to the substance of God himself, but *according to the accident of the creature* in which the change takes place, as when He is called creator, refuge, etc." In the schools, they say this: By essence or inherence, nothing temporal is predicated of God, but *by the mode of causality*, as creator, or *by the mode of union,* as the Word became flesh. *And then the change occurs with respect to the creature. This rule is not a vain scholastic figment,* but is taken from manifest places of Scripture: Num. 23:19. Mal. 3:6; Ps. 102:13; Jas. 1:17; 1 Tim. 6:16; Heb. 13:8. — *The true use of this rule* must also be learned. For the *Scholastics*, from a wrong understanding of this rule, deprived God of all affections, so that they even affirm that the most sweet consolation in Hosea 11:8-9 is to be understood *according to the effect only, and not according to the affection.* It is true, indeed, that since no accident can befall God, compassion in Him is not such an affection as it is in us; but because His mercy is not distinguished from His essence, there is something *far more ardent* in God than we can conceive." (L. th. 1. *de Deo*. c. 3. f. 28.)

GERHARD: "If those attributes were really different from the essence of God, then God would certainly be *composed* of essence and accidents, and thus the divine essence would not be supremely one and indivisible. . . For God is not *good* by some other thing superadded, but by Himself, that is, by His essence; and therefore He is goodness itself and the supreme good. He is not powerful by some accident superadded to His essence, but by Himself, that is, by His essence; and therefore He is omnipotence itself, and so it must be said of the other attributes as well. Hence it is that power, goodness, wisdom, etc., are called *attributes, and not qualities or accidents*. . . From this come the rules: *Nothing in God is not God Himself.* There are no accidents in God. The divine essence identifies itself with all that is in the divine being. This complete identity of the divine attributes with the divine essence is first confirmed by those passages in which God is called life itself, light itself, goodness itself, etc. . . . Secondly, this is confirmed by a collection of passages from Scripture. Ps. 25:6. The royal prophet prays: 'Remember Thy mercies, O Lord, and Thy loving-kindnesses, which are from of old. Do not remember the sins of my youth and my ignorances; according to Thy mercy remember me, for Thy goodness's sake, O Lord'; compare this with Isa. 43:25. . . Finally, the passages which testify to the *immutability* of the divine essence must be referred to this. . . Although, in truth, those attributes of God are not really distinct in God from one another or from the divine essence: nevertheless, the weakness of our intellect requires that they be treated of separately. 'God condescends to us, that we may rise up', Augustine, *de spec*. c. 112., and since we are human, He speaks to us in a human manner." (*Loc. theol. de N. D.* §§ 47—51.)

QUENSTEDT: "Whatever the creatures act and perfect by diverse and distinct virtues and qualities, all of this is acted and perfected by God through His essence. *We*, *through our essence*, *are men; through the quality of goodness, we are wise*; through one virtue, just; through another,

liberal, etc.; but God by essence is and acts all things. Therefore the consequence does not hold: 'Those whose effects are actually different, nay, contrary, also differ actually themselves.'" (L. c. q. 3. f. 436.)

THE SAME: "Hence the theological rule: *Divine attributes can be predicated of one another in the abstract*, *insofar as they are in God*, but not insofar as they are in our concepts." (L. c. f. 435.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. The *Scotists* and certain Nominalists, who hold that being, essence, spirit, etc. are *univocally* predicated of God and creatures. Thus Scotus, Ockham, Gabriel Biel, and others, whom *Slevoyt,* Prof. at Jena, disputes. acad. § 46. p. 66., saying: 'Since, therefore, being with respect to lower things is not analogous, however the analogy is explained, and truly the name, but also the very reason of being, truly pertains to them, there is no reason why anyone would want to deny that this is univocal; we therefore follow the Scotistic school and certain Nominalists.' So says he. 2. Of certain *scholastics* and others, who hold that essence, substance, spirit, etc. are predicated of God and intellectual creatures only *homonymously* or *equivocally*, such as Aureolus, Polanus (asserting that spirit is predicated of God, angels, and human souls *homonymously* or equivocally), Keckermann, Bartholinus (who considers spirit to be predicated equivocally of God). Thomas attributes the same opinion to R. Moses, namely that being is predicated equivocally of God and creatures. Dionysius Petavius, in tom. V. *dogmat. theol*, tom. V. *dogmat. theol*. l. I. c. 6. § 4. 5. p. 40. sq., where he proves at length that 'to be' in the true and proper sense and 'to exist' belong to God alone. — ... Thomas, Part I, Q. 13, Art. 5, thus concludes: 'If these things were predicated equivocally of God and creatures, nothing could be known about God from creatures, nor demonstrated, but the fallacy of equivocation would always occur.' And this is as much against the philosopher, who demonstrates many things about God, as it is against the apostle, Romans 1:17 ff.' An equivocal concept leads to the following absurdities: 1. Thus creatures would share the bare name of being and would in reality be non-entities. But who would assert that God produced bare non-entities? 2. If a creature were plainly a non-being, it could not be referred to God as an effect and a dependent being. 3. Christ, in assuming the human nature, would have assumed a non-being." (L. c. s. 2. q. 1. f. 423. sq.)

G. THOMASIUS: "These (immanent or essential) attributes are therefore distinguished on the one hand from the proper determinations of the essence (being, consciousness, will), on which they rest, and no less from the Trinitarian relations, which *establish* personal distinctions in God. On the other hand, however, those must be excluded which merely express God's relations to the world. . . Thus, for example, the attributes of omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, and criminal justice undoubtedly express God's relations to the world; they cannot be fully understood without the concept of the world. If *these* attributes were essential properties, then the world *would* also have to exist, so that God might exist. . . That exclusion is therefore indispensable. . . It is also found among our former doctors, who divide the attributes into immanent or absolute, and into transcendent or relative, . . . only that to this correct distinction the proper *consequence* is not given by them. . . For Christology, our view is of importance in that, according to it, the *renunciation* of relative divine attributes can be asserted quite well without endangering the essential ones." (*The Person and Work of Christ*. First Part. Second Ed. Erlangen, 1875. p. 49. sqq.)

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of certain *Calvinists*, who contend that the attributes of God are *non-entities*, improperly attributed to God, and not truly in God, that God is in Himself devoid of idioms, etc.; see

Beckmann's Servestan Disputation, Part I, pp. 272, 294. (who argues: One cannot give what one does not have; but God does not have attributes; therefore He cannot give and communicate them to another, i.e., to the human nature of Christ); Masson's *Anatomia Universalis Triumphi*, vol. I, p. 330., and Sachs's disquisition against Meisner, who deny that there are, or can be, any true nominal idioms in God, and therefore that any such idiom could have been communicated to the human nature of Christ. . . The *Socinians,* who also attribute *accidents* to God, as Crellius, *De Deo et Attributis Divinis*, c. 32, p. 348. They also deny that the divine properties are God Himself on the part of the thing." (L. c. s. 2. q. 2. f**.** 427.)

c) For Scripture presents several who are actually distinct from one another, each of whom exists in the mode of an intelligent *suppositum* [assumption], and each of whom is taught to possess that divine essence and properties, as we shall see below.

d) And those things which pertain to the divine essence and attributes are known, besides the Scriptures, in some way even from the light of nature; but *those which* pertain to the persons can be known only by divine revelation (of which more will be said below), and therefore their consideration rightly precedes the treatment of these.

e) For insofar as some of these, as we have just indicated, are known from the principles of reason, their consideration belongs to natural philosophy or theology; here, however, we are dealing with revealed theology.

## § 6.

The essence of God [(a)] can be described [(b)] as follows: God is a spiritual being [(c)] subsisting of Himself;[(d)] or, more briefly: God is an independent spirit.

a) As it is contradistinguished by its attributes.

b) There is no reason to demand or expect such an exquisitely so-called *definition*. For it must be admitted that in this life we do not have a known and perceived *essential, proper, and adequate* account of the divine essence. For *we know in part* only*,* according to *1 Cor. 13:12.* Likewise also *Musaeus* in *Coll. MSto contra Socin*. Disp. I. Q. V. § 12. Cf. *Hafenreff.* L. *de Deo*, p. 27., *Franz. Interpr. Script. S. Orae*. CIII. p. 226. 227., also Disp. V. de Sacrif. thes. 119., *Cundis.* Not. ad Comp. Hutt. L. II. Q. II. p. 70. 71.

HAFENREFFER: "A perfect and accurate *definition* of the essence of God cannot be given by man in this life; it is, however, easier to explain *what* God *is not* than *what* He *is*. Damaskenus, in his *de orthodox, fid*, Book I, Chapter 4, after demonstrating that God is incorporeal, finally adds: "But this is not a definition of His substance, just as neither are the fact that He is uncreated, without a beginning, unalterable, and incorruptible, nor whatever else is predicated of or about God. For these do not signify what He is, but what He is not. But he who wishes to assign the substance of something must say what it is, not what it is not. And as for God, to say what He is according to His substance is impossible; it is far from fitting to speak of God by the negation of all things. For none of the things that are is it; not as a non-being, but as

transcending all beings and as being the being of all. And a little later: 'His divinity is infinite and incomprehensible; and this alone is comprehensible about Him: His infinity and incomprehensibility.' For whatever we affirm about God through affirmative theology does *not* indicate his *nature*, but those things which are *around* the nature, not the nature itself. For even if you say good, just, wise, or anything else you wish, you are not speaking of the nature of God, but of those things which are about the nature, *οὐ τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τὴν φύσιν."* (L. th. lib. 1. 1. 1. pag. 27.)

GERHARD: "Two things are asked in this place: I. *Whether God can be defined. . .* We answer *in the negative.* 1. *From the defect of the genus . . .* God, as the creator, and the creature are separated by an infinite interval, and there is nothing that can be predicated equally of both. . . 2. *From perfection.* God is the supreme being and is a pure and most perfect act. Because He is the supreme being, He has nothing superior; now, whatever is properly defined is defined by something prior. . . 3. *From a sufficient enumeration.* If God could be properly defined, that definition would be either *essential* or *causal*. It cannot be *essential*, because that consists of a genus and a specific difference. But God does not have any univocal genus in common with other beings, nor is His simplest essence composed of genus and difference. A *causal* definition cannot be it either, because God is the cause of all things; but no cause of God is given; He is *αναίτιος* [uncaused], *ἄναρχος* [without beginning], etc." (*Exeges*. loc. 2. § 89.)

DANNHAUER: "To be defined otherwise, thatis infinite, certainly cannot be circumscribed by a genus and difference, much less represented by a single concept. Every genus properly so called, with its species and individuals, is multiplied in the plural number; e.g., Abraham is a man, Isaac is a man, Jacob is a man; therefore Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are three men. But in speaking of the divine it is not permissible to use the same mode of expression; one cannot say, for example: The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God; therefore the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three Gods." (*Hodosoph. Phaen*. III. B. p. 92.)

a) Which occupies a place of a more general *genus* or concept. And just as a complete being is immediately distinguished into *material* and *immaterial,* or spiritual, so God is rightly considered to be an *immaterial* or *spiritual* being. Compare *John 4:24,* where it is expressly said *πνεύμα ό θεός, that God is Spirit.*

GERHARD: "When we call God *a spiritual essence* from Exod. 3:14, or *Spirit* from John 4:24, then the term essence or spirit *is not some universal νόημα* [concept] abstracted from individuals by the mind, common equally to God and angels; but signifies an infinite thing, one in number, truly existing, most simple, in common to the three persons of the Godhead, which is predicated *neither univocally nor analogically* of God and angels or other creatures, but *in a wholly singular way*, since the infinite and the finite essence, the uncreated and the created spirit, differ by more than a whole genus. From which principle the unity of God or of the divine essence is deduced." (Exeges. 1. II. § 95.)

LUTHER: "Who knows what is, that is called God? It is beyond body, beyond spirit, beyond everything that one can say, hear, and think." (*That these words*: "This is, etc." XX, 1005.)

b) For by this, just as God is *adequately* distinguished from all other things, so there is nothing that you can conceive of in God as a proper and determinate concept *before* you conceive of that which is *not from another,* and thus exists in itself and necessarily. But this is also what Scripture says of God*: "the First" (Isaiah 41:4, 44:6, 48:12).* For *to be the First* is not to acknowledge any prior being from which one depends, or from which

one has its being. What therefore is such a thing certainly subsists of itself. Compare *Exodus 3:14,* where God says, *"I am that I am";* and thus, just as He attributes to Himself a mode of existence that is entirely *peculiar*, so He indicates that He does *not* exist *from another*, *nor* in such a way that *He could not exist,* as other beings do; but *from* Himself, and in such a way that His nature and essence involve necessary existence.

## § 7.

Divine attributes [(a)] are divided into *negative* [(b)] and *positive*.[(c)] The former are: *Unity*, *simplicity, immutability, infinitude, immensity, eternity.* To the latter class belong: *Life*, *knowledge, wisdom, holiness, justice, truthfulness, power, goodness, perfection*.[(d)]

a) See their common description in note *b.* to § 5.

b) Obviously, they imply, either by the force of the *words* or by the force of the *meaning*, *a* certain *negation* or removal of some imperfection found in creatures.

c) Which are conceived with respect to the *perfections* we perceive in creatures, *and in the same manner* as they, though on a *more eminent* degree.

d) Of which we will treat in their proper order.

HOLLAZ: "There is a certain distinction between divine *perfections* and *properties.* Of course, *perfections* are those attributes which can indeed be shared with created and finite things to a certain degree, but which belong to God alone in every way and to the highest degree, such as: intellect, will, knowledge, wisdom, justice, power, blessedness. By *'properties*,' I mean those attributes which belong to God alone in the most absolute sense and in no way inhere in any created thing. Of these properties, some are *natural*, equally common to the three divine persons—namely, independence, absolute eternity, infinity, immensity, and immutability; others are *personal,* in that they are by which the persons either differ among themselves or are distinguished from one another, namely, the eternal generation and spiration, each either active or passive." (*Exam. th. F. I.* c. 1. q. 21. p. 234.)

QUENSTEDT: "There are two kinds of these attributes: some describe the divine essence absolutely and in itself, apart from relation to operation, and are called *immanent*, *ανενεργητα* or quiescent, which, i.e., are not ordered to any acts, such as immensity, eternity, spirituality, etc. Some describe the divine essence relatively, by reason *of ἐνέργεια*, or as *operative* and exerting itself outwardly, or as that which is known to be directed to certain operations, such as power, knowledge, justice, and mercy." (L. c. c. 8. s. 1. th. 4. f. 409.)

## § 8.

*Unity* is attributed to God, both *absolutely*, which signifies the indivisibility of God's essence;[(a)] and *exclusively,* by which we know God as the one [(b)] besides whom there is no other God.[(c)]

a) And this indeed *almost* coincides with the *simplicity* of God, which we shall treat of shortly. For although it is otherwise said that *every being* is *one*, so that one and many, like being and beings, are distinguished. Yet because we know that God is not only undivided, but also indivisible, we say that he is *one absolutely,* so that we may at the same time assert him to be simple.

QUENSTEDT: "Our discourse is of that *unity* of God which is drawn from the supernatural light alone and is made known to us by the revelation of the Holy Spirit. This very unity of the divine essence, however, can indeed be conceived by the human intellect, with the Trinity of persons abstracted and the plurality of gods excluded, but such a concept is not part of saving faith, which never conceives the unity of the divine essence affirmatively and positively apart from the communion of the divine essence that is between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Whoever, therefore, conceives the unity of the divine essence by the abstraction of the three persons, in this conception omits and ignores the true essence of God, which is nothing other than the one essence of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." (L. c. c. 8. s. 2. q. 4. f. 437. sq.)

THE SAME: "Others say that God *is one in number*, since a singular one is also one in number, not because it contains number, but because it excludes it." (L. c. f. 437.)

THE SAME: "Tertullian, l. I. c. Marcion., says: 'God, if He is not *one*, does not exist.' *Athanasius* prays, against idols: 'Ἀ *πολυθεότης ἐστὶν ἀθεότης,'* 'a multitude of gods is the nullity of gods.' To have many gods is the same as if you acknowledge none. Eph. 2:12. The apostle teaches that the Ephesians, before they had taken the name of Christ, were *'atheists* in the world,' however many myriads of gods they might have worshiped. Even the more sensible among the Gentiles, although very often, carried away by the popular way of speaking, called them *gods*, nevertheless acknowledged and confessed one God." (L. c. f. 439.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis: . . . of the Tritheists,* whose *leader* was John *Philoponus,* who was most learned in the subtleties of Aristotle, in Nicephorus, book XVIII, chapters 44 and 45, who posited three eternal spirits, different in essential number." (L. c. f. 438.)

b) For unity, indeed, implies the negation of the plurality of beings of the same nature or reason.

c) It is proven in part from those places of Scripture where God is expressly called one, e.g.*, Deut. 6:4: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one." 1 Cor. 8:4: "There is no God but one,"* cf. *Eph. 4:6; 1 Tim. 2:5;* partly from those sayings in which it is denied that there is any other God besides him, e.g. *Deut. 4:35: "Jehovah* himself is *God*, and there is *no* other God *besides him."* Cf. *Isa. 44:6.*

## § 9.

*Simplicity* is *absolutely* proper to God, by which God is free from *all* (a) *true* and *real* (b) composition.(c)

QUENSTEDT: "*Composition* is the union of several distinct things, constituting a third thing. This union must be of several things. For nothing composes itself, but several things placed together produce a third thing, a composite." (L. c. s. 2. q. 5. f. 441.)

a) Not only from the composition *of matter and form,* which itself argues God's spiritual being, and thus also from the composition *of integral parts;* but also from that by which something consists of *a subject and an accident,* likewise of *nature and subsistence*, which are *really* distinct.

b) For the composition of *reason,* e.g., when we conceive of God as just, wise, and good, etc., does not conflict with the simplicity of God, even the highest, and with God Himself.

QUENSTEDT: "Nor do we allow *that a logical composition*, which is from genus and difference, is to be attributed to God. . . If in God there is a composition from genus and difference, God will at least be a monadic species, so that although in reality, concretely, and in actual exercise, there is only one thing that participates in the nature of divinity, by the reason of the definition, which is based on the concept of genus and difference, it will be so constituted that multiplication into several is not repugnant to it. However, to want to think of such a multiplication of the divine essence is impious and absurd." (L. c. f. 443.)

THE SAME: "Nevertheless, by no means are those to be reproved who call him (Christ) *ὑφιστάμενον σύνθετον* [composite substance], not composed of several hypostases or natures *co-uniting into a third,* but of two natures *cohabiting* in one hypostasis most closely and *intimately*." (L. c. f. 448.)

GERHARD: "Does the *Trinity* of persons conflict with the simplicity of God? So it seems to the Photinians, from which they cry out that a threefold, three-personed, and composite God is introduced by us... We proceed thus: 1. The articles of faith are not to be opposed to one another. And the simplicity of the divine essence, and the Trinity of persons are proposed to us in the Word; both, therefore, are to be accepted by the obedience of faith. 2. We do not assert that the divine essence is really distinguished from the persons..., but we assert that the divine essence and the three persons of the Godhead are most truly and simply one, we assert 3. Personal properties do not multiply the divine essence nor are they composed with it, since the one and the same divine essence is in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; in the Father *ungenerated,* in the Son *generated,* in the Holy Spirit *proceeding.* ... 4. Therefore, when the Photinians press the point: "Where there are three truly and really distinct persons, there is not pure and supreme simplicity; but in the divine essence, according to our hypothesis, there are three truly and really distinct persons—there we limit the major: where there are three truly and really distinct persons, of which there is not one and indivisible essence, there is not pure and supreme simplicity." For indeed the three divine persons have one and the same undivided essence." (Exeg. 1. II. § 134.)

c) *Exodus* 14 is usually cited here; for there it is indicated that whatever is in God is God Himself. That, however, which Holy Scripture sometimes attributes to God—human *members* and other things that are found in creatures, especially in men, and which argue composition in them—is done by means of *a metaphor,* one which they call *ἀνθρωποπάθεια* [anthropopathy] or *συγκατάβασις* [condescension], and it must be expounded *θεοπρεπῶς* [in a manner befitting God].

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of the ancient *Anthropomorphites*, who ascribed corporeal members and integral parts to God. . . Likewise of the *Manichaeans*, who contended that the substance of God was diffused in fragments into all creatures. But this error rather deserves a place among deliriums than opinions." (L. c. f. 441.)

THOMASIUS: "Finally, we cannot help but raise one more objection from our concept of God against the idea of a

nature or *corporeality of God*. This thought, already expressed by Tertullian and frequently repeated by the mystics of all ages (Tertullian attributed body and form, corpus et forma, to God, which, however, is only the anthropomorphic expression for substantiality and personality, as Baur very aptly notes, p. 24), also resonates in much of modern *theosophy*; above all in Oetinger, whom one can call its founder. Starting from a just polemic against an idealism that dissolves all reality, this profound theosophist asserts the concept of *life,* the 'vita absoluta' [absolute life], citing Ezekiel 1 and 10, as the only adequate concept of God. It is not thought, nor being, that is primary in God, but life precedes them both. This life is movement, a kind of wheel-like, circular, self-generating movement, which Oetinger preferred to call 'intensum' [intensity]. . ., a living, self-developing, fulfilling, spiritual organism. But this life-movement, Oetinger now has it*, condenses* outwardly *into corporeality*, breaks forth into a higher naturalness, and thus vindicates for God a physical being, a *spirit-bodily nature,* in which He has His full reality; for the spiritual only attains concrete reality in the corporeal (!). And with this, Oetinger connects himself retroactively to *Jac. Böhme*, whose fundamental idea of a nature in God also underlies the system of *Fr. Bänder* and his students. But modern philosophy has also adopted the same idea in many ways. I find it in *Billroth,* in the younger *Fichte,* in Hanne, and most clearly in *Schwarz: Das Wesen der Religion*, page 185. Here it says: "The world-creating principle is not pure spirit, but the unity of spirit and nature." This Nature, however, is defined as "the real side of the divine essence, which is the eternal substratum from which the temporal world in the infinite plurality of its individual things emerges," as "the eternal, archetypal world in God, i.e., as the world as it is still held together into a unity by the pervading Spirit of God." Here, then, the thought is perfectly clear. And one sees at the same time the true reason for it. It is the total rejection of the scriptural doctrine of *creation out of nothing*. Because this cannot be understood (which is quite true), the world must proceed from the essence of God; it comes into being as God lets nature go forth from Himself, as it unfolds in space and time by His will, but as such is also continually permeated and united by His Spirit. pp. 187, 193. And herein lies for us the reason why we must decisively reject this theory; it makes creation an *emanation* from God, it posits the substance of the world as essentially one with the substance of God, placing the difference between the two solely in the form of existence." (*The Person and Work of Christ*. I. p. 36. sq.)

## § 10.

*The immutability* of God consists in this, that God is subject to no change, neither according to *being* (a) nor according to *accidents,* (b) nor according to *place,*(c) nor according to *will* or purpose.(d) (e)

Quenstedt: "The immutability of God is the perpetual identity of the divine essence and all its perfections, negating all motion whatsoever, both physical and ethical." (L. c. s. 1. th. 20. f. 414.)

a) In this respect God is *immortal* or *incorruptible.* See *Romans 1:23,* where He is called *ἄφθαρτος* [*incorruptible*]*; 1 Timothy 1:17,* where *βασιλεὺς ἄφθαρτος* [*incorruptible king*]*; 1 Timothy 6:16,* where *he alone* is said to have *immortality (ἀθανασίαν)*.

b) So in *James 1:17* it is said that with God there is no *παραλλαγὴν ἢ τροπῆς ἀποσκίασμα, transmutation or shadow of vicissitude,* such as is found in men, who undergo changes of accidental perfections and imperfections of various kinds.

c) See *Jer. 23:24*: *"Do I not fill heaven and earth?" says the Lord.* But He who fills all things does not change place, nor can He change.

d) See *Num. 23:19: God is not a man, that He should lie, nor the son of man, that He should repent. Has He spoken*, *and will He not do it?* (that He should not want what He has hitherto willed) *or has He spoken and will He not fulfill it?* And *Proverbs 19:21: The will of the Lord shall stand.* And *Malachi 3:6: "I, the Lord, do not change;* but I have sworn and will fulfill what I have decreed and promised; I will not change my will."

e) That*, however,* in the Scriptures *repentance,* and every *local motion,* descent or ascent, is sometimes attributed to God, is said *anthropopathically*. Compare *Mus., Disp. de Vol. Dei Antec. et Conseq*. § 5. 6. p. m. 691, 692. Similarly, *affections* are attributed to God; *those*, indeed, which in their *formal* concept involve *imperfection*, are so only *metaphorically; the others*, however, which *do not* formally involve *imperfection*, truly do pertain to God in their formal concept, but *apart from the change* which they materially involve.

GERHARD: "Did the work of *creation* make God mutable? It is denied. . . In creation, two things are to be considered: 1. the principle of action, 2. the effect produced. The principle of action is the very essence of God, to which no change was added by creation, because by a new act of will God willed something in creation that He had previously willed from all eternity, but in time He did that which He had decreed from all eternity by His immutable will. In the effect produced there is a change from non-being to being, but this did not make God Himself mutable. The same judgment applies to the question: Did the work of the *Incarnation* make God mutable? Socinus affirms in the *Defensio Animadversionum Posnaniensium* (p. 66): "Who will be able to deny, if God was then truly incarnate and made man, when Christ Jesus was conceived by the Holy Spirit in the womb of the virgin Mary and was born from her, that something adventitious and new, and of the greatest importance, happened to God himself and his substance?" Yet the same *ὑπόστασις* [hypostasis] of the Word remained*,* although another nature began to be a *ὑπόστασις* [hypostasis] of it." (Exeges. 1. II. § 154.)

## § 11.

*Infinity* of essence [(a)] belongs to God, insofar as the essence of God is contained within *no limits*.[(b)]

a) For otherwise infinity is not a peculiar attribute of God, but extends to various positive attributes, as when it is said that God's knowledge, goodness, and power are infinite, etc.

GERHARD: "Two quasi-*species* of infinity are established: Eternity and immensity." (L. c. § 171.)

b) This is proven from *Psalm 145:3: "Great is the Lord and most worthy of praise; His greatness no one* can fathom." For this refers not to the greatness of mass, or quantity, which does not apply to God, but to the greatness of essence.

GERHARD: *"(God) is infinite inferiorly,* because all things are smaller and inferior to God, and therefore are at an infinite distance from Him. He is infinite *superiorly,* because He received His being from no one and acknowledges nothing as superior. He is infinite *anteriorly,* because He is not from an efficient cause; nothing was formed before Him, Isa. 43:10. He is infinite *after,* because nothing will be formed after Him. He is infinite *outside,* because nothing outside of him is superior to him. He is infinite *inside,* because he is his own being, subsisting from Himself and by Himself." (L. c. § 169.)

THE SAME: "It is understood that 1. *it is* not an *infinity* of corporeal *quantity* or *extension,* but of essence and perfection; 2. it is not a *privative* infinity, but *a negative one.* The non-finite is *privatively* that which has not yet attained its ultimate perfection, like a fetus in the womb. The infinite, *in a negative sense*, is that which so lacks a term and limitation that it neither ought nor can be terminated and limited. *Thus*, the infinite is said to be infinite *in a privative sense* when, although it does not currently have an end, it can have one, as with quantity; *in a negative sense,* when it simply does not have an end. 3. Although the etymon of 'infinite' refers only to the end, it is nevertheless understood to mean a 'term from which' (*terminus a quo*), so that God may be infinite and called such, because He has neither beginning nor end. 4. To philosophers, the infinite is threefold: according to substance, according to quantity (that is, continuous and discrete), and according to quality. In created things there is no actual infinity, neither in substance—for every created substance is composite—nor in quantity, nor in quality, because an infinite quantity or quality cannot exist in a finite substance. God alone is infinite, not indeed in quantity or quality, but in substance." (L. c. § 162.)

## § 12.

*The immensity* of God consists in the fact that the divine essence cannot be measured or contained by any limits of place.[(a)] [(b)]

a) Rather, apart from other things, God, by His very substance, is *omnipresent*, so that He is not confined to any place, yet He is present with all creatures, without any extension of Himself, and nevertheless at no distance, just as omnipresence, as a positive attribute, is commonly joined with immensity. However, the immensity (and omnipresence) of God is proven from *Jer. 23:24.* For He who *fills heaven and earth is present* in heaven and on earth, though not *circumscriptively* here or there. Hence *Augustine,* in interpreting the prophetic phrase, says that God fills heaven and earth *with His presence, not His absence,* Book VIII. *On the City of God*, ch. XXX, p. m. 694., and this reading is vindicated by *F. L. Coquaeus* in his Notes, *who* also cites a passage from *Hilary* from Book V on the Trinity: "*There is no place without God."* Similarly: He who *fills heaven and earth* with *His presence, not His absence,* as *in 1 Kings 8:27*, is rightly said to be immeasurable by any spatial boundaries, since the highest heaven is described as such that nothing is said to be created beyond it; at the same time, it is rightly said that He is present with the heaven and all that it contains, and absent from nowhere.

GERHARD: "*The immensity* and essential *omnipresence* of God is to be understood thus: 1. That God is present to all things not only in power and efficacy, nor only in vision and knowledge, but also *with* his whole and individual *essence*; for he is immense and infinite not only in power and knowledge, but also in essence. Enter, present God is here and everywhere powerfully. . . 2. That God is everywhere present *not συνεκτῶς* [as being contained], so as to be comprehended, *but συνεκτικῶς* [as containing], so as to comprehend and contain all things, *not περιεκτῶς* [as encompassed] and *περιγραπτῶς* [as circumscribed], *but περιεκτικῶς* [as encompassing]. The Scholastics say that God is everywhere . . ., *and not* in the same way that intelligible forms, namely angels and souls, are in a place or rather in a definite *whereabouts,* because they are defined by the unity of their essence; *but in a filling way,* which is not to be understood in a crude and corporeal manner, as if God were to fill all places just as a body fills its place, preventing another body from being located in the space it occupies, but in a *divine way*, that God, not confined to any place, contains all places because of the immensity of His essence. 3. That God is present everywhere is *not* by *a multiplication* of His essence, for He is *ὅλως ὅλον τι* [wholly something whole], the simplest being, and therefore, wherever He is, He is whole; nor by *a division* of His essence, for He is not half of the world in one half, but everywhere whole; nor through *extension* and *rarification,* for he is not some corporeal mass, but infinite essence, incomprehensible power, and ineffable efficacy; nor through *mixture,* for He is the simplest and indivisible essence, entering into the composition of no thing. 4. For God is present everywhere with His essence*, not subjectively*, as an accident inheres to a subject, because God is neither composite nor can He be composed, and just as time is excluded by the notion of eternity, so place is excluded by the notion of immensity, as if it were occupying a subject*; but effectively*, as a principle and cause is present to the thing it effects; For God is not contained in place, but rather He gives being to place and to the things that are in place. It is a presence *α. illocal, β. impartible, γ. incomprehensible* to our reason*, δ. efficacious* and operative, ε. *containing all things in itself like the smallest point.*" (Exeg. 1. II. § 172.)

THE SAME: "Is it rightly said that God really exists *outside the world in an imaginary space?* . . . In short, God, as He was *before* the world was created, so today He is *outside* the created world *in Himself;* He Himself is to Himself both world and place and all things, as Tertullian says adv. Praxeam c. 5.:

‚Say, where would He then be, when besides Him there was nothing:
Then, where now, *in Himself,* since He is sufficient to Himself.' Dionys. Carthus." (L. c. § 186.)

QUENSTEDT: "When as yet nothing existed, extra-mundane presence, and therefore *omnipresence*, did *not* exist; yet the power to be present everywhere without a place was there from all eternity. *Thus immensity differs from omnipresence;* . . . *the former* is eternal, *the latter* by no means so, but began with the creatures. For when God willed creatures *to exist, He* also willed them *to be present to Himself,* not by a certain addition to the perfection of God, but by the excitation of a non-existent thing." (L. c. c. 8. s. 1. th. 18. sq. f. 414.)

CALOV: "It should be noted that these *degrees* so *succeed* and follow *one another* that the later ones always presuppose and require the prior ones, but not vice versa. Thus *the presence of grace* presupposes divine *omnipresence;* the presence of *glory* in a certain way includes or prerequires the presence of *grace*; and finally, the presence of the *hypostatic union* supposes and prerequires in its own way the presence of *glory,* as well as the presence of *grace,* and indeed the *universal* presence or power, that is, omnipresence." (*System*. Tom. II. p. 613.)

LUTHER: "The proud, arrogant spirit flatters itself that when it merely says outright, such and such does not fit, this or that would follow from it, therefore it must be so and need not prove it. Thirdly, he thereby reveals his crude, foolish thoughts, since he

thinks of God's essence in all places in no other way than as if God were a great, vast being who fills the world and extends everywhere. Just as if a straw sack were stuffed full of straw and yet stuck out at the top and bottom, precisely according to the first bodily, comprehensible manner. Then of course Christ's body would be nothing but a pure poem and a ghost, like a larger straw sack, with God inside along with heaven and earth; would that not be speaking and thinking of God in a gross enough manner? But we do not speak in this way, but say that God is not such a stretched-out, long, wide, thick, high, deep being, but a supernatural, unfathomable being, who is at once in every single grain completely, and yet in all, over all, and outside all creatures; therefore there is no need for any fencing here, as the Spirit dreams. For a body is far, far too wide for the Godhead, and many thousands of Godheads could be inside it. Conversely, it is also far too narrow, so that not a single Godhead can be inside. Nothing is so small, God is even smaller; nothing is so great, God is even greater; nothing is so short, God is even shorter; nothing so long, God is even longer; nothing is so wide, God is even wider; nothing is so narrow, God is even narrower, and so on, it is an unspeakable being above and beyond all that one can name or think of." (*Confession of the Supper*. 1528. XX, 1202. sq. cf. The treatise, *That These Words: This is My Body, Still Stand Firm*. 1527. L. c. p. 1000—1009.)

THE SAME: "Yet you do not handle this example rightly and, as a useless dispute before the multitude, you condemn the statement that God is in a cave or a sewer; for you think about God too much in a human way. I confess, indeed, that there are some frivolous preachers who, with no religion or piety, but either for the lust of glory, or for the sake of some novelty, or out of impatience with silence, chatter and trifle most lightly: but these please neither God nor men, even if they assert that God is in heaven of heavens. But where there are grave and pious preachers, who teach with modest, pure, and sound words, they speak such things before the multitude without danger, and indeed with great fruit. Should we not all teach that the Son of God was in the virgin's womb and was born from a womb? For how far does a human womb differ from any other unclean place? And who could not define him in a foul and shameful way? But we rightly condemn those who do so, when pure words are available with which we express that necessity even with decency and grace. Likewise, the body of Christ Himself was human, just like ours; what is fouler than that? Shall we therefore not say that God dwelt bodily in it, as Paul said? What is more foul than death? What is more horrible than hell? Yet the prophet boasts that God is with Him in death and in hell. Therefore, a pious mind does not shudder to hear that God is in death, or in hell, either of which is more horrible and foul than a cave or a sewer. Rather, since Scripture testifies that God is everywhere and fills all things, it not only says that He is in those places, but one will necessarily learn and know that He is there: unless, perhaps, if I were captured by a tyrant and thrown into prison or a sewer, as happens to many saints, it would not be permitted to me, to invoke God there, or to believe that He is present with me, until I come to some ornate temple. If you have taught us to trifle about God in this way, and have offended the places of His essence, and will not finally permit Him to dwell with us in heaven; for neither the heavens of heavens can contain Him, nor are they worthy." (*De servo arb. c. Erasm*. 1525. See Dr. M. Luther's Latin Works, Various Writings, ed. Schmidt, Frankfurt, Vol. VII, p. 141 ff. cf. Hal. Vol. XVIII, 2095 ff.)

ANTITHESIS.

GERHARD: "(They err in this place:) 4. The *Calvinists*, when certain of them deny that God is present to all creatures in His *essence*. Crocius, P. II. conv. Prutenicae, p. 497. . . b. While they maintain that the *right hand of God,* to which Christ was exalted in his ascension, is a *certain place in the heavens*. . . c. They define the omnipresence of God by *mere non-distantness* without operation." (L. c. § 179.)

b) That, however, God is sometimes said to *draw* near to men and to *withdraw* from them is not to be understood as if He, according to His essence, were to begin or cease to be contained in a certain place, but rather as a statement made by *anthropopathy*; just as we spoke of His immutability in § 10, note. *e.* For although the Scriptures teach a certain *special indwelling* and *nearness* of God in the saints, and although this presupposes God's immediate presence with respect to His substance (or *ἀδιάστασιν)*, it nevertheless formally signifies *a* certain *mode* of *modified* presence, or such a one, by which God is said to be present, where He manifests Himself as present through certain operations, namely, that He presently confers and increases superior spiritual gifts on *regenerate* men, or otherwise gives signs of His providence; when He is said to draw near to the *ungodly*, He declares His wrath, etc. It is the *coming* of God *to believers, by which an exhibition of grace and beneficence is noted, Exod. 20:24.. John 14:23. There is also the coming of God to judge and punish, Isaiah 3:13-14.:* these are the words of *Glassius* in Philol. S. L. V. Tr. I. Cap. VII. p. 143. (1149.) Behold, the coming of God to believers in the right sense is the very display of grace and beneficence! an operation, I say, gracious and beneficent, and on the contrary, with respect to the wicked, an operation of wrath and vindictive justice. That, however, besides the special operation of God (who by the power of His immensity is already intimately present to all) in the believers, it also brings a *special approximation* of His very essence to the substance of the believers, has not yet been shown clearly enough. For the letter of the phrase in Scripture, e.g*., "we will come to him,"* etc., cannot be pressed, since its rigid interpretation, as if it were a word or phrase properly pertaining to *local motion*, does not apply to God, and, by the force of the opposition between *near* and *far,* if the approximation is referred to the very essence or substance of God, it would signify some *distance* of the divine essence from the human essence that preceded it (that is, that God was absent before He came), and *for* that reason, it would be necessary to deny the immensity of the divine essence. For if it is said that, by denying a certain mode of presence, not all presence is immediately denied, much less is a distance between the divine and human substances presupposed; it must nevertheless be said at the same time that the divine essence, apart from that new approximation of itself (or before that new advent), according to its substance, was not present in a certain way (though not simply, yet in a certain way, distinct from its operation). and thus a certain distance will be given or presupposed between the divine and human substances, in a certain way distinct from operation. When, however, we remember that the omnipresence of God according to substance is so founded on the immensity of the divine essence, that with this posited, and the simultaneous existence of things distinct from God, or created, by which God is said to be present, it cannot but be the case that an omnipresence of that kind is posited, by which the whole divine essence is intimately, *intimately*, I say — present to all things: indeed, we will not only necessarily acknowledge some kind of presence, but a presence of such a kind that it does not admit of more or less, insofar as it is considered as presence, apart from operation. Therefore, although God's presence, insofar as it imports God's efficacious operation outside of Himself in creatures, does admit of degrees, and thus of more and less; yet the divine essence or substance is such that, if you consider its presence apart from its specific operation (and not the operation itself), it does not imply a new kind of approximation to the

human being (to whom God is present and in whom or around whom He operates), but rather excludes it; since it is the most intimate, more interior, stricter, or nearer approach that can be given or conceived. And this is what many of our own (especially *Gerhard,* Disp. Isag. LL. Disp. IV. L. V. § ult. p. 106.) *regarding* the omnipresence of God*,* considered in relation to creatures, say that it is an *efficacious operation joined with presence,* which (*operation*) in turn admits of various *degrees*, not the presence of substance to substance, which would be something other than, and more or less proximate. In the passages of Scripture, however, where the coming of God to men is indicated, they say it is *ἀνθρωποπάθεια,* a kind of *metaphor*, taken from *man* or *human things* to *God* or *divine things,* by means of a certain similarity, which they also call *συγκατάβασιν*, i.e.*, condescension, because in the sacred speech Jehovah as it were descends to us and expresses his heavenly mysteries in human words*. See *Glassius* 1. c. pp. 98, 99 (1116). To brand this *ἀνθρωποπάθεια* and *συγκατάβasis*, however, as a *misuse of language*, and by this name to render suspect or odious the doctrine and interpretation of the passages of Scripture, founded on the *αναλογια* [analogy] of faith, partly because the usage of speech and definitions is not permitted in the schools of rhetoric, partly because the laws of truth and charity forbid it. Certainly, the ancient doctors of our church described the different degrees of God's presence *not* through *different approximations of the divine essence to the essences of creatures, but through the diverse operations* of God, through the immensity of His essence, ever and everywhere present to all. You will search in vain for that other opinion among the commentators on Christ's *saying in John 14:23: "I will come to him* (I and the Father to the one who loves me) *and make my home with him*" (which, however, others think is the *proper seat* of this doctrine): *Casp. Cruciger* the elder, *Johannes Brenz, L. Osiander, Aeg. Hunnius.* We also know, however, that *Nic. Selneccer*, when answering the question: *'Is the Holy Spirit given to those who already have the Holy Spirit?'* replied: *'it is given with respect to the increase of holy impulses and gifts,* P. I. Exam. p. 212. On the approximation of the essence, *he says nothing at all.* Likewise*, John Wigand,* when he published his methodical consideration on the ubiquity or omnipresence of God, printed at Jena in 1591, proposing a doctrine of ubiquity in the church and of indwelling in the regenerate, offers nothing on the approximation of the divine substance. *E. Hunnius*, however, in his *Quaestiones et Responsa de S. Trinitate*, Vol. I, p. 121, expressly teaches and admonishes that it must be *held that the presence of essence* (by which the Holy Spirit *is present even to the ungodly*) *is one thing*, and *another His gracious indwelling; while the latter undoubtedly presupposes the former.* He had previously said that the Holy Spirit is said *to be sent ἀνθρωποπαθῶς [in a human-affective manner], just as God Himself is said to descend through ἀνθρωποπάθεια,* that is, insofar as *He, who because of the invisibility of His essence was previously thought to be absent, now by a new kind of work manifests His presence and in a manner makes it visible.* Cf. his Comm. on Chap. VI of John, T. IV, Op. fol. 759. Similarly *Balduin,* in declaring the mystical union of God and holy men, refers to Chap. VI of the former to the Corinthians, p. 17. P. H. Observ. 9. p. m. 358a. states that *it consists in the mutual adherence of God and man*. However*,* in further explaining this, he says that *God adheres to us through the communication of His grace, and we adhere to Him through the confidence of the heart, which apprehends the grace of God.* Nothing is said of a closer conjunction of the substances. On the contrary,

when treating of the loss of the Holy Spirit, which occurs through sins against conscience, Comm. in Epist. ad Ephes. chap. IV. P. II. Q. V. p. m. 922., teaches nothing concerning the loss of the nearer presence of the Holy Spirit with regard to its substance; rather, he says, the *Holy Spirit is lost, not as if his substance departs from man* (either simply or in part), *for it fills the whole world, Wis. 1:7; but because it withdraws its grace from man, depriving him of consolation and help. Gesner* also, in Disp. V. pro libro Conc. Cap. VIII. § 11, distinguishes the *presence of grace* from the presence of *universal conversation* (which others call presence). He says that its *access* is *by the word;* he says that it is effected *by the act of indwelling, by which God makes a dwelling in the faithful*, *so that the children of God may be moved by the Spirit of God, and be temples of God*, etc., p. m. 138. Thus also our *Gerhard*, in Volume I of the Loci, (which he published in 1610) in explaining the various degrees of divine presence, not only did he not present the diversity of the approximation of the divine essence, but rather expressly taught that those different degrees *differ only in their effects,* or *that the distinction of the manifold presence consists solely in the diversity of effects*, § 219. Indeed, even after *Gerhard* had published his *Exegesis* fifteen years later, and in the meantime that opinion concerning the approximation of the divine essence to the substance of man had begun to appeal to and become known to *some*; he himself was nevertheless found not to subscribe to it, but, having presented the arguments on *both sides*, *to have suspended* his *judgment*. But in the Harmonia Evangelica, P. III. Cap. CLXXVI. p. 598, to the words of *John 1:23*, he writes that the *advent of the Father and the Son* (to the faithful) takes place *by a demonstration of special effects, and that Christ speaks through a certain συγκατάβασις* [condescension]. To this he adds the words of *Augustine, Fulgentius*, and *Bernhard*. This was done in the year 1627. Indeed, even in his Commentary on Deuteronomy (to which he was devoted), on Chapter 4, verse 7, he says: "*By the drawing near* of God," he says*, "is understood grace and favor, a gracious presence, benevolent hearing, deliverance from dangers and adversities,* etc.," p. 174. cf. p. 178, nos. 5 and 6. And so also his colleagues and successors, persisting in the simplicity of doctrine, refrained from embracing the other opinion. Cf. *Musaeus*, *Ausführl. Erklärung*, Q. 74, p. 610 ff.

> QUENSTEDT: "The gracious divine presence, although it presupposes the general divine proximity by which God fills heaven and earth, nevertheless includes in itself also *a special proximity of God,* truly distinct from that general one, which entails *not only the operation* of grace, but also a peculiar *approximation* of the divine essence to the substance of the faithful man. It is therefore *false* that the proximity according to substance is the *same* with respect to the pious and the impious, differing only in that in the saints the proximity of God according to substance is joined *with a gracious operation,* whereas in the impious it is joined only *with a general operation*, consisting in the conservation of things in their being and their governance. (L. C. P. III. c. 10. s. 2. f. 902.)

> LUTHER: "Let us also omit another question, what God did before the beginning of the world, whether He rested or not? To which Augustine reports that a certain one answered in this way in his confession: that God prepared hell for those who inquire curiously, namely, to evade, as Augustine says, the violence of the question. Therefore, Augustine's modesty is pleasing, who indeed frankly says that he lowers the sails of his own mind in such questions, because even if we were to speculate and dispute endlessly, these things nevertheless remain incomprehensible. For if we do not even clearly understand those things which we see and experience, how much less will we comprehend these?

> For what do you suppose existed outside of time, and before time? Or, what do you think God did before there was any time? Therefore, let us cast aside these things, and feel that God, before the creation of the world, was incomprehensible in His essential quiet; but now, after creation, He is within, without, and above all creatures, that is, He is also incomprehensible. Nothing else can be said, because our intellect does not understand what it is to be outside of time. Therefore God also does not manifest Himself except in works and word, because these are in some way grasped; the rest, which are proper to the divinity, cannot be grasped or understood, such as being outside of time before the world, etc. . . For this nature is so deformed by sin, indeed corrupt and lost, that it cannot know or comprehend God naked, or what He is like. Therefore these veils are necessary. And it is madness to dispute much about God outside and before time, because that is to want to comprehend the 'naked' divinity, or the naked divine essence. Since this is impossible, God therefore veils Himself in works, and in certain species, just as today He veils Himself in Baptism, in absolution, etc. If you depart from these, then you go beyond measure, place, and time, and into the most proper nothing, of which, according to the philosopher, there can be no knowledge." (On Gen. 1:2. Vid. Exeget. opp. lat. Cur. Elsperger. Erlangae. Tom. I. p. 15—17.)

## § 13.

God's *eternity*, taken absolutely,(a) signifies the permanent existence or duration of God, without beginning or end (b) and without any succession (c) or change.(d)

a) For it is not here taken for *a long period of time, nor* for a duration that acknowledges a beginning but *lacks only an end,* but in the *strictest* sense*;* which *Boethius* defined as *the entire and perfect possession of an interminable life, all at once.*

b) For it thus implies *the negation of terms*, that is, an *interminable* life.

c) For this reason it is called *the possession of the whole of life at once,* i.e., devoid of parts succeeding one another; so that the prior and the posterior, the past and the future, and thus the beginning, are excluded not only with respect to simple being but also with respect to motion and operation, so that it is rather a uniform duration.

d) The eternity of God is proven from *Psalm 102:28,* where in contrast to *heaven* and *earth,* which though long-lasting, exist with a beginning and an end, God is said *to endure,* as though free from all decay, fall, or ruin; it is said that *He Himself is* (always) *the same,* without any alteration or change. Cf. *Ps. 90:2,* where God is said to be *from everlasting to everlasting;* so that no term, neither beginning nor end, can be assigned to God (v. 4), *since a thousand years are with* the Lord *as a day already past,* to indicate that there are no 'intervals of time' with God, before whom the times of all ages are like a single *indivisible present*, as *Aeg. Hunnius* interprets T. I. Op. fol. 85., *Gen. 21:33 and Isa. 40:28,* where אל עולם, *God of the age,* is also called the King of ages in *1 Tim. 1:17,* where *Βασιλεὺς τῶν αἰώνων, King of the ages*, is said; namely, superior in all time,

coexisting with all ages indeed, yet not measurable by ages or time. Finally*, in Rev. 1:4 and 8,* ch. *11:17, and 16:5: Who* is, *who was, who is to come.* For although by these words the duration of God seems to be described through the distinctions of time; if you attend correctly, this is what is taught: *that* God *exists* in such a way that before He is conceived by us as existing, *He* already *existed* and can be conceived to have existed *for an infinite time,* and that He can also be conceived *to exist* or *to exist in the future* for an infinite time.

ANTHITHESIS.

GERHARD: "These are to be opposed... 5. *To the Photinians,* who also undermine the eternity of God: a. by denying, with Vorstius, that there is a description of eternity properly and absolutely so called, because God is said to have been *before the world* was created . . ., with the aim that the argument, which is drawn for the true divinity of Christ from Prov. 8 and by establishing *the succession* and differences *of time* in eternity." (*Exeges*. 1. II. § 144.)

## § 14.

*Life* [(a)] of God, considered in *the first act*,[(b)] signifies the very essence or nature of God, insofar as it moves itself in a certain way, or can be conceived as the principle of vital or immanent operation; in *the second act*, it denotes the very immanent operation,[(c)] proceeding from the divine nature.

GERHARD: "*The life* of God is the act by which the divine essence demonstrates that it is actual; and in three ways, as the scholastics teach, the divine essence shows that it is actual: *by intellect, by will*, and by *the power* to act; these three therefore pertain to the life of God: intellect, will, and the power to act." (L. c. § 160.)

J. A. OSIANDER: "The knowledge of God . . . is not a *habit,* added to the divine essence, like human wisdom, but is the very essence of God." (*Colleg. theol*. I, 290.)

a) God is called *living, Gen. 16:14; Josh. 3:10; Ps. 42:3; 84:3; Isa. 37:4; Acts 14:15.* He is said *to have life in Himself, John 5:26; to swear by* His own *life*, *Deuteronomy 32:40; Ezekiel 33:11.* And men swear *by the living God, 1 Kings 17:1.*

J. AD. OSIANDER: "The knowledge of God is called . . . one *general*, by which he knows all things and the causes of things, universals and particulars, good and evil; another *special,* by which he knows his elect." (L. c. p. 290.)

b) For life is also taken in a *twofold* sense, since in the *first act* it signifies the *nature* of each thing, *which in a manner moves itself,* whereas in *the second act* it signifies *the* very *motion* or *immanent operation* proceeding from such a nature, which is either *material,* namely vegetative or sensitive, or *immaterial,* rational or intellectual. In *God,* however, and in the thing itself*, life in the first* and *second acts* are plainly *identical,* since God's very *being* is His *life*.

c) And this, since it must be most perfect, is necessarily immaterial and indeed *intellectual*. Hence, we must now proceed to treat of the intellect and will of God.

# § 15.

The *knowledge* [a] of God consists in this, that God *knows Himself* and *other things* distinct from Himself, which *are*, and which *can be*,[b] *all* [c] according *to* their *own being,*[d] which each has in itself outside of God, *in one* single *act*,[e] *immediately by Himself*, without an intelligible species [f] or discourse,[g] knows; indeed, He understands exactly not only those things which truly exist or will exist, *whether* by necessity of nature *or* contingently through the free determination of human will,[h] but also those things which *would have been* future if a certain *condition* were fulfilled, which however are not actually future because the condition is not fulfilled.[i]

a) Or His *intelligence*, which, whether taken for the *power* to understand, or for the *act* or actual knowledge, is *in reality the same* and most simply one with the divine *essence*, since no accident falls upon God, according to § 9 and note *a.*

b) Hence, God's knowledge is distinguished into *natural* and *free;* namely, that the former is natural and necessary to God, insofar as God eternally and *antecedently* to every decree of free will knows *Himself* to be necessarily existent, and all *other things as possible, as such* (by which latter reason it is also called the knowledge of *simple intelligence*); *this*, however, pertains to God *consequentially* to the free decree concerning things to be produced at some time, and in this way God knows from eternity all things as if they were to be future after His free decree, and what each one and all will do with the divine concurrence (by which reason this is called the knowledge of *vision*, because through it God knows things according to their own proper existence, as if *beholding them face to face).*

> GERHARD: "The knowledge of God *is distinguished*... into theoretical and practical. *Theoretical* is that by which God knows all things simply and absolutely. *Practical* is that by which God knows certain things in such a way that He also works the same. It is also called the knowledge *of approbation* and *approbative knowledge. The former* extends to *all things*, *the latter* only to *good things. The former* is distinct from the will; *the latter* is joined *with* the will. *The former* acts in itself, *the latter* acts in another. *The former* is not the cause of things, but *the latter* truly is the cause of things. An example of the *former* is given in a physician who foresees that a patient will die the next day; of the *latter*, in a robber who foresees that he will be killed the day after he himself inflicts violence upon another." (L. c. § 244.)

c) Hence He is called *omniscient*, and this is proven from *1 Sam. 2:3,* where God is called the *Lord of knowledge*, that is, possessing all knowledge. Similarly in *1 John 3:20,* where it is stated explicitly: *God knows all things.* In particular, note is also to be taken of the passages where God is said to know

the secret *thoughts of* any *human being,* which no one else knows or can know: *1 Kings 8:39; Psalm 7:10; 34:15; 139:1 ff.; Proverbs 15:3.*

d) For He *not only* knows created things insofar as they eminently have their being *in Him* (God), but also in such a way that God's intellect is terminated on the *being* that they have *in* themselves.

e) For just as the potentiality and the act of understanding in God, with respect to the thing understood, do not differ from the divine essence, so the acts of understanding are not multiplied in reality with regard to the diversity or number of their objects.

f) *Intelligible species*, wherever they have a place, stand in for the objects and are really distinct from the intellect, and together with it constitute a complete principle of understanding. In God, however, where there are no actually produced acts of the intellect, the divine intellect itself represents the object in the manner of an expressed species.

g) For although the word "*knowledge*" elsewhere implies the *knowledge of a thing through its cause,* and thus *a progression* from *the cause*, as the more known, to *the effect,* as the less known, since however God, to whom nothing is unknown, does not progress from the known to the unknown, therefore neither can knowledge through demonstration or discourse be properly attributed to God.

h) And these are indeed known immediately in themselves, as having a truth determined in them (for the contradictory opposites, for example*, "Adam will sin" and "Adam will not sin,"* must have one be true and the other false), and therefore truly knowable. That God, however, knows such contingent future events, which by reason of their very existence depend on a free, or indifferent, cause to act or not to act (namely, on the free will of the created will), this *foreknowledge* of God is called by a special name: are proven*, partly* by the many divine *predictions* of future events among men, and *partly* because God distinguishes Himself from false gods by this very *characteristic*. See *Isa. 41:22-23, 42:9, 43:12.*

J. A. OSIANDER: *"Predestination* is said not with respect *to God*, but with respect *to things.* For just as *post-knowledge* has no place in God*,* even if He knows the past, so, to speak accurately, *praescientia* (foreknowledge) cannot be attributed to God with respect to the knowledge of future things in time. For all things are present to God, not indeed *actually,* by existence, but *objectively*, through the perspicuity and breadth of the divine intellect." (L. c. p. 290.)

GERHARD: "That *foreknowledge* is attributed to God is done with respect to us; for to Him all things are present, which to us are still future, and with respect to things which happen in time, since they are known to God from eternity." (L. c. § 243.)

LUTHER: "Here in the world, there is a measure, that time goes in succession, the Son after the Father, and so on. For example, if a piece of wood lies far from you, or you look at it lengthwise, you cannot see it all; but if it lies close to you, or you stand on it and *can look at it across its width,* then you have it all in your sight. Thus we on earth cannot grasp this life; for it always goes on in succession, step by step, until the Last Day, but *for God everything stands in a single moment.* For to him a thousand years are as one day, Ps. 90:2; 2 Pet. 3. Thus the first man is as near to Him as the one who is to be born last, and He sees them all at once: just as the human eye can bring two things, even if they are far apart, together in an instant." (Ad 1 Pet. 3:19. Zweite Auslegung des 1. Br. St. Petri. Tom. Hal. IX, 788. sq.)

GERHARD: "In order to explain in some way the reason why the certainty and *immutability of divine foreknowledge does not remove the contingency of things and the freedom of the human will,* it must be distinguished between *the necessity of the consequent* (which they otherwise call absolute, preceding, simple), which arises from the necessary connection of the cause with the effect and the intrinsic connection of the terms; and the *necessity of consequence* (which they call hypothetical, following, accompanying, conditional, or from supposition), which arises from the act of existence from the very positing of the effect, because everything that is, by the very fact that it is, is necessary to be. By this *latter* species of necessity, things that come to be from contingently and freely acting causes are necessary with respect to divine foreknowledge, and this necessity does not take away freedom, but rather presupposes it." (L. c. § 255.)

LUTHER: "I would certainly have preferred that a better term be used in this discussion than this customary one, Necessity, which is not correctly spoken of, with respect to either divine or human will. For it has a most disagreeable and incongruous meaning for this place, suggesting a kind of compulsion, and altogether that which is contrary to the will, to the mind, when, however, the cause in question does not mean this. For a will, whether divine or human, by no compulsion, but by mere inclination or a desire, does what it does as if it were truly free, whether good or evil: yet the will of God is unchangeable and infallible, which governs our changeable will, as Boethius sings: "Stable and remaining, you cause all things to move;" and our will, especially the evil one, cannot by itself do good. Therefore, what the voice does not express, let the reader's intellect supply the necessity of, understanding what you would have said: the immutable will of God and the impotence of our evil will, as some have called it, the necessity of immutability, which is neither sufficiently grammatical nor theological." (*De servo arbitrio*. See Opp. lat. var. argum. Cur. Schmidt. Francof. 1873. Vol. VII. p. 134. sq.)

i) Hence it is called the knowledge *of* the conditional *future*, that is, one in which the *condition* has *a connection* with *the effect* or future thing, but only a *contingent one.* Otherwise*,* it is called *middle* knowledge*,* namely because its *object* lies *between things* considered under the precise notion *of possibility* and *things absolutely* future. However, it is proven that it belongs to God to have knowledge of conditional futures from *Matthew 11:21,* where Christ testifies as the *God-man,* He knew that the citizens of *Tyre* and *Sidon would have repented in sackcloth and ashes,* had a certain condition been met, namely, if *miracles* like those which occurred in their time in the cities of *Chorazin* and *Bethsaida* had been performed *before them*; yet, since that condition was not fulfilled, they did not truly repent. Add *1 Sam. 23:11 ff.* Compare also the *Dissertation Acad. pecul*. by *Frid. Bechmann* on *the knowledge of God.*

ANTITHESIS.

GERHARD: "The divine omniscience is undermined by ... 4. The *Photinians,* while denying that God foresees the future sins of men... *Socinus* in Prael, Theol. ch. 8–11.: "No reason, no testimony of Scripture can be produced, from which it is openly concluded that God knew evil, dependent on the wills of men, before it was done." (L. c. § 250.)

CALVIN: "Nor does He *foresee* things that are to come for any other reason than that He *has decreed* them to come to pass." (*Instit*. III, c. 23. s. 6.)

## § 16.

The *wisdom* [(a)] of God imports the most exquisite counsel of God, by which He knows how to dispose and order all causes and effects in a plainly admirable manner to His own end.[(b)]

a) Although it seems to be comprehended under the knowledge of God; yet because it is commonly, and by Scripture itself in accommodating itself to the understanding of the common people, distinguished and customarily handed down as a special topic, it therefore had to be indicated here separately as well.

QUENSTEDT: *"Wisdom* is distinguished from the *knowledge* of God in Romans 11:33, where mention is made of the depth of the riches *and of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God. The former* is an *absolute* attribute of God*, the latter a relative one; the former* is conceived by us as a mode *of being,* the latter as a mode *of acting.* (L. c. c. 8. s. 1. th. 26. 417.)

b) *This* is proven from *Job 12:13,* where it is said *that wisdom is with God;* that *counsel and understanding* are *His;* and *from chap. 28:20 ff.,* where, when the praise of full wisdom is taken away from all others, it is taught that it belongs to God alone. Compare *1 Tim. 1:17,* where God is called *μόνος σοφός, the only wise one*; and *Rom. 11:33,* where the stupendous and *unfathomable* wisdom of God is celebrated.

## § 17.

Before we proceed to the consideration of the other attributes, something must be said about the *will* of God,[(a)] or, insofar as the divine essence has itself in the mode of [(b)] an appetitive power, tending toward the good apprehended by the intellect as something to be willed, and toward the evil known as something to be avoided.

a) For the attributes of holiness, justice, and truthfulness pertain to the divine will.

GERHARD: "*Will* signifies: 1. *θελητικόν,* the very *faculty* or power of the soul, by which we will; 2. *τὴν θέλησιν, the act* of willing, which the barbarians call volition, the philosophers *νοεράν ὄρεξιν* [rational appetite]; 3. *τὸ θελητόν,* the *object* or thing which we will." (L. th. de nat. D. § 163.)

b) Or, as *the principle* of the act *of willing*, the object is appetible, and *of not-willing* or aversion, the object is disagreeable or evil: although the *essence* of God and the *will,* and its *acts,* do not differ from each other from the standpoint of the divine intellect with regard to the thing, but are *in reality one* and the same.

GERHARD: "When will is attributed to God, it is not to be understood as a certain faculty of willing, really distinct from the very essence of God, which, by the act of willing, which they call volition, likewise distinct from the essence, exerts itself; but the will of God is the very *essence of God,* or God willing." (Exeges. 1. II. § 265.)

## § 18.

There are no formally [a] causing causes of the acts of divine will; however, there are virtually [b] causing ones: *an efficient* [c] internal [d] and external [e] *impelling cause*, and also a final [f] cause.

a) For otherwise it would be necessary to posit within God something actually produced and actually distinct from the divine essence, since the *formally causing cause* and the *that which is caused* differ, as if they were *two different things;* on the contrary, it would imply a *contradiction* if we were to posit that *the divine essence* is *independent,* and yet *that something,* which is *the same as* the divine *essence* in respect to the thing itself, is *dependent,* as if truly and really produced by another. Compare *Musaeus, Tract. de Aeterno Elect. Decr*. chap. I. § 4. sqq. p. 2. sqq.

J. SCHARF: "These terms: formally and materially, are variously used and abused. *Formally* is taken 1. for the whole quiddity of a thing, so that it is the same as what *is quidditative.* Thus it is said: man is formally a rational animal. 2. For the *ultimate difference of a thing.* Thus, unity formally signifies indivisibility. Thus, a genus pertains to the material; the specific difference alone, so to speak, completes the formal reasoning. 3. For *actually*, or for that which is actually present. Thus, formally is contrasted *with* virtually. Thus I say: The sun is not formally hot, but virtually. 4. For the *internal principle of acting.* Thus man is formally animate, formally understands." (*Metaphysica*. Ed. 5. Witteb. 1649. p. 18.)

REUSCH: "*Formal causes* are properly called the causes which differ from the effect not only in reality but also in essence, so that the cause and the effect are distinct entities or, as the author puts it, 'one thing and another.' But *outside of God nothing can exist that can produce an effect in God,* because God is independent and, as a pure act, cannot receive or suffer the actions of other beings. Likewise, *no act of God can produce another act in God as a distinct being,* or so that those acts differ as one from another; because God is so simple that He cannot consist of several beings. Therefore, neither outside of God nor within God can there be a proper cause for any perfection found in God or for a divine act. But in the point of reason, one perfection of God must often be conceived before another perfection in God can be conceived; e.g., before I can conceive that God is *eternal,* it must be presupposed in the point of reason that He is a *self-existent being* and exists necessarily. Therefore, since the knowledge that must be presupposed from the nature of the object, if I wish to conceive another knowledge, is called the *a priori* reason for that knowledge, and such an *a priori* reason is to be called a *virtually causing cause; a priori* reasons, or virtually causing causes, are given for as many divine perfections or acts as possible." (Annot. p. 175. sq.)

b) Or *a priori* reasons for being, which in our mode of conception stand as causes, so that if that, which is said to be its cause, were to be caused, they would in reality and truly exist in that genus of its cause. See *Mus.* 1. c.

c) Thus *God* Himself is the *efficient* cause *of the acts* of His will.

d) Namely, *some* are said to proceed from the divine *goodness, others from* the divine *justice*, which moved God.

e) Thus the act of the will by which God *decrees* to confer *salvation* on certain *men* acknowledges an *external impulsive* cause*, the merit of Christ,* to be apprehended by final *faith*, and thus foreseen, as we shall see below in the locus on Predestination.

f) Thus God, who wills what He does, is said to will and do for the sake of His own *glory* as an end.

## § 19.

God's will is distinguished [a] into *natural* and *free.* The *former* is called God's willing what He cannot but will; the *latter*, His willing what He could also not will, or could will the opposite. By the *former* He is said to will Himself; by the *latter* reason He is said to will created things.

a) According to the different relation to different objects.

b) As if in which every reason for the good appears without defect, so that it is *the primary object* of the divine will*,* which imports a necessary relation to the will of God.

GERHARD: "God wills himself as an end, creatures as means." (Exeg. L. II. § 279.)

c) Since they are contingent and have only finite goodness, they do not imply a necessary relation to the divine will; which refers to what is said in *Psalm 115:3*, *that God does what He wills,* and thus wills freely and, of His own free will, does what He does.

THOMAS: "God does not necessarily will whatever He wills; but, given that He wills something, it is necessary, because the will of God is immutable." (L. I. c. gent. c. 83.)

## § 20.

The free will of God is distinguished 1. into *efficacious* and *inefficacious.* An efficacious will is that by which God wills something as to be brought about;[a] an inefficacious will is that by which God is pleased with something in itself, although He does not intend to bring it about.[b] An efficacious will is further divided into *absolute*, by which God wills something unconditionally,[c] and *conditional,* by which He wills something under a condition.[d] 2. Into *absolute*, by which He wills something to be brought about by His absolute power, that is, not bound to second causes;[e] and *ordered*, by which He wills something to be brought about by His ordered power, that is, bound to second causes and a certain order of means established by Himself.[f] 3. In *the first*, or *antecedent*, in which He wills something from Himself alone, or from His native inclination precisely, not yet having

regard to the circumstances;[(g)] *and the second,* or *consequent*, by which He wills something, having considered the circumstances, or with respect to some cause or condition, viewed from the part of the creature to which He relates.[(h)]

a) Thus the will, not only human but also divine, by which Christ the *God-man* willed to give Himself (according to His human nature) into death, or to lay down His soul, and to offer Himself as a victim for sinners, *John 10:18; Hebrews 7:27,* was certainly efficacious, because Christ intended to bring this very thing to pass. And others define an efficacious will as one that is actually fulfilled, so that not only is something intended to be done, but it is also accomplished and attained; which is indeed the case in the example given. However, according to the *thesis*, an effective will is that by which something is intended to be effected, whether the intended effect or end is achieved or not; by which reason God, since He intends the salvation of all men with an effective will, does not, however, obtain it for all. Compare *Mus.* Disp. *de Volunt. Dei Antec. et Conseq*., which is appended to the treatise on the Use of Principles, § 14, p. 697.

b) Thus Christ, the *theanthrope* (*θεάνθρωπος,* God-man)*,* willed the preservation of human life and the averting of imminent death, *Luke 22:42,* since this pleased Him *in itself*, yet so that He would not change His will to die for men. *Others* call it an ineffectual will, which is not fulfilled, although something is intended to be effected; a view we leave to its own authors.

AUGUSTINE: "The will of God is always fulfilled, either by us or from us." (Enchir. c. 100.)

c) *Absolute* will*,* as is clear from the thesis, is said *in various ways*; however, a definite meaning must be sought from that with respect to which it is called absolute. Hence, here it is said in relation to some *condition*, and in *opposition* to a *conditioned* will. And in this sense, God is rightly said to have eternally willed to create the world absolutely: for He willed without a condition. It is also rightly said that He wills absolutely that those whom He foresees as believing finally be saved. For He wills this also without condition, since the foreseen final faith has the status of a fulfilled, not a pending, condition.

d) This pertains to the will by which God *wills all men to be saved,* namely*,* if they believe; likewise by which God *willed many good things for the Israelites,* namely*,* under the condition of sincere and constant obedience, *Deut. 28.* And it is not absurd that this will *should not be fulfilled* (since God foresaw that the condition could not be fulfilled, and would not be fulfilled). Cf. *Mus. Disp. cit. de Volunt. Antec. et Conseq*. § 31. p. 710.

e) It is said to be absolute with respect to *the law, order*, or *course of nature,* or *of second causes.* Thus God willed *the sun to stand still, Josh. 10:13;* cf. Disp. cit. § 28, 29, p. 708.

f) By which means God wills *to save* the *elect,* namely, *through the means of grace.* Hence it is also clear that a *conditioned* and *ordered* will *does not entirely coincide,* although at first glance it might seem so. On the other hand,

it is certain that it is not absurd *for the ordained will of God to be resisted*. See *Mus.* 1. c. § 30. sqq. p. 708. sqq., § 42. p. 719.

g) Thus *Chrysostom* in Homily I on Ephesians, Chapter I, and the *Damascene* in lib. II. *de orthod. Fide*, Cap. XXVI, called the will of God, by which He wills the salvation of all, the *πρώτην ἢ προηγουμένην* [first or antecedent], although this is not understood by all in the same way. See *Mus.* 1. c. § 2. 3. p. 689, 690, § 10 ff., p. 695 ff.

h) And *some* indeed explain this precisely of that which arises from *our own fault*, or by which God wills to punish, to damn, etc., on account of sin; *others* take it more broadly, of whatever in us has its cause or occasion, either *from sin* or *from elsewhere*. And our own scholars, for this reason, refer to the consequent will not only that which pertains to the *damnation of unbelievers,* but also that which pertains to the *final salvation of believers, as such,* or which is terminated by the foreseen final faith in Christ. See *Mus.* Disp. cit. § 2. 3. and 10. sqq. But manifestly, *both* of these wills of God, the antecedent and the consequent, are set forth in *Matthew 23:37.,* where Christ the *God-man* testifies that His will was *first*, or *antecedently*, determined to the salvation of the Jewish people, and this as if from a native and paternal inclination or affection; but then, or *consequentially,* having first considered the incorrigible nature of their impiety, it was determined to the excision and destruction of the Jews.

DANNHAUER: "There is indeed a *twofold will of God* in the matter of our salvation*, one antecedent, the other consequent;* twofold, I say, not in reality and essence, but in the order of our reason, which conceives one act before the other. This distinction arises: 1. From the marvelous *tempering* of divine *justice and mercy* in their reconciliation with each other. For there are utterances in the Scriptures that show *mercy* inclined to save all; there are others that note *justice* excluding from the inheritance those who oppose the divine order. A reconciliating work was therefore necessary, lest the Holy Spirit contradict Himself. Suggested 2. It is suggested by *the parables of Christ*, Matt. 22:1; 23:37. Luke 14:16. cf. Matthew 5:45 with Amos 4:7, there God is said to rain on the just and the unjust, here to rain on one city and not on another; the implied meaning being that the city which served God was to be watered, while the other, which had prostituted itself to idols, was to be left parched and desolate." (*Hodos. phaen*. 7. p. 274.)

THE SAME: "Caspar Sanctius on Ez. 18. p. 419. makes these not inept observations: ‘The Lord denies that it is His will to deliver the sinner to death, and yet He delivers him to death and condemns him to capital punishment, indeed to the punishment of hell. Therefore I said above that God, as it were unwilling and with a resisting nature, is drawn to the punishment of men, however wicked, which is proper to him—to have mercy always and to spare—and that He is carried by that inclination and impetus with which rivers flow down a sloping channel. Theologians here recognize two wills in God; they call the first the *antecedent will*, which most clearly indicates the goodness of the divine nature, which wills all men to be saved and does not think of any one's evil, unless something happens from man that calls forth and provokes another, more severe will. This latter will is called the *consequent will,* which, of course, arises not so much from God according to the benignity of His nature, as it is provoked by the sins of men, which He wishes to heal, though with a severer medicine, or to punish with a vindictive scourge. The *antecedent,* therefore, is born of God's mercy and goodness, the *consequent* in a manner from the fault of men. This is easily understood *by* the *examples* that follow. By the *consequent* will, however, the merchant, when compelled by a storm, casts merchandise into the sea, because otherwise he would perish altogether, though he would wish it to be saved if he could; nor does the judge, by his antecedent will, wish to put to death the one he has condemned to capital punishment, nor the physician to burn and cut the

brother whom he loves. Yet by a *subsequent* will, the merchant, when compelled by the weather, casts the goods into the sea, because otherwise he would perish altogether, though he would wish them to be saved if he could; and a judge, because both public reason and the merits of the condemned demand it, sentences to death the one whom, however, he would prefer, if these were absent, to spare, restraining both the avenging rod and public authority; nor would a physician, by his prior will, cut or burn a patient, unless his subsequent will required it, either from the demands of medicine or the patient's need. Thus, therefore, the death of the impious is not the will of God, namely, of the *antecedent will*, for He does not delight in the destruction of the living, Wis. 1:13; yet He punishes and condemns by the *consequent* will, because right reason and the public good demand it, so that sins may not remain unpunished.'"(L. c. p. 274. sq. not..)

ANTITHESIS.

GERHARD: "Those who undermine orthodoxy here are: . . . 2. The *Calvinists,* who oppose the freedom to act, or God's free will, to the other divine attributes, that is, because of this freedom of action, they attribute to God things that are at odds with His own goodness, justice, and wisdom. Thus they say that God impels to sin, that God has made an absolute decree of reprobation, etc.; and if we say that this conflicts with the justice and holiness of God, they take refuge in the fact that God is a most free agent, subject to no laws. But God acts freely in such a way that He does not act contrary to His own natural justice and goodness." (Exeg. 1. II. § 278.)

## § 21.

In a particular sense, a *decree* is called *absolute* (a) to exclude a reference to a *motivating cause outside* of God,(b) to which is opposed the *non-absolute*, of which a motivating cause outside of God is given, and which it virtually causes.(c)

a) For the voice of the *will* extends more broadly than that of the *decree.* For we are said to *will* whatever is in itself desirable in itself, even though, when all circumstances are considered, we do not will it. But to *decree*, properly *speaking*, we are said to do only what we effectively will when all circumstances are considered. Hence, the *antecedent will* (of which in the preceding §) *cannot properly* be called a *decree*. Compare *Aeg. Hunnius* at the end of the *Admon. ad Lectorem* prefaced to the *Tract. de Prov. et Praedest*.

DANNHAUER: "A divine *decree* is either absolute or hypothetical. An *absolute* decree is, for example, the decree to create in this order, in this sequence of days, with this goal; no human condition intervenes here. The proclamation of the gospel through the apostles was an absolute decree, *ακατάλυτος γάρ ή βουλή αντη* (i.e. his unalterable counsel), Acts 5:39; the condemnation of Satan to Tartarus, from which that theological proverb, "If Satan repented, he would be saved," is a hypothesis based on an impossible condition, equivalent to a simple negation; in much the same way, that apostolic passage in Gal. 1:8 is to be understood: ‚If an angel from heaven, etc.' By an absolute decree I was born, twice to my parents, in this region, at this time. It was the absolute will of the Lord that John should die a natural death (John 21:22). This kind of divine *βουλή* [counsel] reigns in divine matters and in miracles, the performance of which (now) depends on the will of the one God; by this absolute will the *hemorrhaging woman* was healed at that time, i.e., after a desperate medicine had been tried, not before. It is *hypothetical*, which from the hypothesis, explained by the words "if, unless," is established: Num. 14:12; 1 Sam. 13:13; 2 Sam. 2:16; 1 Sam. 2:30. Jer. 18:8; Acts 27:31; Luke 13:3. Thus it was a hypothesis, that the Son of God

should become incarnate, if namely man should fall; but after the Incarnation of the Son was decreed, the execution of the Incarnation was an absolute decree. Therefore, concerning this, those Judaizers had no grounds for despair, reasoning that the Messiah had been promised to the Jews on the condition that they were descendants of Abraham and righteous; if not, he would not come. They are refuted in the Psalms. 89:34., where the witness in heaven (who keeps faith even now in the last age, which had been ratified by the pre-diluvian covenant) v. 38., the oath v. 36. excludes all suspicion of a condition, Heb. 6, 17. Likewise, in Christ's passion, the '*to be treated unjustly*' (*το ἀδικεισθαι*) is of an absolute, implorable, and immovable decree (Acts 4:28); but that this passion was inflicted by Herod, Pilate, and Judas pertains to a hypothetical decree: If Herod, Pilate, and Judas crucify Christ, I decree to permit it. Let us here distinguish the co-fated, for the hand of Herod, Pilate, and Judas was not necessary for the passion; the heavenly Father could have immediately crucified, slain, and sacrificed the Son, just as Abraham did Isaac. Thus: if Paul remains constant in the faith, he is elect; if not, reprobate. The distinction must be held here between the decree of God and a *νεμετικόν* [retributive] judgment*:* every punitive *judgment* is decreed, but not every decree is a *νεμετικόν* judgment*;* the former can be absolute, antecedent, predetermining, and absolutely inevitable; the latter is hypothetical, consequential, and either avoidable or mitigable. And hence, if anything is absolutely decreed, it is also absolutely unchangeable, irresistible, and invincible. 'For who will resist His will?' (Rom. 9:19). If hypothetically, it is changeable through the removal of the condition. A composite decree, taken as a whole together with the supplement of the hypothesis, certainly cannot be changed. It can be through the cutting off of the hypothesis, e.g., "Nineveh will perish," this is mutable; "it will perish, unless it repents," this is immutable." (*Hodos. phaen*. 3. P. p. 158. sq.)

b) Not only as formally causative (for in that sense every decree of God would be absolute), but also as virtually causative. See § 18, note a.

c) For this reason, our own scholars say that the decree of predestination and reprobation is not absolute; for it acknowledges an external cause or impulsive reason: the former indeed, the merit of Christ apprehended by final faith; the latter, final unbelief: about which we will see more in its proper place.

## § 22.

There also occurs [(a)] the distinction of the divine will into the will of *sign* and the will of *good pleasure.* The *former* is so called when the *name of will* is attributed to the *effect* or object of the divine will, namely, as a sign of some will in God.[(b)] The *latter* denotes the *very act* of the divine will, by which it wills something. Hence it is clear that the distinction is *analogical*.[(c)] However, one must be careful not to imagine a will of the sign *such* that the *will of good pleasure*, which the *sign* is *instituted* to signify, *conflicts with it*.[(d)]

a) Not only in *Lombard*, I Sent. dist. XLV. cap. III. sqq. and dist. XLVII. c. II., and in *Thomas*, I Q. XIX. art. XII., but also among our own, *Balth. Meisner*, Anthrop. Disp. XII. Q. I. th. 1., and *Gerhard.* Exeg. L. de Deo § 269. and others.

b) *To which Matthew* 6:*15* refers*: "Thy will be done!"* i.e., let the things and actions to which your will is directed by commandment be accomplished, as if they were to be performed.

And *chapter 12, verse 50,* where it is said *that they do the will of the Father* who do the works that God wills to be done. Furthermore*, in 1 Thess. 4:3,* where it is said that *this* is *the will of God,* i.e., that the divine command and thus the sign of the will, prescribes our *sanctification*, *that we abstain from fornication*, etc. Although at the same time the object of the divine will or command, or the thing willed and commanded, seems to be taken for the command itself. The authors, however, besides the precept, also refer other things here*,* e.g.*, counsel, prohibition, operation,* and *permission*.

c) For *the inequality* among the members of the distinction is such that one claims the name of will *properly,* the other *improperly, according to the figure* (as they say).

d) E.g., if you say with the *Reformed,* who abandon the scholastics' footsteps, that *God wills the salvation of all* by a will *of sign,* but *not* this very thing by a will *of approbation;* or *that He prescribes* conversion to man, yet does *not* seriously *will* that he be converted. For these things are repugnant to divine wisdom, goodness, and equity, and they destroy the certainty of Scripture. Conf. *Mus., Tract. de Aet. El. Dec*. c. XI. § 336. sqq. p. 253. sqq.

GERHARD: "The will is another *of the sign,* another of the *good pleasure.* Both the Scholastics and the Calvinists use this distinction, but with a different meaning. The Scholastics define the will of the *sign* as the *effect* of God, when He proceeds outward, acting with us through some covering or through external things which we can apprehend, such as the Word and the Sacraments instituted by Him. They call the will of *approbation* the essential will of God or *the* naked *divine majesty,* which is God himself. . . They count *five* such *signs:* precept, prohibition, permission, counsel, operation; hence the verse:

He commands and forbids, permits, counsels, and fulfills.

In this scholastic sense, *Luther,* vol. 6, Wittenberg ed., p. 98, in his commentary on Genesis chapter 6, repeats and approves that distinction: "We (he says) in the New Testament have Baptism, the Lord's Supper, absolution, and the ministry of the Word; these are, as the scholastics called them, the *will of the sign,* to which we must look when we wish to know God's will; another is the *will of good pleasure,* the substantial will of God or His bare majesty, which is God; from this the eyes are to be removed." The *Calvinists* abuse this distinction, while, to the same object, they posit a contrary mode of the will of the sign and of the will of the good pleasure, from which they assert that the will of the sign is repugnant to the will of the good pleasure." (L. c. 1. II. § 268.)

QUENSTEDT: "Although the will of God is one and most simple, it is nevertheless distinguished in various ways. . . 3. Into *hidden* and *revealed;* the *former* is secret and inscrutable; the *latter* is revealed in the Word of God and infallible; the *former* concerns the various judgments of God, which St. Paul calls *κρίματα ἀνεξερεύνητα,* i.e. impenetrable judgments, because no creature can grasp their reason by searching and investigating, Rom. 11:33. *This* is occupied with the business of our salvation. However, it is not to be opposed to the revealed will of God, as the *Calvinists* do, since God cannot be contrary to Himself." (L. c. c. 8. s. 1. th. 27. f. 418.)

## § 23.

Among the attributes of God's will*,* the first that occurs is *justice,* by which God is in part just *in Himself*, which we call by the special name *holiness,*(a) and it implies the rectitude

of the divine will, by which all things that are right and good are conformed to His eternal law:(b) partly in relation *to others,* so that He prescribes fitting laws to creatures and directs (c) and governs them, also keeps and fulfills the promises (d) made to men, finally rewards the good (e) and punishes the wicked.(f)

a) Thus *Lev. 19:2: "Be holy,"* says God, *"for I am holy."* Cf. *1 Pet. 1:15-17.*

b) See *Deut. 32:4: All his ways* are *judgment* (just). *God* (is) *truth and not iniquity, just and upright Himself.* And *Ps. 92:16: The Lord* is a righteous *heart, and there is no iniquity in him.* This justice of God, however, has a certain analogy to the *universal* justice which philosophers call (by which one lives in conformity with all laws, hence it is called the complex of all virtues). Not, however, with the same rigor with which this name is used by them, but it is to be understood *εὐπρεπῶς* (*properly*). God, who does not have a law made by a higher authority, is himself his own law. And this is usually referred *to Hebrews 2:10: ἔπρεπε τῷ θεῷ (it was* fitting *for God),* it was appropriate to His most perfect nature.

> GERHARD: "Our own people say that *sins are not committed simply when God is unwilling* or reluctant; for no one can compel God, nor can anything be done with God hindering and resisting; *nor yet when God simply wills,* because God neither wills nor approves sin; but *they are committed when God is unwilling.* The difference between *unwilling* and *not willing* is this: *the former* involves *the privation* of will and active principle together with repugnance and a contrary action, while the *latter* involves only that *privation* without violent opposition. . . Therefore, lest anyone *misuse* this distinction to undermine the orthodoxy *concerning the cause of sin,* we prefer to speak thus: *God wills some things, as good, and permits others, as evil."* (L. c. § 275.)

c) It is indeed the *same* rectitude of will *in substance* as *the former;* but with *the relation* to the creatures, to be led to their *end,* and *to prescribe a mode of living* congruent with it.

d) For to *fulfill*, or *to perform the promises* of justice is ascribed, even though it is referred to *truth* in another sense, of which we will speak shortly. Meanwhile, for the present, it does what God says in *Isaiah 45:23*: "*Out of my mouth has gone forth righteousness, a word that shall not be revoked.*" And in *Romans 3,* the *righteousness* of God is mentioned in verses 4 and 5, insofar as it coincides with the *truth* in verse 7, by which God establishes the *truth* of his words in verse 2.

e) Hence it is commonly called *remunerative* justice; see *Romans 2:5, 6, 7,* where this is referred to *δικαιοκρισίαν,* or the *just judgment of God*, which confers *eternal life* on *those who persevere in doing good*, and in *2 Thess. 1:6–7* it is said to *be just on God's part to grant relief to those who are afflicted.* Yet for this reason, it should not be thought that man has any right or merit properly speaking toward God, by which God would owe man anything good, since rather whatever good is in man is from God's grace, and God *crowns His own gifts in man,* or rewards them out of mere grace. Therefore, just as that remunerative justice is

founded in the love of God and in the gratuitous divine promises, so it is *not* so much called justice in an *absolute* sense as it is when it is referred to the *goodness* or *truthfulness* of God.

GERHARD: "The question is: Is there *a commutative justice* in God*?* Thomas, Part I, Question 21, Article 1, rightly *denies* this, because whatever we can give to God, we receive entirely from Him; hence He is indebted to no one, Romans 11:35." (L. c. § 234.)

f) This is what is commonly called *vindictive* or *avenging* justice*;* see on this *Rom. 2:5, 8, 9,* where God is said, by *just judgment*, to be about to repay those men *who are contentious and do not obey the truth, but practice injustice, with indignation*, *wrath, and affliction*, and *2 Thess. 1:6, 7., that it is just with God* to render *affliction to those who afflict* others*,* and thus for God *to inflict vengeance on those who do not know God,* etc. Cf. *Gen. 18:20; Ps. 5:5.*

DANNHAUER: "God is the most just judge, a rewarder of the good and a punisher of the wicked, who cannot transmit even the smallest sin, unless the exact punishment is exacted either in the sinner or as his forfeit; whose entire nemesis (to which Aristotle rightly referred *κολαστικην* (punitive) justice) in a manner corresponds to a commutative and arithmetic proportion, and is a *retributive* equivalent to the guilt, so that, just as sin is an infinite evil, so its wage is an infinite and eternal death." (*Hodos. Phaen*. III. p. 112.)

## § 24.

Next comes the *truthfulness* (a) of God, by which God is consistent in speaking the truth (b) and in keeping His promises.

a) It is called *truth in speaking* or testifying, and is distinguished from truth in *being* and truth in *knowing,* which nevertheless both also belong to God.

b) For just as by the infinite perfection of the *intellect*, or knowledge, He cannot be deceived, so by the infinite perfection of the *will* He cannot deceive. See *Num. 23:19* (above § 10, note d*)* and *Heb. 6:18: It is impossible for God to lie.*

## § 25.

The *power* (a) of God follows, by which the divine essence is efficacious (b) to operate and to produce something outside of itself, and indeed everything (c) that is in any way possible and does not imply imperfection on the part of the agent.(d)

a) Which is *either* the very will of God, its direct practical knowledge, believed to be so efficacious in itself that, whatever it wills, it can produce by willing alone, without a distinct executive faculty or power; *or* is the very being of God, insofar as it is subordinated to divine knowledge and will for operating outside of itself; since God is conceived as operating by a power those things which He freely willed, and thus operating by the power of the will, directed and applied in an act of free choice.

b) Hence it is understood to be an *active* power; since it is otherwise certain that God is entirely devoid of all passive power.

c) *Omnipotence* is commonly called the power to effect all things, or an *extensively infinite* power*,* since it has no limit in the extent of its effects. And this is proven from *Matthew 19:26: "With God all things are possible."* And *Luke 1:37: "With God nothing is impossible" (πᾶν ῥῆμα,* 'every word,' whatever that signifies, He will do). Related to this is that God is called *παντοκράτωρ*, omnipotent, *πᾶν κράτος*, having all strength, power, or might, or *κράτος εἰς τὰ πάντα,* having and exercising *power* over all things, *2 Cor. 6:18. Rev.* 4:*8,* and that *all power and strength (δύναμις καὶ ἰσχὺς)* is ascribed to Him, ch. 7:*12.*

d) For it is not absurd to say that God cannot lie, hunger, or sleep, since these powers are not of perfection but of imperfection, and therefore are repugnant to God as the most excellent being. For the power of God is *intensively* perfect, or of infinite perfection *in itself*, as David*,* in *Psalm 145,* after saying that there is *no end to the greatness* of God*,* adds: "*Generation to generation shall tell of Thy works, and shall declare Thy strength* (power)*."*

> QUENSTEDT: "The object of divine *omnipotence* is . . . all those things which do not involve a *contradiction*, such as: 1. those which cannot have any *being*; thus God cannot make a fact un-factual; 2. those which imply a fault or defect, such as: to be able to lie, to sin, to die. For to be able to do such things is not an argument of power, but of impotence." (L. c. c. 8. s. 1. th. 36. f. 421.)

> GERHARD: "We concede that God does not do those things which imply a *contradiction* and which are simply impossible, but we add that a distinction must be made between things impossible *of* nature and things impossible *by* nature. Things impossible *to* nature are those which surpass the accustomed course of nature, such as: for the sun to stand still, fire not burning, etc. Impossibilities *by nature* are those that are contrary to the definition and nature of a thing and imply in themselves to be and not to be at the same time. The former they call impossible *in a certain respect*, the latter *simply and absolutely* impossible; therefore, we say that God can do the former, but cannot do the latter. . . We deny, however, that what is truly contradictory *in the mysteries of faith* should be judged according to the principles of our reason. Accordingly, we assert these propositions: 1. Those things which God in the Holy Scriptures asserts He can do, and promises He will do, are not truly contradictory, even if they appear so to our reason. . . Otherwise the truth of God would be in jeopardy. . . 4. It cannot be demonstrated clearly and apodictically that something implies a contradiction, unless a full and perfect knowledge of that thing, whose nature is said to be in conflict, precedes." (*Exeges. Loc*. II. § 199.)

> SCHERZER: "God cannot deny Himself, die, sin, give creatures infinite perfection so that nothing is lacking, make it so that the past has not passed, or make tomorrow be today; because this implies a contradiction either on the part of God or on the part of the thing itself. For if God were to lie, die, or sin, God would not be God; if a creature had infinite perfection, it would not be a creature; if the past had not passed, the past would not be the past; if tomorrow existed today, today would not be today." (System, th. pag. 55.)

> GERHARD: "As knowledge is said with respect to knowables, so power is said with respect to possibles. Therefore, *impossibilities* do not fall under power, and consequently, power in no way limits or restricts infinity; for if they did fall under power, impossibilities would not be impossibilities." (Exeg. Loc. II. § 195.)

SCHERZER: "Just as a brute from its own imagination cannot know what a human can or cannot do; nor a human from his own ingenuity, what an angel is capable of: so much less will a human determine what God can or cannot do, since the distance in reason for understanding between God and man is far greater than that between man and the brute. What? For it cannot be known even from revelation. For God has nowhere revealed to us all things that are absolutely possible. Therefore, we must guard against that rashness, lest we precipitously say: 'God cannot do this or that, because I cannot comprehend it with my intellect.'" (*Syst. th*. p. 56.)

## § 26.

God's power is distinguished [(a)] into *ordered* and *absolute*. *Ordered* is that which is determined by God's decree or some law to operate in a certain way.[(b)] *Absolute* is called that which is suited to itself, and is not determined by any prior decree or law.[(c)] The *former* can be resisted, [(d)] but the *latter* cannot.[(e)]

a) There is indeed *one and the same* infinite power of God, but it manifests itself in *different* ways, and thus is called by different names: ordered and absolute. Compare what we have said about the absolute and ordered will of God in § 20.

b) Or by which God acts in accordance with His own *law* or *decree,* and thus with the order He has established, cooperating with second causes and working according to their requirements, for example, when He preserves men through the means of food, when He regenerates through the means He has instituted, the Word and Baptism.

c) E.g., when he causes a virgin to give birth, raises the dead, etc.

KROMAYER: "*He who freely gave the laws of nature did not bind Himself to the laws and order of nature.* This is a golden aphorism against those sectarians who measure the fields of the Christian religion with the measuring line of human reason, such as the *Socinians,* for whom reason is religion, and the *Reformed,* who are persuaded that God proposes nothing incomprehensible to reason for us to believe; hence they do not hesitate to call the very divine omnipotence into question, if something contrary to reason is proposed for belief. That God, however, has *abundantly* given laws to nature, e.g., that fire should burn, a virgin should not bear, the liquid should not be confined within its proper boundaries but within alien ones, that every heavy body should be carried downward, that every natural body should be in its proper place, that there should be no regression from total privation to habit, that celestial bodies should be in perpetual motion, and that they should constantly observe their own laws: all of this proves the most complete suspension of the course of nature in the events already mentioned. For the fire did not burn, Dan. 3:28; the virgin gave birth, Matt. 1:25; Luke 2:7; the liquid was enclosed within its own boundaries, Ex. 14:*22;* a heavy body was carried upward, 2 Kings 6:6. (that the outermost body is not circumscribed by place, even physicists themselves are forced to concede, which, however, seems scarcely comprehensible to us, who are circumscribed by place), a regression from total privation to habit (from death to life) was given, John 11:43. and in other places of Scripture of the Old and New Testaments, that the motion of the heavenly bodies was hindered, Isa. 38:8, that their laws were also changed and an eclipse of the sun was seen at the full moon, Luke 23:45 is asserted." (*Theol. pos.-pol*. P. II. p. 122.)

GERHARD: "God can do many things by *absolute* power, which He nevertheless does not do. He could free the damned from hell; but He does not, because justice has decreed eternal damnation for them." (*L. th. de nat. Dei*. § 130.)

d) For indeed, secondary causes can be resisted and their influence impeded.

e) Otherwise, the finite power of a creature would prevail over the infinite power of God.

## § 27.

*Goodness* belongs to God *both absolutely and in itself,* which is His very *perfection*,(a) or the essence of God, insofar as it contains within itself all perfections,(b) or *formally,*(c) or *eminently;*(d) then *relatively,* or in relation to creatures, to whom God is good, insofar as he *efficiently* (e) produces all created goodness; and this according to His own perfection, as an idea or *exemplar* (f) of created perfection; he also attracts or moves toward the love and desire of himself, as the *highest good.*(g)

GERHARD: "The question is: Is God *alone good* by essence? — It is one thing for the *essence* of a thing to be good, and another for a thing to be good *through* its own essence. The essence of any created thing is good; hence of the *devil* himself, the author of all evil, Augustine says: 'The devil, insofar as *he is*, is good; every nature, insofar as it is, is good.' (*De nat. boni* c. 1.) But no created thing is good *through* its essence, that is, by itself and of itself. For if it were good through its essence, then it would be good *essentially;* if it were essentially good, it would be good by the force of its own nature and essence, and would not have its goodness as a participation from elsewhere, nor could it be perfected by accidents; none of which can be said of a creature, which is good only accidentally, mutably, imperfectly, and participatively. Hence the Scholastics rightly conclude: 'God alone is good by essence." (Exeg. 1. II. § 210.)

a) For the goodness and perfection of God differ only in this, that God is called *perfect* absolutely and in Himself; but *good*, not only in Himself and absolutely, but also relatively.

b) Thus *in Matthew 5*:48 Christ says: *Be perfect (τέλειοί), as your Father in heaven is perfect:* that is, I want you to imitate, as far as is possible, the perfection of God, who is proposed to you as an example. And in *Luke 18:19,* he says: "*No one is good except God alone."* For creatures are perfected by those things which are added to their essence; God, however, in whom no accident occurs, is perfected by His very essence.

c) As for perfections *simply* such, which in their formal concept do not include imperfection.

d) As for perfections *secundum quid* (in a certain respect), or those which in their formal notion involve a perfection with an admixture of imperfection; these, therefore, are *not* in God *according to* their *own proper reason, but* through something *more excellent,* or through *an eminent virtue* to produce them

in other subjects. Thus *in Psalm 94:9* it is said: *"He who planted the ear, shall He not hear? Or He who formed the eye, shall He not see?"*—that is, it is absurd not to attribute sight and hearing to God, who gave sight and hearing to men. Therefore, He sees and hears, not, however, by a sensitive power, but knows in a more excellent way what creatures attain through sight or hearing.

e) Hence it is said to be good in the genus of an *efficient cause.* To which pertains what is said, *that He gives to all life and breath through all things,* which are natural goods, *Acts 17:25,* and in Him we *live, move, and have our being,* v. 28. Thus also *every good gift and every perfect gift* is said to *be from above*, *descending from the Father of lights, James 1:17,* and *1 Corinthians 4:*7. *What* (good) *do you have* (O man!), *that you did not receive* (from God)?

f) In what way it is said to be good in the genus of the *exemplary cause,* as we will see in the loci on Creation and the Image of God.

g) In what respect it is said to be good in the genus of a *final cause.* Compare *Ps. 73:25-26,* where David, despising *heaven and earth* and everything in them, though his *flesh* and his *heart fail*, says *that the strength* of his *heart* and *his portion* (like a desired inheritance, and thus the good in which he may rest) is *God forever.* This pertains to what we have shown above, that God is the *ultimate end* of man and of theology, both natural and revealed. Proleg. chap. I. § 4. p. 9. sq. § 17. p. 38.

## § 28. ^

As to the divine persons,[(a)] it is to be held in the simplest terms that the essence and all the divine perfections are shared without division or multiplication by these three distinct persons whom Scripture calls the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.[(b)]

a) Their consideration in the order of doctrine now follows; see above § 5, notes c, *d, e.*

b) The sum of this mystery is demonstrated by the passages *1 John 5:7* and *Matthew 28:19.* For *there* it is said: "*There are three who testify in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are one (ἓν εἰσι)."* The passage acknowledged by *Jerome,* who used the most accurate manuscripts, and by *Cyprian*, who cited those words before the Arian controversy in *de simplic. Cler*., and later also by *Fulgentius* in *Respons. ad Obj. ult. Arian*. as *authentic,* as a part of *the divine-inspired* Scripture*.* They are also confirmed by the Codices Complutensianus, Antwerpensis, Britannicus, Robert Stephanus, and Vatican Library codices. Cf. *Gerh*. in *Disp. Acad*. P. III. p. m. 1306 ff. It is manifest, however, that those *three*, *the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit,* are presented 1) as being really distinct from one another; but also 2) as *testifying in heaven* (that is, of their majesty), endowed with a heavenly, or supreme and truly divine authority and operative efficacy, and possessing it of themselves, since 3) *they are* among themselves (not only do they feel or will, but *they are*) *one,* and thus one God. In the *other*

place, however, where Christ commands the apostles *to baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit,* again 1) these three are joined as distinct, so that 2) baptism must be administered in the *name*, as it were, common and indeed of equal authority, by which men are consecrated to God and to His grace and remission of sins (according *to John 3:5* and *Acts 2:38. Titus 3:*5) they are made capable; and since 3) there is no name of such dignity, in which so grave and salutary a rite can and ought to be administered, other than that of the one true God (according to *1 Cor. 1:18* and *Luke. 20, 4. sqq.),* it is clear that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are that one true and eternal God.

Cf. the critical apparatus and Gnomon of A. Bengel on 1 John 5:7.

KROMAYER: "THAT in one divine essence there are three persons can be solidly proven from the Old Testament alone, without the aid of the New Testament. Likewise, the mystery of the Holy Trinity was not unknown to the fathers of the Old Testament . . The *first* class of proofs contains those passages of Scripture in which a *plurality* of persons of the Godhead is mentioned, which is sufficient against antagonists who concede only a single person of the Godhead. Such passages are those in which a plural noun is constructed with a singular verb, as in Gen. 1:1, 3. Then, when God says in the chapter and verse just cited: 'Let us make' etc., where the plural verb and pronoun attached indicate plurality; 3. when the divine majesty, through irony—derisive but reproving—speaks to the first-formed humans in Genesis 3:22: 'Behold, Adam has become as one of us,' i.e., Elohim; in which place the indivisible God is as it were divided into several persons; 4. when the persons of the Godhead ... address one another in this way, Gen. 11:7: "Come, let us go down," etc. The *second* class of proofs contains those passages of Scripture in which *two* persons are mentioned, which is also sufficient against antagonists. Such are Gen. 19:24: "Jehovah rained fire from Jehovah." Exod. 34:5. Jer. 23:33. Dan. 9:17. Hos. 1:7. Zech. 3:2, 9. Ps. 110:1. cf. Matt. 22:44. The *third* class contains those sayings in which mention is made of the *three* persons, as in Gen. 1, where a commemoration is instituted of God, the divine Word (that is, the Son, as is explained in Ps. 33:6 and John 1:1), and the Spirit of God brooding over the waters and imparting to them the vital force. Ps. 33:6; Isa. 48:16; 63:10–11; Num. 6:24–26; Ps. 67:7–8; Isa. 6:3; Josh. 22:22. The *fourth* class contains those passages of Scripture in which *God is said to have a Son,* not an adopted one, but a natural one, begotten from His own essence, as in Ps. 2:7; Prov. 30:5 (from which place Christ seems to have drawn the problem in John 3:8, 13). The *fifth* class of proofs contains those passages of Scripture from which the triadic number of *persons* is derived. For in neither the Old nor the New Testament is this read *literally*: 'In one divine essence there are distinct persons,' but it is sufficient that only three, and no more nor fewer, can be found in the Scriptures to whom the name, attributes, works, and divine worship belong. An argument could be constructed as follows: If, besides the Father, there are still two—and no more, no fewer—to whom the name, etc., applies, then it follows that in the one divine essence there are three distinct persons. But the former part is true. The minor is proven: Concerning the Father, the adversaries concede that He is the true God of Israel. But the proper name of God, attributes, works, and worship are also attributed to a certain *Angel*, not created but uncreated, the angel of the covenant Mal. 3:1 and the angel of great counsel Isa. 9:6, the Son of God... e.g. Gen. 16:10, 13; 22:12, 14, 16; 48:15; Ex. 3:4, 6, 8, 12, 14, 18, 20; 14:24; 13:21, 22; 23:21; 33:14; Is. 64:9. . . Furthermore, the *Holy Spirit* is given the proper name of God 2 Sam. 23:1, 2; Is. 64:10 (Ps. 95:9), omnipresence Ps. 139:6, omniscience Isa. 40:13, divine works Gen. 1:1-2. Ps. 33:6. Job 33:4. Isa. 61:1; 11:2. Worship of adoration Isa. 6:3. (Acts 28.) Ps. 95:6. Therefore, if the fathers of the Old Testament. either read or heard these and similar things, who would deny that the concept of the three persons of the Godhead was formed in their minds?

Negligence was not lacking in the New Testament either. In the *sixth* class, we place those testimonies which are partly taken from the *Chaldean paraphrase* and partly from the *ancient Jews*. . . In the *seventh* class, we place the fact that this *article is fundamental* and consequently for all time. Eph. 4:6." (*Theol. posit.-pol*. I, 146 sqq.)

GERHARD: "The mystery *of the Trinity* can and must be confirmed not only from the New, but also *from the Old Testament* 1. We do not say that the testimonies concerning the Trinity in the Old and New Testaments have *the same clarity* and evidence; for a clearer revelation of this mystery was reserved for the New Testament . . 2. Nor do we mean that in a dispute against a stubborn adversary *one should begin* with the more obscure sayings of the Old Testament. But this we assert, that certain *testimonies* from the Old Testament can and should be brought forward to support the dogma of the Trinity, since God has always from the beginning revealed Himself in such a way that the church in all ages has acknowledged, invoked, and celebrated God as one in essence and three in persons. We prove this thesis: 1. From the first thesis. For if the dogma of the Trinity is *necessary for all who are to be saved to know and believe*, then its traces must certainly exist in the sacred letters of the Old Testament; otherwise, the perfection of Scripture will be undermined. 2. From the very *evidence of the matter*. . . 3. From the *divine prohibition* in Ps. 81:10: 'There shall be no strange god in you' (זר, which the Vulgate rendered 'a strange god'), "nor shall you bow down to a foreign god." But if the mystery of the Trinity had been entirely unknown in the Old Testament, then surely in the New Testament a strange god would be introduced through the worship of the Son and the Holy Spirit Isa. 43:10: 'Before me no god was formed, and after me there will be none.' But if in the New Testament the Son of God became God, as the Photinians maintain, and began to be accorded divine worship in the New Testament, then after God the Father another God would have been formed." (*Exeges*. 1. III. § 20. sq.)

QUENSTEDT: "The question is not whether some *signs* and *traces,* or passages more obscurely hinting at this mystery, are in the Old Testament, but whether there are open, clear, and convincing testimonies of the Holy Trinity: *this* we affirm, *that* our adversaries deny. . . The question is not whether all who lived in the Israelite church, whether pious or *impious,* had knowledge of the Holy Spirit from the oracles of the Old Testament of the Trinity, or that it was proposed and revealed there, could perceive and understand; since even today, in such clear light, in the very bosom of the church, many Epicurean and profane men live who are little concerned with the knowledge of the Holy Trinity—but whether the pious and faithful could have had knowledge of that dogma from it. The illumination and enlightenment of the Holy Spirit is not to be excluded here, since no one can perceive the divine meaning of the words of Scripture unless his intellect is enlightened by the light of special grace. . . The thesis is proven in general: 1. from the distinction between natural and revealed theology, or *θεογνωσία* [knowledge of God]; for the former, when compared with this knowledge of God, is very imperfect, indeed almost nothing. . . 2. From the unity of faith in the Old and New Testament, Eph. 4:5. The common salvation of the Old Testament Church presupposes a common faith with us. Therefore, it must not be believed that the fathers of the Old Testament had a different and other justifying faith than ours, or that there is anything necessary for belief in the New Testament which was not necessary for belief in the Old Testament; for it would follow that, over the course of time, the fundamental articles of faith were either changed or augmented with respect to the substance of the faith, which is absurd on both counts. . . 3. From the apostles' explicit assertion. Acts 4:12: "There is salvation in no one else," etc. Where all other ways of salvation, both in the Old and New Testament, are excluded, and the one alone, i.e., through Christ, the Son of God, is established as common to all. Cf. Acts 10:43. Peter explicitly says in Acts 15:11: 'The fathers were saved by the same grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, just as we are justified and saved.' . . 4. From the identity of the doctrine of the Old and New Testaments. Thus Paul says in Acts 26:22: 'I testify to small and great alike, saying nothing except what the prophets and Moses said would take place.' To these words, Dr. Huelsemannus in Dial. Th. 17: 'In this place, he says, because the universal negative *particle* precedes the *particle εκτός, ὅδε καὶ μὴν,* I have said nothing besides or above those things which the prophets and Moses have spoken,

*every exception of any doctrine* proposed by Paul, which Moses and the prophets have not likewise proposed, *is excluded*. Therefore, whatever is in the writings of the Apostle Paul must also be found repeatedly in the writings of Moses and the prophets.'" (*Theol. did.pol*. P. I. c. 9. s. 2. q. 3. f. 509. sqq.)

THE SAME: "By the testimony of the Old Testament alone (Christ and the apostles) they convinced the Jews and demonstrated these mysteries exclusively from the Old Testament Scriptures. Matt. 22:46; Acts 18:24, 28. Therefore, either the *refutation* of Christ and the apostles was sufficient and the Jews could be convinced by the testimonies of the Old Testament alone, or Christ and the apostles inaptly disputed with them from an invalid and unsuitable principle; which to say is impious." (L. c. q. 4. f. 516.)

KROMAYER: "It is surprising that this thesis (that the Trinity can be proven from the Old Testament) was impugned not so many years ago by those who wish to be members of the Augsburg Confession. For it could not escape them that *in the conflict with the Jews*, who do not accept the New Testament, this thesis from the Old Testament alone had been asserted so firmly by our own people that it has remained until now *ανίκητος καϊ ακίνητος* [unconquered and unmoved]." (*Th. posit.-pol*. I, 146.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* ... 5. Of the *Innovators*, who dogmatize: 'That the mystery of the Trinity was known to the patriarchs and prophets in a certain way *from a special revelation of God*; yet not so contained in the books of the Old Testament that it could have been perceived there by anyone, either in ancient times or now apart from the New Testament *Traces* and *indications* rather than open and convincing statements are to be perceived there for the Trinity." (L. c. q. 3. f. 510.)

LUTHARDT: "The scriptural proof from the *Old Testament* . . rests almost entirely on incorrect or forced exegesis and on a generally unhistorical view that fails to recognize the gradual course of revelation. . . That identification, however, is explained by the fact that *in* the Angel of Jehovah, Jehovah Himself appears. . . Only the New Testament actually revealed the divinity of the Messiah. . . The Old Testament therefore contains only the prerequisites of Trinitarian knowledge of God, because of the Trinitarian self-revelation of God; only the New Testament brought with it both." (*Compend*. 3rd ed. p. 78. sq.)

KAHNIS: "In the Old Testament the unity and oneness of Yahweh so decisively emerges, that what is said of the Messiah and the Holy Spirit only contains the germ of divine personalities." (*Die luth. Dogm*. Zweite Ausg. I, 353.)

VILMAR: "Old dogmatics asserted too much when it claimed that God had not only *revealed* Himself in the Father, Son, and Spirit in the Law and before the Law, but also that the 'Church of the Old Testament,' i.e., those of that time who stood firm in God's promise*, had known* this revelation of God as Father, Son, and Spirit. Neither one nor the other can be granted in this way; God does not reveal Himself before He reveals Himself; and He did this as Son and Spirit only when the Logos had become flesh and the Spirit had been poured out. But where a revelation does not take place, knowledge of it cannot be posited. This view destroys revelation as *a historical process,* mixes promise and fulfillment together, which are yet so sharply distinguished by God Himself, and even endangers the distinction between Law and Gospel. Precisely this, that the Jews would not acknowledge in Christ the *New*, which had nevertheless been prophesied to them, is the charge which Christ brings against them; *not* (!), that they *fell away* from that which they already had and knew." (*Dogmatics*. 1874. 1,275.)

HOFMANN: "The Old Testament teaches no more that God is multiple within Himself than it teaches the unity of God with reference to a multiplicity within Him." (*Schriftbeweis*. 1852. I, 85.)

# § 29.

For a fuller declaration of this mystery [(a)] it is to be observed: I. That the Father is really [(b)] different from the Son, the Son from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both; so that the Father is truly one person, the Son another, and the Holy Spirit another.[(c)]

a) This, however, is not yet to be set forth in ecclesiastical terms, but only in a popular manner.

b) This is to be understood not by any operation of our mind, nor by anyone thinking, or by the mind conceiving various designations.

c) Thus Christ expressly says that *the Father* is *ἀλλον, other* than Himself, *John 5:32, 37,* and that the Holy Spirit*, the Paraclete, the comforter* or *advocate* of the faithful, is *ἀλλον, other* than Himself and the Father, *John 14:16.* The same is also evident from the names *Father* and *Son*, that the former is described as *the one who begets, and* the latter as *the one who is begotten*, *Ps. 2:7; John 1:14, 18; chap. 3:16,* and that the Son is said *to be sent* by the Father, *chap. 10:36. Gal. 4:4, that the Holy Spirit proceeds* from the Father, *John 15:26, that He is sent from the Father, John 14:26, that He is sent from the Son, John 15:26.* For indeed no one is the father of himself, nor the son of himself. No one generates himself, or is generated from himself. No one proceeds from himself, or is sent by himself. Compare *Mus. Diss*. ann. 1649, habb. Disp. III. § 11, 12, 13, pp. 57, 58, 59.

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis***:** 1. Of the *Praxeans, Noetians, Sabellians*, and *Samosatensians,* who, just as they established one *ουσία* [essence], so also established one *Ὑπόστασιν* [hypostasis] or person, which, in different respects, takes on the name of the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit. . . Hence called by the ancients *Patripassians. 2. Arius and the Arians,* who . . . most vehemently attacked the *homoousia* [consubstantiality] of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, from which the Arians were also called *Triusians* by Fulgentius. . . 3. *The Tritheists,* who, in order to avoid the heresy of Sabellius, spoke of three gods or three divine essences, one being-essentiate, two being-essentiated. . . 4. of the ancient and recent *Photinians*, who deny the mystery of the Trinity, from which they are rightly called *Antitrinitarians*; i.e., they deny that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinguished in persons in such a way that they are nevertheless that one true God." (L. c. c. 9. s. 2. q. 1. f. 493.) The *Swedenborgians* are to be added.

# § 30.

Then II. it is to be observed: Not only the Father,[(a)] but also the Son [(b)] and the Holy Spirit [(c)] are true and eternal God.

a) For the fact that He, whom Scripture calls the *Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,* is the true and supreme God, is conceded *today* by all who accept Scripture and is not further proven here.

b) They prove that the Son is true and by nature God with various arguments: I. That Scripture expressly calls Him *God* (the name God, however, *properly* understood, is the name of the divine *nature*, see above § 3 and note *b ,*

pp. 7–8), see *Acts 20:28,* where *Christ* is said *to have redeemed the church with His own blood.* This refers to Christ, the Son of God; for the Father and the Holy Spirit do not have blood in their persons—the Son alone is *ἔνσαρκος* [incarnate]. Other *epithets* are also added*,* confirming the proper meaning, e.g., that Christ, the *Son of God,* is called *true God (1* John *5:20),* that the same, *who is to appear* visibly at some time*,* is called the *great God (Titus 2:13),* that He is called *God blessed above all things forever (Romans 9:5).* (by which formula the supreme God is described *Rom. 1:25).*

II. From *a comparison of the statements of Scripture* in the Old and New Testaments, or, that what is explicitly said in the Old Testament about the supreme God is explained in the New about Christ, the Son of God; for example, the argument is: *He whom the Israelites tempted in the desert besides Moses is the true and eternal God,* which is proven from *Numbers 21:5-6.* But Christ is He *whom the Israelites tempted in the desert besides Moses,* according to *1 Cor. 10:9.* Therefore, *Christ is true God.* Similarly: *He whose glory Isaiah saw* (ch. 6, 1 ff.) *is the true God.* But *Christ is He whose glory Isaiah saw* (then)*,* which is proven from *John 12:40-41.* Therefore, He is the *true God.* In the same way, the following passages can also be compared: *Ps*. *68:19* with *Eph. 4:8.* For in *former*, the one who *ascended on high and gave gifts to men, etc.,* is called *God,* יה *(v. 5),* and Lord κατ' ἐξοχήν אֲדֹנָי v. *12. 18, 20,* the *God of Israel v. 9,* astonishing works wrought for the people proceeded, v. 8 ff. In the *latter*, however, that same one is shown to have been *Christ*. Likewise Ps. *97:7; Ps. 45:7; Ps. 102:26. Ps. 110:1,* with *Heb. 1:6, 8, 9, 10, 13.* Indeed, He who in the Psalms is 1) presented *to be adored by the angels of God* and is expressly called יְהוָה *(v. 1);* whose *throne* 2) is eternal, yet He Himself is called *God*; who 3) is described as *having laid the foundations of the earth* and created *the heavens*, *unchangeable* in his *being*; and who was already called by the name יהוה in verse 1; who 4) is said to *sit at the right hand of God*: the same is taught *passages of Hebrews*. to be *the Son of God*. Finally*, Isa. 40:3* and *Mal. 3:1***,** with *Matt. 3:3, Mark 1*:*3, Luke 3:4, John 1:23.* The prophets testify that he, for whom *the way* was *to be prepared*, is Yahweh himself. The evangelists, however*,* teach that this same one is *the Christ*. To posit *a subordination, dependency*, or *likeness,* or some other thing of this sort, under the name of *accommodation*, in this matter, so that one need not concede identity and equality, is foreign to the Christian religion. Cf. *Hackspan, Disp. de Accommod*. in *Sylloge Disp*. p. 417.

III. An argument is drawn from *the generation* of the Son by God the Father in this way: Whoever is begotten of the substance of God the Father is true and eternal God. But Christ, the Son of God, is begotten of the substance of God the Father. The major is evident from the light of nature, which teaches us that *the begetter* and *the begotten,* if *properly* so called, are of the same essence; so that it is a contradiction to be begotten of someone, *properly* speaking, and yet not to have the same essence. The minor is proven from *John 1*:*14, 18. ch. 3:16,* where Christ is called the Son *μονογενής, unigenitus,* that is, begotten, without a figure of speech, *not* merely *beloved,* or *begotten improperly,* adopted, etc. Cf. *Rom. 8:32* and *John 5:18,* where He is called the Son of God *ἴδιος, proper.*

IV. From the divine *attributes* (which we see in § 5, note *b.,* do not really differ from the divine essence*)*, assigned to Christ, such as: 1) *eternity,* described in *John 1:1*, as existence *ἐν ἀρχῇ, in the beginning* (not *in a derivative sense,* by reason of creation, or the restoration of mankind, but *absolutely),* so that before the *λόγος,* or the Son of God, nothing at all plainly existed, but He Himself *existed from the beginning πρὸς τὸν θεὸν, with God* (the Father), so that neither did He exist before the *λόγος,* but the *λόγος* coexisted with Him from eternity. Conf. *Rev. 1:8,* where for the same reason as in verse 4 above. God the eternal was described (see above § 13, note *d.),* of Christ it is said: *ὁ ὢν, καὶ ὁ ἦν, καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, who is, who was, and who is to come,* and it is added in the person of Christ: *I am the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end,* and v. 11. *the first and the last,* without beginning, because He is the beginning of all things that are, and without end, because He Himself is the end of all. Conf. *Heb. 1:11,* where the eternity of God, described in *Ps. 102*, is attributed to Christ. 2) *Omniscience, John 21:17: Lord, you know all things,* cf. ch. *16:30.* Also that *in Christ* are *all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, Col. 2:8,* and that Christ is the *searcher of hearts* (which is proper only to divine omniscience; see § 15, note *e,* p. 29 ff.), *Matt. 9:4; John 2:24-25. 1 Cor. 4:5.* 3) *Omnipotence, John 10:28,* where He Himself says that *no one* can *snatch His sheep* (His faithful) from His *hand,* namely because His power surpasses every finite power, and *Revelation 1:8,* where it is expressly said *παντοκράτωρ, omnipotent.*

GERHARD: "Observe, it must be prudently distinguished between the passages which speak of the communication of the divine essence to Christ by the eternal generation according to His divine nature, and those which speak of truly divine and infinite gifts, personally communicated to Him according to His human nature; However, from the latter of these two kinds of statements, no less than from the former, the true divinity of Christ can be proven consequently and *by extension*. For unless the human nature were personally united *to the Word*, that is, unless Christ in the unity of person were true God and true man, the human nature could not have been made partaker of that dignity through the communication of the idioms." (Exeg. 1. IV. § 48.)

V. From truly divine *works* (which argue for divine nature and perfections in the one who works them), ascribed to Christ as the principal cause; such as 1) the *creation* of this universe, *ποίησις τών πάντων, John 1:3. Col. 1:16,* so that not only are all things said to have been produced *through Him* (just *as through* the Father, not certainly as a less principal cause, but as the principal one, as Paul says He was called *Gal. 1:1),* but also in the dative case, He Himself is said to have created all things*, Heb. 1:10,* from *Psalm 102:26: Thou, Lord!* (O Son of God, v. 8!), *in the beginning didst lay the foundations of the earth*, etc. 2) The *preservation* of this universe, as in Col. *1:17,* where all things created through Him are said to *consist (συνιστάναι)* and, so that they do not dissolve or collapse, to be held together by His power. And *in Heb. 1:3* it is said of Him that *He φέρων τὰ πάντα, that He carries* or sustains all things, lest they should fall and perish. 3) The *resurrection of the dead* and long-buried, and this of His own free will, and thus in the manner of a principal cause, *John 5:21, 28, 29.* And to this also pertains 4) the *crushing of the serpent's head,* or the destruction of the devil's kingdom and power, which is ascribed to *the seed of the woman*, or the promised Messiah, *Gen. 3:15.* For this is truly a divine work, and it was fitting that the Almighty God should be the one to accomplish it; as also He taught, and showed that the mystery of the Trinity could be demonstrated by several arguments from the Old Testament, *Musaeus* in his collected manuscript *Quaest. illustrium L. de Deo* Q. I.

VI. From the fact that true divine *worship* (which God *denies He will give to another* who is not the true God, *Is. 42:7; c. 48:11*) is ascribed to Him as equal with God the Father — e.g., *Joh. 5:23*, where *all* are commanded to *honor the Son just as, καθώς, they honor the Father*, not with a different kind of worship that could not but be dissimilar. Cf. Heb. 1:6 and 8.

QUENSTEDT: " Chemnitz in LL. Theol. loc. de Filio Dei p. 52. sq. divides the heretics who attacked the truth of Christ's divinity into *three classes*. In the *first* order are the ***ανυπόστατοι*** (*anypostatoi*), who held that the Son of God, before His birth from Mary, did not have a subsistence, but was in the Father, as a sentient and intelligent power is in the soul; such were *Ebion* and *Cerinthus, Paul of Samosata,* and *Photinus,* whom today the Mohammedans and *Socinians* follow. In the *second* order are the ***έτεροουσιοι*** (*heteroousioi*), who acknowledged in Christ a nature higher than human, but denied that he was ***όμοουσιον*** (homoousion) and consubstantial with God the Father. The leader of these was *Arius* in the fourth century. In the *third* order are the ***ανόμοιοι*** (*anomoioi*), who said that Christ was of the same substance as the Father, but not of the same power as Him. Such were *Aetius* and his disciple *Eunomius.* "(L. c. c. 9. q. 6. f. 524.)

c) That the Holy Spirit is a true and eternal God, is likewise proven:

I. From the *words* of Scripture, by which He is expressly called God; as Peter*,* in *Acts 5:3*, calls the *Holy Spirit* the God *to whom* Ananias, apart from the apostles and above all, *had lied*, or to whom he had dared to offer his falsehood as truth, and then immediately in verse 4 He calls Him *God* Himself. Paul*, in 1 Corinthians 3:16-17*, says that the faithful are *the temple of God* because *the Spirit of God dwells* in them as in a temple. He therefore indicates that the Holy Spirit is God. Cf. *2 Samuel 23:2,* where David says: "*The Spirit of the Lord spoke in me, and His word was on my tongue."* However, verse 3 adds: "*The God of Israel said to me, 'The Rock of Israel has spoken to me*,' etc." Therefore, He teaches that the same one whom He calls the Spirit of the Lord is the Lord Himself.

II. From a *collation* of the passages of the Old and New Testaments, in this way: *He who spoke to Isaiah, and commanded him to go to the people, etc., (Isa. 6:9), is the true and highest God. But the Holy Spirit is He who spoke to Isaiah,* 'according to *Acts 28:25.' Therefore* the Holy Spirit is true God. Likewise: *He who spoke through David, Ps. 95:8, 9, 10, 11, is the true and highest God,* according to v. 1 and following up to 7. But *the Holy Spirit is the one who spoke* (those words) *through David,* which is stated expressly *in Hebrews 3:7-10.* Therefore, He is the true and supreme God. However, what we warned above in note *b.* η. II. concerning *accommodation* must be repeated.

III. From truly divine *attributes*, e.g. 1) *immensity,* which is ascribed to the Holy Spirit *Ps. 139:7: "Whither shall I go from your Spirit?*" etc., that is, I shall go nowhere where your immense Spirit is not. 2) *Omniscience,* which is attributed to him *1 Cor. 2:10,* namely, that *He searches, έρευνα,* not that it strives to know successively and with some labor or trouble, but that it plainly penetrates and, with no one else revealing, knows accurately by Himself *the depths of God,* all the secret senses and counsels of the divine mind, so that nothing is hidden or remains obscure.

IV. From truly divine *works*, e.g. 1) *creation,* which *Job* mentions in chapter 33:4, saying*,* "*The Spirit of God,"* he says*, "has made me, and the breath of*

*the Almighty has given me life*." And David *in Psalm 33:6,* proclaims that *by the Spirit of the mouth* of God *all the host of heaven* was *made*. 2) The *voluntary bestowal* and *distribution*, as from the principal efficient cause, of spiritual gifts to ministers — and not only of common gifts, but also extraordinary and very miraculous, which are attributed to the Holy Spirit (*1 Cor. 12:11)*. 3) *The governance* of the church and the *appointment of bishops,* or ministers of the church, *(Acts 20:28).*

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. The practice of the Praxeas, Sabellians, Noetians, and Samosatenes in the second and third centuries, who admitted only one person in the Godhead, and of the *Macedonians,* who held the Holy Spirit to be only a certain motion or created quality. ... 3. the *Socinians,* who vehemently attack the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit, stating that the Holy Spirit is not a divine person or supreme God, but is a certain power of God, common to the Father and the Son and existing in both, naturally in the Father, but in the Son by the benefit and grace of God." (L. c. q. 10. f. 560.)

THE SAME: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of *Arius* and the Arians, who said the Holy Spirit was a creature of the Word, i.e., of the Son of God, and thus a *κτίσμα κτίσματος*, a creature of a creature, as attested by Epiphanius and Theodoret. 2. The *Macedonians,* who were peculiarly called *πνευματομάχοι* (*pneumatomachoi*, fighters against the Spirit), because they were chiefly occupied in assailing the divinity of the Holy Spirit, saying, 'That He is a mere creature.'" (L. c. q. 11. f. 564.)

ANTHITHESES OF THE MODERN WRITERS.

KAHNIS: "What reason and Scripture demand, an absolute Personality, finds its truth in the fundamental doctrine that the *Father* is the divine *primal Personality*. . . If the Father is the divine primal Personality, the Son has proceeded from the divine primal Personality in a mysterious way, then it is already stated here without a doubt *that the Son is God only in the second sense of the word.* . . . The symbols and rules of faith express most definitely that the *Father* is *God in the only and proper sense of the word*, by calling only Him God." (*Die lutherische Dogmatik*. Vol 1. 2nd Ed. Leipzig 1874. p. 351. 361. 399.) "In the New Testament, Jesus Christ, in consciousness of His pre-eternal being (John 17:5), *thus not as a man,* but as *the Logos* made flesh*,* calls His *Father* the *only true God (τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν Θεόν),* expressly *distinguishing Himself,* the messenger of God, *from Him.* Where God is in the subject, the Father is always meant. . . No one (!) will appeal to the passage 1 Tim. 3:16, since the reading *θεός* has been rejected by critical scholarship." (p. 353) . . . "In the doctrine that the Son and the Spirit have their ground of origin in the Father, it lies with logical necessity that the *Father,* who has no ground in anything else *(ἀγεννησία),* is *God in the only sense of the word*." (p. 400.) "In and of itself, however, this name *(Son of God)* does *not* express *the divine personality* of Jesus Christ. This lies in the attributes which Jesus attributed to Himself, and which the apostles attributed to Him." (p. 360) "Finally, in the concept of a divine personality which becomes human in order to bear humanity forever as its nature, it lies that it cannot be equal to the original personality, which, being unchangeable as it is, cannot receive finitude within itself, as indeed. Jesus Christ *submits* to the divine original personality not only in individual words (John 5:19 ff., 10:29, 17:3 ff.), but in his entire attitude toward the Father.*"* (p. 362.) "In any case, this mysterious origin of a

divine personality from God is different from creation and in Col. 1:15 is only connected (!) with creation insofar as the *generation of the Son* formed *the transition to creation*." (p. 361) "What is certain, however, is that Scripture says nothing about the origin of the *Holy Spirit* from God. The judgment of the Church concerning the origination of the Spirit, that He proceeds from the Father (*εκπορεύεται*), has its scriptural basis (?) in the words of John 15:26, which, however, as noted, signify the economic procession of the Holy Spirit." (p. 367) "One often appeals to the word *ὁμοοῦσιος,* which was ascribed to the Son at Nicaea and Constantinople. But this word had a very different meaning. . . This word is only to express that the personality of Jesus was of *a divine nature* in the same way as that of the Father... We see here clearly that the Homousia was *not coordination*." (p. 379, 380) "It is only inherent in the concept of each person that, being a distinct 'I' with the powers of thought, will, and feeling, it *possesses the divine attributes in a distinctive way.* To have failed to recognize this is a major deficiency of the older theologians. The properties were conceived of as a possession common to the three persons. But then how could one attribute a divine nature to Christ, one intimately united with the human, if this nature was at the same time that of the Father and the Spirit? One was then compelled to proceed to the doctrine of an incarnation of the Godhead, which is nevertheless contrary to Scripture (!) and Church teaching (!)." If the properties are the moments of the divine personality, but the Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct personalities, then each of the three persons must also possess the divine properties in a distinct way." (p. 404.) "Before the foundation of the world, the Son and the Spirit were with the Father. *Was there a heavenly time before the world, when the Son and the Spirit did not yet exist?* Whether the process of begetting and breathing has ceased with the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit? How do begetting and breathing differ? *These are questions that cannot be answered*." (p. 403.) "Since Petavius, the father of dogmatic history, it has been generally conceded that the *pre-Nicene Fathers* subordinated the Son and the Spirit to the Father. To this, however, more recent scholars (Baur, Dorner, Ullmann) have added the certain (!) result that even the Nicene (!) Fathers teach a subordination of the Son." (p. 398.)

SAME: "Thus the Father is greater than the Son. The Son, who is *God* in *a manner* conditioned by the Father—hence *secondary*—can never be the Father. Not to be equal to God *(ἶσον εἶναι Θεῷ),* but to be godlike in being *(ἶσα εἶναι Θεῷ*)—that is, the primordial simplicity of life flowing from the divine original personality (1 Tim. 5:15)—this was what the pre-human Christ could possibly have desired." (L. c. I, 461.)

HOFMANN: "According to this most obvious interpretation, *ὁ λόγος* is a designation for the proclaimed Jesus Christ and not for a pre-worldly and super-worldly being." (*Schriftbeweis* I, 102.) "The passage (Luke 1:35) states that the child, who receives the beginning of His life in Mary through the power of God, *is called the Son of God for that reason.* We oppose this valid explanation of the sense in which Jesus is called the Son of God to the dogmatists, who deny that He is so called because of his conception by the Holy Spirit (see Quenstedt, *Syst*. II, p. 570 ff.), and who rather distinguish a twofold generation, an eternal generation, through which He has what makes Him the Son of God, and a temporal generation, through which He has what makes Him man or the Son of man. . . It is precisely the *man* Jesus who, on the basis of the relationship God established with Him at the beginning of His life, calls Himself the Son of God and God his Father in an exclusive sense, and

is called the Son of God by His own people." (p. 114.) "Where it (the Scripture) speaks of the generation of the Son, we have seen above that it does not mean an eternal, but a historical event. And so it is with the procession of the Holy Spirit." (p. 176. sq.) "If, then, it appears that Scripture teaches the Trinitarian relation in God as eternal only by way of the historical, and that it does not name it after how it is eternal, but after how it is a historical relation; then the further proof is also already provided that, according to Scripture, the internal-divine relation is not to be conceived without the relation of God to man, and that it is therefore scriptural to teach that the internal-divine relation exists *for* the relation of God to man, or, *that God is three-in-one in order to be the God of man.* For as a historical event, we find it in Scripture only in connection with the history that takes place between God and man, but as *an eternal event*, we find it taught only apart from its historicity. *Consequently, as an eternal event*, *it stands in the same relation to the eternal will of God,* which is fulfilled in the history between God and man, as it does as a historical event to that history itself." (p. 177. sq.) "Thomas had already recognized and greeted the Risen One with the joyful exclamation: *ὁ κύριός μου καὶ ὁ Θεός μου.* That this exclamation is meant for Jesus, and cannot be understood as referring to God the Father, no longer needs to be proven. . . The *Lord,* whom he had often called such, had now become *God* to him: *not in the sense that he recognized in Him the subject ὁ θεός, but he gave Him the predicate θεός.* And he gave it to Him in the sense in which it shone forth from the fact of His victory over death." (p. 126.) "The man Jesus Christ, who, when the world and time began, was *with* God, was of course, before He became man, God, and, when the world came to be, mediated its coming into being and God's creating through Himself. As Mediator, however, He is designated by *δι' αὐτοῦ*, just as it is also said of Him that He was *with* and *thus* God. Because He can be distinguished from the one who is *God*, the *Father,* and is called the Mediator, as the one who became man in the world and has God for His God, therefore and accordingly He also wishes to be designated as the one mediating the relationship of God to the world, and thus to be *distinguished from God the Creator*. One will, of course, now oppose the passages where *Jehovah* and Christ *supposedly* appear as one and the same person. The most extensive passage of this kind would be the Old Testament quotation in Hebrews 1:8-9, if the Son were really addressed here with *ὁ θεός*; in that case, not only would the Son be named Jehovah, but would also be distinguished from Jehovah." (p. 147.)

## § 31.

Finally, III. it must be observed that *the Father*, *the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not three Gods*, *but one God.*

For we have already taught above in § 8 that God is *one,* and that there is no other besides him. Therefore, since it has been shown that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are the true God, it immediately follows that they are one God, not many gods.

QUENSTEDT: "God *is not divided into three persons,* but three persons, *distinct from one another, indivisibly participate* in that one, numerically unique, indivisible, and infinite *essence;* so that each person has the same

essence without its multiplication or division; for in this mystery there is given *ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος*, one and another, *ὑποστατικῶς* [hypostatically], not *ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο*, one thing and another thing, *οὐσιωδῶς* [essentially]." (L. c. s. 1. th. 20. f. 469.)

CALOV: "The catholic faith concerning the Trinity does not consist precisely in this formula of speech, that there are three *persons* in that one divine *essence,* but in this, that we sincerely believe that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God, yet so that the Father is not the Son, but is other than the Son, nor is the Holy Spirit the Father or the Son, but is other than the Father and the Son; according to the Athanasian Creed, God is the Father, God is the Son, God is the Holy Spirit, and yet not three Gods, but one is God, so that in all things we may venerate the Unity in the Trinity and the Trinity in the Unity." (System, loc. th. Tom. III, p. 4.)

J. EBART: "The persons of the Trinity are indeed, in reality, nay, most truly distinct from one another, but so *that each person is that entire divine essence and none of them is any part of it.* For God subsists *in* three persons, not composed *from* them.'" (Enchir. th. 1662. p. 76. sq.)

Hollaz: "The Socinians insist: Wherever the whole essence of God is, there the whole Trinity is. But in each divine person, etc. Therefore. I answer: Wherever the whole essence of God is *under all three modes of subsistence*, *there* the whole Trinity is, I grant. But one divine person has the essence of God not under three, but under *one* mode of subsistence. For God the Father subsists *ἀγεννήτως* [unbegottenly], God the Son *γεννητῶς* [begottenly], and the Holy Spirit *κπορευτῶς* [processionally] (*Exam. th*. P. I. c. 2. q. 55. p. 347.)

## § 32.

To express this mystery more distinctly [(a)] and to exclude the sophistries of heretics,[(b)] the ancient Christians, the Westerners or Latins, said that there are *three persons in one* divine *essence*, while the Easterners or Greeks said that there are *τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις καὶ μίαν οἰσίαν* [three hypostases and one essence];[(c)] just as the Nicene Fathers, in a special way, decreed concerning the Son that He is, or ought to be acknowledged as *ὁμοούσιον* [consubstantial] with the Father, that is, *co-essential* or of the *same substance.*[(d)]

a) That is, so that, while maintaining the unity of God, the real distinction between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as being of the same nature and equal in dignity, would be signified in clear terms.

GERHARD: "The rashness of those who use new words not yet received by the church in explaining this mystery is not to be approved. We ask for a reason: 1. from the apostle's precept, 1 Tim. 6:20: 'Guard the deposit, avoiding *τὰς βεβήλους καινοφωνίας,* the profane novelty of words.' (Some read *κενοφωνίας,* since there is the greatest kinship between these words, as between the things signified, the new being often even vain, Acts 17:21.) 2. From the manifold inconvenience which follows that rashness. For it gives opponents an opportunity to slander, it sows seeds of dissension in the Church, suspicion of singularity arises, etc. *On the contrary, it is the mark of a moderate mind, since the church not only reverently feels but also speaks,* and it is the duty of obedient children not to disdain their mother's voice. Augustine, *lib. X. de Civitate Dei*, chapter 23: 'Philosophers speak in plain terms, and they do not fear offending pious ears with matters that are most difficult to understand; but for us, it is permissible to speak according to a certain rule, lest the license of *words* also generate an impious opinion about the *things* they signify.'" (*Exeg*. 1. III. § 45.)

LUTHER: "It is perhaps not a very fine German, nor does it sound elegant, to call God by the word *'Trinity'* (just as the Latin 'Trinitas' does not sound fine), but since we have no better word, we must speak as best we can. For (as I have said) this article is so far above human understanding and language that God, as a Father, must be pleased with His children stammering and babbling as best they can, so long as the faith is pure and right. For one still wants to say with this word that it is to be believed that the divine majesty is three distinct persons of one true substance." (*Kirchenpostille*. *Ep. D. Trin*. XII, 830.)

b) Of these, *some* said that only the Father is the true God, that the Son is a creature, that the Holy Spirit is a creature made through the Son, or a gift of God in men; *others,* that only different names are attributed to that one and eternal God on account of different respects, but that in reality the Father is the same as the Son and the Holy Spirit, they determined, each with various sought-after evasions, by which they would subvert the light of the said Scriptures and defend and commend their own errors.

c) For although the Greeks and Latins contended with one another for some time, and the *former* indeed thought that by the name *'person'* among the Latins an *office* or external *habit* was designated, and therefore that three persons did not imply or express a real distinction of the Father, of the Son and the Holy Spirit, while the Latins, however, would think that *ὑπόστασιν* in the nominative case denotes the very essence, so that, by admitting three *ὁποστάσεις,* three essences must be posited: later, however, when they understood each other more correctly, it came about that the Greeks said *τρία πρόσωπα* and the Latins three *hypostases.*

LUTHER: "We have to use the little word *'Person*,' just as the Fathers also used it; for we have no other." (Ad Joh. 1:2. VII, 1407)

d) That is, who is of one and the same essence with another, not in species, but in number. For the divine essence cannot be multiplied after the manner of a species in several individuals, but is unique and most singular. Therefore the Son must be *ὁμοούσιον* to the Father*,* of the same essence as the Father by number, not by species; although things that are the same by number are also one by species, namely, where a multiplicable nature exists in several places. See what I have discussed in *Disp. de concilio Nicaeno* § 72 ff. to 78 and *Disp. de Paulo Samosateno* chap. IV, last §, pp. 55–56.

SCHARFF: "A numerical one is called *a one by number,* which is counted as one, and is therefore determined by a numerical unit. Thus every individual is called a one by number; as Peter, this man, this whiteness, Bucephalus. It is called an individual one, a singular, this something. It is defined by others as follows: *A one by number* is that which is so one that, according to its being a whole, it cannot be divided into several entities, such as it is. — *A one by genus* are those things which are under one genus, whether a proximate or a remote one; or those which agree in the same genus and have opposite differences, such as species. Thus man and beast are one in genus, namely in animal; thus temperance and fortitude are one in genus, namely in virtue; thus the heavens and the elements are one in respect of the body. They are of *one species*, whose essence and definition is one, or which have the same specific nature. Thus all men are of one species. Similarly, this or that horse is said to be one in specific essence, although there are many individuals in number." (*Metaphys*. p. 44. 48.)

LUTHER: "Homoousios means one and the same substance or nature, or one substance and not two substances, as the Fathers had established at the Council and as it is sung in Latin, Consubstantialis, and some later called it Coëxistentialis, Coëssentialis. Such a thing they (the Arians) had accepted at the Council of Nicaea and still accept it, whenever they have to speak before the emperor and the fathers. But among their own people they fought it very hard; they pretended that such a word was not in Scripture, held many councils, even in the time of Constantine, so that they might weaken the Council of Nicaea, brought about much disaster, and afterward things so difficult for our people that even Saint Jerome, alarmed by it, wrote a lamentable letter to the Bishop of Rome, Damason, and began to demand that the word Homoousius be scratched out. For I do not know (he said), what poison there is in that letter that the Arians make such a fuss over it. And there still exists a Dialogue, in which Athanasius and Arius argue before a magistrate, Probus, about this word Homoousius. And when Arius pressed hard that such a word was not in Scripture, Athanasius in turn, with the same skill, trapped Arius and said, "These words are also not in Scripture: 'innascibilis, ingenitus Deus,' that is, 'God is unborn,'" which the Arians had used to prove that Christ could not be God because He was born, whereas God was unborn, etc. And the prefect Probus judges against Arius. For it is true, one should teach nothing in divine matters outside of Scripture, as St. Hilary writes in *1. de Trinit*. This means nothing other than that one should *teach* nothing else. But that one should not use more or different words than are in Scripture cannot be maintained, especially in a dispute and when heretics want to falsify matters with blind groping and pervert the words of Scripture; it was necessary to summarize the meaning of Scripture, which is set forth with many passages, into one short, summary word, and to ask whether they held Christ to be homoousion, as the meaning of Scripture is in all the words which they had perverted among their own people with false glosses, but had freely confessed before the emperor and in the Council. Just as if the Pelagians wanted to entrap us with this word, 'original sin,' or 'the plague of Adam,' because such words do not stand in the Scripture; yet the Scripture powerfully teaches the meaning of those very words, as: that we are conceived in sins, Ps. 51, 7., all by nature children of wrath, Eph. 2:3., and all must be sinners for the sin of one, Rom. 5:12." (*On Councils and the Church*. 1539. XVI, 2702. sqq.)

GERHARD: "It cannot be proven simply and without the addition of a convenient interpretation, that *Calvin*, in Book 1 of his Institutes, chapter 13, section 15. writes: ‚If only the names (of the Trinity, *ὁμοουσίας* etc.) were buried, it would be established that this faith is common to all: that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God.' Of course, that must be understood with regard to the occasion and origin of these appellations, which was a heretical perversity, and not with regard to the use of the appellations themselves." (L. c. § 43.)

## § 33.

By the name *essence* or *ουσία* (*ousias*) is understood the divine nature itself, such as it is in itself absolutely, which, together with the attributes, is most simply one and singular, [(a)] and thus also of the three persons there is only one. [(b)]

a) According to what we have said in § 5, sqq.

b) Thus, in the same way, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit each have one *intellect* by which they understand, one *will* by which they will, and one *power* by which they operate outside the divine essence. Cf. *John 5:19.*

CHEMNITZ: "The *essence* of men is something communicable, but it is a universal name which in itself does not truly exist, but is gathered only by cognition and comprehended by the intellect. The essence *in the divine*, however, is not some imaginary thing, like a genus or a species, but truly exists, although it is communicable. *Augustine* elegantly expressed this. 'Essence,' he says, 'is predicated of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit not as a genus of species, nor as a species of individuals, nor as a whole of parts, but in some other ineffable and incomprehensible way.' For in this entire article, that rule of Augustine must be diligently observed: "If you cannot find out what God is, yet be careful not to think of Him as that which He is not." Therefore, the Church understands by the name 'essence' not a universal name, as philosophers call human essence, but a truly existing divine nature, which is communicable and common to the three persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. and is whole in each. And this is only a definition of the name, says Nazianzus. As for what it is, with regard to the definition of the thing, I say that this is unknown, except that we say that the attributes placed in the definition of God are the very essence of God Himself." (*L. th. de Deo in specie*, c. 2. s. 4. f. 3G. sq.)

QUENSTEDT: "*Οὐσία* (Ousia) and *φύσις* (physis) are here taken for the same thing; *'for every ousia is called a physis,'* says Aristotle, Metaphys. IV. Synonyms of divine *οὐσίας* in the Scriptures are: *θεῖα φύσις*, 'divine nature,' 2 Pet. 1:4; *θεότης*, 'deity,' Col. 2:9; *θειότης*, 'divinity,' Rom. 1:20. But the most common appellation among the doctors of the church is *οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ* and divine essence (the essence of God). — The word *οὐσία* does not exist in the Holy Scriptures; nevertheless, because it was in the mind of Holy Scripture, it was used by the orthodox fathers at the Council of Nicaea, and was thus later explained at the Chalcedonian Council that *φύσις* denoted more than *οὐσία.* For *essence* is the simple constitution of any thing, devoid of all its properties and accidents; *nature,* or *φύσις*, is the essence already clothed and joined with those properties. Therefore the fathers said that in the one person of Christ there are not only the simple *οὐσίαι* themselves, namely the divine and the human, but also *φύσεις,* i.e., the very essences united with their true properties." (L. c. s. 1. th. 6. f. 459.)

DANNHAUER: "The distinction between *essence* and *person* . . . was taught both by this article and by the article on the person of Christ; as there in one essence three persons, so here in two natures one person was made known from heaven." (*Hodos. Phaen*. 3. B. p. 93.)

GERHARD: "They preferred to use the name essence rather than substance, a. to indicate that God is *ουσίαν υπερούσιον* [super-essential essence] not included in the categories, among which the first is substance. Damascene, Book I, ch. 12.: 'God is a kind of infinite ocean of substance.' See 1. *de nat. Dei* § 32. b. Because God does not subsist under accidents, as the essences of created things do, but the attributes are His very essence, c. Because the name substance is ambiguous, for it is sometimes used for *ουσία,* and sometimes for *ὑποστάσει* (hypostasei). So Hilary in *lib. de synod.* says, 'in God there are three substances,' i.e., persons, in which sense some also take what is said in the Latin version of Heb. 1:3, that the Son is the character of the substance of the Father." (*Exeges*. 1. III. § 60.)

# § 34.

By the name *person* or *ὑπόστασις,* just as elsewhere it signifies a suppositum [(a)] understanding itself, so here it indicates that three

are subsistences or personalities [(b)] in one divine essence, [(c)] and therefore three supposita, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

HUELSEMANN: "It should be noted, with regard to ecclesiastical writers, that they rarely, if ever, consistently used the words *ουσίας, ὕποστάσεως,* and 'person' with a single, uniform meaning." (Praelectt. in F. C. p. 258.)

a) By which name we comprehend the *nature* as the *material,* and its *subsistence* as the *formal*. But if you further ask what the Latin word for person or *suppositum* in the nominative case imports, whether nature itself or subsistence, difficulty will arise on both sides. For if the *former* is said, it does not appear how, having admitted three persons in one divine essence, it can be denied that there are three natures, or three divine essences. If the *latter* is admitted, this seems to be the same as if one were to say that "the *black thing*" in the nominative case denotes *blackness* itself. Therefore, perhaps it must be said that a person in the nominative case imports something *compounded from nature and subsistence,* just as in the concept of a material composite, from matter and substantial form, neither part of the composite is placed in the nominative case. See *Dr. Peter Musaeus*, *Introd. in Loc. de persona Christi*, § 43 and following. As for the Greeks, the word *ὕποστάσεως* denotes for them now precisely the very *subsistence*, now *the suppositum* or person; just as some Latins also sometimes used the word *substance*, when they defined person as substance; although we have otherwise been accustomed to call the very nature itself by the name of substance.

SCHARFF: "Suppositum and person are almost one and the same thing. For they differ at least in the reason of the nature or subject. So that *suppositum* is common, and is found in all complete substances ultimately *per se* subsisting, i.e., subsisting independently, whether they are rational or irrational. But *person* is only in rational and intelligent natures, completely subsisting, as in men, angels, and in God. . . Therefore, *person* is a stricter term than suppositum." (*Metaphys*. p. 252.)

AUGSBURG CONF.: "They use the name *'person'* in the sense in which the ecclesiastical writers have used it in this matter, to signify *not a part or quality* in another, but *that which properly subsists* [das selbst bestehet]." (Art. 1)

QUENSTEDT: "The word *ὑπόστασις* is taken either *concretely and materially*, as when it denotes both the thing itself and its mode, and also the essence marked with a hypostatic character, i.e., the person, in which sense Christ is called *χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως Θεοῦ,* i.e., of the Father, Heb. 1:3, — or *abstractly and formally,* as it designates the very personality or subsistence, which is the ultimate act, mode, or degree by which an intelligent nature subsists completely and incommunicably, which the Greeks call *τρόπον ὕπάρζεως,* the ultimate mode of subsistence or, as others express it, the entitative mode, which ultimately terminates and completes the substantial nature and gives it incommunicability. In this sense, the word *ὑπόστασις* is not found in Scripture, but it can be rightly deduced from the material meaning. . . A *person (taken concretely*) is *an individual substance* (to distinguish it from the universal) *that understands* (by this it differs from a suppositum, as the narrower from the broader; for every person is a suppositum, but not every suppositum is a person), *subsisting ultimately and immediately by itself* (to be distinguished from secondary substances, which subsist by themselves, but mediately and in first substances, i.e., individuals; also from the human nature of Christ, which is indeed an individual and

intelligent substance, but not a person, because it does not subsist by itself ultimately and immediately, but in *the Λόγος*); *incommunicable* (to another person, namely); *not sustained by or in another.* Some add *'living*,' but it is redundant and unnecessary, since it is included in the word 'intelligent'; for whatever is intelligent is also living, but not conversely." (L. c. s. 1. th. 8. 12. f. 460. sq.)

CHEMNITZ: "The term *ὑποστάσεως* or person is used differently in the church than in common speech. In men we know what a person is; what it is in angels, we understand. Peter, Paul, John are three persons, who have in common one human nature, but differ very much: 1. in substance, because each is distinct from the whole; 2. in time, as John is younger than Peter; 3. in will, as Paul contradicts Peter Gal. 2:11; 4. power; thus Paul labored more than the others (1 Cor. 15:10); 5. operation, as Peter worked among the circumcision, Paul among the Gentiles (Gal. 2:8). In the Trinity, however, the persons are not distinguished in the same way as an angel from an angel, or a man from a man, as Cyril says, where the whole Peter is locally distinguished from the whole Paul; but in John 14:10 Christ says: "I am in the Father, and the Father is in me." Likewise, among creatures it does not follow that where one person is, the others must also be, on account of the common nature; because one angel is in Persia, another in Greece (Dan. 10:13). The Son, however, says: "The Father does not leave me alone, but is with me," John 8:29. Likewise, in men and angels, as has been said, the persons differ in time, will, power, and operation; but in the persons of the Trinity there is coeternity, one will, one power, one operation. These are the words of Nazianzus and Cyril. And this distinction must necessarily be observed. For it is not merely a mystery, at which even the angels marvel, if it were so that there were one essence and three persons, just as Michael, Gabriel, and Raphael are three persons, to whom a single angelic nature is common and equally belongs. From these foundations, the common rule has been drawn: *The Divine Persons do not differ essentially,* as in creatures, where each one has its own proper being; *nor is there there only a distinction of reason*, as Sabellius maintained, but *they are distinguished really*, *though in a manner incomprehensible and unknown to us. . .* But if anyone wishes to cavil, let him have this answer, which Augustine says in Book I, Chapter 5 *de Trin*: "Human speech labors indeed under a great poverty." However, it was said that there are three persons, not that this might be asserted, but that it might not be altogether kept silent." (*Loc. th*. f. 36. sq.)

THE SAME: "Person is also not carried or sustained by another joined essence — as: you are a person, but your body alone is not a person, for it is sustained by a noble creature, namely the soul; and when the soul departs, the body dissolves and decays." (L. c. f. 37.)

REUSCH: "If it is said that the suppositum and person denote the nature in the nominative case, what the blessed author (Baier) supposes does not follow from this, namely, the multiplication of the nature for the number of the subsistences and persons. For if you say that the suppositum is the nature, insofar as it is determined by the complement of existence or subsistence, it does not necessarily follow that the nature is multiplied, e.g., triplicated, according to the number of subsistences; since it is not contradictory for *one* and the same *nature* to exist or subsist *in several modes* with the complement." (*Annotatt*. p. 90.)

b) And these subsistences are *relative*, not *absolute.* For they are founded on divine relations, of which more will be said shortly. The one and simple divine essence does not admit of more absolute subsistences. However, we acknowledge relative subsistences in God according to revelation; although reason, left to itself, knows nothing of such things.

c) So that no person and no subsistence differs from the divine essence in reality, but only in reason (which is evident from the simplicity of God); yet the persons are distinguished from one another among themselves by reason of their relative opposition in reality and without any operation of the mind.

## § 35.

Although the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are *not explicitly* called three *ὑποστάσεις*, *hypostases, persons,* or three supposita in the Scriptures, *the thing* itself, signified by these terms, is nevertheless contained in the Scriptures.

Indeed, those who do not wish to twist *the names* cannot deny that *the Father and the Son* are *persons*, but they acknowledge that they are founded on *a* true and real *generation*. Furthermore, the aforementioned *attributes*, especially those that have to do with operation, e.g., omniscience and omnipotence, and above all those *actions*—creation, preservation, resurrection (of which we have spoken above)—belong to supposita or persons, as *principles which*, according to the received canon. As for the *Holy Spirit*, *the works* proper to persons are predicated of Him no less properly than of the Son and the Father, e.g., that *He distributes gifts* to individuals *as He wills, 1 Cor. 12:11,* that *He comforts, reproves, teaches, John 14:16 and 26; 15:26; 16:8 and 13.* Here it is not permissible to invent a trope, as if to evade the mystery.

SCHARFF "Philosophers consistently teach that actions belong to the suppositum." (*Metaphys*. p. 337.)

B. MEISNER: "All actions and passions are most properly said of the suppositum itself, as the subject acting and suffering. For to every operation the existence of that which acts is required." (*Philos. sobr*. 1611. P. I. p. 310. sq.)

GERHARD: "Naked power does not belong to the mere faculty to assume a corporeal form, to appear in it, and to descend; for who has ever read, heard, or seen the mercy, wisdom, etc. of God appearing in some external form?" (*Exeges. loc*. III. § 82.)

## § 36.

Although, in this life, we cannot sufficiently understand or explain [(a)] how three persons can exist in one most simple essence, who are distinguished from the essence itself only by reason, yet are really distinct from one another; nevertheless, because both have been revealed, we rightly believe both. [(b)]

a) Indeed, if our reason here ventures to define anything (which, however, it ought not to do when the matter itself goes beyond its limits), it is so far from being able to bring a firm demonstration of this dogma from its own principles that, rather, it will *either* have brought in matters foreign to the question *or* will have slipped into manifest absurdity. (as *Musaeus* showed by the example of Barthol. Keckermann

in a special disputation, *φευδαποδείζει* [refutation of his false demonstration], which is annexed to the treatise on the *de Usu Princip. Rat.*, p. 661. sqq.), *or* it would deny or attack the mystery itself. (Which is evident from the example of the Socinians and the like.)

DANNHAUER: "Chemnitz admonishes that the whole of God's knowledge is to be handled with caution, chastity, and modesty; especially in the mystery of the Holy Trinity, an ineffable mystery, which is proper to the Church and is not to be sought outside of it. For although something concerning the *Logos* and the *Son of God* may have emanated into paganism, those are nevertheless plagiarisms, stolen from Moses and the prophets. There is no power of reason in this greatest mystery of the Trinity. Hilary (*De Trin*. 1.8) says excellently: 'This the Church understands; this the synagogue does not believe; this philosophy does not know: that from one there is one, and the whole from the whole God, and that the Son, neither by His birth deprived the Father of what He is in His entirety, nor by not being born deprived Himself of His own being.' Hence, those who have attempted something here from the light of reason—e.g., the scholastic summist Becanus and, after Lullus and Keckermann, more recently Bisterfeld—offer their adversaries nothing but scoffs and mockery. For example, the argument drawn from the communicability of the highest good is as easily solved by a pagan philosopher as a fox eats a pear. Good is diffusive, not as a fruitful mother is of offspring, generating its likeness from herself, but as the sun communicates itself to the world, not by begetting a new sun, but by giving out its rays; or like a coin in the hand of a liberal man, which is handed over to the needy without any new fruit of usury, remaining the same." (*Hodos. Phaenom*. III. p. 92.)

FECHT: "The arguments which are brought from reason to prove the mystery of the Trinity plainly prove the contrary." R. H. Rullius adds: "When Barthol. Keckermann, formerly Professor of Gdansk, 1. 1. *Syst. theol*. c. 3. wrote that the Trinity of persons proceeds from the very essence of God, and that God cannot be God unless He has three distinct modes of existing, or persons, to prove this very point, he assumed that it is proper to God to have an intellect and a will, whose acts are not accidents in God, but substances subsisting in the very divine essence, and therefore that through the intellect one person is produced, and through the will another. But to this reasoning, J. Musaeus opposed the following: It is unheard of to human reason that the intellect, by understanding itself, and the will, by loving itself, would produce persons distinct from themselves; indeed, reason will rather conclude the opposite from its own principles. For they seem to be in perpetual conflict with each other: that the essence of God is most simple, and yet that in it another person is produced by the intellect and another by the will. Indeed, if this were granted, though not conceded, infinite persons would have to be posited in God." (*Controversiarum Sylloge ed. by Rollio*. 1768. pp. 56, 59, sq.)

b) And we are certain that this does not involve a contradiction, although it may appear so to the reasoning of some men, who argue poorly from the nature and condition of finite things. Indeed, *every thought* must be taken *captive to obey Christ,* according to *2 Corinthians 10:5.*

KROMAYER: "There is no contradiction here, which some imagine, that God is one and three, but only an *ἐναντιοφανές*, i.e. an apparent contradiction, because the laws of legitimate opposition are neglected, namely the law *πρὸς αὐτό*, i.e. with respect to the same thing. If God were one in essence and triune in essence, or one and triune simultaneously in persons, then perhaps those on the opposing side would obtain something; but unity refers to the *πρὸς οὐσίαν,* i.e., the essence, and the Trinity refers *to the προς υποστάσεις,* i.e., to the persons." (*Theol. pos.-pol*. II. p. 65.)

LUTHER: "Holy Scripture teaches that God is most simply one and three (as they are called) persons most truly distinct. Each of these persons is the whole God, and there is no other God besides. Yet it cannot be said that any one person is God alone. For this would be the same as saying that there is no God, since with any one person

excluded, the whole God would be excluded, and with any one person excluded, the whole God would be excluded. Hence, the corrupt reason, to be captured by original sin, nay, to be extinguished, is with its own light and wisdom in obedience to faith. It is another thing to say, one person is the whole God, and one person alone is one God. How, however, the person is distinguished from the Godhead itself is not for reason to inquire, nor is it comprehensible to angels. Indeed, it is dangerous and to be avoided to suppose any distinction there, since any person is the very and whole God. The thinking of the Scotists and their like is futile and of no account, for they have fabricated a formula or some other distinction here. They do not know what they are saying or affirming, while they try to aid reason with such remedies of wisdom. For however subtly these things may seem to be said, reason nevertheless does not grasp that a formal distinction is other than a real or essential one. For reason cannot grasp that one indistinct thing is three distinct things. Therefore, mathematics and all the reasoning of the creature must be excluded from the belief in the Divinity. Although it seems no less impossible that one person of one simple essence should have become man without the others, it is in truth far more impossible that one indistinct thing should be three most distinct things. Therefore, to believe that the Son of God became man is less than to believe that He is of the same substance as the Father and the Holy Spirit. As for what dialectics argues, that it does not conform to its own rules, it must be said: "Let the woman keep silence in the church." No wonder, then, that Arius, the Jew, Mohammed, and the whole world deny that Christ is God." (*Disputation in 38 Sätzen*. 1545. Theses 1–18. Opp. Hal. X, 218–221. cf. Opp. lat. Jen. I, 534. sq.)

# § 37.

However, the divine persons are distinguished by personal *acts*, [(a)] personal *properties* [(b)] and personal *notions.*[(c)]

LOEBER: "We see the distinction of the divine persons in the personal effects (*actus personales*), also in the personal notions (*notiones personales*) and personal properties (*proprietates personales*) of the most holy persons of the Godhead. The *personal effects* are those effects within the divine essence (*opera ad intra*), by which one person of the most holy Godhead from another person of the divine essence has. There are two such effects: one, where God the Father eternally begets his Son (*generatio*), and the other, where God the Father and the Son eternally send forth the Holy Spirit from themselves (*spiratio active talis*). .. On these two personal effects are founded the *personal properties*, namely, that the first person is Father (*paternitas*), the second the Son (*filiatio*), and the third the Holy Spirit or the Proceeding One (*processio s. spiratio passive talis*, the term 'passive' being understood grammatically only). . . Finally, also belonging to the distinction of these most holy Persons are their *personal knowledge,* from which we can discern their personal properties; namely, in the first Person, that it is neither begotten nor proceeding from another (*innascibilitas et improcessibilitas*, insofar as it is neither begotten nor proceeding from another); in the second Person, that He is begotten by the first Person (passive generation as such); but as for the third, that it is not born, but proceeds from the Father and the Son (passive spiration in such a grammatical sense)." (*Ev.-luth. Dogm*. St. Louis u. Leipz. 1872. p. 201. 204. 205.)

a) They are also called *opera ad intra* [works inward], because they are terminated within the divine essence toward a certain person, which regards the other person (or

the others) as the producer (producers). And these are the *divided* works*,* i.e., not common to all persons of the Godhead, but proper to this or that one, by which they are opposed to the *works ad extra*, which, proceeding from the active power common to the three persons, terminate in an effect outside of God that is actually produced. Cf. *Mus., Disp. de Deo* (which is the third of those held in 1649) § 42. p. 70. Meanwhile, it is not to be denied that a certain *work ad extra,* or external work, is customarily ascribed to each of the divine persons in a special way, by which that person has manifested Himself peculiarly; just as *creation* is ascribed to the Father, *reconciliation* to the Son, *sanctification* to the Holy Spirit, even though each of these proceeds from the three persons: which the authors call *appropriation*. See *Mus.* 1. c. § 54, p. 75.

GERHARD: "Some distinguish as follows: *The works of the Trinity are threefold:* a. *ad intra,* b. *ad extra,* c. *mixed,* which *are πρὸς ἔσω* [inward] with respect to the terminus, *πρὸς ἔξω* [outward] with respect to the principle. The *first* are personal, the *second* essential, the *third* are both personal and essential. The *mixed* work is the Incarnation, which is efficaciously and inchoatively of the three persons, but formally and terminatively of the Son alone. From the passages of Scripture that speak of the work of the Incarnation, that distinction is clearly gathered. The Father sent the Son into the world. The Holy Spirit, supervening, sanctified those drops of blood and cleansed them from sin, from which the body of Christ was formed, so that what was to be born of Mary might be holy, and by divine power in the blessed virgin He worked, so that, contrary to the order of nature, she might conceive a fetus without a male seed. The Son descended from heaven, overshadowed the virgin, came in the flesh, became flesh, partaking of her, manifesting himself in her, assuming her into the unity of His person." (*Exeg*. 1.IV. § 103.)

FECHT: "Those who in the works ad extra assert any inequality of operation with respect to the divine persons, apart from the difference of order, harm the unity of the divine essence. John 5:17, 19. Creation, redemption, sanctification, while said to be appropriated to the divine persons, the reason for the appropriation cannot be sought except in the similarity of the order of works with the order of the persons." Rollius adds: "Therefore it cannot be said that the Father manifested Himself most principally in the work of creation, because no foundation for this manifestation is available. . . Because the Father is the first person of the Holy Trinity, it is fitting that the first divine work, which is creation, be appropriated to Him. And so it is with the others." (L. c. pp. 56, 61 sq.)

b) These are called by some notiones *συστατικαί* [*constitutive*] of each person in their being as such; namely, they are relations founded in personal acts.

c) They are certain principles of cognition by which the divine persons are conceived by us and distinguished from one another ‘*ad intra*’, or within the divine essence. And these notions, taken *more broadly,* also include the personal properties themselves; but when taken *more narrowly,* they are distinguished from them and are called, with the appropriate term*, σημαντικαὶ καὶ γνωριστικαὶ* notions*,* that is, *significative* or *indicative.*

## § 38.

There are two personal acts, the generation and the spiration.

# § 39.

Generation [(a)] is an action [(b)] ad intra, by which God the Father from His own substance [(c)] from all eternity [(d)] produced [(e)] the Son.

a) Not *tropically,* but said in a true and *proper sense*, just as the Father and the Son in the divine nature are not improperly, but properly called the Father and the Son. Cf. § 28, 29.

b) You might call it a *real* action, insofar as it has *a term* that is actually produced and distinct from the producer; although it is *not an effect* that recognizes an efficient cause from which it differs as one thing from another. And if you inquire more specifically about this action, it must be confessed that both the *action* itself *and the* active *power* of generating are inscrutable to us. For thus also *Gregory Nazianzus*, *Orat. I. de Filio, "Let the generation of God be honored with silence.",* p. m. 209. med. Compare *Cyril* of Jerusalem, *Catech*. XI, p. m. 118. E.

c) For this pertains to the formal concept of generation. However, this divine generation is not effected or was not effected *by means of a seed,* which is cut off from the substance of the generator; for the divine essence is not a material principle from which the Son was produced, but consists only in this, that that very essence, which is that of the generating Father, is perfectly communicated to the begotten Son. Cf. *Mus.* Disp. cit. p. 70.

d) Thus in *Psalm 2:7* God the Father says to the Messiah or Christ (see *Acts 13:33): "You are my Son; today I have begotten you,"* where the word היום denotes the most present and unique moment of eternity, where there is neither past nor future. Compare *Micah 5:2,* where the prophet says that the *goings forth* (the birth) of the Messiah are *from of old, from the days of eternity:* מימי מקרם עולם.

> HUELSEMANN: "Nor indeed, when in Acts 13:32-33 it is said that the sonship of Christ was fulfilled in his resurrection, it is denied that the Son Himself did not exist before the resurrection, but God is said *to have completed it*, to have brought it to the highest point with regard to notoriety and recognition, to which it is said in Ps. 2: 'You are my Son.' However, it does not follow that the time when Christ's sonship was fully revealed was also the time when it began." (*Vindiciae S. Scripturae*, p. 17.)
>
> SCHERZER: "It has been shown that the objection from Acts 13:33 is futile. The conclusion does not follow: the resurrection demonstrates that Christ is the Son of God; therefore Christ was begotten by God only through the resurrection. Just as it does not follow: the nourishment demonstrates that Peter is Paul's son; therefore Peter was begotten through nourishment." (*Syst. th*. p. 68.)

ANTITHESIS.

> HOFMANN: "With the Psalm passage (Ps. 2:7) is meant His first introduction into the world, and thus not the resurrection from the dead, nor any single event from the course of Jesus's history, but its beginning, his *Incarnation*." (*Schriftbeweis*, I, 113.)

e) That the Father, however, produced the Son by an act of the intellect, reflected upon itself (the intelligent God), or by *τό dicere, the act of speaking,* cannot be demonstrated or defended. See *Mus., Disp. cit. contra Keckerm*. § 9. sqq. pag. 662. sqq.

QUENSTEDT: "The eternal *generation* of the Son is an internal personal act, by which the eternal Father, *by communicating* the essence of the same number, begets the Son, who is of the same substance, from all eternity, truly and properly, yet in a hyperphysical and inscrutable manner. This generation of the Son of God is *not figurative and metaphorical*, as our mind generates concepts, but true and most proper. We argue thus: Wherever there is a communication of essence, implying the relation of father and son, there is generation properly so called and substantial; but such a one exists in the divine: therefore. This generation of the Son of God *is not effected by derivation or transfusion, nor by an action that begins and ends, but by an ineffable emanation,* for which there is nothing similar in nature. For God the Father *has begotten* His Son *from all eternity, always begets Him, and will never cease to beget.* For if the generation of the Son had an end, it would also have a beginning, and thus it would not be eternal. *Nor*, however, can this generation be called *imperfect* and *successive;* for the act of generation is considered *perfect in the work of* the Father and Son*, and perpetual in its operation.* Although this generation is the most proper and true, the very mode of its generation is unknown and ineffable to us. This divine generation can, however, be illustrated *by the analogy of the sun's rays, which flow from the solar body in perpetual dependence.* For just as the sun is not older than its rays, nor is the generating one temporally prior to the generated: so the eternal Father has eternally begotten the Son. And just as the sun generated its rays from the beginning and still generates them now and will continue to do so, yet from this it cannot be inferred that the generation of the sun's rays is not yet complete: so too God has eternally generated His eternal wisdom from all eternity and always generates it and will never cease to do so, yet for this reason it cannot be said that the generation of the Son is not yet complete. This seems to be what the Holy Spirit implies in Psalm 2:7, where the Father thus addresses the Son: 'You are my Son; *today* I *have begotten* you.' *By* these words, the generation of the Son is expressed *in the past tense,* yet it is said to be taking place *today,* because the Son's generation is *present* and *will never cease.* However, there is a great difference between these two; for the sun is a substance, but its rays are an accident; but the substance of the Son is the same as the substance of the Father." (L. c. c. 9. s. 1. th. 28. f. 473. sq.)

LUTHER: "Some admonish whether one should say: The Father has always begotten or begets the Son, or whether the Son has always been born or is always being born. Those who hold the latter mode of speaking argue that the Son of God must be said to have always been born, because the past tense denotes the perfect, while the present tense denotes the imperfect. Hilary and others dare to say that the Son is always being born from the Father and lives from the living and is born from the unbegotten. But I think this is more a grammatical or philosophical, and theological, controversy, by which the flesh or reason is moved. For it is certain that in the Godhead, since it is eternity itself, there is no place for grammar or philosophy, where the past, present, and future are the same. Therefore, the past tense 'born' of the Son does the same as the present 'is born,' and the future 'will be born.'" (L. c. Thesis 20—25.)

GERHARD: "(The adversaries) write: 'Know that generation from the essence of God is in every way impossible. For if Christ had been born of the Father's substance, he would have been born *either from a part* of it *or from the whole*; not *the former,* because the essence of God is most simple and indivisible, nor *the latter,* because the Father would no longer be the Father, since the essence of God is numerically one and therefore cannot be common to several.' *Resp.*: We hear again an argument not from the school of Christ, but from the principles of human reason. We say, therefore: 1. When an article of faith is proposed in Scripture in its own clear words, philosophical principles, however plausible, are not to be urged against it. 2. That principle, upon which the whole structure of the argument depends, only holds when the essence is finite; but it is plainly false where an infinite and immense essence is given. The Father, by begetting, communicates to the Son his entire and identical essence, yet neither is it lost by this communication, nor is anything diminished from it, precisely because it is infinite and immense. 3. What is more,

not even in natural things can this principle hold true in all respects. A man begets a man, light is kindled by light, and yet by generation a man loses nothing of his essence, nor does light lose anything by the act of kindling." (*L. th. de Deo Patre et Filio*, § 164.)

THE SAME: "At this point certain questions arise: I. concerning the divine nature of the Son. 1. Is the Son *αὐτόθεος (autotheos)?* The term is ambiguous; for *it is* either *opposed to the communication* of the divine essence, and thus we deny that Christ is *autotheos,* because He received the essence; or it is opposed to the *inequality* of the divine essence, and thus we concede that Christ is *autotheos.* Gregory of Valencia, *l. 1. de Trinit.* c. 22: 'The Son, as a person, is from another; as the most simple being, He is not from another.' Christ is truly God *by Himself*, but He is not God *from Himself*. . . Question 4: Can the *Father* be called the *cause of the Son?* The Greek Fathers use the terms *ἀρχή* and *αἰτία* interchangeably in this mystery, as appears from the Damascene, *l. 1. Orth. fid.* c. 9 and 11: ,*Ὁ υἱὸς¸ οὐκ ἄναρχος, τοῦτ' ἔστιν, οὐκ ἀναίτιος, ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς γάρ.'* [*The Son is not without beginning — that is, not without cause — for He is from the Father*] But the Latin church doctors repudiate the name of cause, and use the name *principle* alone, saying that the Father is a principle without a principle, the Son is a principle from a principle, hence the scholastics unanimously pronounce that the Father is not the cause of the Son, but *the principle;* that the Son is not the cause of the Holy Spirit, but the principle; for the term 'principle' is broader than 'cause,' to which it is related, like a genus to a species; for every cause is a principle, but not every principle is a cause." (*Exeg*. 1. IV. § 67. 70.)

QUENSTEDT: "Not only the act *of the intellect* through generation to the Son, nor only the act *of will* through spiration to the Holy Spirit, but the simplest, purest, and indivisible act *of the* divine *essence*, wholly in the Father and the Son, and the simplest and purest act of the divine essence, is communicated to the Holy Spirit, wholly in the Father and the Son." (L. c. q. 9. f. 562.)

THE SAME: "If the Son of God properly proceeds through *the intellect* and the Holy Spirit through *the will*, the persons of the Holy Trinity are not equal. For 1. it can be said that the person who proceeds through the intellect is, in this respect, unequal to the will, and that the one who proceeds through the will is, in the reason of the intellect, unequal. . . 2. No adequate reason can be shown why one person proceeds more by intellect than by will, and vice versa. Nor should that distinction be sought in the distinct operation of intellect and will, since the operation of both intellect and will is common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; but rather it arises immediately from *the* very *essence,* under the trope *of ὕπαρξις* [subsistence] proper to the Father, subsisting and determined to His person, insofar as He is referred to the Son and with the Son to the Holy Spirit through active generation and spiration, not insofar as intellect and will are conceived in God. And why is it not also said that a person proceeds through *power*, since the second person of the Holy Trinity is also called the power of God? 1 Cor. 1:24." (L. c. f. 555.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of some of the Fathers ... 3. Of the *Scholastics*... 4. *Philip Melanchthon,* who in the body of the doctrine of Meissen asserts: 'The Son of God is begotten by the Father by thought, because the Father, contemplating and considering Himself, begets a certain substantial and permanent image of Himself; just as our mind begets an accidental and evanescent one.' This dream of Philip was defended by his followers (the Philippists) as a certain dogma and article of faith." (L. c. f. 554.)

## § 40.

The procession is an action *ad intra*, by which God the Father and the Son [(a)] together [(b)] from their substance [(c)] from all eternity [(d)] produced [(e)] the Holy Spirit.

a) For 1) just as the Son is said *to send the Holy Spirit, John 15:26; Luke 24:49,* so it must be acknowledged that the *Son* also *breathes forth* the Holy *Spirit*, since the *mission* of a divine person is founded on *the* substantial *procession* of that same person from the sender, and no mode of proceeding other than *breathing forth* can be ascribed to the Holy Spirit. 2) Furthermore, the Holy Spirit is called not only the *Spirit of the Father, Matthew 10:20,* but also the *Spirit of the Son, Galatians 4:6; Romans 8:9; 1 Peter 1:11.* For the Spirit is called the Spirit of the person from whom He proceeds. (Cf. John 20:22; Isa. 11:4, coll. with 2 Thess. 2:8.) For 3) otherwise the relative opposition, and thus also the real distinction, between the Son and the Holy Spirit would be removed, unless the *Son* is the *one who spirates, and the Holy Spirit is spirated* by the Son.

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* In the third, i.e., in the age of the more recent doctors of the *Eastern Church*, Theophylact, Archbishop of Bulgaria, Michael Cerularius, abusively called Patriarch of Constantinople, and others, fiercely contended *that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone and in no way from the Son,* an error which the *Greek Church* still to this day tenaciously defends against the Latin, especially the Roman, Church. In the antithesis, therefore, the following are to be noted: 1. The *Nestorians,* who in the symbol produced at the Council of Ephesus, asserted that the Holy Spirit 'has not its subsistence through the Son, but from the Father alone.' 2. *More recent Greeks,* to whom the Muscovites, Russians, Armenians, as well as the Copts or Egyptians, Abyssinians, Syrians or Melkites, Jerusalemites and Chaldeans are to be added, who in this chapter on the procession of the Holy Spirit all conspire in denying His *ἐκπόρευσιν* [procession] from the Son (L. c. s. 2. q. 12. f. 573. sq.)

b) So that, although the Father and the Son are truly two supposita, they nevertheless produce the Holy Spirit by one and the same spirative virtue, in which sense the doctors have said that *the Father* and *the Son* have themselves as *one spirating principle* of the Holy Spirit.

GERHARD: "The Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father *indirectly,* through the intervention of the Son; for by this means He would be more proximate to one person than to the other; but he proceeds *immediately from both*, as from one essential source; For just as the Father and the *Word* are one in essence, so in producing the one and the same consubstantial Spirit they are one essential principle and one altogether in spiration under the unity of essence, yet so that the Father has that spirating faculty from Himself, while the Son receives it from the Father through the ineffable generation." (*L. th. de Sp. S.* § 87.)

c) For the spiration agrees with the divine generation in that it denotes the emanation of the breathed person from the breathing person within the divine essence; whereas generation signifies the emanation of the begotten person from the begetting person.

d) As the generation is eternal.

e) However, we do not dare to say that the Holy Spirit is breathed forth by an act *of the will* or *love*. Cf. *Mus., Disp. cit*. § 10. sqq. p. 664. sqq.

## § 41.

That the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit differ,[(a)] is certain; but the manner in which they differ, we cannot define more fully.[(b)]

a) Not only by reason *of the principle,* since the principle of the *generation* is the Father alone, for He alone is said to have begotten the Son, whereas the principle of the *procession* is the Father and the Son, according to the preceding §, notes *a and b,* but also by reason of the *term* produced. For we do not say that the *Holy Spirit is begotten* or *is the Begotten,* nor *that the Son is proceeding.* And although in the Scriptures the Son is said to *ἐξέρχεσθαι* [go forth], He is not said *to ἐκπορεύεσθαι* [proceed], but this is believed to be proper to the Holy Spirit.

b) Cf. *Gerhard* in *Loc. de Spiritu* S. § 71., *Aug., lib. 3. contra Maxim*, c. 14., *Nazianz.* in *Orat, de Spiritu S*., and elsewhere.

> KROMAYER: "I have professed that I do not know what it is to be born, what it is to proceed." (*Th. pos.pol*. II, 81.)
>
> THE SAME: "The Holy Spirit immanently emanates from the Father and the Son and immanently emanates." (L. c. p. 78.)
>
> DANNHAUER: "Does it not detract from the divine majesty of the Holy Spirit, that He Himself produces no other person? Ans.: This in no way diminishes His glory, but rather His eternal majesty is thereby ineffably illustrated. . . He can in no way be considered imperfect, who in His own substance both *begins and completes that production of persons*, and thus reduces the entire Trinity in a completed perfection to a kind of sphere and circle, so that in this his Spirit the Father and the Son rest uniquely." (*Hodos. phaen*. 3. p. 94.)

## § 42.

The personal properties are three:(a) *paternity*,(b) *filiation*,(c) and *procession* strictly so called, or passive spiration.(d)

a) Namely, with respect to *the number of persons,* each of which is constituted by a relative subsistence in the being of a certain person.

b) Founded on generation viewed *actively*.

c) Founded on generation viewed *passively* or terminatively.

d) Not that any real passion falls upon God, but *grammatically* speaking, or because the Holy Spirit is said to be *spirated,* not to spirate; although on God's part the spiration is a pure act, devoid of all passion. Cf. *Mus., Disp. cit. de Deo* § 6, pp. 73–74.

## § 43.

The notions *specifically* so called (a) are two: unbegottenness (innascibility), (b) and active spiration.

a) Or distinguished by their properties. For otherwise, if the term 'notion' is taken *more broadly* and its properties are included, there are *five* notions.

> HOLLAZ: “Unbegottenness (*ἀγεννησία*) indeed denotes God the Father, and indicates that He derives His origin from no other person; but it does not constitute Him in the being of the Father, and therefore is not His hypostatic character (i.e., personal property), but a personal notion.' (*Exam. th*. P. I. c. 2. q. 10. p. 286.)

b) Indeed, the Father is known through *his innascibility (ἀγεννηαίαν)*, insofar as he is neither begotten nor proceeds from another (for this is how the term *ἀγεννησίας* is accustomed to be understood; although *γέννηαις* is proper to the Son); through *active spiration*, the Father and the Son, though not from one another, are nevertheless distinguished from the Holy Spirit. Nor are the persons thereby multiplied, because, according to the rules of theologians, *in the divine nature all things are one, unless a relative opposition is encountered.* On the part of the Father, however, *paternity, innascibility,* and *active spiration* do *not* oppose one another *relatively;* just as *neither do filiation* and *active spiration* on the part of the Son.

QUENSTEDT: "Active spiration is not a character or property of the Son, strictly speaking, because it also belongs to the Father. For *properties* are the characters of persons, which belong to one person alone and not to another. And there are only three such: Active generation, passive generation, and procession or passive spiration. Therefore, the Socinian argument fails: 'As many relations are there in the divine nature, so many persons; but there are four relations, namely, paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. Therefore [there are four persons].' For we deny the major, because only *opposite* relations multiply the persons in the Trinity; therefore, as many persons as there are *opposite* relations or hypostatic characters." (L. c. s. 1. th. 46. f. 482.)

## § 44.

The Father is the first [(a)] person of the Godhead, not begotten, nor proceeding, but eternally begetting the Son from His own substance, and with the Son eternally spirating the Holy Spirit.

a) Not, however, either *in time,* or *in nature* (such as the priority of a cause in relation to its effect), or *in dignity;* for all the divine persons are coeternal, and with the divine essence are in reality identical and mutually equal: but only *in order,* which some call *the natural order of enumeration*, since it is founded on the origin or emanation of one person from another. Hence the Father, who is not from another, but from Himself, and is He from whom the other proceeds, namely the Son and the Holy Spirit, holds the first place.

QUENSTEDT: "From *the real distinction of the persons* arises their *order* both in subsisting and in operating. . . Order in *subsisting* among the divine persons is proven from the procession or emanation of one person from another... Order in *operating* is insinuated in Scripture *by the particles διακριτικάς: ex* [from], *per* [through] and in. Rom. 11:36: "*For from* Him and *through* Him and *to* Him are all things." According to the holy Fathers, the particle *ἐξ* [from] is attributed to the Father, *διά* [through] to the Son, and *εἰς* [in] to the Holy Spirit. However, these particles do not imply *any inequality* among the persons of the Godhead in the work of creation, but only indicate their *order* in acting. However, the particle *ἐξ* is expressly attributed to God the Father in 1 Cor. 8:6: 'One God the Father, from whom are all things'; and *διά* to the Son in the same place: 'And one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things'; likewise John 1:3: 'All things were made through Him (the Word of God, v. 1)," cf. Heb. 1:2. The particle *ἐν* is used of the Holy Spirit in 2 Thess. 2:13. However, the natural order of the divine persons is not always used in Scripture, but is sometimes applied arbitrarily, as is clear from 2 Cor. 13:13, where the Son is placed before the Father, and Rev. 1:4-5, where the Son of God is subordinated to the Holy Spirit (designated metonymically by the name of the seven spirits), so also are those particles interchanged, as *διά* for the Father in 1 Cor. 1:9, Rom. 6:4, Heb. 2:10, to the Son *εκ* John 16:15, *εν* Col. 1:14, 16, *εις* ibid v. 16, *εν* to the Father and Son in the Epistle of Jude

v. 1, because by this very *permutation the* ὁμοουσία [same essence] *and* ισότης [equality] *of the divine persons* are clearly asserted and the inequality of dignity is excluded." (L. c. s. 1. th. 17—19. f. 469.)

THE SAME: "According to Athanasius against Gregory of Nazianzus, the Father is *the root and source of the Son and of the Spirit.*" (L. c. th. 22. f. 471.)

THE SAME: "*The source* has no *superiority* or *preeminence* in respect to the rivers, but only priority of order. Just as the sun in relation to its rays, so neither does the Father, who is the source of the Godhead; for by the order of procession it does not attain the prerogative of the essence.... *Distinguish* between *the first being*, which is opposed to the created and dependent, and that which is opposed to the other coeternal persons by reason of origin; thus the Father in the Godhead can be called the first being with respect to the other persons, so that they are and remain coeternal, i.e., a being simply infinite and first with the Father according to essence from eternity. — *Distinguish* between the denomination *of cause*, which cannot be attributed to the Father in the divine nature with respect to the Son; for thus the Son would be a dependent being, posterior in nature to the Father, and would differ from Him in number of essences; and between the denomination not *of a principle* of nature or causality, but of comparison, relation, and *ὑπάρξεως (existence)* in respect, from which the Greek Fathers, in calling the Father *αίτιον* (cause) of the Son, used the word 'cause' for 'principle' *in a catachresis*; whereas the Latins, however, were unwilling in any way to admit the name 'cause'. . . *Distinguish* between Christ as *man in a state of self-emptying* and Christ as God. Christ says in John 14:28, "The Father is greater than I," but He affirms this of Himself as man, who as God had called Himself one with the Father (John 10:30) and equal to the Father (John 5:18). He says the Father is greater than Him according to that nature by which He goes to the Father by dying and rising again. Rightly and truly Luther, Tom. VII. Jen. German, fol. 119.: 'Christ's words*: 'The Father is greater than I,'* are to be understood not of the origin of the Son from the Father by reason of the Godhead, as Origen, Nazianzenus, and Hilary explain, nor of the human nature in itself and precisely, but rather of the state and condition in which Christ was then living, i.e., of the state of his self-emptying. . The Father is called *the God* of Christ John 20:17, *the head of Christ* 1 Cor. 11:3, insofar as He is man or in relation to His human nature, which, together with the Father, is one God and the head and Lord of all, insofar as He is God and the Son of God. For there is one Lord, through whom are all things 1 Cor. 8:6. *Objection: Since Christ acknowledges God the Father as the first author of His doctrine and works,* He therefore has *a preeminence* over the Son*.* Answer: 1. The entire Scripture teaches that Christ is the first cause, and not merely a second, of His doctrine, His works, and all things pertaining to salvation. 2. Although the Son is from the Father, He is nevertheless God with the Father, the author of the divine Word and the first and supreme cause of all works. He submits to the Father in all things, both with respect to His eternal origin and generation, and with respect to His temporal mission. "Whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise," John 5:19. *Objection: The Father has His essence from Himself;* therefore He is superior to the Son, who does not have His essence from Himself. Answer: 1. Even among humans, for that reason, a father is not more excellent than His son by reason of essence. 2. Although to have one's essence from another through dependence and causality implies inferiority, this is not the case when one has it through origin and procession. 3. Those who are one in essence do not receive a prerogative and excellence of essence from one another. But the Father and the Son are one in essence, 1 John 5:7; John 10:30. Therefore... *Hilary and many other ancient writers call the Father greater by reason of origin;* but not greater than the Son as God, but as Son; not by reason of nature, but of person. Referring that superiority exclusively to the origin of the person, while preserving the numerical unity of the essence, they are therefore a world away from the profane *heterodoxy* of M. Nicholas*,* who contends that the Father is to be acknowledged as God and Head of the Son, as God. . . More accurate church doctors, however, acknowledge that origin does not imply any excellence or superiority, and they dismiss as *ἀκυρολογία* [improper speech]—that the Father is greater than the Son by reason of origin. Calov. . . No Greek father uses this way of speaking:

The Father is more worthy or excellent than the Son, or has greater authority than the Son, although some say that one person is prior in dignity to another. Therefore, Clichtoveus should not have (who, at the command of the theological faculty at the Sorbonne in Paris at the beginning of the last century, wrote *Anti-Lutherus* against the blessed Luther, a 'hare in armor') should not, therefore, have conceded that there is a 'more principal' or 'more perfect' mode of subsisting of one person than of another, because these words signify not only priority of order, but also greater dignity and excellence of nature." (L. c. s. 2. q. 5. f. 519—521.)

GERHARD: "It should be observed here that the name 'Father' (just as the name *'God')* is taken in the Scriptures either *οὐσιωδῶς* [essentially] or *ὑποστατικῶς* [personally/hypostatically]. If it is taken *οὐσιωδῶς* [essentially], it applies to *the whole Trinity,* to one true God, who by reason of creation and preservation is Father of all, and especially by reason of adoption and paternal affection is the Father of believers. If, however, it is taken *hypostatically* (which can be inferred from the context whenever the second person, namely the Son eternally begotten by the Father, is specifically mentioned), then it applies *only* to *the first person*. In short: when the Godhead is described *within itself,* the name of the Father is taken *hypostatically*; but when the Godhead is communicated *to the creatures,* the name of the Father is taken *ontologically* and includes all three persons." (*L. th. de Deo Patre et Filio* § 8.)

KROMAYER: "The Achilles' heel of the Socinians is John 17:3: 'And this is eternal life, that they may know You (the Father) the only true God, and the one You sent, Jesus Christ.' From this they conclude that only the Father, and not Christ, is the true God. But we answer: The exclusive particle here is not opposed to the remaining persons of the Holy Trinity, but to all those things which are outside the divine essence, such as the pagan gods, who are not the true God and yet were eagerly worshipped in the world; according to the rule of logicians: 'An exclusive does not exclude a concomitant.' Moreover, the Son (whom John in his First Epistle, ch. 5, v. 2. calls the true God and eternal life) is here joined with the Father, so that the sense is: This is eternal life, that they may know You, the Father, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent, to be the only true God. 'Only' because of the multitude of pagan gods, 'true' because the gods of the Gentiles are not *by nature* God, Gal. 4:8. If anyone, however, were to wish to oppose Christ, the Son of God, together with the Father by way of an exclusive against the idols of the Gentiles, so that the true Mediator would be distinguished from God, the sense would be: That the heart of salvation turns on *θεογνωσία* [knowledge of God] and *χριστογνωσία* [knowledge of Christ]. This exclusive proposition is rather *of the subject* than of the predicate." (*Th. posit.-pol*. Art. 2. p. 173.)

## ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Arians, Eunomians,* and other accomplices of theirs, who assigned *a prerogative* to the Father before the Son. . . 2. *Socinians,* who deny that the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is His true and natural father and contend that he is a father only in an improper and metaphorical sense . . ., as if He were not the true Father, but only the vicar of the Father. . . 3. Of the *Papists,* like *Bellarmine,* who in lib. I. de Christo c. 10, assigns to God the Father, in reality, a certain preeminence and superiority over the Son; for he writes: 'The Father is the source and principle of the other persons, and for that reason has a certain superiority.' . . . This pertains to the assertion of some *scholastics*, who say: 'The Holy Spirit proceeds principally from the Father, rather than from the Son; that in the Father there is authority, and in the Son sub-authority.' 4. Of *certain Calvinists,* who attribute to the Father *a* certain *preeminence* and *superiority* over the Son even with respect to deity; as *Calvin*, Book I of *Institutes*, chapter 13. § 29., where he says: 'The name of God, although it is also common to the Son, is nevertheless sometimes ascribed to the Father *by way of preeminence*, because He is the source and principle of the Godhead"; *Zanchius,* with great apparatus of words and arguments, tries to defend this *preeminence*. .. 5. Of the *Arminians,* who make the Father superior to the Son and the Holy Spirit in dignity as well as in power, as is evident from *Episcopius*, lib. IV. Instit.,

chapter 32. . . He here fashions a certain *subordination*... 6. M. *Henrici Nicolai*, a logician from Danzig, who places the Son and the Holy Spirit under the supreme God and attributes a prerogative to the Father over the Son and the Holy Spirit; likewise he asserts that the Word and the Holy Spirit are *something in* that infinite *essence*, not the infinite essence, something of 'that supreme God,' not that one God; confesses that God the Father is an unoriginate and independent God; the Son, second to God the Father, originated, dependent, and subordinate; the Holy Spirit, third from the Father, originated from both, the originate God." (L. c. f. 517. sq.)

# § 45.

The Son is the *second* [(a)] person of the Godhead, eternally begotten of the Father, from whom the person of the Holy Spirit also proceeds eternally.

a) For the Son is not from Himself, yet from Him proceeds another, namely the Holy Spirit.

QUENSTEDT: "*The consequences* *ὁμοουσία* [consubstantiality] are: 1. *περιχώρησις* or *ἐνύπαρξις*, *circumincession,* immanence and mutual and singular inexistence, by which one person, because of the unity of the essence, is in another, John 14:11, 17, 21. 2. *Equality* of the persons, so that no person is greater or lesser, nor can the Father properly be called God *κατ' ἐξοχήν* [pre-eminently] or, by reason of His mode of subsistence, greater than the Son. 3. The most perfect *communion* of all essential perfections. 4. *Ταὐτότης,* or *identity*, both of *the* divine *works ad extra* [toward the outside] and *of the mode* of acting, so that they do *ταῦτα καὶ ὁμοίως* [the same things and in like manner], John 5:19, although *not in the same order*... The rule of Augustine is well known*: "The works of God ad extra are indivisible*," that is, common to all three persons. The reason for this rule is the unity (ἑνότης) of the divine essence, the commonality (*κοινότης*) of the power of acting, the equality (*ὁμοιότης*) of the operations, and the identity (ταυτότης) of the works of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; and from this, finally, the *ἰσότης* or equality of designation. However, the following clause must be added to the Augustinian rule: "*With the order and distinction of the persons preserved";* for since the Father Has *his essence from Himself*, *He* also *acts from Himself;* the Son acts from *the Father*, and the Holy Spirit *from both*, and the , John 5:19, 20. *Observation* on this statement: 1. *'He can do* nothing' *does* not *denote weakness,* impotence, or infirmity, as in John 15:5: 'Without me you can do nothing,' cf. 2 Cor. 3:5; but rather, when it is predicated of *God* simply, it designates *the supreme perfection of the nature operating in the same way,* so that it cannot be otherwise; as when it is otherwise said to be *impossible* for God to lie, since He is *ἀψευδής* [incapable of falsehood], Heb. 6:18. Titus 1:2. When it is used of the true Christ, it expresses the identity, unity, and inseparability of the essence, power, will, and operation of both Himself and the Father, and at the same time the *τρόπον ὑπάρξεως* [mode of subsistence], namely that the Son, just as He has His essence not from Himself but from the Father through eternal generation, so also He does not have *the power to act* from Himself, nor does He act from Himself, but from the Father. In the very same sense in which the Holy Spirit, because of His procession from the Son, is said not to speak on His own, but to receive and announce the things that are Christ's (John 16:13). Therefore, the Son *does* not *act* of Himself, just as the Father *does not,* since *He is* not from Himself*,* but from the Father, from whom He has His essence, and likewise His omnipotence. In short: it is impossible for the Son to do anything that He has not seen the Father do, because of the Son's *ὁμοουσία* [consubstantiality] with the Father and His origin from the Father. *Observe*: 2. 'To see' the Father doing something is said *ἀνθρωποπαθῶς* [anthropopathically], or in a human manner, but it must be understood *θεοπρεπῶς* [in a manner befitting God], and it denotes the most exact *knowledge,* which the Son received from the Father not through teaching, as a disciple, but *through eternal generation*, as the only-begotten Son. The Son 'sees' what the Father does, not after

the operation, but because He is the wisdom of the Father through whom He acts. Christ, however, willed to show Himself so united in nature to the Father that He would nevertheless signify His distinction. He shows Himself to be *united* when He says that He cannot do anything unless the Father *does it; distinct*, when He says, "except what *I have seen* the Father doing." For He who sees is one, and He who is seen is another. He makes Himself equal to the Father, yet in such a way that He speaks in a manner fitting for the Son. The 'seeing' attributed to the Son in v. 19 and the *δεῖξις* [showing] in v. 20 are correlative. Therefore, just as the Father shows all things to the Son by working through the Son, really and not by way of example, so also the Son sees while working *ὁμοίως* [in like manner] with the Father in the unity of wisdom and power. For '*δείκνυσιν αὐτῷ*' ['He shows him'] means 'He will work in Him and through Him,' a verbal expression for a real one, John 10:32, Acts 9:16, 2 Tim. 4:14. Since the Son is the image of the Father and the brightness of His glory, Heb. 1:3, it is said that the Father demonstrates to the Son and demonstrates Himself in the Son. Cyril of Alexandria, l. II. in Joh. c. 137, beautifully says: "The Father demonstrates to the Son what He Himself does, not as if painted on tablets, nor as if instructing a person who is ignorant." For the Son knows all things, as God, but He paints His whole self in the nature of the Son in such a way that whatever He has in Himself, He demonstrates in the Son," etc. . . 3. *The particle ἅ [whatsoever]* is not to be extended to internal or intra-trinitarian works, such as to beget, to be begotten, to breathe, to proceed, which belong only to one or two persons in the Godhead, but only to works *ad extra,* and not only of miracles, as the Socinians want, but *to all external works* (creation, preservation, universal governance, etc.) is to be understood. For whatever the Father does (i.e., to the outside), the Son does also, *not similar things* by imitation, *but* the *same* works by co-operation... The Son does the very same things, so that nothing is excluded, *ὁμοίως* [in like manner], *in the same way,* not with some disparity or inequality, but *from the same essence*, *wisdom, goodness, and power*. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orat. IV. de Theol*.: "He does not say *'similarly'* because there is a similarity of works, but because the faculty of both is equal, and their majesty is equal." (L. c. s. 1. th. 21. f. 470. sq.)

# § 46.

The Holy Spirit is the *third* [(a)] person of the Godhead, not begotten, but proceeding eternally from the Father and the Son.

a) Because He is not from Himself, nor does another proceed from Him, i.e., another person of the Divinity.

QUENSTEDT: "With regard to the *name,* it is called *Spirit:* 1. *On account of spirituality* or spiritual essence and because of spiritual *effects*; and so all three persons of the Godhead are called and are Spirit, John 4:24. 2. *From the ἀτμάττῳ ὕπαρξης,* or *hypostatic character*, i.e., the eternal procession; by which reason neither the Father nor the Son is the Spirit, but only the third person; for to this person that name, on the reason of the *πνέοντος* [breathing] of the Father and the Son, is most properly appropriate, because He proceeds from both eternally by spiration... He is and is called *Holy* not only by *essence,* by which reason essential holiness with the Father and the Son belongs to Him, Isa. 6:3; but also by *a singular character,* from the work, i.e., of sanctification, which the Holy Spirit most proximately and immediately performs and to effect which He is sent by the Father and the Son into the hearts of believers." (L. c. s. 1. th. 56. 57, f. 486. sq.)

LUTHER: "The Scripture calls this Spirit of God the *Holy* Spirit because, just as the office of the Son is indicated by the fact that He is called a teacher of righteousness, so the Spirit of God is called holy from *His office.* For He makes us holy, who by sin are born and are altogether unholy and ungodly." (Ad Joel 2:28–29. Opp. Hal. VI, 2315.)

## § 47.

God, when regarded in terms of both essence and persons, can be described [(a)] as a spiritual being, subsisting in Himself, in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

a) *Other*, more lengthy descriptions are also commonly offered, by which the persons are described even by their works toward the outside: the Father by creation, the Son by redemption, and the Holy Spirit by sanctification. But since these works are not coeternal with God and the divine persons, we have preferred to retain the one that is fitting for God and the divine persons, as they are *in themselves from all eternity*. Cf. *Mus.* cit. Disp. III. § ult. p. 76.

LUTHER: "Therefore you see here on what the *Symbol* [Creed] *of the holy Athanasius* is founded, which is so framed that I do not know whether anything more important and glorious was ever written in the Church of the New Testament in the time of the Apostles." (Ad Joel 2:28 [or 2:27 KJV]. VI, 2314; [*StL* 6, 1576])

# Chapter II. ^

ON CREATION.

## § 1.

Among the works by which God has exercised His supreme goodness,[(a)] creation is to be regarded first.

a) See chap. I. § 27, p. 44, and § 37, note *a,* p. 64. And thus the reason for the order, with respect to this place, immediately following the preceding one, is made clear.

GERHARD: "When we say that God *makes* something, we do not understand that He has some *motion* in operating, but we signify a certain new *effect* of His eternal will, i.e., we say that something comes into being by His eternal will." (*L. th. 1. de creatione* § 4.)

## § 2.

The word creation denotes [(a)] the production of a subsisting thing, either *from nothing*, or which is made independently of a subject, or dependently on a subject, or *from* some *subject*, but one so *unsuitable* and undisposed that from its power such an effect cannot be produced by the virtue of a created agent.[(b)]

GERHARD: "We call that *to subsist* which exists not in another, but in itself." (Exeg. 1. III. § 57.)

REUSCH: "A *subsisting* thing is here called a substance, i.e., an entity which, by its own power sustained by God, or per se, as others say, can exist,

and thus that which can exist separately from other finite entities, or have a separate and proper existence. Therefore the blessed author takes '*to* subsist' in a different sense than it is otherwise used by philosophers; since 'subsistence' and 'to subsist' is said to be the existence of a *suppositum* [a distinct individual]." (*Annot*. p. 195.)

a) Indeed, in the style *of Scripture* and speaking *properly*. For *otherwise,* even in a *moral* sense*, magistrates, consuls, leaders,* etc., are said to be created. And Scripture itself says that a *new* heart is created in man*,* i.e., that new spiritual powers are conferred on man, which they call a *metaphorical* creation. *Philosophers,* however, take the word "creation" *more strictly* for the precise production of a thing from nothing.

QUENSTEDT: "*The phrase* '*ex nihilo*' signifies nothing other than *the point from which,* that is, the nothingness from which all things are said to have been made. It is *not* a matter of *the substance,* but of the point from which the account is taken and which must be understood in terms of the order of creation. And the particle 'ex' can rightly be translated as *'post'* [after], as Thomas observes, so that the sense is: 'After nothing, as the point from which, something was made.'" (L. c. s. 1. th. 13. f. 594.)

b) This twofold sense of the term *to create* occurs in *Genesis,* chapter 1: the former in verse 1, concerning the creation at the *beginning*; *the latter* in verses 21 and 27, concerning the creation *of aquatic creatures* from the water and *of man* from the dust of the earth; compare chapter 2, verse 7. More will become clear from what follows.

## § 3.

However*,* production from nothing also occurs *in two ways,* insofar as an effect is produced *either* independently of *any* subject*, whether* pre-existing *or* co-existing; in this way, *immaterial* substances, angels, and the soul (of Adam) were produced;[(a)] *or* the effect is produced, *indeed* independently of a pre-existing subject, *but* nevertheless dependently on a co-existing one; in which way *simple* bodies, e.g. the heavens and the elements, were produced. [(b)]

a) Indeed, substances, which in their *being* do not depend on matter, were *produced* in accordance with their nature also independently of all matter.

b) Indeed, material things, and those that are simple, since they consist of matter and form with respect to their *being*, and since their matter did not exist separately before any form, nor did the (material) form exist apart from matter, are thus dependent in *their coming into being* (as if they were composites) on matter, but not on pre-existing matter.

REUSCH: "The author added *heaven,* as a peculiar and distinct species from the Aristotelian elements (in Baier. *de creatione* § 22)." But heaven, as heaven, and distinct from the total bodies of the world, such as planets, comets, and fixed stars or suns, consists of aether, which fills those vast spaces, and by this it is not distinguished from the Aristotelian elements." (*Annot*. p. 199.)

THE SAME: "Simple bodies, or physical elements, were produced independently of pre-existing matter," asserts the blessed author [Baier], and thus

he assumes as indisputable that the metaphysical elements, from which simple bodies are composed as from matter, did not exist individually and separately in the first creation; on the contrary, they were produced immediately from the beginning in that union by which they constitute physical elements. But the mode of creation depends on the free will of God, determined by the reason of the best. Whether, however, the simultaneous production of the individual metaphysical elements without the union in which they constitute simple bodies, or physical elements, which union was subsequently effected in the separation of the physical elements; whether the simultaneous production of the individual metaphysical elements, immediately in that union by which they constitute the physical elements or simple bodies, is the better and most optimal mode of creation, and thus decreed by God according to the reason of the best, cannot be determined with certainty; since no certain principles, either from reason or from revelation, are available from which it necessarily follows that one mode of creating is preferable to the other. Therefore, those things *which the blessed author asserts as indubitable are not such, but only probable.* However, it is not denied that they have some probability." (Annot. p. 199. sqq.)

## § 4.

The remaining works of creation, or *mixed* bodies, were produced dependently on pre-existing matter,[(a)] namely, from the simple bodies themselves first produced.[(b)]

a) For although God, by His absolute power, could also have produced mixed bodies independently of a pre-existing subject, it nevertheless pleased God to carry out the work of creation in accordance with the order of nature, and to produce mixed bodies from pre-existing simple ones.

b) Thus plants were produced from the earth, and fish from the water; as we shall soon see.

## § 5.

According to the history of creation,[(a)] God completed the production of this universe in six [(b)] days.

LUTHER: "Hilary and Augustine, as if two greatest lights of the church, hold that the world was created suddenly and all at once, not successively over six days. And Augustine wonderfully plays with the treatment of the six days, making them mystical days of knowledge in the angels, not natural ones. . . Nor is it useful to make Moses so mystical and allegorical in the beginning. For he wants to teach us not about allegorical creatures and an allegorical world, but about essential creatures and a world visible and exposed to the senses, calls, as the proverb goes, a spade a spade, that is, he calls it day and evening, just as we do, without allegory, just as the evangelist Matthew also retains this phrase in his final chapter, when he writes that Christ rose on the evening of the Sabbath, which was dawning into the first day of the week. But if we do not sufficiently grasp the reason for the days, nor understand why God willed to use these intervals of time, let us rather confess our ignorance than twist the words beyond their meaning to a foreign sense. Therefore, as for this opinion of Augustine, we hold that Moses spoke properly, not allegorically or figuratively, that is, that the world with all its creatures was created within six days, as the words sound. For if we do not grasp the reason, let us remain disciples, and leave the teaching to the Holy Spirit." (On Genesis 1:1. Exegetical Works, Latin ed., Cur. Elsperger, Vol. I, p. 8 ff.;

QUENSTEDT: "That all things were not created at once in a single moment or instant, but *in the space of six days* by God, is proven: 1. *from the history of creation* described in Genesis 1, in which all the words are to be understood historically and literally, and one must not depart from the clear letter unless the analogy of faith, antecedents and consequents, and other circumstances suggest it; in which, however, Moses teaches in the clearest terms what was made by God on each day. 2. *From the sanctification of the Sabbath* and the reason for this, which is given in Genesis 2:3 and Exodus 13:6 and 20:11. This would be of no importance if God had created everything in a single moment, and not successively over several days. 3. *From reason;* if everything had been created at once, some reason would have to be given for the order of that Mosaic narrative. But Moses does not observe the order of nature, not of dignity, not of knowledge; the order of time, therefore, is left. (*Theol. did.-pol*. P. I. c. 10. s. 2. q. 6. f. 613.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. *Of some of the fathers,* such as *Origen*, lib. 6, c. against Celsus; *Athanasius*, orat. 3, c. against the Arians; *Augustine*, lib. 4, de Gen. ad literam c. 22 sq. and lib. 2, de civit. Dei c. 29. sqq., *Procopius of Gaza* on Genesis, who hold that the world was created by God in a single moment and that the six days are to be interpreted allegorically. . . 2. *Philo* Judaeus, Book on the Creation of the World and Book 1 of the Allegories of the Mosaic Law, p. 29. . . In short: that opinion, that all things were created in a single instant, was devised by the Rabbis, embellished by *Cajetan* and Melch. Cano (as related by Domin. Banne), and was recently championed by Nicholas Abramo, a Jesuit from Macerata, and enriched with new paradoxes; for he posits that: 'the substance of all things, except the soul of man, was produced at the first moment of time, and that in six days, by natural emanation, all things came forth according to their qualities and, by a natural inclination, strove for their natural place,' an opinion which Dr. Calov refuted in his *Tom. III. System* (L. c.).

VILMAR: "The investigation and answer to the question of whether the days are 24-hour days, dependent on the Earth's axial rotation, or periods of creation (restitution) of an unspecified duration, can safely be left to dogmatic theology. In the *application* made of these (5 days) in Genesis 2:2–3 and later in the Law, 24-hour days are indeed intended, and the wording (evening and morning, the first day, the second day, etc.) seems to support this. On the other hand, the statement in Psalm 90:4 and 2 Peter 3:8, according to which a thousand years are like a day and a day like a thousand years in God's sight, is not unfavorable to the assumption of creation periods. These periods could have ended with a twilight and begun again with a twilight, thus being separated by a night in which God *did not* create, but they would have depended not on the rotation of the earth, but on other struggles between light and darkness." (*Dogmatics*, I, p. 247.)

a) Which is accurately described *in Genesis chapters 1 and 2.*
b) See chapter 1, last verse, and chapter 2, 2. *Gen.*

## § 6.

On the first day, and since until then no thing had been created, but only God existed, (a) God produced heaven (b) and earth, (c) and also light, (d) which would establish the alternation of day and night.

a) See *Genesis 1:1,* where the word בְּרֵאשִׁית [In the beginning] is to be understood *adverbially and negatively*, so that nothing, not even any matter of this universe, is to be said to have existed before.

SCHERZER: "In the beginning, בראשית (from which the Cabbalists, by means of temura [anagrams], make the first month September; and Dr. Calov, although the fathers and other theologians choose the *spring* season, a view which has also at times pleased us, Syst. III, f. 924., argues for *autumn*, since otherwise the fruits would have had to be produced twice in the first year of creation, and thus God would have immediately changed His order, which is improbable), or *in the first instant of time* (and therefore *not in time*, for creation and time began simultaneously) God created the heaven and the earth, Gen. 1:1. Nothing else can be understood, except the beginning *of time*; not of eternity, because it is without a beginning; not of the age, because this duration is only that of created spirits: therefore, of time. It is said ineptly: In the beginning *of the world*, the world was created; or: In the beginning *of creation*, God created the heavens and the earth; for the question remains, what beginning is meant; but Moses did not leave the reader in suspense." (*System, theol*. 1. 1. § 8. p. 87. sq.)

QUENSTEDT: "It is *ἀκυρολογία* [improper speech] to say that the world was not always. For 'at some time' is the same as 'at a certain time'; but it cannot be said that it did not exist at a certain time, since there was no time before the world was created. He speaks more cautiously who says that the world has not always existed." (L. c. q. 2. f. 602.)

THE SAME: "It is proven that *the world could not have existed or been created from eternity:* 1. Because to exist from eternity is proper to God alone, so that whatever is eternal must necessarily be God. 2. Because it involves a contradiction both on the part of the creating God, who cannot produce a God different from Himself, and on the part of the creation, because this presupposes some beginning in which it takes place, and finally on the part of the creature, which is not capable of existence from all eternity. That which cannot be except after non-being cannot be from eternity; but no creature can be except after non-being, for to be created is to be produced from nothing. Therefore. That which exists from eternity exists without a beginning of its own; a creature, however, whenever it is created, comes into being, because every effect, while it is being produced by its cause, comes into being and receives its being from that same cause. But when a creature comes into being, it begins to exist; and if it begins to exist, it could not have existed from eternity. For they are contradictory: to exist with a beginning of one's own existence, and not to exist with a beginning of one's own existence." (L. c. f. 601.)

THE SAME: "That dispute (whether the world *could have been* created from eternity*)* does not concern an article of faith; and therefore neither opinion is to be accused of heresy, much less of any atheism. For neither do those who deny that the world could have been created from eternity detract from the power of God, since they do not deny this for want of power in God, but because of an impossible object, which they judge to involve a contradiction; nor do those who affirm it admit an actual eternal creation, but only make it possible and do not think it involves a contradiction." (L. c. q. 2. f. 599.)

THE SAME: "The creation of the world from nothing in time *cannot* be known *by natural light* or demonstrated apodictically and clearly by philosophical arguments, but is known only from divine revelation, and is therefore an article of pure faith and mere revelation." (L. c. q. 1. f. 596.)

b) Suppose the very *heaven* under *the substantial form* of heaven, and the *earth* under the *substantial form* of earth; which is proved *partly* by the letter, i.e., the proper meaning of the names heaven and *earth* (which is not to be abandoned without significant necessity, according to the rule on interpreting Scripture given above, Vol. I. p. 179. Proleg. c. II. § 45.), and *partly* by the fact that Moses adds the emphatic or demonstrative ה to both, as if pointing with an outstretched finger, signifying *this heaven* and *this earth*. But what is added — that the earth was תֹהוּ וָבֹהוּ, *void and empty* —

indeed denies the cultivation and adornment of the earth (which in this sense, and because it was enveloped in waters, could indeed be called *a shapeless, crude, and unformed mass*), but I do not deny the substantial form of the earth, of which there is here a discussion. Compare *Isaiah 34:11 and Jeremiah 4:23,* where the devastation of the land or the region of the Jews, not the abolition of the earth's substantial form, is designated by these words. See more in *Mus., Disp. Theol. V. de Creat*. § 26. sqq. p. 140. sqq. and *Tract. Germ. Ausführl. Erklärung* Q. 23. 24. 25. p. 183. sqq. In the same manner, however, *Hutterus, LL. Theol. de Creat*. Q. III. p. 201. taught *that by the appellation of heaven and earth, those parts of the universe are not to be understood which later came into being, or are now seen by the eyes, marvelously and stupendously wrought, but rather a formless, crude, and in a manner confused mass, which God afterward distinguished and elaborated by a certain order, so that by the name of heaven the entire celestial body, encompassing all the orbs, is meant—perfect and complete in its substance and magnitude, yet without light, without motion, and without the distinction of stars, etc., which were added later; and by the name of the earth in verse 1. of Genesis, one must understand that it is the very element of the earth that is meant, which was later distinguished and separated from the waters on the third day.* He adds, however, these noteworthy words: "*Indeed, unless it is established at the beginning that the earth was created, insofar as it is considered according to the nature of its substance, it does not appear from Moses when it was finally created." For the objection of some concerning the third day is too weak; for Moses does not say that the earth was created on that third day, but that God commanded the dry land, or earth, to appear out of the waters.* Likewise, *Gesner* also taught in his *Commentary on Genesis*, pages 11 and 12, *that by heaven in this passage is understood that which is now visible; the earth* is called *Tohu, a word which* then *denoted* either *a deprivation of accidental form and figure,* or that it was *mixed with waters.* The same is said of *Bohu, which epithet denotes that the earth was 1*) *uncultivated, 2) barren, since it was not yet adorned with trees, herbs, or grass, 3*) *devoid of cultivators, men, and animals.* Others, however, who seem to *deny* that the heavens and the earth were then produced in their present form, do not obscurely declare that they are *not* speaking of *the substantial form* of simple bodies, *but* in opposition to the subsequent *elaboration*; certainly, they acknowledge that the earth and the water, although not yet separated from one another, nevertheless truly existed on the first day *κατ' οὐσίαν* (in their essential being). See *Selneccer*, Commentary on Genesis, p. 43; *Meisner*, *Philosophical Theology*, Part I, Section III, Chapter III, Question III. p. m. 510. and Q,. IV. p. 544., *Friedlieb, Theol. Exeg. in Genes*. Q. VII. p. 27. First of all, to our point, and that the so-called *Chaos* was *a mass of the three primary bodies, the heavens, water and earth, not yet distinct in places, compacted,* and each *is called a seed of the heavens, of the earth*, and *of the waters, because none of these bodies was then distinct;* and finally, that in this sense (not with respect to the negation of substantial form) *the mention of the heavens, the earth, and the waters* may be said to be *made by πρόληψις* [prolepsis], as several authors teach, among them *Scherzer* in his *System*. L. III. § 10. p. 90., where he also praises *Musaeus's Disp. de Creat*, cited here by us.

> QUENSTEDT: *"The empyrean or fiery heaven,* which was produced on the first day and at the first instant of creation and located above the firmament as the dwelling place of the blessed angels and the saints, or even the palace of God Himself, as most *scholastics* and other *Papists writers*, as well as the *Calvinists*, contend, is a sweet dream without sleep. . . The heaven of the blessed, although *it is not a* physical *place*, is not nevertheless nowhere, but *somewhere;* that is*, it is not everywhere,*

nor nowhere, but *somewhere.* To define precisely where it is, however, is rash. ... *A distinction is made* between a certain, corporeal, and determinate place created by God and destined for the blessed and angels, such as the 'heaven which is not, nor will be,' and the where of the blessed, which is distinguished from *the where* of the damned, in which the souls of the pious after separation from the body are gathered and made partakers of heavenly goods, which we also concede. . . The falsity of the opposing opinion and the truth of our own *are proven*: 1. *From reason. .. 2. From the silence of Scripture.* Scripture says that the heaven of the blessed is *above* us (using words that signify a place to describe the sublimity of status and condition); but that it is a certain space first created, corporeal in substance, of the greatest extent in quantity and a true place, of the brightest quality, indestructibly self-sustaining in duration, supreme in position and raised above all visible heavens, or encircling the starry heavens circularly and on all sides: Scripture nowhere hints at this, and so it is rash to want to define it as such. . . 4. From Matthew. 18:10, where it is said that *angels are on the earth* and guard little ones, and *are at the same time in the heavens* and see the face of God the Father *δια παντός*, from which we infallibly conclude that the heaven of the blessed or of the angels is not a place created far from the earth and placed above the sidereal heaven, since for that reason angels, while they are on earth, could not be in heaven. Thus, the angels, who are not absent from the earth by reason of place, are at the same time in the heavens by reason of their state and condition. That continuity of apparition before the Father in the heavens does not remove their presence and *ministry (διακονία)* among the saints and little ones on earth. Therefore, the place where the angels can be in the heavens, and these heavens of the angels can be on earth among the little ones, and so the angels are never outside the heavens and outside the contemplation of God (which is the very heaven or beatitude of the angels), not even when they minister to the saints on earth. 5. From *the conflagration of the visible heavens* at the Last Day, 2 Pet. 3:7, 10; Ps. 102:27; either therefore the heaven of the blessed will perish at the same time, being immediately adjacent to the starry heaven according to the opinion of our adversaries, or it must be excepted from that *πανολεθρία* [universal destruction], and this exception must be demonstrated from Scripture." (L. c. q. 9. f. 623. 625. sq.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. *Of the Scholastics and most of the Papists,* who laboriously dispute and sweetly fabulize about the heaven of the blessed, which they call the empyrean, and its situation, location, and qualities, as well as the exercises of the blessed in that fictitious heaven, indulging at times in purely carnal and worldly speculations... *Becanus* dares to write that this empyrean heaven has the most solid foundation in the Scriptures. 'For Scripture teaches,' he says, 'that the firmament and all things were produced on the second and fourth days.' He adds: 'the firmament is in the midst of the waters, so that some waters are above, some below the firmament. If this is so, it follows that the heaven which was created in the beginning is above the firmament and above all the waters, which surely can be nothing other than the empyrean.' . . 2. *Calvinists,* who hold that the heaven of the blessed is a corporeal, created place, above this corruptible world and above all the heavens, and that it has distinct local spaces and seats in which one may locally go, sit, stand, walk, etc. . . *Joh. Cloppenburg*, *exercit. de creatione disput*, Disp. 3, where he says: "The first work of the first day is the outermost and highest heaven, the third heaven, the heaven of heavens, which is corporeal and consequently local, in which the throne of God and the seat of God is," he asserts. . . They nevertheless disagree among themselves on some points; for some wish the heaven of the blessed to be of corporeal substance, while others say that it is indeed a place and created by its local situation to be upward, but leave it undecided whether it is a body. . . 3. The *Socinians*, who confine God to a certain place and state that His substance is present only in heaven, which for them is the place of immortality, the dwelling place of God,

established above the starry expanse.. . 4. The *Arminians,* whose forerunner Episcopius (in his *Inst. Theol*., bk. 4, sect. 3, ch. 1) holds that the first thing created was the heavens, so that it would be a suitable dwelling place for the angels, and that God intended it to be His palace." (L. c. f. 624 sq.)

LUTHER: "Moses's most simple meaning, therefore, is this: that all things which exist were created by God, and that at the beginning of the first day a crude mass of clay or earth, and of mist or water was created, into which God later, during the rest of the first day, poured light, and made the day appear, which would show that this crude mass of heaven and earth was not 'dissimilar to a crude seed, yet fit to produce something.'" (Opp. exeg. Cur. C. S. T. Elsperger. T. I. Enarratt. in Genesin. Cap. 1, 1. pag. 11.)

ANTITHESIS.

J. H. KURTZ: "We take up the codex of the sacred documents of revelation, and immediately encounter in the very first line the enigmatic *Tohu va Bohu,* that desolation, emptiness, and darkness, in which the first gaze of the holy seer beheld the earth, which through the work of the six days was to become the dwelling place of light and fullness of life. . . We already have, in *pre-human times*, an earth*,* and no less a *history,* which unfolded on and in it. The prophet of primeval history beheld this earth as a wilderness and a void. *Before* this chaotic state of desolation and barrenness, there was a state of order, of light, of life, as befits every work of God; and likewise, a creative restitution *followed* in the work of the six days, by which light was brought forth from darkness, and out of desolation and barrenness, order and fullness of life were produced, by which our present earth was founded, formed, ordered, and made alive. *The desolation was a consequence of the fall of the angels,* from which we further conclude that that primeval earth was the dwelling and place of exercise for that part of the angels who rebelled against God, and thereby lost their principality and were compelled to leave their habitation. The *restitution*, on the other hand, was the result of the divine decree, by which He does not allow His world-plan to be hindered, by which He again raises from the floods of destruction a whole world of life that had fallen into ruin, exiles the destroyer from it, and sets upon it a new inhabitant and ruler, man, — from which we further conclude that *man, placed in the stead of Satan and his angels,* was also called to carry out his unfulfilled task, to restore the disturbed harmony of the universe, the broken connection of the whole, and to defeat and judge *him*, the destroyer and rebel, himself." (*Bibel und Astronomie*. Second ed. Berlin, 1849. pp. 94, 96.) "The view defended here is already very old. . . Even in later, more recent, and the latest times it has been very widespread, and not only Theosophists and theosophically tinged expositors, such as J. Böhme, St. Martin, J. M. Hahn, Fr. v. Meyer, Hamberger, etc., have been attached to it, but also such sober and level-headed men as Reichel, Stier, G. H. v. Schubert, Kniewel, Drechsler, *Rudelbach, Guericke,* J. P. Lange, Schmieder, Ebrard, M. Baumgarten, A. Wagner, Michelis, Wichart, Lebeau, F. W. Krug, etc., have spoken in its favor." (p. 95.) The same is asserted by Dr. Delitzsch (See *System der bibl. Psychologie*. Leipzig 1855. pp. 42–45.), Dr. Vilmar (*Dogmatik*. Gütersloh 1874. I, 242. sq.).

c) But that *water* was produced together with the earth, not from pre-existing matter, can be gathered from *Genesis 1:1.* Compare *Hutter,*

*Musaeus,* and *Scherzer* II. cc. However, it is the probable opinion of some that *air* and *fire*, if they are to be considered elemental, were created on the first day along with the other elements (as *Scherzer* notes, loc. cit., *air* is *an appendix* to the waters*, as a symbolic element,* and the mention of *darkness upon the face of the abyss* is not without reason); although others think that the air was produced on the second day from the thinner parts of the water.

d) See *Genesis 1:3.* It seems to be understood, however, as a certain ethereal and *luminous body*, produced dependently on the substance of the heavens and functioning *in the place of the sun*. Cf. *Hutterus*, loc. cit. Q. VIII, p. 211, and *Mus.*, loc. cit., §§ 27, 28, p. 143, 144.

## § 7.

On the second day God separated the elementary waters (a) into the waters below and above, by interposing an expanse (b) of air, (c) so that this expanse touched (d) from above to the subtler waters gathered in the clouds (e), and its lower side the denser waters surrounding the surface of the earth.

a) Which on the first day were not distinct from the earth in place, but with it formed one confused mass, so that the earth lay hidden in them, as in an abyss. *Mus.* 1. c. § 30. p. 14. Indeed*,* the same waters are understood *in Gen. 1:2 and 6.*

b) It is called by Moses רָקִיעַ in chapter 1, verse 6, which properly means *'an expanse*,' as admitted by D. *Chytraeus, L. Osiander, S. Gesner, J. Gerhard*, and others.

c) Thus also they accept the opinion not only *of the Rabbis,* but also of *D. Erasmus Marbach*, Comm. in Gen. p. 10. For on the first day both the elementary waters and perhaps also the element of air were produced; for since then the mass of water surrounded the earth on all sides and the thinner parts of the water, mixed with the air, stretched themselves up to the heavens, like a denser mist, it pleased God on the second day to make the air *the expanse* and the medium interceding between the two parts of the elementary water. Cf. *Mus., Disp*. cit. § 30. p. 145. 146. And *Ausführliche Erklärung* p. 196.

d) For this is what the words מֵעַל and מִתַּחַת signify, which should not so much be translated: *above* and *below*, but as: *from above*, *from the upper side* (von oben), and *from below, from the lower side* (von unten), and thus they confirm the view that by that רָקִיעַ is to be understood *not* the *ethereal* heaven (which certainly does not reach down to the lower waters) *but* the *aerial*, which, although *not in its entire extent* (which the words of the text do not require either), *yet truly in some part* of itself lies between the upper and lower waters and touches both. See *Mus., Disp*. cit. § 37. p. 150. 151., *Ausführl. Erklärung* pag. 198. 199. 204. 205. Likewise, *Marbach* (loc. cit.) also holds that God*,* in *Genesis* 1, *assigns the middle region of the air to the known and rain-bearing waters, so that they may be contained there*

*for the irrigation and fertilization of the earth.* And *Albert Grauer,* to the question: *"Whether there are true and natural waters above the starry heavens,"* answers: "*It is doubtful."* See *Quaest. Illustr. Disp. VIII. Coroll*. I. p. 336.

MEISNER: "The better part of theologians has always understood in Gen. 1:7 waters properly so called, which they defend as truly and really placed by God above the firmament or the starry heaven in a singular and wondrous manner." (*Philos. sobr*. P. I. s. 3. q. 3. p. 819.) Cf. Luther, Opp. T. I, 42. 49. sq.

e) For in *Ps. 104:3,* too*, clouds* are understood by the name of *waters*. Cf. *Geier* in his Commentary, and *Marbach, Genesis 1:7-8*, believed that rainwaters were denoted. However, that part where the clouds are is not infrequently called *heaven*. See *Gen. 1:26, 28, 30,* where *birds* are said to *fly through heaven*, which assuredly fly not in the aether but in the air. See *Deut. 4:17.* And *the fountains of heaven,* that is, of the air, are said to be *opened and closed, Gen. 7:11, chap. 8:2.* And what is said in *Ps. 148:4*: הַמַּיִם אֲשֶׁר מֵעַל הַשָּׁמָיִם, Luther translated: "The waters which are above the heavens," and the glossators added: In the rain clouds; so that the *expanse of the heavens* encompasses both the *ethereal and the aerial* expanse or heaven; of which now the one, now the other, now both are to be understood according to the diversity of predicates and context. Add *Mus., Disp*. cit. § 33. sqq. p. 148. sqq., *Ausführl. Erklärung* p. 200. sqq.

## § 8.

On the third day the lower waters were gathered together, washing the earth into certain basins or channels, which God called *seas.*[(a)] The remaining parts of the earth, however, appeared dry; and from them immediately grew herbs, trees, shrubs, etc.[(b)]

a) See *Genesis 1:9-10.*

b) L. c. v. 11 and 12. Indeed, so that *the earth* had the role *of a non-active*, or rather *passive* and material, *principle*. See *Mus., Disp*. cit. § 53. 54. p. 166. Moreover, it is not believed without reason that *stones* and *metals,* and even *the Garden of Eden,* or paradise, were produced on this same day. See *Mus.* 1. c. § 40. p. 153. The same seems to be said of *the minerals* which they call *media* (by which they mean various *earths*, *salts, sulphurs,* and *bitumens*).

## § 9.

On the fourth day God made the sun,[(a)] the moon, and the other stars,[(b)] and gave them a fixed motion and the power to influence, so that they might measure out the seasons and by their influence produce various effects on the earth.[(c)]

**a)** For He added fuller light and perfection to the imperfect luminous body that had been created on the first day, so that it might then at last fully assume the nature of the sun.

HOLLAZ: "The most wise Creator created *the earth* so that, ordinarily and universally*, it would not move,* but would remain at rest. He, however, gave the heavenly luminaries the task of defining the seasons by their motion." (*Exam*. P. I. c. 3. q. 21. p. 369.)

CALOV: "*The earth* was established, not to *be moved,* either in a circle or by any other means, much less to define the seasons by its own motion—a task given to the heavenly bodies—but to stand firm and unmovable. 'He established the earth upon its foundations; it shall never be moved,' Ps. 104:5. Although the earth is drawn from the waters and is washed by the waves of water that surround it and tower above it, it is nevertheless founded by divine power so that at no time, until the Last Day, can it be moved from its place as a whole. Cf. Job 26:7; 38:6-7; Eccl. 1:11. Therefore the Holy Scriptures oppose those who make the earth *a planet*, or establish the earth as mobile, whether by ascribing to it both daily and annual motion, or either motion alone, along with Copernicus, Kepler, and Lansberg." (*Syst*. T. III. art. 5. c. 2. p. 952.)

THE SAME: "Those *who place men on the moon* will never be reconciled with the Christian religion, and they assert that they would actually prove this, if they could reach the orb of the moon by the flapping of their wings, unless they also invent that Christ died for the Selenites, moon-dwellers, (as Origen did for the stars) and that the apostles flew to the moon's surface, and many other things, entangle themselves in paradoxes, overturning the orthodox religion." (L. c. p. 961.)

ROLLIUS: "Question: Does Scripture ever speak *to the erroneous understanding of the common people?* It arose from the Copernican opinion about the motion of the earth and the stillness of the sun and the other heavenly bodies. For when the authority of Scripture was objected to by the Copernicans, which testifies that the earth stands still and the sun rises and sets, they answered that Scripture speaks to the erroneous understanding of the common people. But this is a false and blasphemous opinion against God, the author of Scripture. An excellent dissertation on this subject exists by the late Dr. *Rambach,* delivered at the Halle academy in the year 1727. To which also pertains the dissertation of Dr. Heinrich Ascanius *Engelken,* a theologian of Rostock, on the injurious opinions concerning the Holy Scripture and the less safe methods of handling it, which he prefaced to the collection of the latest controversies published by the learned *Schomer* in Rostock in 1703. (See Fecht's *Sylloge*, p. 28 ff.)

ACTA ERUDITORUM: "Hafenreffer, a theologian, advises Kepler, a friend, to cultivate the system of a shifting earth as *a hypothesis* useful for explaining astronomical phenomena, *but to refrain from reconciling it with Scripture*." (Vol. of 1719, p. 5.) Cf. Luther on Genesis 1:6, I, 44.

ANTITHESIS.

DEYLING: "Nor should we be offended by the division of created things into heaven and earth. For Scripture sometimes follows the experience of the senses or the ideas most powerfully impressed by them, and speaks of heavenly bodies just as it does of earthly ones—not otherwise than as our senses represent them to us, since whatever we know about bodies is made known to us through the senses. These forms of expression are what experts in the art are accustomed to call *optical*, and they distinguish them from physical truth. Therefore, let us by no means say that the more divine Scripture accommodates itself to the understanding of the common people, i.e., to error, or speaks erroneously, as many, especially from the school of *R. Descartes*, ignorantly and impiously suppose. What, then, prevents us from affirming and conceding that Scripture, in certain places, speaks *not physically but optically*, that is, according to the observation of the senses and as things are perceived by the senses? Do not the astronomers themselves refer the moon to this or that

part of the ecliptic, in which it is not really, but appears to our eyes? Do not all the astronomers' tables rest on an optical position, which, however, are not indices of errors but of true observations? *He alone errs in the error of the multitude who takes the optical position for a physical one,* for the Holy Spirit, the author of the Scriptures, did nowhere do this nor did He regard the error of the multitude, but our *δψιν* [vision]. Furthermore, the holy letters were not entrusted to philosophers, either to amuse or instruct their minds, but to instruct the souls of people eager for salvation, who are for the most part simple and uneducated. I certainly think that a great argument of divine goodness lies in this, that the construction of this universe was described not according to physical, but according to optical truth, so that the weaker and uninitiated in philosophy would not be offended, for whose sake we know the entire Holy Scripture was composed, so that they may read it and easily understand it." (*Observ*. *s*. P. I. p. 355. sq.)

**b)** The moon and the remaining stars were, however, made *either* immediately from the substance of the ethereal heaven, *or* from that which we have called the luminous body. *Mus.* Disp. cit. § 42. p. 155.

**c)** See *Gen. 1:14-17.*

# § 10.

On the fifth day, aquatic animals were produced from the water,(a) and flying creatures from the earth.(b)

a) See *Gen. 1:20.* Indeed*, the waters teem with living creatures, not* as an *effective* principle*,* but as *a material,* just as we said of the earth with respect to plants, at § 8, note *b.* And it was indeed fitting for the nature of these creatures to be produced from water, though not from water alone or pure water. *Mus.* 1. c. § 44. p. 155.

b) See *Genesis 2:19,* where God is said to *have formed the birds of the air,* as well as the beasts of the field, *from the earth*. Earth is also more suitable to the nature of these creatures than water.

LUTHER: "The text is clear that the birds, produced from the water, sought the air in which they live." (On Gen. 1:20.) CALOV on the same verse: "The origin of birds from the waters is indicated." (*Bibl. illustr*. I, 228. Cf. *System. th. Th.* III. p. 967. *Hollaz* contradicts.)

# § 11.

On the sixth day God produced the land animals, first the quadrupeds, then the reptiles,(a) from the earth.(b)

a) See *Gen. 1:24.*

b) And in these animals, indeed, it is manifest that earth is the predominant element.

HAFENREFFER: "What is to be thought of those animals which today are produced, either from *the* varied *mixture* of different species*,* or from *putrefaction* or some similar cause, whether they too were made in the first six days of creation? There was no putrefaction in the first creation of things; therefore, there were also no animals of that kind then, such as

lice, fleas, ticks, mites, earthworms, and other small creatures which are accustomed to be born from various kinds of putrefaction. Although such *acts* did not exist at that time, they nevertheless lay hidden in *potential* in other animal species and in the suitable matter, from which they are now produced by various means. The very same must be said of those species of animals which are born of the mixture of different species, as is related by the physiologists concerning the mule, the lynx, the leopard, and others." (L. th. L. I. Loc. 2. p. 70. sq.)

GERHARD: "If one asks about poisonous herbs, harmful beasts, etc., we answer with the words of Augustine in *de Gen. ad literam* 1. 3. c. 15.: 'Created animals that are harmful would have harmed no man, if he had not sinned. For they began to harm for the sake of punishing vices and earthly things, or for proving or perfecting virtue; they were therefore created harmless, but because of sin they became harmful." (*Loc. de creat*. § 33.)

# § 12.

Finally [a] God created man on that same day,[b] indeed his body from the earth,[c] but his soul from nothing,[d] producing it and uniting it to the body.[e]

a) After all the other creatures had been produced; the reason for which order *Philo Judaeus* gives in his book *de mundi opific*.: *Just as dinner guests*, he says, *are not invited to supper before those who host them have prepared what is necessary for the banquet; and those who put on athletic and theatrical games first gather the competitors before they assemble the spectators in the theaters or stadia, and prepare an abundance of things pertaining to the pleasure of the ears or eyes: so the prince of the entire world, about to invite man to the feast and spectacle, as it were as the giver of a contest or a banquet, prepared whatever pertained to both, so that man at his entry into the world might at once find both a banquet and a most sacred theater*.

b) See *Gen. 1:26* ff.

c) *Genesis 2:7*, he is said to have been made *from the earth,* just as the brute creatures are said to have been made from the same, verse 19, so that up to this point the origin of man and the beasts is common. And from the reason of his origin from the earth, he drew the name *Adam*. However, he is said to have been made עפר, *dust from the earth, in verse* 7, where some, with *Tertullian*, conjecture that God, by adding *a liquid*, *coagulated the dust into mud* and *as it were clay*, and thus fashioned the human body; of which, however, there is not enough evidence from Moses's account.

LUTHER: "Gen. 2:7. Here Moses returns to the work of the sixth day, and shows whence the tiller of the earth came. Namely, that God formed him from the dust, just as a potter forms a vessel from clay with his hand. Therefore, above He did not say, as He did of other creatures, 'Let the earth bring forth man'; but, 'Let us make man,' to show the excellence of the human race and to reveal God's singular counsel, which he used in creating man, even though thereafter man grows and multiplies in the same way as the other beasts. . . But in the first creation, Moses shows that there is a great dissimilarity, since human nature was created with a singular counsel and wisdom and formed by the finger of God. This dissimilarity, which exists between the origin of man and that of beasts, also indicates immortality. For although all the other works of God are full of wonder and very magnificent, this shows that man is the most excellent creature, since God applies counsel in creating him and uses a new method. He does not leave him to be shaped by the earth, like the beasts and trees. But He Himself

forms him in His own image, as a partaker of God and one who is to enjoy the rest of God. Therefore*, Adam, before he is formed by the Lord, is a dead and lying clod; God takes it and forms from it the most beautiful creature, a participant in immortality.* If Aristotle were to hear this, he would burst out laughing and would judge it to be, though not an unpleasant, yet an utterly absurd tale, that man, in his first origin, was a clod of earth, formed by divine wisdom, and thus created so that he might be capable of immortality. For even though some of the philosophers, like Socrates and others, asserted the immortality of the soul, they were nevertheless ridiculed by the other philosophers and were almost torn to pieces. But is it not great folly to be so offended by reason, when one sees that even today the generation of man is full of wonder? For will you not judge it absurd that a man, who is to live forever, is born from a single drop of seed in his father's loins? There is almost more absurdity in this than in what Moses says, about the clay formed by the fingers of God. But reason, in this way, shows that it knows absolutely nothing about God, who by a single thought makes not a human seed, but a human being from the dust, and, as Moses later says, makes a woman from the rib of a man. This is the first origin of man. And so, after the male and female were created, man is later generated from their blood by divine blessing. Although this generation is common to us and the beasts, it nevertheless does not take away that glory of our first origin, that we are vessels of God formed by God himself, that He himself is our potter, and we are His clay, as Isaiah says in the sixty-fourth chapter. And this not only pertains to our origin, but throughout our entire life and even to death and the grave, we remain the clay of this potter. (Exeget. opp. lat. Cur. Elsperger. Tom. I. Erl. 1829. p. 104—106.) Cf. S. SCHMIDT, who writes: "Since Gen. 1:26 ff. has described the creation of man rather according to qualities, i.e., the image of God and the dominion given over all things, here (Gen. 2:7) a clearer mention is made of the essential parts, the body and the soul. Therefore Jehovah God formed the אֶת־הָאָדָם, *the man,* that is, him *who was to become and soon be a man;* for He did not make the whole man, but only the man's body from the earth. He thus made the soul and united it to the earthly and mortal body, so that He breathed into it, as a soul of lives, i.e., not only living immortally in itself, but also quickening the body and breathing through the nostrils. He inspired it into the nostrils of man through His Holy Spirit, by which He impressed the image of God upon him. Thus man was *made a living soul,* i.e., a perfect *animal* living according to his entire substance." (*Super Mosis librum primum*. Strasbourg, 1697. p. 24.) CHEMNITZ: "Just as the souls of beasts are dissolved, vanish, and perish along with their bodies, because the earth produced a living soul, so from the description of the creation of the human soul, Solomon says in Ecclesiastes 12:7: 'Let the dust return to the earth, from where it was; and let the spirit return to God, who gave it.' Therefore he calls the breath of חַיִּים, i.e., of lives, in the dual number, which is not restricted only to the life of the body's duration, but also to the spiritual life in the other world. Hence Christ says in Matthew 10:28, "Do not fear those who kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul," and in Job 12:10, the soul is properly attributed to other living creatures, while to humans the spirit is attributed. By breathing He created the human soul, i.e., besides the vital spirit which man shares with the beasts, God created a rational soul, and it is said that He inspired it because He poured into that soul the divine light, wisdom, justice, etc., so that man might be the image and likeness of God. For Christ also, in restoring the image of God in man, used inspiration, when by breathing on the apostles he gave the Holy Spirit, John 20:22; and He undoubtedly wanted to lead us to the thought of the first inspiration." (*Loc. th. loc. de creat*. c. 5. f. 113.) SCHERZER: "The divine inbreathing sufficiently proves immortality. He who breathes in, bestows *something* of Himself. However, by the words נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים, this immortality is not proven; because by this reasoning the souls of beasts would also be immortal, according to Genesis 7:22." *(System. Loc. V.* § 5. p. 114.)

LUTHER: "Gen. 2:7. Here a new question arises. For just as Moses speaks of man here in a new phrase: 'God formed man from the dust of the earth'; yet of other living creatures He did not speak in this way above: so also here he says something peculiar about man, that God breathed into his face the breath of life, which he did not say of the other beasts, since nevertheless a spirit in the nostrils is in all the beasts, just as in man. Therefore, the question arises, why did Moses wish to say this? A second question also arises (although it pertains to the same matter): since throughout Scripture all animals are called living souls, why is it said here only of man that he was made a living soul? For above He said: "Let the earth bring forth the living creature, each according to its kind." But here he changes it greatly, and says, "Man was made a living soul." These things undoubtedly moved the patriarchs, the holy fathers, and the prophets to examine such passages more carefully, because this singular way of speaking signifies that Moses intended to show something remarkable. For if you consider the animal life of which Moses speaks here, there is no difference between a man and an ass. For animal life requires food and drink; it requires sleep and rest; bodies alike are nourished and grow with food and drink, and wither and perish from lack of it; the stomach receives food and passes it on to the liver, which produces blood, by which all the members are restored. When we consider these things, there is no difference between man and a beast. And yet Moses adorns the life of man in this way, that of him alone he says that he was made a living soul, not simply, like other beasts, but a soul living excellently, because he was created in the image of God, which image undoubtedly shone uniquely in the face of Adam and Eve in the state of innocence, just as after the Fall, however, the Gentiles concluded from the posture of the body—that man alone walks upright and lifts his eyes to heaven—that man is a more excellent creature than all other creatures. Paul had this in mind when he quotes this passage, 1 Cor. 15:45: "It is written, 'The first man Adam became a living soul,' but the last man is a life-giving spirit." He calls a "living soul" the animal life, which consists of eating, drinking, procreating, and growing—all of which are also found in brute animals. By antithesis, however, he says that the last Adam was made a life-giving spirit, that is, a life that does not need these conditions of animal life. Paul also teaches that even if Adam had not sinned, he would nevertheless have lived a corporeal life, in need of food, drink, rest, growing, procreating, etc., until he was translated by God to spiritual life, in which he would have lived without animal nature, so to speak, namely from within, from God alone, and not from without, as before from herbs and fruits, and in such a way that man would nevertheless have flesh and bones, and not be merely a spirit, as the angels are. I answer, therefore, the question, that God, through the mouth of Moses, also wished in this place to show the hope of a future and eternal life, which Adam, had he persisted in innocence, was to have after this animal life. As if Moses were to say: Man was made a living soul, not simply as the beasts live, but one which God was henceforth to vivify, even without animal life. This hope of immortality we also have through Christ, although because of sin we are subject to death and all calamities. Adam's future condition would have been better. He would have lived on earth pleasantly and with the utmost delight, and then would have been translated from animal life to a spiritual one without any trouble. We are transferred from the animal life to the spiritual one only through death, and after infinite dangers and torments. In this way, we must diligently examine Moses with the holy prophets and observe why, by a singular counsel concerning man, he says what he did not say of the other living creatures: so that the faith and hope of immortality may be confirmed in us, that, although man is like the other brute animals in his animal life, he nevertheless has a hope of immortality which the other animals do not have; he bears the image and likeness of God, which the other animals do not bear." (L. c. p. 106—109. ) Cf. A. Osiander, who

writes: "I answer, that *man* is said to be formed *from the dust of the earth* not with respect to the work in progress, but *with respect to the term;* for Moses speaks of the perfect and formed man, not of the one being formed and produced. But as he indicates by these words, what God produced, what He formed, as the complete end of creation, so he then proceeds to an exposition of the parts, and explains how each was produced, namely, by breathing into the soul, forming the body, and presupposing that which was formed to this breathing." (*Colleg. th. syst*. I. p. 224. sq.)

d) *Ibid.* For that *inbreathing*, which is said to proceed from God, cannot denote the emission of a corporeal breath, since God is incorporeal; and therefore it denotes nothing other than the *immateriality* of the action and that the *effect* produced was a *spirit,* distinct from the body and all matter.

e) So that the *body* was produced from the dust and *a soul* was breathed into it *at the same moment*. For although the word יָצַר is sometimes used of *a potter* shaping a vessel from clay or mud, it does not follow that a successive production of the body's parts, or a successive introduction of a heterogeneous form into each part, and thus finally the animation of the body, should be conceived, when we behold the work of divine power. Nor may one go beyond the third point of the comparison.

A. OSIANDER: "Moses does indeed mention *three*, but *two* are *essential parts,* while the third is *a composite* resulting from the union of these parts; this composite is called a living soul, the name being, so to speak, derived from the more prominent one." (L. c. p. 222.)

QUENSTEDT: "Man consists of only *two* essential parts, the rational soul and the organic body; and therefore neither the spirit is a third essential part of man, nor the rational soul alone, but also the human body essentially constitutes man. . . *Distinguish* between *spirit*, as it denotes *the essence* of the soul (for the soul itself is also a spirit and an incorporeal essence), and as it denotes *the qualities,* motions, and affections of the soul, according to which the soul is at one time called joyful, at another sad, at another strong, and at another weak and timid." (L. c. c. 12. s. 2. q. 2. f. 738.)

THE SAME: "Weigel tries to establish his *trichotomy* from the exegesis of Holy Scripture, which makes a distinct mention of the soul and spirit, such as Luke 1:46-47. 1 Thess. 5:23. Heb. 4:12. But he washes a brick [labors in vain]; for 1. it does not follow: Holy Scripture somewhere distinctly mentions soul and spirit, therefore there is an *essential* distinction of soul and spirit. 2. By 'spirit' in such passages Holy Scripture does not mean any spirit substantially different from the human soul. For not every *διαίρεσις καὶ μερισμός* [division and separation] is an essential distinction. 2. By 'spirit' in such passages, Holy Scripture does not understand some spirit substantially different from the human soul, but the higher part of the soul (as Dr. Feuerbach puts it). 'For the soul,' says the same author, 'is accustomed to be distinguished into its higher and lower powers and faculties.' And therefore Paul himself calls the spirit the mind (Eph. 4:23). (L. c. f. 739 sq.)

THE SAME: "When *Luther* in Vol. VI. Wittenberg, fol. 13, and Jen. I, fol. 479. and other writers here and there say that man has three parts: body, soul, and spirit, they by no means understand three parts essentially different from one another (for they explicitly teach that the soul, as to *οὐσία* [essence], is that spirit, and this, as to substance and nature, is that one), but rather *adjunctive parts.* For it is not unusual to also call the division of a subject into adjuncts a distribution of the whole into parts. Thus, for example, philosophers are accustomed to call the powers of the soul parts, as in *the λογικὸν μέρος* [the rational part]. And Basil in Ps. 33 calls *τὸ λογικόν* [the rational element] of man *μέρος διορατικόν* [the discerning part]; cf. Aristotle, Book VI. Ethic., Nicom. bk. 1. And just as *τὸ μέρος* [the part] is sometimes taken broadly, so that the adjuncts also are called *τὰ μέρη* [the parts], so also

*μερισμός* [division] is sometimes taken loosely and denotes an imperfect division, as some call it. Distinguish between the spirit that constitutes man in the being of nature and humanity — and in this sense the spirit is the rational soul — and the spirit that constitutes man in the being of spirituality and Christianity — and this is the *χάρισμα* [gracious gift] that regenerates and sanctifies — and likewise the one that places man in the being of corruption — and this is called the spirit of dizziness, Isa. 19:14, of fornication, Hos. 5:4." (L. c. f. 740.)

BENGEL: "Jude 19: *πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες*, not having a spirit; therefore the spirit is not an essential part of man." (Gnomon ad loc.)

QUENSTEDT: *"A distinction is made* between *an instrument,* which a man uses, such as a soldier's horse, a carpenter's hammer, and *an essential part,* which is informed by the form. *) The soul does not use the body as an instrument, but the body is informed by the soul, nor is the soul united with the body extrinsically, like a harpist with a harp, a horse with a soldier, a craftsman with a hammer, but intrinsically, which internal union makes a being in itself and one essence. *Therefore, the body is improperly called an instrument of the soul* on account of resemblance, not on account of the true nature of the thing." (L. c.)

THE SAME: "They object: 'Our body does not remain the same numerically; how then can it be a part? For anyone, from early infancy, has gradually worn away many bodies. Therefore, the body is not essential to him, since it can be present and absent while the man remains.' Reply: The body certainly remains the same in number, because it is the same by its form, which is the principle of individuation.**) (L. c. f. 741.)

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*) SCHARFF: "The form is the internal cause, by which a thing is constituted in its being, as in man there is the rational soul. The informing form is that by which a thing is what it is." (*Metaphys*. p. 115.)

**) SCHARFF. "The principle of individuation is the cause, for which a thing is an individual and a singular thing. " (L. c. p. 200.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. The *Manicheans* and Heracleonites, according to Jerome in Epistle 150 to Hedib. and Gennadius c. 20, who posited three essential parts of man: body, soul, and spirit. 2. The *Paracelsians*, who taught the same. . . 3. of the *Enthusiasts,* Schwenkfeldians, Weigelians, and new prophets, who dream that the third essential part, i.e., the spirit, is added to man in regeneration. . . 4. *Joh. Amos Comenius,* a Calvinist, who said: "Man is composed of three parts, body, spirit, and soul. The body we have, formed from the elements; the spirit we have from the spirit of the world; but the soul, or mind, is from God. The body is the organ and dwelling of the spirit, and the spirit, in turn, is the dwelling and organ of the soul," etc. 9. Of Dr. Joachim *Luetkemann,* formerly professor at Rostock, who taught that 'besides the soul and body something else is essentially required for the constitution of man, and indeed something substantial, which is corrupted when man dies, in the absence of which entity Christ at the time of His death was not a true man, if that which is required besides body and soul for the being of man requires that the same third thing returns from the dead when the situation of man demands it' — which he denied; but being warned about these things he declared that by that third thing he meant not a part of man, but a mode of soul and body, namely the union, which he said differs really from both (soul and body) and is something substantial." (L. c. f. 738. sq.)

## § 13.

God, however, at the beginning created only one human individual, namely a male;(a) the female (b) later produced from the rib (c) of the sleeping (d) man.(e)

a) And this is that *one Adam,* who is mentioned in both chapters *1* and *2 of Genesis*. That Adam was alone for some time without a female companion is evident from chapters 2, 18, 19, and 20.

QUENSTEDT: "*Adam*, created by God on the sixth day of the first hexameron, is *the first of all men* and the parent of the entire human race throughout the whole world. . . Our opinion is not merely a matter of debate, but *a dogma of the faith*, and not of slight importance, but very weighty; for the whole of theology is corrupted by this fiction on the Pre-Adamites. . . The gist of the objection is this: Genesis 1 describes the creation of the human race, not that of Adam himself, whose description only follows in chapter 2." (L. c. c. 12. s. 2. q. 1. f. 733. sq. 736.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of the heretical ancient *Arabs*; for the Nabataeans and Sabaeans, inhabitants of Arabia, as related by John Henry Hottinger, *histor. oriental.* 1. I. c. 8. in the thesis, which they say: 'They produced men more ancient than Adam,' for they dreamed that he was born from a man and a woman in the manner of others. . . 2. *Caesalpinus,* preceded by *Avicenna* and *Cardano,* who said: Men are born from putrefaction like mice and frogs. . . 5. of the founder *of the Pre-Adamites Isaac Peyrerius*, a Frenchman by nation, but who gave birth in Belgium to the monster of the Pre-Adamites, by profession formerly a Calvinist, then after *a recantation* a Papist, who in the year 1655... brought forth this portent... from the underworld: That the Gentiles are different from the Jews in kind and origin; That the Jews were formed by God in Adam, while the Gentiles had been created before, on the same day as the other animals... Also: That the epoch of the world's creation is not to be taken from that beginning which is commonly supposed in Adam, but that it must be traced back to a much earlier and more remote age. A certain John Meffresozotius agreed with Peyrerius. (L. c. s. 2. q. 1. f. 734.)

b) For indeed, as far as the body is concerned, God had first formed *Adam from* the clay of the *earth*, that is, according to the body. See *Gen. 2:7, 21,* and *22.*

LUTHER: "The Hebrew word מֵלְע signifies both rib and side. Therefore I take it that the Lord took not a bare rib but one clothed with flesh, just as Adam says below: 'This is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh.' Furthermore, the Lord also did this by His Word, lest we think that He used some kind of incision in the manner of a surgeon. He said: "From this bone, thus clothed with flesh, a woman shall be made, and so it was done." (L. c. p. 162.)

QUENSTEDT: *"The rib,* from which the woman was formed, was not dead or inanimate, but *animate,* having been taken from a living body by the divine hand. And thus *Eve was produced from him in soul and body*, not that the soul of Eve was immediately created by God from nothing and divinely implanted in her, but that the rib of Adam was the *transmitter* of the human soul to Eve, i.e., she did not exist by immediate creation, but by propagation and transmission. A living woman was formed from a living rib, Gen. 2:22." (L. c. s. 1. th. 4. f. 731.)

HEERBRAND: "The earth, from which Adam was created and formed, was not alive, but Adam's body was vivified by the inspired soul. But God afterward built up and produced Eve from Adam's living rib, and she was not written to have been breathed into, as Adam was before; but she was produced and built up entirely from Adam, body and soul at the same time. What other was the mode of creation than that of Adam? Thus God always seems to create man from man, the whole from the whole, even the soul from a soul, just as light is kindled from light. For this order in nature is divinely established, that the like should generate the like: the brute, the brute; so also man, man.

Nor is the generation of man less perfect than that of a brute. And when Scripture speaks of the sins of men, their corruption and regeneration, it understands the whole man in both cases: '*I* was conceived in sins.' 'Unless *one* is born again, etc.'" (*Compend. th. Loc. de pecc*. p. 306.)

c) It pleased God, however, to produce woman from a part of the man's body, *partly* so that the *ὑμνουσία* [identity of substance] of both spouses might be recognized, and thus the unity of the origin or principle of the entire human race be made all the more clearly known; and *partly*, so that a sign of the foundation of conjugal friendship might be perceived. Although, if we listen to *Hugo* of St. Victor, it should be particularly noted *that the woman was not taken from the head, nor from the feet, so that she would not be thought to be either a mistress, if from the head, or a slave, if from the feet: for this reason she had to be taken from the side, that is, from a rib, so that she would be understood as a companion.*

d) It was indeed a true sleep, not an *ecstasy* [trance], although it was divinely induced. And God willed that Adam should not be a spectator of the formation, but an admirer of the work that was formed.

e) It is said that God *built up* the rib, so that we might observe the artistry of the structure in the mechanism of the body.

## § 14.

In which place, or in what part of the earth, God produced Adam and Eve, we do not define.[(a)] However, it is thought that they were created outside Paradise and later introduced into it.[(b)]

a) For the fact that the Hebrews here mention the *land of Damascus* is a tradition of dubious reliability, since Scripture remains silent.

b) As for Adam, the matter is clear from *Genesis 2:7–8,* where it is related that God *took and placed* Adam *in the paradise.* For thereby a local motion or translation of Adam, who had dwelt for a time outside of paradise, into paradise is at any rate indicated. *Basil the Great*, whom many of the more recent writers follow, also thought that the woman was no less produced outside the paradise and finally, after she had been joined to Adam with divine auspices, was translated into the paradise along with him.

## § 15.

But when these works were completed and the sixth day had passed, God rested.[(a)] Nor did He create any more kinds of creatures.[(b)]

GERHARD: "After man, God rested from His works, because man was to be the most peaceful dwelling of the most holy Trinity ." (L. de imag. § 10.)

a) See *Gen. 2:2.*

b) Though He could have added countless others. For God does not entirely rest or cease from His works, as we shall see in the chapter on Providence.

# § 16.

As for the causes of creation, it is clear that God [(a)] Triune [(b)] is the principal efficient cause.[(c)]

a) See *Genesis 1* and *2,* and compare *Isaiah 45:12; Jeremiah 10:11; Psalm 146:6; Acts 4:24; 17:24; Revelation 4:11,* where it is shown that God alone is the cause of creation.

b) For it is an outward work. Compare *Genesis 1:1 and 26,* where the plurality of persons is indicated, not only by the *plural name* Elohim [אלהים], but also by the *verb* and the *two plural suffixes* in the words: *'Let us make* man *in our image* (as of several), *after our likeness* (of several).' Add the passages by which we proved above (ch. I, § 30, pp. 51–52) that creation belongs to the Son and the Holy Spirit as well as to the Father.

c) *One* cause, I say, *not three co-operative* causes. For the power of creating of the three persons is unique. Cf. *Mus., Disp*. cit. § 15. p. 113. Where he also decides the question: *Whether the three persons are rightly called three creators*, so that he warns that this phrase *has never been received by ecclesiastical writers in common usage,* and *that it seems safer to abstain from it altogether, even though it might perhaps be thought to be defensible from the force and meaning of the words.*

> LUTHER: "Now Scripture retains the manner of speaking, saying: 'The world was created *through* Christ and *from* the Father and *in* the Holy Spirit,' all of which has its cause, though not sufficiently comprehensible or expressible. However, to cite just a little, it uses such a manner of speaking in order to show that it is not the Father *who receives the divine nature* from the Son, but the Son from the Father, and that the Father is the first, original Person in the Godhead. Therefore it does not say that Christ made the world *through the Father*, but that the Father made it *through Him,* so that the Father remains the first person and that from Him, yet through the Son, all things come." (*Kirchenpostille*. XII, 212.)

ANTITHESIS.

> PHILIPPI: "If we now ask in what particular manner the individual persons participated in these outward works of the one, whole, and undivided Godhead, the manner of their participation in *creation* will be revealed to us through an analogical inference from the manner of their participation in redemption. For just as the *redemption* proceeded *from* the Father, who from eternity devised the plan of redemption and sent the Son to accomplish it in time, was mediated *by* the Son as the instrument of its objective execution, and was made efficacious *in* the Holy Spirit as the power of its subjective appropriation in us: so we must also say concerning *creation* that it was accomplished *by* the Father *through* the Son and *in* the Holy Spirit (hence the so-called diacritical particles ἐκ, διά, ἐν*)*, and in the form of preservation it is continually accomplished. The Father is the ultimate ground and source, not only of the Godhead but also of the creature; the Son is He whose *mediation* the Father employed in creation; and the Holy Spirit is He in whose power the Father, through the Son, has carried the counsel of creation into

actual reality. We see here the activity *distributed* quite evenly among the Three, although creation appears to be originally and predominantly ascribed to the Father." (*Kirchl. Glaubenslehre*. Stuttgart 1857. II, 125. sq.)

## § 17.

The exemplary cause of creation [(a)] consists of the ideas of the individual creatures expressed in the divine intellect.[(b)]

a) See *Genesis 1,* where this formula is prefixed to almost every work by Moses: *God said.* And it is added: *God saw what he had made, and it was very good.* This very fact indicates that the divine intellect observed the forms for producing individual things, and that the things produced were indeed imitations of those forms according to God's intention, and thus were approved by God. But this is also the nature of other causes that act through intellect: they produce effects in imitation of some form conceived in the mind; and it is certain that the world, and the things in it, were created not by chance, but by the counsel of God.

ANTITHESIS.

KAHNIS: "The *'Through'* expresses that He is the intermediate cause, and the *'To'* that He is the goal of all creation. Through and to, however, are only the unfoldings of the *in,* which designates first the transitive, secondly the immanent cause, i.e., expresses *that Christ is the Idea underlying all finite being,* from which it follows that Christ is also the *goal* recapitulating all finite being." (*Die luth. Dogm*. Lpz. 1861. P. I, 465.)

b) Not indeed as accidents, such as our ideas are, but to be understood *θεοπρεπῶς* [in a manner befitting God].

## § 18.

We seek the impulsive cause of creation in the goodness [(a)] of God alone.[(b)]

a) See *P8. 136:5.* and following, where in the record of the works of creation the formula is always added: *"For His kindness* (his steadfast love, חסדו) *is upon all generations*." Nor will it be difficult to recognize the same, if we presuppose that the world was created by the free will of God.

b) Not by any right that creatures would have to bring themselves into being and thereby obligate God.

QUENSTEDT: "Nor was there any *prior* cause of creation other than the good pleasure of God alone, communicating Himself, *not from a necessity of nature,* but from the freedom of His will." (L. c. c. 10. s. 1. th. 12. f. 593.)

## § 19.

We acknowledge no instrumental efficient cause.[(a)]

a) Indeed, *whether* angels or anything else distinct from God *can* at least be an instrument of His creation, by which something is made out of nothing, is an *uncertain and curious* question. However, it can *by no means* be said that *there* really *was* any such cause for the creation of this universe or its parts. The Son of God, *through* whom all things are said to have been made (namely, with respect to the order he has by reason of his origin to the person of the Father), is nevertheless *not properly* speaking *the instrument* of the Father; for the power to create, which is the same as the Father's, but in no way inferior to it, belongs to Him. However, the *improper* expression of certain ecclesiastical doctors may be excused, but not imitated. Cf. *Mus., Disp*. cit. § 2. p. 129.

ANTITHESIS.

KAHNIS: "The begetting of the Son is the beginning of creation, because what has been created was created *in* Him (Col. 1:16), i.e., the Son is the immanent *mediating cause* of creation." (*Die luth. Dogm*. Lpz. 1861. P. I, p. 464)

# § 20.

There is no matter for the creation of immaterial things; matter for simple bodies is given, but not existing before the form; the matter for mixed bodies is to be sought in simple bodies.

See above §§ 3, 4, and 5. *Mus.* 1. c. §§ 24, 25, p. 139, 140.

TWESTEN: "The expression ('out of nothing') is taken from the Vulgate, which in 2 Maccabees 7:28 translates the words *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησεν αὐτὰ ὁ Θεός* as ex nihilo illa fecit Deus." — One must not, therefore, think of *Nothing* as if it were the *matter* from which things have been formed; for against this one could rightly invoke the well-known axiom: from nothing comes nothing. For we must concede the correctness of that principle insofar as its meaning is: Nothing comes into being without an efficient cause (*in genere causarum efficientium*), or: That nothing can be the matter of something (in the genus of a positive material cause); however, we do not concede this if by it the denial is meant that God needs no matter for creation (in the genus of a negative material cause). — *Ex nihilo* means: not from something, not from prior matter; it does not designate matter, but excludes it. Although this is actually already inherent in the concept of creation, there was good reason to express it separately; for it is precisely through this that the pure relation of *dependence* is designated and asserted, in contrast to the *immanence* and *disjunction* that underlie *pantheism* and *dualism*. . . Whoever considers the world as one with God..., can assume no other relationship between God and the world than that which orthodox doctrine assumes between the Father and the Son and . . . calls *generation*. Likewise, he who posits a second... principle of being besides God, e.g., an *eternal matter*, cannot conceive of God as the Creator from nothing; he can only understand Him as the *ordainer or architect of the world*. All religions except those contained in the Holy Scriptures or derived from them (in certain points) (the Jewish, Christian, and Muhammadan), waver between these opposites, or fall into an even less tenable mixture of them, *hylozoism*, in which matter is originally thought to be united with the

formative or life-giving principle, i.e., the Absolute is conceived as burdened with an original, its essence-negating opposite." (*Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik der ev.-luth. Kirche*. Vol. 2. Part 1. p. 75. sq.)

PHILIPPI: "The concept of creation arose only on the ground of positive divine revelation, and where it is found outside this sphere (as in Mohammedanism, Rationalism), it is demonstrably borrowed from there. In pre-Christian paganism, in which the content of the natural human reason is expressed unmixed with ideas of revelation, the idea of creation is not found, for all pagan speculation, which on the one hand is the root, and on the other the flower and expression of the religious popular view, proceeds either from the pantheistic doctrine of a *world-development* or from the dualistic one of *a world-formation*. Either God is regarded as the *germ* from which the world has unfolded with inner necessity, or it is conceived as *coeternal with the world-forming principle* in its substance, so that the divine understanding (*νοῦς*) is assigned the primordial matter *(υλη)*, into which it has imprinted its ideas. In the first case, God is the original substance, the dark primordial source of the evolving world; in the latter case, the role of the world-maker or architect of the world *(δημιουργός)* is assigned to him." (*Kirchl. Glaubenslehre*. II. p. 225. sq.)

ANTITHESIS.

DELITZSCH: "Therefore the Holy Scripture does not say that God created the world out of nothing (*ex nihilo*). . . The world, far from having been nothing before its creation, had an ideal existence in God, and its creation was the transfer from this ideal existence into a real one. . . All worldly being is *born* from the being of God and is not so set off from it that it does not remain conditioned, sustained, and encompassed by it." (*Zeitschr. f. d. gesammte luth. Th. u. K*. 1876. p. 61. 65.)

## § 21.

The mode of creation of this universe, although consistent with the order of nature,[a] was nevertheless plainly different [b] from physical or natural generation and was an argument for infinite divine wisdom and power.[c]

a) For God first produced the *simple elements,* the principles of mixed bodies, and from these, the *mixed bodies*; again, *imperfectly* mixed, e.g. clouds, first, then *perfectly* mixed, and from a census of the mixtures, first *plants,* then *fish, birds, terrestrial animals*—all indeed from that element which is most suited to their nature, in which they are, live, and are preserved—and finally *man,* the most perfect of corporeal creatures and their future lord, was ultimately produced. See *Mus., Disp*. cit. § 28. sqq. p. 143. sqq.

QUENSTEDT: "The act of creation *is accomplished in three steps:* 1. the *production of* the crude matter, which was like a seedbed for the entire universe, made on the first day; 2. the distinction and *arrangement* of simple creatures, accomplished over the preceding three days; for on the first day He distinguished light from darkness, on the second the lower waters from the upper by the interposition of the firmament, and on the third the earth from the water; and 3. the *adornment* and completion of the world, perfected over the last three days." (L. c. s. I. th. 14. f. 594.)

b) For 1) *physical* generation always requires *pre-existing matter; here*, however, with respect to the production of the heavens and the earth, *matter* did *not* exist *before* the form; as we saw in § 2. 2) *There*, *a suitable subject* and a passive potential not too remote is required, to be certainly and successively disposed for the reception of the form in act; *here,* however, even mixed bodies were produced from an *unsuitable* and *undisposed* subject, so that the dispositions for the form and the *forms* themselves were produced *in the matter in an instant*. *Mus.,* 1. c. § 49. 50. p. 161, 162, 163.

> SCHARFF: "*Passive potency* is either natural or obediential. *Natural potency* is a real inclination inherent in nature toward a certain act, which can be perfected by a natural agent. Thus, in the seed there is a natural passive potency, so that from it, by nature, an animate body is produced. Thus, by analogy, a hazelnut becomes a hazel-tree, from an acorn comes the tall oak. . . *Obediential potency* is that which, apart from its own nature, can be subjected to the efficacy of another, so that an act may result from it. It is thus said to be by *analogy*, because it is as if it obeys the external agent, i.e., does not sufficiently resist. This potentiality is not so much in the passive subject as in the agent, namely, when the power to act is so strong that it can produce something even from that which is not of itself suitable. Thus it is said that sons of Abraham can be made from stones; where, however, that power to become Abraham's sons is not in the stones." (*Metaph*. p. 82. sqq.)

c) This is clear from what has been said, and it must be repeated that, as we said in § 17, God created all things *by speaking*, or by the command of His will, guided by the practical knowledge of His intellect, applied His effective power to operate; or, as others teach, that God*, by willing,* or by the very force of the act of His will, which has reason for its productive power, effected in the work of creation what He willed. Cf. what we have said on the *power of God* in the preceding chapter, I. § 25, p. 41; *Mus.,* 1. c. § 51, pp. 263-265.

## § 22.

But so that the world might endure, God produced *simple* bodies indeed on the condition that *they should never be entirely corrupted;*[(a)] *to the compound ones*, however, which have a life subject to corruption, He imparted the *power of generating* or multiplying themselves [(b)] for the preservation of the species, and therefore produced two individuals *of each sex* at the same time.[(c)] He also soon joined a female companion to the first man and endowed them both with the power of procreation. [(d)]

a) *The heavens* are *indeed incorruptible*, destructible only by the power of God. *The elements*, however, although they are subject to change insofar as they enter into the constitution of composite bodies, yet in themselves *as a whole never* perish; the *composites*, however, which are corruptible, are resolved *into the elements* of which they are composed.

b) Thus God created *the grass yielding seed, and the tree* also *bearing fruit of its own kind, whose seed is in it,* etc. *Gen. 1:11, 12, 29.* Thus*,* blessing the *aquatic* and *flying creatures*, He said: *Be fruitful and multiply*, verse 22.

c) In opposition to the other animals, only Adam is said not to have found *a helper like himself* for a while*, Gen. 2:20.*

d) See *Genesis 1:27,* where *males and females* are mentioned, and verse 28, where mention is made of *the blessing* by which *they* could *multiply* and *fill the earth*. Whether, *just as brute creatures* have the power to multiply themselves by generation, by which, with *the general concurrence* of God along with the seed, and then through the seed altered and disposed, they produce the form and thus *the entire* animal, so by the power of the divine blessing man is generated from man with regard to the *soul* just as much as the *body* by the *universal* concurrence of God alone; or whether in human generation the effect is *nobler* than to be produced through men (the parents) by themselves with only the general concurrence of God (namely, that the rational *soul* is by its nature *immaterial* and demands *a mode of production congruent with* its mode of being, namely, to be produced *independently* of *matter* or from nothing, to which second causes with the general concurrence of God are not sufficient), and thus by the power of that blessing, *God*, as the first cause, concurs by *a special influence* where the second causes fail and supplies the defect of the generative parents; this is an ancient and difficult question, in which we prefer *to suspend judgment* in accordance with what we have said about the examples of the blessed *Luther, J. Wigand, A. Musculus, M. Chemnitz*, and others, in Proleg. chap. I. to § 34. note c. Vol. I. p. 67. For it should be noted that the aforementioned doctors did *not* speak *about the special mode of* the soul's *propagation through the generative line,* but about doubts concerning the very doctrine of the *soul's creation and the doctrine* of its *propagation*, which was then contrasted with that creation and was already being called *'traducianism'* by name. Here, I say, or whenever it is asked *whether the soul is derived from the souls of men or* produced *extrinsically* by God, they did not so much think as assert that *τό ἐπέχειν* [suspension of judgment] could rightly have a place. And Luther, indeed, as reported by *Musculus* in L.L.C. p. 90., follows *Augustine, who argues many things here* (for the view of the soul's creation and for the other concerning its origin through transmission) *and says that neither side is to be affirmed here, but that one should suspend one's judgment; although* (he says) *he is more inclined to the view that the soul is born by transmission, and yet he does not wish to assert it with certainty.* Luther continues with the same author: "*I, for my part, according to my own belief, hold that the soul is from the father; but let us know that in the church we must speak with reverence and the fear of God, and with God-fearing caution, in whose presence we speak. It is not easy to make a firm statement about that which we do not know."* From these, however, which follow in the first chapter, it is clear that Luther not only gave answers to the arguments that oppose the doctrine of transmission, but also to those that are brought forward for that doctrine. *Wigand*, however, having first presented the arguments for the view of creation of the soul, and then for the view of transmission, concludes his discussion, p. 38: *But where am I being led? Since, however, this whole matter is still obscure, and perhaps God has by a singular counsel deferred that question until the other life, and there is no danger to the soul from it, it is therefore free to leave it in the middle.*

> LUTHER: "Those who think that vice and sin cling to nature because it was made from nothing are not far from blaspheming the Creator, since such a thing is not in the angels, the sun, the stars, and the whole heaven, etc. Those who have thought that the soul is transmitted from one to another do not seem to have been entirely at odds with the Scriptures. Indeed, they will more easily defend the propagation of original sin than those who think otherwise, since (according to Augustine) original sin is also

impiety. Augustine admits that he does not know which opinion is more certain and true, and to this day no one has settled that question. For the fact that others follow Jerome from Ps. 33: "He who formed their hearts individually," is clearly irrelevant. As for the determinations of the pope and his synagogue, we have the most just cause for their extermination or execration. . . In this matter, it would be more fitting to follow reason and the poet who says, "The offspring follows its father." It is established that, by common law, a child not only resembles its parents in face, but also in morals and disposition. So that there is nothing to what is said: "The intellectual soul is infused by creation and by being infused is created." Who has proven this, or who will prevent the same thing from being said of every other soul? And they will make the question more difficult: how God is not unjust, who unites a pure soul to the flesh and defiles it from without. Although a Christian may safely ignore this matter with St. Augustine and the universal Church, one must nevertheless refrain from the rashness that could verge on the blasphemy of the Creator. Since it is certain that God also created angels from nothing to live an eternal life without corruption, what difficulty could there be for God to bring forth an intellectual soul, both from nothing and from corrupt seed, just as He brings forth a head of grain corrupted by rust from a corrupt grain, so that many other vicious things also proceed from vicious ones?" (*Disp. th. de distinctione personarum in Divinitate*. 1545. Tom. primus omn. opp. Jenae, 1579. fol. 536.)

QUENSTEDT: "The question is not: 1. Whether *the soul* is propagated by the mode *of corporeal succession,* as if, e.g., a soul were generated from a soul, just as a body arises from a body. Nor 2. whether it is propagated by the mode *of transfusion,* as if it were generated from some kind of infused seed. Nor 3. is it a question whether, if the soul is generated, *it is brought forth from the potentiality of matter* or even derived from it, or made dependently on matter. But 4. the question is asked, *whether the soul is created immediately by God* and infused into the prepared body, or whether it is propagated *through the line* by the power of divine blessing from the parents. . . It can be known by us more *negatively* (ἀποφατικῶς) than *positively (καταφατικῶς)*... Rightly *Hunnius* in *praelect. c. 2. Gen*., says, 'As God did not inspire a soul into Eve, but produced the whole from the whole of Adam, living from the living, with soul and body, so now the whole is propagated by generation from the whole man; so that as the body is propagated from a body, so the soul is propagated from a soul, as light from a kindled light.' (L. c. c. 12. s. 2. q. 3. f. 741. sq. 745.)

GERHARD: "We leave the mode of propagation to be inquired into by philosophers, since we have not yet seen it laid down in the Scriptures; in the meantime, we firmly hold the doctrine of the propagation of souls, for *the propagation* of souls is not to be denied because *the mode* of propagation is not apparent. This is a custom in divine mysteries, that Scripture should set forth the thing itself, but be silent about *the mode.*" (*L. de imag. Dei* § 117.)

QUENSTEDT: *"The thesis is proven:* . . . 6. *from the absurdities.* 1. If it is assumed that the soul is created immediately by God, either *original sin* must be plainly denied, or God cannot be freed from injustice, both of which are absurd; for the souls that are created and infused into the body are either pure or impure; if impure, God is the author of sin; if pure, then God is unjust, who sends pure and holy souls into an impure body. . . 2. It follows that *a man does not generate a whole man*, or the whole composite, but only a part of him; for he who does not give the form of a man does not generate a man; for a man without a form, i.e., a soul, is not a man. 3. *The father is not the physical cause of the son,* but only *the moral one,* i.e., not a cause. For a moral cause is a cause only in an equivocal sense. . . 4. That parents have children not by the soul, but only by the body, and indeed an inanimate body. 5. That the father who begets does not communicate his essence to the son. 6. That Christ assumed only the flesh, not our soul, and thus redeemed only the body, not the soul." (L. c. f. 745. sq.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis: ... 3.* Of *certain Fathers,* such as *Origen* in his book περὶ ἀρχῶν ch. 7 and *Gregory of Nyssa* in his book *lib. de opificio hominis* ch. 28 and 29, as well as *of the rabbis,* who teach that all human souls, along with the angels, were created together on the first day and exist with God, and from there are sent daily into bodies. . . 4. *Jerome*, who contends against Rufinus and elsewhere for the creation of the soul. 5. *Pelagius,* Celestine, and the Pelagians in Augustine's ep. 156., who defend the immediate creation of the soul, and therefore hold it to be free from the stain of sin. 6. Of the *Scholastics* and almost all *the Papist writers*, namely Lombard, Thomas, and Bellarmine, in his book 4. *de amissione gratiae et statu peccati*, chapter 2. (where he says: 'We subscribe to the opinion which teaches that for each individual human being, a soul is created and infused from nothing, not by propagation, but for the first time when the fetus in the mother's womb is conceived and prepared for animation.') ... 7. Of *most Calvinists*, ... who embrace the doctrine of the creation and infusion of the soul... 8. Of *Brenz,* who is almost the only one among *genuine* Lutheran theologians to explicitly assert the creation of the soul... 9. of the *Reformed*, such as Dr. G. Calixt, who likewise hold that the rational soul is produced by God immediately through creation out of nothing and is infused into the body, so that the procreating parents are a kind of occasion, requiring the creation of that soul." (L. c. f. 743. sq.)

## § 23.

The ultimate end of creation is the glory of divine wisdom, goodness, and power;[(a)] the intermediate end is the utility of man.[(b)]

a) Or so that through God's creatures His goodness, wisdom, and power might be made known, insofar as from the contemplation of them man may and ought to be stirred up to celebrate His goodness, wisdom, and power. See *Ps. 19:1; 104:1-2; 136:1* ff.; *148:1* ff.

b) See *Gen. 1:28. Gerhard* in *Disput. Isag. XI.* Sect. VI. *de Creat*. § 6 says: *God would not have commanded the rest to be made, unless He had decreed to make man.* For some creatures serve for the *necessity* of human life, others for its *delight,* some as *remedies for diseases,* others as *safeguards for health,* some as *aids* for the conduct of affairs, others as *examples* and for imitation. Cf. *Lactantius, de Ira Dei*, ch. XIII, and *Damaskus*, Book II, de Orthod. Fide, ch. X, *Mus., Disp*. cit. § 56, 57, pp. 167, 168. And so some do not err in stating that *the end ᾧ or cui [for which]* for *whom all things were created for the good* is *man:* that the macrocosm was created for the sake of the microcosm.

## § 24.

Creation is defined as the action of the triune God [(a)] to the outside, *ad extra*, by which God, moved by His goodness [(b)] created this world, and all things in it,[(c)] first, simple bodies from no pre-existing matter; then, from simple bodies, as from an unfit and unformed matter, compound bodies; and even, independently of all matter,

immaterial substances, so that each of these, according to the idea [d] by the mind of His own will, powerfully [e] effected and in the space of six days completed the entire work, to [f] the glory of His wisdom, power, and goodness, and for the benefit of mankind.

a) See § 16, p. 95, on the efficient cause.
b) See § 18. p. 96. on the impulsive cause.
c) See § 6 ff., p. 79 ff., on the series of the works of creation.
d) See § 17. p. 96. on the exemplary cause.
e) See § 21. p. 98. on the mode of creation.
f) See § 23, p. 102, on the end of creation.

## Chapter III. ^

ON THE ANGELS.

### § 1.

Among the creatures, which all partake of divine goodness, the most perfect [a] are those which Scripture calls angels. [b]

a) And thus the reason for the order of the doctrine is clear.

b) Thus in the *Epistle* to *the Hebrews 1:4,* when it was to be proven that Christ is superior to *all* creation, it is said that He *is better than the angels.* Therefore, there must be no creature more perfect than these.

### § 2.

Although the word angel [a] is indeed a name *of office* and denotes a minister or messenger,[b] it nevertheless, *in a special way*, by this appellation signifies a certain kind [c] of creature, by its very nature [d] distinct from men and all other creatures.

a) As in Hebrew the word מלאן, whose obsolete root לאן nevertheless survives among the Ethiopians and has the meaning *of sending*. See *Golius* in the Arabic Lexicon, fol. 143, *Hottinger*, *Smegma Orientale*, ch. 5. p. 88. and c. 7. p. 164. The Greek literature, from which the Latin name also comes, is more manifest. Hence *Hilary* says, Scripture, when it calls heavenly spirits angels, *testifies to the signification of office, Lib. V. de Trinit*. And *Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 104: Angelus,* he says, *is a name of office, not of nature*. See *Mus., Disp. VI. de Angelis* § 2. p. 69.

b) Hence, any *person* acting as an envoy is also called by this name. See *Gen. 32:3, 6; James 2:25.* Especially the preachers or *ministers of the* divine *Word*, e.g., the various prophets, *2 Chron 36:15-16.* Specifically *Haggai* by himself in chapter 1, verse 13, the priests in *Malachi 2:*7, John, the forerunner of the Messiah, in *Malachi 3:1* and *Matthew 11:10.* Indeed, *Christ* Himself *is preeminently the angel of the covenant in Malachi. 3:1,* namely*,* sent to complete and announce the covenant of grace entered into by God with mankind, sent *'to confirm the promises of the fathers,' Romans 15:8.* (Although He Himself was also given *for the covenant of the people, Isaiah 52:6,* as *the mediator of the New Testament, Hebrews 9:15,* since it is by His *blood* that the covenant between God and the people was established.) The Son of God, however, was sent by the Father, not as one inferior to a superior, but on account of a special operation, by which He began to exist in a new way or with a new effect, conceived in relation to God the Father, from whom He proceeded by eternal generation. *Mus.,* 1. c. § 5. p. 171.

QUENSTEDT: "Whenever and wherever either the name Jehovah or a divine attribute or work and divine worship is attributed to the angel appearing to the patriarchs and other faithful in the Old Testament, there it must be understood that it is *not some created angel, but the uncreated one. For it is the Son of God,* the prince of the heavenly host, the Lord of all angels, who not only once appeared to the fathers in the Old Testament in an assumed visible form by an ineffable condescension, and thus *foreshadowed His future incarnation. — The apparition* does *not* seem to be *a real one* in the strict sense, but *only an objective action*. For what is 'to appear' other than to be perceived or seen? That is, to produce a sensible image of oneself in the sensory organ and from that, by an extrinsic designation, at least to be called the agent. See Suarez: 'It is not the very thing that appears which is the one who appears, but only the medium which the one who appears uses.' The appearing one is so called because, under the figure, it reaches the eyes of the beholder." (*Theol. did..-pol*. P. I. c. 11. s. 2. q. 11. f. 704.)

THE SAME.: "*The παραστατική (parastatic)* union*,* by which the Son of God temporarily assumed a visible form in which to appear, is not to be confused with the *υποστατική (hypostatic)* union*."* (L.C.)

THE SAME: "We do not assert that in those Old Testament appearances the persons of the Holy Trinity were separate, nor that the Father or the Holy Spirit was there where the Son of God made Himself visible in the assumed form. Indeed, the *Son of God* assumed that outward form and appeared in it, *not the Father*, *not the Holy Spirit;* However, the other persons of the Holy Trinity were not separated from that very production, assumption, and appearance of the form. For this very thing is not permitted by *the ὁμοουσία (homoousia)* and the unity of the divine persons and *their* intimate *περιχώρησις (perichōresis*). Wherever one divine person is and acts outwardly, there the others also act, cf. John 5:19. *Calixt therefore confuses the apparition and the presence of the persons* of the Holy Trinity. The *ὁμοούσιος* requires this, that whenever and however one of the persons of the Holy Trinity *appears*, another *is* also *present;* however, it does not follow: the divine persons are present, therefore that very thing which is divinely ordained and disposed in the apparition pertains indiscriminately to all the divine persons. It cannot happen that one person *is present* anywhere without another; but it can happen that one person *appears* in a certain body, adorned by the counsel of the Holy Trinity, and makes its appearance known by certain signs and characteristics." (L. c. f. 705.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Jews,* who hold that God revealed Himself to the patriarchs only through the ministry of angels; as relates Maimonides.

2. Of *Paul of Samosata,* who denied that the Son of God was present to the patriarchs or appeared in the Old Testament. It was contradicted at the Synod of Antioch. . . 3. Of the *Scholastics and the Papists,* who, following *Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite*, hold that God never appeared in person in the Old Testament, but always an angel in His stead. . . They chiefly champion the appearances of created angels for the purpose of establishing their *angel-worship*. 4. Of certain *Calvinists*, who in most of the Old Testament appearances understand a created angel, as Calvin... 6. Of the *Arminians,* who here also hold to Socinianism, stating that angels, not the Son of God himself, appeared in the Old Testament... 7. Of the *Innovators,* such as Dr. George. Calixt, who . . . defends the negative, . . . contending with all his might, 'not the Son of God, but some created angel was seen in these appearances. That the Son of God is neither called an angel, nor can be called one, nor did he appear singularly, etc.'" (L. c. f. 706. sq.) LUTHARDT: "Furthermore, 1. the question concerning the angel of Jehovah, who, according to the traditional interpretation, is understood and defended by Hengstenberg, Kahnis, Philippi, Keil, etc., as Jehovah himself or as the Logos in angelic form; whereas, on the other hand, by Hofmann, Delitzsch, Kurtz, etc., as a created angel, who serves Jehovah as the bearer and organ of His manifestation. In favor of the first view, it is argued that the angel of Yahweh identifies with Jehovah and is shown divine honor. .. For the second view, however, a. the designation itself and the general usage of this word; b. the New Testament usage of *angelos kyriou (ἄγγελος κυρίου);* c. the New Testament conception of the angelic mediation of divine revelation in the Old Testament in general; d. the Old Testament use of Michael instead of the Angel of Jehovah in the later writings; e. the Old Testament passages in which the Angel of Jehovah is unmistakably a created angel. That identification, however, is explained by the fact that in the Angel of Jehovah, Jehovah Himself appears." (*Compendium*. 3rd ed. p. 78. sq.)

c) Which, however, is itself also appointed to divine ministries and missions. For thus they are called *pneumata leitourgika apestalmena (πνεύματα λειτουργικά ἀπεσταλμένα)*, etc. *Heb. 1:14.*

d) As *πνεύματα (pneumata [spirits]),* complete spirits, as we shall say shortly.

## § 3.

That such natures or angels exist, Scripture [(a)] indicates most clearly.[(b)]

a) See *Hebrews 1:4, 5, 6, 7, 13, and 14.* Cf. *Psalm 91:11; 104:4; Matthew 4:6, 11*, and elsewhere.

b) However, it can *scarcely be demonstrated* with evident clarity from the light of nature, although it can *be supported* by probable arguments.

## § 4.

The efficient cause of the angels is God, who produced them from nothing, in time; although on what day they were created is not sufficiently clear.

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. *Of those* who dreamed that the angels were *coeternal with God* and existed from eternity, a view attributed to Aristotle, XII Metaphys. ch. 16, to Photinus and Porphyry, as well as to the Simonians, Nicolaites, Archontics, and others. 2. Of those who, like *the Valentinian heretics*, deluded themselves that the inferior angels were *created by the superior ones*; see Irenaeus, 1.1. c. 1, and Epiphanius, tom. II. 1. 1. haeres. 23. 3. Of the ancient Greek Fathers, such as *Origen, Gregory Nazianzus, Basil, Chrysostom*, and *Damasus,* and of the Latins, such as *Ambrose, Jerome, Hilary, Isidore, and Cassian*, who all asserted that angels were created *before* this visible *world*, etc. 6. The *Socinians,* who first doubted the preexistence of the angels before the world was created and only problematically debated whether the angels existed before the world was created, as is clear from Socinus and Smalz. Later, however, it was defined by the Socinians that the angels pre-existed, and they defend it as a certain article of faith, because they believe it is a convenient way to evade the passages about the eternity of the Son of God, or to refute the argument for the divinity of the Son of God drawn from His eternity. . . 8. *The Arminians,* from among whom Episcopius adorns the same opinion, i.e., that God created the angels long before the Mosaic hexameron, with new commentaries. . . 9. The *Babylonians,* among whom some assert that the good angels were created on the first day, while the pernicious ones were created on the second or fifth day. Others wish that angels or demons were created at the same time, or around the same time, as the woman was formed in the evening of the sixth day, and that Satan took this opportunity to tempt the woman." (L. c. c. 11. 8. 2. q. 1. f. 653. sq.)

Cf. Antithesis of J. H. Kurtz, see preceding chap. § 6, note *b.*

a) Thus, angels are numbered among the creatures in *Ps. 148:2 and 5, Ps. 104:4, and Col. 1:16.*

b) For they are simple substances, and just as they are independent of matter in their being, so also in their coming into being.

c) See *Prov. 8:22,* where it is said that the substantial *Wisdom*, or the Son of God, was *with God before* his *works*. And thus it is concluded that, just as the other works of God or creatures did not coexist with God and His Son from eternity, so also the angels did not; although it is also established that eternity belongs to God alone. See Part I, Chapter I, Section 13, pages 27 ff.

d) They were not created before heaven and earth, because these were created *at the beginning,* and thus were the first of all created things. See *Genesis 1:1.* And it is otherwise known that God's eternity is described by His existence *before the world* was created; see *Psalm 90:2; Isaiah 48:13.* However, they were not created *after,* but *within* the hexaemeron, because, after this period had passed, God rested from His ordinary work of creation. However, that angels were created before man is usually proven from *Job 38:7.* Indeed, some believe that from this very passage it can be understood that angels were created *on the first day*, namely because, when God *had founded the earth,* the angels are said to have immediately praised God. But these things are not sufficiently clear; although we do not deny that angels are designated by the name *of the sons of God*, according to chapter 1, verse 6, and say that their origin is to be referred among the beginnings of the other creatures. Perhaps also, just as we know that man was created after other creatures destined for his good, it is rightly concluded that the angels, to minister to man (according to *Hebrews 1:14)*, were created before man. Nor, however, is it necessary to say that angels are indicated by the names*,* either of *heaven* or of *light,* in *Genesis 1*, taken metaphorically.

# § 5.

Angels, however, are by their nature spirits,[(a)] or spiritual or incorporeal substances,[(b)] not composed of matter and form.[(c)]

a) They are so expressly called *Heb. 1:14.*

b) For in this place the word spirit is *not* taken for a more subtle corporeal substance, such as wind *(John 3:8),* or the *breath* of an animal *(Isaiah 2:22),* but in *opposition* to the *body,* that is, in the sense in which it is taken in *James 2:26* and in which it must be taken when it is attributed to a nature that is not only *living* but also *intelligent.* Compare *Luke 24:39,* where Christ, although 1) according to His divine nature was of a spiritual essence, 2) by His human nature had a spiritual soul, 3) after the resurrection had received a spiritual body, nevertheless denied that He was a spirit, because He wanted to demonstrate the reality of the body in His human nature. So also *in Ephesians 6:12*, angels are opposed to *flesh and blood,* i.e., to corruptible bodily nature. Add *Mus., Disp. de Angel*. § 24. p. 182.

KROMAYER: "Angels were *not* produced *from the substance of God*. For they would have been produced either by generation or by some other kind of participation from it. *Not by generation,* because the Son is *μονογενής*, i.e., only-begotten, John 1:14, John 3:16, 1 John 4:8, he is *ἴδιος,* i.e., proper, Romans 8:32, who has God *as His own Father,* John 5:18. *Not through some other participation,* because the divine essence is *ἀμέριστος* , i.**e.**, indivisible*, ὅλως ὅλον τι,* that is, totally the whole thing, and therefore incommunicable to others, who are placed outside the bosom of the Godhead." (*Theol. pos.pol*. I, 226.)

QUENSTEDT: *"He distinguishes* between angels considered *simply* and absolutely, and thus they are *spirits*; and when viewed *συγκριτικῶς* or comparatively, in relation to God, and thus they have a greater *resemblance to corporeal substance,* being subject to composition and mutability, than to God, and in this relation to the Creator, some of the ancient church doctors seem to have assigned bodies to the angels, according to that of the Damascene, book II, *On the Orthodox Faith*. cf. C. 3.: *'For the divine is truly incorporeal and* immaterial'; also: "Angels are incorporeal in relation to us (*πρὸς ὑμᾶς*)*,* but corporeal nevertheless with respect to God, to whom by a certain relation they have altogether a density and materiality." (L. c. q. 2. f. 658.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists*, who seem to have first commented that angels are not entirely immaterial and spiritual, but material and corporeal natures... 2. Of the *ancient Jews;* for to these Grotius attributes the belief that angels are bodies, but very subtle ones. . . 3. of the *Mohammedans,* some of whom maintain that demons are composed of the elementary, pestilential, and appointed fire, others of air. 4. Of the *Messalians,* an ancient heresy, who hold the devil to be corporeal. . . 6. Of *certain Fathers,* such as *Justin* in his dialogue with Trypho and Apol. I., *Origen,* Book 2. *On Principles*, chapters 6, 8, and 23. . . *Tertullian*, Book on the Flesh of Christ, chapter 6 (who asserts that angels hypostatically unite bodies to themselves), *Basil,* Book 1. On the Holy Spirit, chapter 16, *Cassian*, Collation 7, chapter 13. As for Augustine, it is not certain whether he considered angels to be corporeal or not: in his *Book on the Spirit and Letter* he writes in general, "Every creature is corporeal." *Lactantius, Damaskus, and others* assign to angels some kind of body, not however a carnal one, but a subtle, heavenly, fiery, or aerial one. Of *some Scholastics* and *Papists,* who attributed to angels bodies

of a very subtle nature. . . 7. *Some Calvinists,* who, seriously maintain that angels, even when considered absolutely and in themselves, have bodies (though distinct from human ones), and that these bodies are not assumed for a time, but are their own and essential, co-created and always to be retained, such as Jerome Zanchius. . . 9. The *Arminians,* among whom Simon Episcopius, in Book V of his *Institutes of Theology*, chapter 2, page 347, says: 'It is difficult to assert what the spirituality of angels is, whether it is connected with some kind of corporeality or not.' ... 10. *Hugo Grotius* (a man of no party), who in his annotations on the Old Testament at Ps. 104:4, openly makes the angels corporeal." (L. c. f. 658 sqq.)

KURTZ: "The angels are *spirits,* Heb. 1:14. By this, a positive and a negative are stated about the nature of the angels. The *positive* is the concept of *spirituality,* of a free, self-conscious personality in contrast to impersonal, unfree natural life. . . The *negative* . . . is, to use the words of J. T. Beck (*Christi. Lehrwissensch*. I. S. 176. f.), 'the negation of *the flesh-and-bone*-like and earthy character of life, of the life-form of our earthly-spatial life-organism, and thus also of the dependence on earthly-spatial life conditions and laws of motion, without thereby denying them a bodily organ and an external life corresponding to it.' For the Scripture opens to us, besides and above our *present one*, a sphere of bodily life which, like the present one in its denseness of flesh and blood, corresponds in its earthy character to our earthly system (1 Cor. 15:45. ff.), so also as a faithful likeness to the heavenly world-system, and is likewise homogeneous to the nature of a pure spirit (*πνεύμα*), just as our earthly body in its present reality is to the nature of a mere *ψυχή* (the life of the soul).' Rightly, the aforementioned scholar bases this assertion . . . first on 1 Cor. 15:40 . . .: 'There are heavenly bodies *(σώματα)* and earthly bodies.' . . The bodies here designated as heavenly can . . . only be the bodies of the inhabitants of heaven or of the angels. This is also acknowledged by more recent . . . exegetes (de Wette and Meyer), and has only been abandoned for insufficient reasons by the most recent commentator (*Osiander*) . . ., who understands by this the sun, moon, and stars according to v. 41. . . Human and animal bodies form the same contrast to the bodies of angels as that which exists between earth and heaven. Just as the present human body bears the character and essence of the present earthly materiality within itself . . ., so we must conceive of the angels in a similar relation of their bodies to heavenly materiality . . ., finer, ethereal, purer, and more luminous than the earthly human bodies. Cf. Matt. 22:30; Luke 20:36. . . Matt. 28:3. Here it is not the merely momentarily assumed human likeness of his (the angel's) appearance that is described, but rather that which is outside and above the human, that is, the specifically angelic, belonging not to his temporary appearance, but to his true essence. . . The corporeality of angels is by no means so rigid and brittle, to be conceived as rigid and brittle, like our own, but rather as a highly mobile and fluid one, which nowhere opposes the will of the spirit with the heaviness and immutability of earthly corporeality, but proves itself to be a perfectly adequate and obedient organ of the spirit, yielding to its every need and will. . . In fact, even apart from the positive biblical testimonies, the concept of absolute incorporeality is in itself already completely incompatible with the concept of creatureliness. . '*Flesh is the end of God's ways*.' A creature without flesh is not at all conceivable, *because all that is created, as created*, *can only live, act, and exist in space and time,* and it is flesh alone that binds the creature to space and time. Only God alone is an absolute spirit; only He alone stands outside and above time and space. *A*

*created spirit without a* corporeality... *would have to dissipate into nothingness.* Within the creature, therefore, corporeality is the condition of all existence, the organ of all activity, the foil for the spirit; through it the creature receives its limitation, its determination, and its point of support; without it, it would become unsupported, dissolve, and *flow away.* The corporeality is a *limitation for the created spirit, because it prevents it from being eternal, infinite, and omnipresent.*" (*Bibel und Astronomie*, p. 78–84.)

c) But between those *bodies* which the angels are said to *have* sometimes *assumed (whether* they were formed from the surrounding air, *or* of some other nature) and the very *substance* of the angels themselves, no other *union* than *an accidental one* has place. For they were in them in the manner *of an assisting form,* not *an informing one.* Hence, it cannot be called a natural or essential union. Cf. *Mus., Disp*. cit. § 38. sqq. p. 169. sqq.

SCHARFF: "It is commonly said that one form is the informing one, the other the assisting one. An *informing form* is that by which a thing is what it is. For this is *properly* the form of a thing, while the assisting one is so called only by analogy. *An assisting form* is one that directs the motion and operation of a thing, but does not enter into its very essence; for example, a charioteer is the assisting form of horses, and a teacher of a student." (*Metaphys*. p. 115.)

KROMAYER: "When they appeared in bodies (the angels), they were not part of their own essence, but were created by God the creator (not by the angels themselves)." (*Th. posit.-pol*. II, 132.)

A. OSIANDER: "Men eat and drink because of need, but angels *consume* food *like a flame* because of power." (*Colleg. th*. P. II, 165.)

## § 6.

Just as the angels share a spiritual essence in common with God and the human soul, so they differ from God in that their essence is not infinite, but *finite*;[a] and from the human soul in that their substance is *complete*.[b]

a) For just as the angels do *not* have their being *from themselves,* but *from God*, so they did not receive their being except *finite* and limited.

b) For that nature of theirs is not ordered to another, with which, as with another component part, it constitutes a unity in itself. Cf. *Mus.,* 1. c. § 35. sqq. p. 294.

## § 7.

Furthermore, angels are intelligent substances,[a] so that *intellect* [b] is of their very essence.

a) For the operations proceeding from the intellect are everywhere in Scripture attributed to them, e.g., *to praise God (Isa. 6:3), to worship (Heb. 1:6), to know* the things that are preached in the church (*Eph. 3:10).* And if any among men excel others in knowledge, they are said *to know good and evil as the angel of God, 2 Sam. 14:20.*

b) Accepted as *a power* of understanding. But *the second act* of understanding, or *the intellect* or *cognition* which proceeds from it, is certainly an act actually produced, and *an accident* distinct from the angelic substance; as is evident from the distinctions that follow.

## § 8.

The knowledge of angels is threefold:[a] *Natural, revealed*, and *beatific.*[b]

a) For although there is *one faculty* of knowing in angels, the *acts* of understanding *vary* according to the different modes of knowing, *either* in the same subject *or* in different ones. See *Mus.,* 1. c. § 52. 53. 54. p. 206. sqq.

b) The *former is common to* both *good* and *bad* angels because of the identity of their nature, although even this knowledge admits of more and less. The *latter was common* to all before the fall of some. Afterward, however, it was *taken away* from those who fell, as a punishment for their fall. *The good,* however, having been brought into the state of glory*, do not need* it as they once did, *although in their own way* they can still be said to *partake of* it. *This* pertains *uniquely* to angels confirmed in *good*.

## § 9.

That is called natural knowledge, by which the angels know both *themselves* and *the angels* coexisting with them, and also the heavens and the earth, and all that is contained in them, the essences of all things, and finally *God* Himself; the *former things* indeed with clear cognition,[a] but the *latter* only abstractively.[b]

a) Indeed, so that they know themselves without an intelligible species through their own essence, but *the other things* through species co-created with them, or impressed by God himself in the first production.

b) That is, *from the posterior* and *from* created things, yet more perfect than our abstractive knowledge. Cf. *Musaeus,* 1. c. § 56. p. 210. sqq.

## § 10.

They, however, begin to know individual things distinct from themselves—especially material things, which exist at different times, and also the accidents that pertain to each—successively and in time.[a] [b]

a) For we cannot attribute omniscience to them. And this refers to what is said in *Ephesians 3:10, that now the principalities and powers in the heavenly places might know through the Church, etc.* Cf. *1 Peter 1:12.*

b) Certainly, they can and do proceed from the more familiar to the unknown, by means of reasoning.

## § 11.

Future contingents, which depend on free will,[(a)] they do not know certainly and infallibly;[(b)(c)] although we cannot deny a conjectural knowledge [(d)] to their sagacity.[(e)]

a) But those future events which proceed *from determined causes* and *according to the order of nature* always have the same, for example, the constellations of the stars, eclipses, etc., are known with certainty *from their causes* and in this way they foresee the future; although *they do not know* what God, by *changing the order* of nature with His *absolute* power, is going to do.

b) For this is proper to God *alone*, by which He has willed to be recognized by men as *by a kind of seal.* See *Isaiah 43:12* and h. 1. c. I. § 15, p. 29, 8ff.

c) Namely, by the power of their natural cognition. However, that God can reveal such contingent future events to them, and sometimes does so, so that they know them for certain, is by no means denied (as they are read to have been sometimes used for predicting the future); but this knowledge is alien to the present.

d) By which means they know of future *wars* and *seditions* of peoples, *the sins* and *illustrious deeds* of individual men, etc., namely, from the careful observation of human *dispositions*, *temperaments, morals*, and *present circumstances*, yet in such a way that this is nothing more than a *probable* and *uncertain*, and often *fallacious*, opinion.

> QUENSTEDT**:** **"**The devil, under the guise of Samuel (1 Sam. 28**:**19**)**, could certainly predict the future destruction of Saul and his men, because the *execution* of this very thing had been commanded to him by God, the righteous judge." He also knew the strengths of both armies, the Israelite and the Philistine; he also held the secret plans of both sides, and because he also knew that Saul was destined for punishment by the just judgment of God and that David was already chosen in his place as king, he could easily deduce the outcome of the battle. Or that diabolical specter predicted those future contingents not so much from the certainty of knowledge as from the sagacity of conjecture, estimating in his own mind, with the prophecies of the prophets compared — which were not unknown to him — the spirit, forces, and cause of each side. Nor does the 'tomorrow' surpass every condition of mere guesswork, inasmuch as it does not always signify precisely the next day but also any future time indeterminately in the Scriptures, whence that ambiguous oracle seems to have deliberately made use of its ambiguity here, according to Rainold." (L. c. s. 2. q. 3. f. 666.)

e) For future contingent events of *another* kind, which arise from *natural* causes, indeed, but are subject to various *changes*, or from *causes* that concur *by accident* and chance, and thus occur in different ways—for example*, storms, diseases,* etc.—can only be foreseen *with probability*.

## § 12.

Similarly, concerning the hidden thoughts of men, the angels have only an opinion gathered from signs or effects.[(a)]

a) For God alone claims for Himself an accurate and infallible knowledge of the human heart. See *1 Kings 8:39* and h. 1, chap. I, § 15, pp. 29–30.

QUENSTEDT: "Dan. 2:10-11. The magi and Chaldeans, faithful satellites of demons, though they applied all their arts, nevertheless could not penetrate the thoughts of Nebuchadnezzar. On the contrary, however, the devil, from the pursuits of Judas, could infer from the latter that he was prone to avarice. . . Although evil angels know those thoughts which they themselves suggest to the pious or the impious." (L. c. f. 664. 666.)

## § 13.

With the intellect in the angelic nature is joined [(a)] a free *will*, [(b)] or the power of desiring good [(c)] and avoiding evil.

a) For the power of understanding is never without the will. And the angelic will is indicated by acts *of joy,* by which the will is sweetly carried to the good that is present, which is ascribed to the angels *(Luke 15:10), and of desire,* by which the will tends toward the good that is absent*,* see *1 Peter 1:12, chapter 5:8.* Although this also pertains to the angels' *obedience,* by which they conform their will to the will of their superior (God) and act accordingly; and then *the disobedience,* by which their will tends toward something other than what God wills. See the former in *Ps. 103:20,* the latter in *2 Pet. 2:4.*

b) And this freedom of the angelic will in the state *of the way* was such that an angel could *indifferently* desire *good* and *evil.* What, however, the freedom of the will of good and evil angels is *today* will be taught *below*.

c) Whether *such in reality* or *in appearance,* according to the different state of the angels.

## § 14.

Angels also have the ability *to speak*, or to manifest their mental concepts to others,[(a)] so that they can speak to God,[(b)] to other angels,[(c)] and to men.[(d)] [(e)]

a) For what they speak *to themselves* through the internal conceptions of the mind is not different from the angels' very knowledge.

b) This pertains here, that they are said *to praise God in Isaiah 6:3.* Compare *Revelation 7:11.*

c) See *Isaiah* 1.c., where it is said that *one cried to another.* Compare *Zechariah 2:8.*

d) See *Luke 1:13, 19,* where to Zechariah, the father of the Baptist, and 1:28, 30, 35, where to Mary, the mother of Christ; 2:10, where to the shepherds; 24:4, 5, 6, where two angels speak to the women who wish to anoint Christ; *Acts 1:10-11,* where they are said to have spoken to the disciples, who were spectators of Christ's ascension.

e) However, *the manner* of angelic speech is a matter of inquiry. For although they can speak to *God* by thoughts alone directed to God, e.g., for praising or praying, so that no other signs are needed to manifest them to the divine, omniscient intellect; nevertheless, how they converse *among themselves* is difficult to explain. Meanwhile, the most probable opinion of all is that intelligible species freely impress one another's intellect. Cf. *Mus.,* 1. c. § 67, 68. p. 216. sqq. They also seem to be able to speak to *men* in a similar way, by means of species impressed on their intellect, and furthermore even through phantasms presented to men's imagination. However, in Scripture they are most often said to have spoken with a sensible and distinct voice, formed in the air in imitation of the human voice, which nevertheless cannot be called natural to angels, just as it is to men, since it is not produced by the organs required for forming a natural voice, which are possessed by the speaker himself.

## § 15.

Angels also possess the *power*, or a certain force, to operate outside of themselves,[(a)] which is indeed great,[(b)] but limited and finite.[(c)]

a) Of which, from what has been said, something can be inferred. For since a will is attributed to them, the faculty of carrying out or effecting what they will, in accordance with their nature and original state, must not be denied. Cf. *Mus.,* 1. c. § 70. p. 219. 220. And it pertains to this faculty or power that they can assume bodies and speak to men with a sensible voice. See § 5, note *e,* and 1.14–1.15.

> BROCHMAND: *"That* angels appeared to men *clothed in bodies* cannot be denied. For Moses (Genesis 18:19) explicitly mentions that they themselves spoke, that their feet were washed, that they ate food, and that they led Lot out of the city of the Sodomites, taking him by the hand; which duties, of course, could not truly have been performed without real bodies. Nevertheless, from this it cannot be inferred with any plausibility that angels are corporeal by the nature of their being. . . . Furthermore, it is debated whether angels, in the bodies they assume, truly perform the *functions of life*? However, there is no doubt that just as the angels, clothed in bodies, truly spoke, so *they* also *truly ate and drank.* For Moses, who relates such things about the angels, does not narrate fictions, but what truly happened. I do not ignore that there are those who here seek a straw to find fault with the way it is said. For there are those who contend that angels do not truly perform vital functions in assumed bodies, but only in appearance, so that the angels were seen to eat with Abraham and Lot, when in reality they did not eat. For just as Moses calls the angels men, not because they were such, but because they appeared to be, so they also want to say that Moses said the angels ate, not because they truly ate, but because they appeared to be eating. They try to establish this assertion from the words of the angel Raphael in the book of Tobit 12:19: ,'I appeared to all of you, yet I neither ate nor drank, but it seemed so to you.' Furthermore, angels could neither digest food nor convert it into nourishment, being spirits as they are, which are nevertheless required for someone to be truly said to eat. They add that the bodies assumed by the angels were not truly vital, and therefore the proper functions of true life could not be carried out through them. These arguments do indeed have the appearance of truth, but they are not true. For although Moses calls the angels men, not because they were truly men, but because they appeared as such,

he nevertheless later teaches explicitly that they were not men, but angels. And nowhere in the Mosaic text do I find that the eating is used of the angels in the sense that they appeared to eat. Therefore, just as the angels truly came to Abraham, truly sat down under the tree, truly took Lot's hand, so it was said, without metaphor, that the angels ate. The passage from Tobit, however, does not harm our cause. For although the angel denies that he ate out of necessity of nature or for the sake of nourishment, and therefore neither digested the food in the manner of men nor turned it into nourishment, this nevertheless does not prevent the angel from having truly broken the food with his teeth and consumed it by a divine power unknown to us. Nor is it necessary for a true meal that the food be digested in the stomach and turned into juice and blood; A rich witness is Christ (Luke 24:41–43), who after the resurrection ate before his disciples to confirm the truth of his resurrection, even though the food was not converted into nourishment, for the nature of the glorified body did not permit this (Luke 20:36). It is in vain, however, that it is objected that the bodies assumed by angels were not truly vital. For although they were not vivified by a soul, they were nevertheless so affected by a singular power of the angels that they were suitable for the exercise of speech, touch, motion, and similar acts of living beings. We add that it is disputed by the Fathers and scholastic doctors, whether the bodies with which the angels appeared clothed were created by God from nothing, or whether they were formed and assumed by the angels themselves from pre-existing matter. But here I willingly confess my ignorance." (*System. univ. theol*. art. 8. c. 2. q. 2. f. 98.)

b) Hence *the mighty* are called *strong Ps. 103:20., the host of the Lord Gen. 31.* ult., *the mighty Matt. 12:29, the mighty armed Luke 11:21, the angels of* Christ's *power 2 Thessalonians 1:7,* and are indeed said to *be* far *greater in strength and power* than men *2 Peter 2:11,* and marvelous effects are everywhere ascribed to them in Scripture. See especially *2 Kings 19:35,* the destruction of the Assyrian army, accomplished by the angels.

QUENSTEDT: "*A distinction* is made between the force and *power* of the angels considered *absolutely* and in the abstract, and thus sufficient to overturn by local motion this entire universe and its order and composition; and their virtue and power considered in a limited way, or insofar as they are *subject* and subordinated to divine providence and are governed by it, and then it cannot. . . The good angels are more powerful than the evil ones, because they keep the pious safe against their snares and assaults, Ps. 34:8; Tob. 8:3; Rev. 12:7." (L. c. s. 2. q. 4. f; 666. sq.)

c) For it cannot be denied that it is created and subject to divine power and might. Cf. *Job 1 and 2.* Therefore, it does *not* extend to those things which exceed finite power (for example, angels cannot create something out of nothing, or raise the dead), *nor* to all things which fall under finite power to be effected immediately by their own power, *but* only to those things which are proportionate to their own nature and power. Hence, although they can produce a spiritual quality, or an intelligible species, outside of themselves in another angel or man, they cannot immediately and by themselves produce or change corporeal substances, but only through natural causes and by applying actives to passives. Cf. *Mus.,* 1. c. § 71, 72. p. 220, 221.

QUENSTEDT: "To the examples of children, whom they call *changeling infants,* Wechselbälge, Kühlkröpfe, who are said to have been procreated by devils, I answer: those were either truly devils appearing in the form of human infants, or indeed real infants, but either changelings, or born of women who conceived them through relations with their own

husbands, or with other men. . . *A distinction is made* between *diseases* which the devil *himself,* either by natural means, such as a disturbance of the humors, or by illusions, *has caused* and sent; and these he himself can cure again by applying natural remedies . . ., and between diseases which *depend* on *God* punishing the sins of men, Amos 3:6. In general, Satan can neither send nor drive away any diseases, unless God permits it, Job 2:7, Luke 13:16, . . . *A distinction is made* between a *fictitious and fabulous* metamorphosis or transformation of species, or the foolish and poetic changes, and a true metamorphosis, or the magical and apparent transformations which occur either by the subtraction and supposition of things, or by the deception of the external senses (as the Egyptian magicians produced frogs and serpents by the power of the devil), or from a proper melancholy or corruption of the imagination, by which people falsely imagine themselves to be beasts, and to do this or that, — and *true transmutations*, which are effected by the power of the Almighty God, either to declare justice or to show omnipotence, as in the wife of Lot, Gen. 19:26, the staffs of Moses, Exod. 7:11, water John 2:9. We grant the former to the devils, but not the latter; that is to say, a natural angel, whether good or evil, cannot transform one species into another, e.g., a man into a dog, a cat, a wolf, etc., since such a transmutation is a kind of new creation, which belongs to God alone. . . Dr. *Dannhauer*, *Meletemat. de miraculis*, p. 61. teaches: *"Magical miracles,* or those which are from satanic power, are either merely illusory, or true, with respect to their substance. *Merely illusory,*" he says, "are those by which the senses are deceived: 1. by removing the true object, 2. by presenting a false and fantastic one, or even by painting the true object with a strange appearance (it paints objects with a strange image when it makes its own organs invisible and arranges for them to be seen not in the form of a human being, but in the likeness of a beast or a tree); 3. by perverting the senses of men. They are *true in* their *substance*, that is, they have a real consistency; they are indeed marvelous, but not miracles, because they are not beyond the nature and power of demons, but can be performed by them either through the swiftest local motion, or by the application of active to passive principles, or by other methods which the human intellect cannot comprehend.' So much for him... *A distinction is made* between *the miracles of heretics—*insofar as they are heretics and promote false doctrine, and therefore cannot perform miracles—and those of heretics insofar as they agree with the true church and work miracles for the confirmation of God's doctrine and sacraments. And so, I would not wish to deny that the Jesuits in India and Japan have performed certain true miracles. Dr. *Huelsemann, De auxiliis gratiae*, Disp. II, th. 19, § 21. p. 156. admits that certain true miracles were performed by the Jesuits, teachers of the Japanese, for the confirmation not of the papistic faith as such, but of the common Christian dogmas to which the Papal dogmas had been mixed." (L. c. f. 668 sq. 671 sq.)

A. PFEIFFER: "Philo, *de Gigant*, and others understand Gen. 6:2 to refer to good angels, who, inflamed with human lusts, were cast out of heaven for that reason. . . . But this opinion conflicts both with the nature of angels (Matt. 23:30) and to the passage in Acts. 17, 26., as well as the analogy of faith concerning the confirmation of angels in good. . . The sons of God, who take wives and beget children, are not good angels, much less evil ones, but pious men and their descendants, who, although they have fallen away here, are nevertheless called the sons of God, both because of their former state and on account of their external association with the true Church. Cf. Isa. 1:2; 63:8; Hos. 1:10." (*Dubia vexata*. Ed. 2. p. 59. sq.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of *David George,* who transforms angels into the thoughts and movements of the human mind, or confounds them with them. 2. Of those who deny that devils can accomplish anything through witches. . . 5. The *Talmudists* and *Cabbalists,* who dream that angels are corporeal, that they procreate and die like men. . . 6. The *Sethites,* ancient heretics, who contended that angels cohabited with women to procreate men. . . This pertains to the opinion of those who

thought that angels by women had begotten *giants*, from a misinterpretation of the passage in Genesis 6:2, as *Philo, Justin, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Lactantius, and Sulpicius Severus.* Hence Dr. Dannhauer in *Christeid*. p. 271.: "The monstrous incubus of the angels and their mixture with the pre-diluvian men was a doctrine which the ancients, as it were, vied to embrace against the authority of Scripture, Acts 17:26." The cause of the error, says Pamelus in his paradox, was that the old Greek edition of the LXX, which both Tertullian and earlier fathers, stuck in the same mire, followed, read: *Οί άγγελοι τον θεον* [The angels of God], and the Italian Latin: Angeli Dei'. . . 7. *Bodin* . . ., *Paracelsus* ... and others, asserting that men can be transformed into wolves, asses, cats, etc. . . 8. Of *most Papists*, who hold that Samuel was truly raised 1 Sam. 28:18 and other dead can be raised by the devil, they decree... 10. *Many Papists*... decreeing that the devil can perform true miracles." (L. c. f. 667 sq.)

HOFMANN: "It is impossible, among the בְּנֵי־הָאֱלֹהִים, [sons of God] of whom it is said there (Gen. 6:1 ff.) that they saw how beautiful the daughters of men were, and that they took such for their wives, to understand anything other than *spirits*. . . The Flood, which buried the human race of that time, also banished from the upper world the spirits who had their sinful nature in it: belonging to the condemned world, they fell with it into the darkness into which it was sunk." (*Schriftbeweis*. I, 374. sq. 376.)

KURTZ: "That among the *sons of God* in Gen. 6:2, 4, not pious Sethites, but superterrestrial beings, i.e., *angels,* are to be understood, is a fact that emerges from the context so clearly and irrefutably and which is confirmed by the ... linguistic usage of the Old Testament. is so firmly established that the obstinacy with which the opposing view is nevertheless maintained can only be explained by the power of insuperable prejudices . . . The interpretation as angels is without question the oldest. . . However, since the end of the 4th century, it fell under the ban of absurdity and heresy. Theodoret, Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria, and Augustine dismissed it as absurd, and Philastrius counted it among the heresies without hesitation. This ban remained upon it until *Rationalism,* which cast off the straitjacket of dogmatic and traditional prejudices... along with belief in revelation, the Bible, and angels, perhaps also... took pleasure in being able to point out 'a piece of mythology' in the Bible again, — until, that is, Rationalism restored lexicon, grammar, and context to their former rights. . . Gradually, even among many . . . decidedly believers of revelation . . . the power of grammatico-historical exegesis prevailed. . . I name only the old, stalwart *Köppen* ('The Bible, a Work of Divine Wisdom'), the orthodox *Scheibel,* the faith-stout *Stier,* the Reformed *Dietlein*, the Lutheran *Drechsler,* further *Krabbe, v. Hofmann, Delitzsch, Baumgarten*, *Nägelsbach, Richers*, etc." (*Die Ehen der Söhne Gottes mit den Töchtern der Menschen*. Berlin. 1857. pp. 1, 11, sq.)

## § 16.

From the essence of angels flow I. *simplicity,* or that they are not composed of essential parts, matter and form, nor of integral parts;(a) II. *incorruptibility*, or that they do not have within themselves (b) a principle of corruption; III. *illocality*, or that they are not in a place.(c)

a) Unless perhaps spirituality itself formally implies the simplicity opposed to physical composition. However, by this it is not denied that they are composed of essence and subsistence, and likewise of subject and accidents, which are really distinct. See above § 8.

SCHARFF: *"Essential parts* are those which intrinsically constitute the essence of a thing *through an essential union;* just as matter and form are the essential parts *of a body;* the rational soul and the body are the essential parts of a *human being. Integrating parts*, or integrals, are called those which complete the integrity of a thing *through quantitative union*, i.e., through continuous cohesion, as in animals are the head, neck, belly, feet, arms, and hands." (*Metaphys*. p. 192.)

b) That, however, which was created by God can be destroyed and annihilated by Him, and thus, although they have no form which, with the subject remaining, could be cast off, they can *nevertheless* be changed from *being* to *non-being*, is certain. See *Mus.,* 1. c. § 27. p. 185. Meanwhile, *aevum,* or duration, which indeed has a beginning but is without end, is rightly ascribed to them.

c) For since they lack matter, they are not, properly speaking, *quantified*, nor can they *be confined* to a place. Nevertheless, we do *not* say that they are *everywhere,* but in a certain *definite ποῦ* (*where*), as they call it; so that they can also move from one *ubi (where)* to another and move material things elsewhere. See *Matthew 8:32, where the demons, cast out* by Christ from the possessed man in whom they had been for some time, and *migrating into a herd of swine*, *drove the entire herd headlong into the sea.* Cf. *Mus.,* § 34 ff., p. 193, and § 72 ff., pp. 221, 224.

QUENSTEDT: "Angels are in a certain space by designation or *definitively;* that is, the substantial of their being is defined by their presence in a particular space, not in other spaces, much less everywhere; and because the angel is without parts, the whole can exist not only in the entire place, but also in any, even the smallest, part of the place, indeed in a point." (L. c.)

THE SAME: "Angels are endowed with a certain faculty for moving expeditiously, so that *in an instant* they can be wherever they wish, and hence, because of their speed and most rapid motion, they are likened to the winds and the flame of fire (Ps. 104:4). I say that many affirm that angels move from one place to another *in an instant*; others, however, among whom are Spanheim and Maresius, hold that angels do not acquire a new place the instant they leave the first, but with some delay, because, although the mobile itself is indivisible, the space in which it moves is extended and continuous, which no creature can pass through in an instant." (L. c. s. 1. th. 11. f. 634.)

## § 17.

The number of angels is (a) great, but not (b) definable by us.(c)

a) Thus, *thousands upon thousands,* and *ten thousand times a hundred thousand* angels are mentioned who serve God, *Dan. 7:10.* And Christ*, in Matthew 26:53,* teaches him who asks *that more than twelve legions of angels would be sent by the Father for* his sake. But it is also read that in one man there was an entire *legion of unclean spirits, Mark 5:8.* A legion, however, among the Romans was commonly a multitude of six thousand soldiers, although the number varied on other occasions.

b) For this is what is meant by the mention of *innumerable angels (μυριάδων) in Hebrews 12:22.*

c) However, these angels, whatever their number, were created by God at once, and were not multiplied, like men, by successive generations.

# § 18.

That the angels differ among themselves in certain *orders* or degrees is beyond doubt.[(a)] Whether they also differ in species and essence, however, is not clear.[(b)]

a) This is gathered from the different names: such as *Cherubim Gen. 3:*24, *Seraphim Isa. 6:2;* thrones, principalities, dominions, authorities, powers [*θρόνοι, ἀρχαὶ, κυριότητες, ἐξουσίαι, δυνάμεις] Col. 1:16. Eph. 1:21, archangel in 1 Thess. 4:16,* and that elsewhere also evil angels are described as having an order among themselves, such as that of rulers and parents. For thus in *Luke 11:25. Beelzebub* is called *the prince of the demons*, and in *Matthew 25:41,* mention is made of the *devil* and *his angels*.

> QUENSTEDT: "That there are a determinate number of *nine orders* or choirs of angels, and that these are divided into three classes or *ternions,* which they call *hierarchies*, and that they are distinguished by dignity, degrees, and offices in such a way that, for example, the first or supreme order immediately knows God and divine things and teaches the second, and this in turn teaches the third, so that the first may command the second and the second the third, and likewise, that the first only assists and does not minister, etc.; on which *the Scholastics and Papists*, especially Bechanus, philosophize at length—*following Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite—we* reject them as uncertain and false." (L. c. s. 2. q. 8. f. 681.)

> THE SAME: "At most, from the places in Scripture that exhibit the appellations of angels, only these can be gathered: 1. That there are orders among the angels; 2. that this order of angels can be established as a. they are thrones, b. dominions {κυριότὴτες, dominationes}, c. authorities {ἐξουσίοι, potestates}, d. powers {δυνάμεις, virtutes}, e. rulers {ἀρχαί, principatus}, archangels and angels, Col. 1:16. Eph. 1:21; 1 Pet. 8:22, although in these places these names are also interchanged; 3. that archangels are superior in order to angels; 4. that archangels are higher than rulers and these higher than powers, from Rom. 8:38; 5. that *the εξουσίαι [authorities]* are superior to the angels, and that the *δυνάμεις* also precede them in order, from 2 Pet. 3:22; 6. that between the *άρχάς* (principalites) and the *δυνάμεις* (powers), the *'εξουσίαι* (authorities) intervene, from Eph. 1:21; 7. that *άρχαϊ* [principalites] are indeed superior to angels, but inferior to all of these, from the same...; 8. that *κυριότητες,* dominions, are superior to them. Now, if thrones are to be distinguished from them, this order would be established: thrones, dominions, powers, principalities, angels... Since in the aforementioned places these names are interchanged, and it is unknown whether the archangels, Cherubim, and Seraphim are included in the first five terms or are distinguished from those orders, nothing certain can be defined here." (L. c. s. 2. q. 8. f. 682. sq.)

b) Indeed, St. *Augustine*, in his Enchiridion to Laurentius, chapter XXVIII, speaking of the distinction among the angels, says, "*let those speak who can; I confess that I am ignorant of these things."*

## § 19.

Angels can be defined as [(a)] spiritual,[(b)] intelligent,[(c)] complete, and finite substances.[(d)]

a) As far as their common nature is concerned.
b) See § 5, p. 107.
c) See § 7 ff. p. 109.
d) See § 6, p. 109.

## § 20.

To the angelic nature God, in the very first creation,[(a)] imparted certain habitual perfections, for eliciting acts suitable to them, for the sake of attaining a supernatural end through the grace of God. These perfections authors call by the name of *grace*.[(b)]

a) For one must not imagine a state of *pure nature,* as some call it; but rather acknowledge that God, who made all things very good, created the angels at their very beginning such as they needed to be, so that they could attain the supernatural end. Cf. Epistle of *Jude* 6, where the angels who became *evil* are said *not to have kept their own origin (τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχήν).* It is therefore necessary that they were formerly good. See below, note to § 25.

QUENSTEDT: "*The state of pure nature,* in which some *Catholics* say that angels and men were first created, is a pure and utter fiction; for Scripture is silent about it." (L. c. q. 5. f. 674.)

b) For the states of the angels are distinguished into the state *of grace* and the state *of glory,* the former preceding, the follows; of which we must treat distinctly.

## § 21.

Just as the angels, in order to tend toward their end, ought to have known God rightly, loved Him above all things, believed His truth, trusted in His goodness, obeyed His commands, and hoped for eternal life;[(a)] so that grace, divinely granted to the angels to enable them to perform these acts, included on the part of the *intellect* a certain habitual light [(b)] [(c)] by whose benefit the angels would know what had to be known to attain their supernatural end, but could not be known by the light of nature;[(d)] on the part of the *will*

it imported habitual righteousness [e] and holiness,[f] by which they could [g] institute and perform all actions in conformity with the eternal law of God.

a) Indeed, the *means* by which the angels would attain their end, or beatitude, had to consist in acts of the mind and will occupied with their God and the author of their beatitude. Yet, even if they had performed this, they could not properly be said to *merit* their beatitude, but could obtain it only through God's grace, that is, His gratuitous and undeserved favor. Hence, those *means* were called *not causal*, or in the stricter sense, but in a *broader* signification, according to what we have said in Proleg. chap. I. § 3. Vol. I. p. 6. and § 7. p. 13.

b) However, it appears that these consisted of species divinely impressed, by which God, as it were, spoke to the angels, and supernatural things to be known were presented to their understanding, so that these, though not evidently and as they are in themselves, could nevertheless be recognized with reference to God speaking, and the angelic intellect in this way became a sufficient principle for supernatural acts of knowing and assenting.

c) Some call *faith the light of faith; Gerhard* calls it the *supernatural habit of faith*, *Isag*. LL. Dispp. XIII. cap. IX. § 7. p. 557. They established that the angels *believe* by faith, distinguishing it from the evident knowledge of science, because they know under the reason of truth what they would otherwise know by the object's evidence; not, however, by the object's evidence, but by the authority of the speaking or revealing God.

d) For example, the very ultimate end, or the beatific vision of God to be expected at some future time, as a motive for the constant obedience to be rendered in the meantime; also at the same time the mystery of the Holy Spirit. of the Holy Trinity, which surpasses the limits of natural intelligence, but which the angels were to know, so that God might be worshipped as He was in His persons. We do not say, however, that the mystery of the Incarnation (since Christ *did not assume angels, Heb. 2:*16) and the other free decrees of God were known to the angels in their state of way by the light of grace.

e) Either a complex of supernatural virtues, so that it is the *ὅλη ἀρετή, or universal righteousness.* And *truth,* or *veracity,* or faithfulness, integrity and sincere holiness belong here, from which the devil is said to have fallen*, John 8:44.*

f) Authors call it *hope* and *charity*. See *Gerh.,* l. c. p. m. 557. And indeed the angels had hope in the state of the journey, by which they embraced future beatitude as an absent and arduous good, yet possible and truly to be attained (unless they themselves stood in the way). And this hope presupposed a *trust* placed in God as the cause of attaining beatitude, by which their will rested in God as a present good and the cause of another good. *Charity,* however, had as its object both *God,* to whom they desired to do a pleasing thing or service, and the fellow *angels*, to be loved for God's sake as future partners of their nature and co-heirs of salvation.

g) They were not, however, compelled to perform their actions in a holy manner, but retained the *freedom* to act otherwise and to fail; which is evident from the subsequent fall of some.

## § 22.

And so it is clear that it cannot be entirely denied,[(a)] that the angels were created in the *image of God*.[(b)]

a) It must be confessed that this does not exist expressly (*κατὰ ῥητὸν*) in the Scriptures, unless perhaps you want to refer here, that angels are called the *sons of God* in *Job 1:6, chapter 2:1, and chapter 38:7,* and that a son is commonly called the *image* of his father.

b) It is certainly true that the angels were *conformed* in this way *to the* divine *Nature,* and received this conformity *by the intention* of God, who conferred it upon them. Compare *Gerhard,* in *Isag*. Disp. XII. cap. VI. *de Ang*. § 26. p. 523.

## § 23.

Although indeed the gifts of grace were bestowed by God upon all angels, yet not all, but only some, made proper use of the grace granted to them; and from this arose the distinction of angels into *good* and *bad.*

## § 24.

The *good* are those who persevered in the goodness or righteousness, and holiness in which they were created, and who were confirmed in good by God, graciously rewarding their obedience, so that they can no longer lose their goodness, sin, or become evil.

## § 25.

They are called *evil* who of their own accord have fallen away from their original goodness [(a)] and, deprived of grace by the just judgment of God, are so confirmed in evil that they cannot return to goodness, do good, or refrain from sinning.

a) For this is *not to keep one's origin,* but to undergo a change of the first state for the worse, *Jude 6. (*For that *'principality'* does not denote the substance itself, received in the first creation, which always remains the same, but rather the concreated perfections, which are subject to loss.) And for the same reason it is said *not to stand in the truth, John 8:44,* which supposes that it had previously been in it.

QUENSTEDT: "In short: they are said to be evil *not by origin,* but *by fall; not by being,* but by *quality*." (L. c. s. 1. th. 29. f. 640.)

## § 26.

However, how long the state of grace lasted, namely before the angels were confirmed in good and others, falling from good, became evil, is not sufficiently clear.[(a)] This is certain: the distinction between good and evil angels existed before [(b)] the first humans fell.

a) For the opinion of some, that their fall is indicated by the fact that it is not added to the narrative of the works of that day, "*God saw that* they were *good,*" is plainly weak; and the general clause, *Genesis 1:31,* is rather to be noted*: God saw all that He had made, and behold, it was very good;* from which you would rather conclude that the angels had not yet fallen after the entire six days had passed.

b) For Christ calls the devil a *murderer from the beginning,* and the *father of lies, John 8:44,* the *first* liar of all, and the cause of the defection of men from God, and thus of the necessity of death being brought upon men, and who gave an example of consummate malice in seducing Eve, *Genesis 3:1* ff. On the contrary, the angels were undoubtedly confirmed in good, who guarded the paradise, when men, having fallen, were cast out from it, *Gen. 3:24.* See *Gerh.,* ad loc. in *Comment*. p. 124.

## § 27.

However, the good angels are *confirmed* in good through *beatitude* itself.

## § 28.

Namely, after they had steadfastly rendered their obedience to God in the state of the way, even while other angels were falling,[(a)] it pleased God to fill them with the *light of glory,* so that they might be able [(b)] to know *God* Himself clearly and *intuitively*.

a) And there are those who assign to these angels a special operation, consisting in a fight against the evil angels and in resisting their insults; of which, however, Scripture is silent.

*b)* For this is *to see the face of the heavenly Father*, *Matt. 28:10.* And rightly *Gerhard: "To see the face of God" (βλέπειν πρόσωπον θεοῦ), in the sacred letters does not precisely denote waiting for God's command (although it may be implied*), *but the beatific vision. Isag*. LL. Disp. XIII. cap. IX. de Angel. § 9. p. 558.

## § 29.

Following this vision of God,[(a)] however, there ensued an *intensely fervent love,* by which the will of the angels began so to cleave to God that it could not be turned away from Him.

a) Cf. here the Proleg. chap. I, § 4, note *d,* Vol. I, p. 10.

## § 30.

And thus their *confirmation in good* was made, that is, the determination of the will toward good, so that whatever they do, they do it in relation to God, as to an infinitely perfect good perfectly known, without any stain, [a] without any defect.

a) And this is the *ἀναμαρτησία*, or *impeccability*, commonly attributed to the blessed angels. For sin implies *ἀνομίαν,* or *illegality*. But the sum of the law is to love God above all things. Therefore, those who always love God, clearly known, above all things and incessantly embrace Him as the supreme good**,** by this very fact cannot act *ἀνόμως***,** since that would imply the contradiction of being conformable to the law by loving God above all things, and at the same time straying from the law by sinning.

## § 31.

Yet not all *freedom* of the angelic will is taken away. For although it is no longer indifferent to good and evil,[a] it is nevertheless indifferent with regard to created goods, so that whatever of these it wills, it can also not will any of them,[b] or will one [c] thing instead of another. [d]

a) Nor did that freedom of will to evil, as well as to good, imply perfection; therefore, in the state of the angels' perfection, it can be absent, indeed it is absent.

b) And so it is free by the freedom of *contradiction* or of *exercise.*

c) Authors call it the liberty of *contrariety* or *specification*.

d) Of course, if a created good is not necessarily to be desired because of God's will, otherwise in this case it is entirely desired by the blessed angels.

## § 32.

To that very beatitude,[a] good angels were indeed destined by the eternal [b] decree of God and thus *elected*.[c]

a) For it cannot be said that God confers on angels in time what He has not eternally decreed to give at some time. And compare *1 Tim. 5:21*, where Paul makes express mention of *τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν ἀγγέλων, the elect angels*, designating that only a few *out of* many, or from the entire assembly of spirits, were *chosen* to receive the beatitude, of which all could have become partakers.

b) *Not*, however*, absolutely,* or excluding every foreseen condition on the part of the subject, to be fulfilled freely, but certainly. For just as God in time conferred beatitude only on those who persevered in good,

so the eternal decree concerning the angels' future salvation rested on the foresight of that condition to be fulfilled in time. And indeed, the election of angels acknowledges *an internal*, *impulsive cause* or reason in the choosing God—namely, His goodness—but *not* an *external*, impulsive cause. And although on the part of the divine intellect it supposes an act of knowledge terminated on the very constant obedience of the angels, yet this *obedience*, due to God the creator and temporal, has *no* force *of merit* before God, nor a force to impel His will to decree, or to give, the good of eternal beatitude.

CALOV: "If God in the first creation granted to all angels sufficient means to persevere in good, so that they might enjoy eternal glory, it is false that some of them were predestined to eternal glory (the rest being rejected, or deprived of that grace or not instructed) by the *absolute* decree of God. But the former is true. And the latter." (*System*. T. IV, p. 71.)

c) However, in the sense in which Scripture describes the election of men, which has reference to the merit of Christ and the faith to be placed in Him, we do not say that the angels were elect. Cf. *Gerhard, Isagogica ad Leges*, Disput. XIII, cap. IX, § 13, p. 561.

QUENSTEDT: "On the passage Job 4:18.: 'Even in angels He found foolishness,' as the Vulgate has it… the sense is: If even good and righteous angels were to contend with God, as you do, and try to persuade Him, as if they were more righteous than He (in some particular case), He would nevertheless not believe their words, or decide that things were so. . . *A distinction is made* between the redemption of the angels, and the restoration of friendship and concord between the inhabitants of heaven and earth, effected through the passion of Christ, and their reconciliation; of the latter, not the former, does Paul speak in Eph. 1:10; Col. 1:19, 20, when he says that through Christ all things in heaven and on earth have been reconciled and brought under one head. *Note.* Reconciliation presupposes offense. But the good angels did not offend God. Therefore, all things in the heavens are said to have been reconciled, because even those who were already triumphing in heaven were reconciled to God by the blood of Christ, namely, the faithful of the Old Testament who died before the advent of Christ." (L. c. f. 680.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of *certain Calvinists,* such as Bucanus, Pareus, Ravanellus, and others, who hold that 'good angels, apart from the vision of perseverance and praiseworthy steadfastness in the truth, were confirmed in the good by an absolute decree.' Bucanus, loc. VI. *de angelis*, where, having proposed the question: Why, while others have fallen from the truth, have some persevered in grace and truth?, he subjoins: 'The supreme cause is the eternal, firm, and unchangeable decree and good pleasure of God.' And Piscator in *Ausführlichem Bericht von den Hauptstücken christl. Lehre*, p. 18. writes: "It is certain that God from eternity has decreed to make some angels and some men blessed, but to condemn others." 2. *Scholastics and Papists,* such as Lombard, as well as Thomas and Becan, who hold: 'That by their obedience the angels not only once merited their beatitude or confirmation in good, but also that even today they merit something.' 3. Of *some Papists*, such as Philip Diez, Gregory of Valencia, Blasius of Viegas, and Suarez, who attribute the grace of confirmation and the glory of the beatitude of the angels to Christ the mediator and His merit, or assert that the good angels were redeemed through Christ, who preserved them from the fall and merited for them grace and beatitude. . . 4. The *Calvinists*, such as Calvin in chap. 1 of Eph. and chap. 1 of Coloss., Buchanan, Philip Caesarius, Rivet, the

Professors of Leiden, Zanchius, teach that even the angels had need of Christ as mediator, not for redemption from sin, but to the preservation and confirmation of themselves in the concreated holiness and grace, partly, because they were not without the danger of falling, partly, because their own righteousness and obedience before God is lacking and imperfect, and therefore they have need of forgiveness and a more perfect righteousness, or so that their righteousness, which is lacking before God, might be covered by the righteousness of Christ.' Otto Brunfeldius says: 'The cross of Christ has profited not only men, but also angels, and all creation has been purified by the cross of the Lord.' 5. Of the *Socinians,* like Enjedini, asserting: "That the regeneration or reformation of the good angels also pertains to the blood of the cross of Christ," and that even the evil angels have been restored through Christ, because many evil spirits after the coming of Christ repented and were reconciled to God." (L. c. q. 7. f. 678. )

## § 33.

In their blessed life [(a)] the good angels perform various *operations*, *some* of which pertain to their own beatitude, while *others* are ministerial,[(b)] by which the angels serve God [(c)] and Christ the *God-man* [(d)] and promote the salvation of men.[(e)]

a) For beatitude does not consist in *idleness*, but *partly* it involves a certain *activity* of its own, and *partly* it allows for several operations to be performed by those who are blessed.

b) For this reason, the angels, though already blessed*,* and *all of them* (with no one, not even of the highest order, excepted), are *ministering spirits [πνεύματα λειτουργικά], spirits appointed to public service* and *performing* it*. Heb. 1:14.*

c) As to their Creator, Lord, and Author of their blessedness, to whom they cannot but be subject, *they* therefore *carry out His Word and obey His voice Ps. 103:21; they do His will in heaven Matt. 6:10.* God, however, uses their ministry not out of any necessity, but by His free will and the sweet disposition of His providence.

d) *Prostrating themselves before Him, worshipping* Him, either bowed down or fallen at his feet *Heb. 1:6, ministering to Him*, carrying out or dispensing the things entrusted and committed to them, *Matt. 4:11),* and they do this for Christ even according to His human nature (which is clear from the passage), since He is thus made a partaker of the divine majesty.

e) Because of the will of God, from whom they are *sent, apostles,* to human service; and out of a love like that shown to friends and *fellow-heirs of salvation, Heb. 1:14.*

## § 34.

Actions of the *former* kind are *partly* those in which the essential beatitude of the angels consists, and are *specifically* acts of intuitively *knowing* God, acts of most intensely *loving* God clearly known;[(a)] *partly* those which

confer upon the angels a certain *accidental* beatitude,[b] namely, acts of understanding objects *other* than God, specially revealed or perceived through experience in the Church, e.g., the mystery of the Incarnation,[c] the conversion of a sinful man;[d] to which similarly, on the part of the will, are added acts of love and joy.[e]

a) See what we have said in §§ 28 and 29.

b) For an accidental increase of beatitude the angels certainly do not reject; just as also, on the part of men to be blessed, there are degrees of glory, as will be shown below.

QUENSTEDT: *"Distinction* is to be made between the essential beatitude of the angels, ... and the accidental beatitude, which consists in the revelation of new mysteries, in love and joy outside of God, i.e., arising from the conversion and repentance of sinners, and in this the angels can *make progress*, as is clear from Luke 15:7; this, however, increase of beatitude will last *only until the day of the final judgment."* (L. c. s. 2. q. 6. f. 675.)

c) See *Luke 1:26 and 31; chapter 2:13.*

d) *Luke 15:7 and 10.*

e) For in *Luke 2:15,* the very glorification of God is a sign of joy, and in *Luke 15:10, χαρὰ ἐνώπιον τῶν ἀγγέλων τοῦ Θεοῦ, "joy before the angels of God,"* is said to exist. In both cases, the love of the angels is presupposed. For they glorify God as the good whom they love; they congratulate men as friends; they rejoice over the conversion of those whom they love as their own, wishing them all that is best.

## § 35.

Actions of the *latter* kind [a] *partly* concern individual pious people,[b] *partly* the hierarchical orders themselves,[c] to be guarded and to have their welfare promoted.

a) By which they minister to God in such a way that they also serve men at the same time.

b) Or as members of the commonwealth, and as human beings, regarded without regard to any particular status or order.

c) Or the sacred classes or orders of men within the church, where some preside, others are subject.

LUTHER: "God has ordained three hierarchies against the devil, namely, the household, the polity, and the Church." (Opp. lat. Jen. I, 524. b.)

BRENZ: "The state is not in the Church, but the Church is in the state." (*Gelehrter Männer Briefe von Schumacher*. III, 193. sq.)

## § 36.

Angels minister to *individual* pious persons,[a] when they protect them in the very *beginning* and infancy of life,[b] serve the *more mature* [c] in every honorable function, and are present to the *dying.*[d]

a) Whether a *certain* angel has been given to *each* person for their protection was a question long ago begun to be investigated. This much is certain: a person's protection is not to be assigned to a single angel in such a way that they are deprived of the help of the others. However, while *it can be said with probability that one angel is ordinarily appointed to each pious person for their protection, it can also be said with probability that extraordinarily, more than one angel is sent to each individual faithful person.* See *Gerhard. Isag*. LL. Disp. XIII. § 7. Cf. *Gen. 32:2; 2 Kings 6:17.*

> QUENSTEDT: "Whether *one or more* angels have been given by God to each of the faithful for their custody is a problematic question, not an article of faith. . . When Christ says in Matthew 18:10: 'The angels *of the little ones* in heaven always see the face of my Father, who is in heaven,' it does not follow from this that to each of *the little* ones *one* specific angel is perpetually assigned, but only that angels in general are appointed to their care. Moreover, Christ's purpose here is simply that the little ones are not to be despised, whether they are such physically, ethically, or politically, since God even employs *heavenly* angels for their care and protection. A more probable inference would be drawn if the Holy Spirit were speaking in the singular number of the angel of each one of those little ones, and not indefinitely of the angels of those little ones. — *Note.* The Greek fathers were confirmed in their opinion by a false interpretation of the LXX interpreter. Deut. 32:8: "He set the bounds of the nations according to the number of the angels of God." . . . That one in Acts 12:15: *Ὁ ἄγγελος αὐτοῖ* (the words of the faithful gathered in the house of Mary in Jerusalem, when St. Peter, miraculously freed from prison, was knocking at the door at night), some take it to refer to a *human* messenger sent by Peter from prison. . . But because the word *angel* is commonly taken in Scripture for a spirit, others more rightly understand the word *angel* not of some human messenger, but of a heavenly spirit. However, it does not necessarily follow from this that each individual believer has one constant and ever-attendant angel. For the following conclusion does not hold: The Christians gathered in Mary's house believed that the apostle *Peter* had a special guardian angel, and indeed at the time when he was held in prison; therefore, such an angel is assigned and attached by God *to all people*, and for all time. No, I say, the conclusion does not hold, from the exceptional apostle to every single person. Nor is the same the reason for God's guardianship over profane and impious men as over the pious, and especially the distinguished. Therefore, this passage, which Nazarius in his *Controversia Unica* calls the most remarkable of all testimonies, does not prove that for each individual, both faithful and unfaithful, a single angel is appointed by God for their protection. *Distinguish* between the *opinions* of certain people, and indeed of common folk, and the *doctrine* of the entire Church. . . *Distinguish* between the assertion of *Scripture* and the assertion or conjecture of *men* who are introduced as speaking in Scripture. Indeed, not everything sound was advanced by the Jews, or even by Christ's own disciples, at times in His presence while He was still living on earth. It is not credible that guardian angels would assume and imitate the appearance, form, clothing, voice, and gestures of those whose guardians they are considered to be. For such things are not feigned except for the purpose of deceiving and misleading. The devil is accustomed to represent men... Although many of the fathers, and indeed Luther himself in the prescribed morning and evening prayer of the catechism ("May your holy angel be with me," etc.), speak frequently of the guardian angel, it is by no means to be understood exclusively in this sense." (L. c. s. 2. q. 9. f. 686. 690. sq.)

b) Thus the *angels of the children* are said to be those appointed to their care, *Matt. 18:10.*

c) *The angel of the Lord encamps around those who fear God and delivers them, Ps. 34:8. It is commanded to the angels by God to guard* the man who trusts in God *in all his ways, etc., Ps. 91:11-12.* Thus they are read to have admonished Joseph, the husband of Mary, about present matters*, Matt. 1:19, 20;*

*2:13, 19;* Cornelius the centurion*, Acts 10:3, 5,* to have forewarned about future things*, Rev. 1:1; 22:6, 16*, to provide help in avoiding evil *Ps. 91:11, 12;* to defend in adversity, as with Daniel in the lions' den, *Dan. 6:22,* to rescue from evil, as in the example of Peter, *Act. 12:7,* and of several apostles at once, *Acts 5:18–19,* to provide comfort to the fearful: to Zechariah, *Luke 1:13;* to Mary, *v. 30;* to the shepherds, ch. *2:10;* to the women coming to Christ's tomb, *Matthew 28:5; Mark 16:6. And just as the wicked labor to inflict upon men Typhonic winds, hail, locusts, diseases, pestilence, and other such evils, so it is beyond doubt that the good ones help in their own way with εὐ̃ετηρίαν, calm air, and moderate winds and fruitful rains, protect the salubrity of the air, and show remedies against diseases,* writes *Er. Schmid*, in his commentary on *Hebrews 1,* refers to *John 5:4,* about the angel who stirred the water in the pool of Bethesda. He adds: "*Thus there is no doubt that in the thermal baths, metal mines, and the like, the ministry of angels comes at God's command. But who acknowledges these things!*" p. 1297.

d) As they are said to *have carried the soul of Lazarus into Abraham's bosom, Luke 16:22.* Not that a separated soul cannot move itself, but to signify an escort, done out of honor, or because angels are guides to souls, showing them the way they must go, according to *Chrysostom*, *Homil*. XXIX. on Matthew, Tom. II. Opp. fol. m. 270. C. D.

# § 37.

To the office of angels pertains the *ecclesiastical* state, in that they promote the ministry of the Word, and specifically, that they were present at the promulgation of the Mosaic law as ministers;[(a)] that they announced the advent of Christ in the flesh;[(b)] that they hinder the introduction of idolatry into the Church,[(c)] and are present at sacred assemblies.[(d)]

a) See *Deut. 33:2* and *Gal. 3:19,* where it is said*, ό νόμος διαταγε)ς δι Αγγέλων, the law ordained by angels.* This is what our own writers explain about the sound of trumpets raised by the angels. Cf. *Acts 7:53.*

b) *Luke 1:26; 2:9.*

c) *Jude 9.* For it is believed that the dispute of the angel with Satan over the body of Moses arose from this: that Satan was striving to bring the body of Moses, which God had hidden, to light in order to give the Israelites an opportunity for idolatry; and for this reason the good angel opposed him.

d) See *1 Cor. 11:10,* where Paul argues for women to observe modesty in their dress in sacred gatherings by appealing to the presence of angels, who love good order and decency. Compare *1 Tim. 5:21,* where Paul, having given Timothy lengthy admonitions concerning his duties in the holy office*, summons him before the angels.* And it is certain that the angels present celebrate God with us, and remove no few impediments.

## § 38.

Angels serve the *political* order in such a way that they prevent the bonds of the republic from being broken,[a] they assist and defend the magistrate and his ministers,[b] they ward off dangers, and afflict wicked enemies.[c]

a) Thus in *Daniel 10:13* it is said that God sent an angel into the court of the king of Persia at the time when, through the efforts of *either* angels *or* wicked officials or counselors, religion and justice seemed about to be destroyed, so that, by suppressing their attempts, peace and public safety might be preserved.

b) Thus we read *in Daniel 6:22 that an angel sent by God shut the mouths of the lions* so that they could not harm Daniel, a chief minister of the kingdom, who was facing danger for the glory of God.

c) So too, in *2 Kings 19:35* and *Isaiah 37:36*, it is told that the angel of the Lord came to the aid of the pious King Hezekiah, who was attacked by the Assyrians in an unjust war, and gave the hostile army over to destruction.

## § 39.

They minister to the *household* by promoting the marriages [a] of the pious, preserving the family estate,[b] and protecting the family's pledges, the children.[c]

a) This Abraham, in providing a wife for his son, testified that he hoped for this*, Gen. 24:7.*

b) See *Job 1:10,* where God is said *to have walled* or surrounded his *house*, in the sense that in *Psalm 34:10* it is said that God sends *the angel round about those who fear Him.*

c) See *Matthew 18:10.*

ANTHITHESES TO §§ 35—39.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis* 1. Of the *Gentiles;* for the Gentile world, barren and fruitful mother of monsters, has at one time given birth to geniuses, the guardian protectors of men, places, regions, cities, and buildings. . . 2. Of the *Rabbis* and *Cabbalists*.. . 3. Of the *Mohammedans.* For the Mohammedan opinion see Phil. Lonizerus, vol. I of the Turkish Chronicles, where he says: 'The firm opinion of all Mohammedans is that to each infant, as soon as they are born, two angels are added, one of whom guards the right, the other the left.' . . 4. Of *some of the Fathers,* especially the Greeks. For the opinion, derived from the commentaries of poets, Platonists, and Stoics, and from Jewish sources, is that each person, especially the faithful, is assigned a single angel for their protection. . . *Primasius* in his epistle to the Hebrews, chapter 1, asserts that to each of the faithful, from the time of their birth, or rather from the time of their baptism, God gives an angel for their protection. . . And famous is that saying of *Bernhard* in Sermon 12 on Psalm 90: 'In every corner, in every place, have reverence for your angel, and do not dare to do before him what you would not dare to do in my presence.' 5. Of *certain Fathers,* such as *Origen . . ., Chrysostom* hom.

III. on Col., author of the imperfect work on Matthew, hom. V., asserting: Each individual has not only a good angel, by whom he is defended, but also an evil one, by whom he is attacked. . . 6. of the *Scholastics* and *Papists*, who establish *seven* principal angels, to whom the care and governance of the Church and the whole world is assigned. . . Salmerio notes here that those seven angels are called by some: Michael, Gabriel, Raphael, Uriel, Saathiel, Ehudiel, Barachiel. The first three names, indeed, Michael, Gabriel, and Raphael, are found in the Holy Scriptures; to these, however, they added Uriel, Saathiel, Ehudiel, and Barachiel, partly from the Fourth Book of Esdras, partly from I know not where. They make, I say, certain universal guardians . . ., or of individual men, who are specially called guardian angels; about whom they posit these things as certain and indubitable: 1. That to each individual man, both elect and reprobate, both Gentile and Christian, even to the Antichrist himself, a good guardian angel is assigned. See the Scholastics on Book II of Sentences. Although the Master of Sentences, Lombard, doubts whether one angel might also have the care of many, Thomas, however, in Part I of the *Summa*, Question 103, teaches that "to each individual human being, individual angels are appointed for their protection." They state the same, as attested by the great number cited by Gabriel Vasquez; Becanus says: "That each of the faithful has a proper guardian angel assigned to him is the common opinion of the Fathers." 2. They state that an evil angel is also assigned to each person, but appointed by the prince of demons. And they call this the exercising demon. . . 7. Of *certain Calvinists,* such as Hieronymus Zanchius, who puts forth this thesis: 'That to each elect one a certain proper angel, who is his perpetual keeper and companion, is assigned by God from birth until the end of life; that outside of this order, however, several are sometimes sent to him by God, according to His good pleasure, for the sake of greater consolation, is probable and more consistent with the sacred Scriptures.' Likewise Alsted, Vossius, and Hug. Grotius, who partly admit the opinion of a good guardian angel assigned to each faithful person as probable, and partly defend it expressly. 8. Dr. *Horne*, who considers the aforementioned opinion to come closest to the truth." (L. c. f. 686. sqq.)

## § 40.

Finally, it will be a special duty of the angels, which they will perform *on the Last Day*, when they will accompany Christ as He approaches for judgment and will proclaim His coming with the sound of trumpets,[a] they will gather men from all parts of the world,[b] they will separate the righteous from the wicked,[c] they will place the former on Christ's right hand [d] in the air, brought to meet Him,[e] the latter, placed on the left of the Judge,[f] will soon be cast into hell.[g]

a) See *Matt. 25:31; 1 Thess. 4:15–16.*
b) *Matt. 24:31; Mark 13:27.*
c) *Matt. 13:41 and 49.*
d) *Matt. 25:32.*
e) *1 Thess. 4:17.*
f) *Matt. 25:32.*
g) *Matt. 13:42, 50.*

## § 41.

Because of those perfections, by which we have seen that good angels are endowed, and because they are exceedingly favorable and helpful to us, it is fitting, therefore, that we *think highly* of them,[(a)] love them, and take care not to offend them by our evil deeds.[(b)]

a) For what the *Augsburg Confession* teaches in Article XXI to be owed to the holy dead (namely, that their *memory* may *be proposed* so that *we may imitate* their *good works*), the same is rightly shown to the angels, especially since it is otherwise established that the angels are concerned with our actions.

b) See *1 Cor. 11:10*; here § 37, note *d.*

## § 42.

However, it is not fitting to direct our *prayers* to the angels. For this is *either* impious and idolatrous,[(a)] *or* at least useless and unwise.[(b)]

a) Namely if we direct *religious* prayers with confidence to them as though they were the bestowers of spiritual goods.

b) For whatever those prayers may be, it must nevertheless be admitted that Scripture provides us with no *command*, nor any *example* or *promise*. And from where, I ask, shall we know that the angels *understand* our prayers, or that they *delight in* them*?* Indeed*,* in *Revelation 19:10 and chapter 22:8–9,* the angel *simply* and *consistently* repudiates the worship of adoration, with the reason added, that he is a *fellow servant* of John and partaker of the faith, and that *God* (in *opposition* to all who are not God but are fellow servants among themselves, and therefore God *alone*) *is to be worshiped.* Which is indeed plain: the angel acts *not* out of affected *humility,* but *seriously* and for solid reasons, *and* does *not* distinguish between *degrees* of religious worship, of which one belongs to God alone and another to himself. Hence, having regard to this passage, *Augustine*, in his book On True Religion, chapter LV, has written excellently. *We honor the angels,*" he says, "*with charity, not with servitude, nor do we build temples for them. For they do not wish to be honored by us in this way, because they know that we ourselves, when we are good, are temples of the Most High God.*

SMALCALD ARTICLES: "Although the angels pray for us in heaven... from this it does not follow that the angels and saints are to be invoked by us, adored, etc." (II, 2. p. 305.)

QUENSTEDT: *"Distinguish* between adoring [τὸ adorare], insofar as it signifies to exhibit *a sign* of honor and *reverence* by an outward bodily gesture, or even *civil worship* itself, signified by external bodily gestures, and thus adoration can be paid to both angels and excellent men, — and τὸ adorare, insofar as it denotes *to worship* someone for their eminence in omnipotence and holiness and *as the author and giver of all good with an inward intention of the mind, to invoke* and place one's hope in someone*,* or *religious worship* itself*,* and thus only God is to be adored. And so, since the word 'to adore' is used in the Scriptures indiscriminately for both civil and religious worship, it is not immediately to be understood that religious adoration is meant whenever the term is found. Becanus, therefore, errs, who, upon reading that Abraham, Lot, and Balaam adored the angels, immediately concludes that they adored them religiously. . .

*That little distinction* of the Papists between *latria* and *dulia,* as if the former is due only to God and the latter may be rendered to angels, is a thing, and a terminology, fabricated and devised outside, apart from, and contrary to Scripture. For the words δουλεία and λατρεία are used throughout the Scriptures of both the civil worship of creatures and the religious worship of God alone; that there is no trace in Scripture of a worship *of* any *intermediate kind* between the religious and the non-religious or civil being denoted by the word *δουλείας*. . . That an dutiful adoration (*δουλεία)* can be paid to the angels, which can also be called civil insofar as they belong to one city with us (Heb. 12:12), is beyond doubt (if, that is, they appear to us), but not a religious *δουλεία*." (L. c. c. 11. s. 2. q. 10. f. 692. sq.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of the *ancient Platonists*, who held that daemons are by nature, dignity, and place intermediate between God and human beings... and therefore to be religiously worshiped and propitiated with sacrifices. ... 2. Of the *Jews*, who were also angel-worshipers. . . 3. Of *ancient heretics*, who as early as the time of the apostles, under the pretext of humility, wanted to introduce *θρησκείαν ἀγγελων*, the worship of angels, Col. 2:18. . . . Likewise of the successors of Simon the magician, such as the *Cainites,* whom Theodoret testifies, along with Epiphanius, worshiped and invoked angels. . . 4. *Socinians,* who teach that angels could be worshiped and religiously honored in the Old Testament, but that this should not be done today. . . 5. The *Papists,* who generally contend that angels were both rightly worshipped in the Old Testament and should be worshipped and religiously venerated today, i.e., that prayers can rightly be offered to angels as mediators between God and men, and that they are to be honored with a certain cultus that is somewhere between civil and religious, though still to be referred to the latter; and this is evident from their theory and practice. . . The *Council of Trent*, with its blunt anathema, strikes those who deny that the saints (i.e., angels and deceased saints) are to be invoked, session 25. The words of the council are: 'Those think impiously who determine that it is foolish to supplicate with voice or mind the saints who reign in heaven' (to implore someone by mind is properly to worship religiously and divinely, as Gerhard teaches). . . . *Bellarmine* . . . makes them omnipresent: 'for there is not one of these,' he says, 'who does not see all things everywhere,' 1. I. de b. s. c. 20. respons. ad 6.; omniscient. ‘It is not true, he says, that it is assumed, that the saints do not know what we ask of them'; omnipotent: ‘for who can justly deny that they (the angels, or holy men) are not only powerful, but plainly omnipotent?" (L. c. f. 693. sq.)

# § 43.

It is not sufficiently clear what the *fall* or first sin of the *evil* angels was, by which they departed from the goodness in which they were created and became evil; it is commonly thought to have been pride.(a)

a) Whether in inordinate self-complacency and a desire for divine honor and dominion. For the spirit dwelling in the serpent, *Genesis 3:5,* deceived Eve with the vain promise of a special likeness to God; and because he desired to be worshiped by Christ, *Matthew 4:9,* since he thus displayed the height of pride, he is considered to have first defiled himself with this sin. Since *pride* is also called the *beginning of all sin*, *Ecclesiasticus* 10:14, it is inferred from this that the origin of the diabolical sin, which was the first of all, is also found there. Cf. *Gerhard*, *Isagogica*, Disp. V, § 11; Lib. IX, §§ 8, 9.

QUENSTEDT: "That *pride* was the first sin of the angels, is probably concluded: 1. from 1 Tim. 8:6.: 'Lest, being lifted up with pride, *τυφωθείς* (Vulg.: *in superbiam elatus*), he fall into the condemnation of the devil', i.e., lest he incur the same damnation that Satan himself brought upon himself through arrogance. So Chrysostom, Gerhard, and others. . . 2. From the temptation. . . 3. From the perpetual endeavor by which he seeks to transfer the glory of God to himself. . . This opinion is also proven by Luther in his commentary on Genesis 1. Basil the Great, Cyprian, and Bernard join *envy* to pride." (L. c. s. 2. q. 12. f. 729.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* That certain angels are evil not by a fall, but by origin, i.e., that from the beginning of their existence or from their very nature, they have always been evil, was the doctrine of the *Manichees* and *Priscillianists.* . . Regarding the sin in particular, they state: 1. *Josephus* and *Philo,* as well as some of the fathers, such as Justin, Athenagoras, Origen, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Lactantius, etc., hold that the first sin of the demons was *intemperance,* or lust and lewdness. For they believe that some angels defiled themselves with lusts and loved the company of women. ... 2. Others believe that the devil coveted the *hypostatic union* and *envied* that excellence of human nature*,* as Suarez." (L. c. f. 728.)

## § 44.

The Fall, however, was the assembly of the evil angels under a certain leader or prince, whom Scripture calls the *devil*,[(a)] who by *either* his example *or* by his persuasion drew others into fellowship in the same sin.[(b)]

a) In the singular, see *John 8:44,* and here he is *ὁ ἄρχων τῶν δαιμονίων, the prince of demons, Luke 11:15, the ancient serpent and Satan, Revelation 12:9.*

QUENSTEDT: "By the *devil* is understood here (John 8:44) not a prince of the devils, as in Matthew 12:24, but the *whole host* of malignant spirits, because these predicates apply to all evil angels." (L. c. s. 1. th. 30. f. 640.)

b) Hence it is that Scripture speaks of the *angels of the devil, Matt. 25:41; Rev. 12:7.*

QUENSTEDT: "In what order the evil angels sinned, whether all at once, or one after another, or whether the first one fell and led the others by his example and persuasion into *apostasy* and fall, on this the *Scholastics* dispute, but *without scriptural support*." (L. c. s. 1. th. 34. f. 643.)

## § 45.

Having committed sin, all those angels *lost the grace* that was concreated in them, and thus they fell into the most bitter *misery*, without any hope of restoration.[(a)]

a) For God did not grant angels, as He did men, a time and place for repentance, but utterly denied them the help of grace; the reasons for this divine counsel, as handed down by the Fathers, see *Gerh.,* loc. cit. Disput, cap. IX. § 17.

QUENSTEDT: "Scripture nowhere teaches that any remedy for their fall was prepared, or that *any space for repentance* was left to the fallen; indeed, that God *simply* spared the sinning angels, Peter denies (2 Pet. 2:4). That the devils cannot perform salutary penance, however, is established from the fact that they are deprived of a mediator." (L. c. c. 14. s. 2. q. 5. f. 827.)

THE SAME: *"Why* God, after the fall of angels and men, chose to show Himself *φιλάνθρωπον*, loving toward mankind, and not *φιλάγγελον*, loving toward angels*,* the fathers and scholastics give these probable reasons: 1. because the angelic nature did not perish entirely, but only in part, whereas the human nature entirely in one; which Augustine notes in *Enchiridion* c. 29; 2. because the angelic nature fell not tempted by another, the human nature tempted and seduced by another; the former fell through malice, the latter through weakness." (L. c. f. 829.)

## § 46.

For their *understanding*, deprived not only of the light of grace but also of the light of glory, and fixed in the contempt of divine wrath and its own misery, is, as it were, dulled and lacks a right judgment for doing good.[(a)]

a) This is what is said in *John 8:44*, *that the truth is not in the devil.* For the *truth,* in which Satan, when first created, did not stand, was a full integrity and *a power* and perfection created to rightly exercise acts befitting him, which above all things included a right judgment concerning things to be done; Thus, by falling from the truth, Satan, and whenever it is denied that *truth is in him*, is in this very thing known to lack a true and sound judgment about how to act; hence, in calling him, he is not truthful, but a liar, a deceiver, and a slanderer, etc. Furthermore, the corruption of the devil's intellect is also shown by the fact that Satan promoted the death of Christ with such zeal, not realizing that from it he would draw upon himself the greatest adversity. And whatever *natural* knowledge remains in the evil angels adds nothing to their happiness, since they have been rejected by God.

QUENSTEDT: "The devil says to Christ, 'If you are the Son of God,' etc. Or therefore he knew that Jesus was the Son of God, not by the certainty of knowledge, but by a conjecture of a firm opinion, so that he is to be considered as *suspecting* rather than *knowing*, as Hilary speaks; or, if he knew for certain that He was the Son of God, he was *impudently insane*, to think that by his cunning and stratagems he would subvert and entice God Himself to evil. . . The evil angels have some *knowledge of supernatural things,* but it is combined with an extreme hatred of God and the good and pious angels and men, as well as with ignorance, doubt, error, and oblivion, Matthew 4:6; John 13:2; 1 Corinthians 2:8. . . They possess a remarkable *knowledge of natural things,* both natural and experimental: 1. *Natural*, from the subtlety of their spiritual nature and the keenness of their judgment; 2. *Experimental,* and remarkable for this, from the use of long experience; hence St. Augustine says somewhere: 'The devil is a doctor not promoted, but experienced.'" (L. c. c. 11. s. 1. th. 36. sqq. f. 644. sq.)

## § 47.

The *will,* deprived of the supreme love of God and the joy derived therefrom, and thus turned away from God, is hardened [(a)] in evil, and is consequently miserably tormented and afflicted.[(b)]

a) *Not* from a special influx or *determination* of God, *nor* from *the absolute decree* of God*, but* because of that *deprivation of the perfections* of the intellect and will, merited by the antecedent *sin*.

b) For, knowing *that there is a God,* whose idea they cannot completely erase from their minds; that the same God *is* also supremely *powerful* and, *in Himself* and in *other* good angels*,* supremely *good,* yet irreconcilably *hostile* to themselves and always imminent and severe—*they* not only *do not love* Him, but they hate and *oppose Him;* and when they recognize that they have brought this evil upon themselves by their own yoke*, they become hostile* to themselves and quarrel with themselves*,* as it were (hating God and themselves alike at the same time). Hence, when they recognize that it is better for others than for themselves, *envy* of another's happiness and a perpetual *sorrow* from the constant presence of their own evils necessarily arise.

## § 48.

Therefore, the *freedom* of the will of the damned angels does *not* imply indifference toward good or evil, or toward several goods, *but* is concerned with particular evils, insofar as they can choose this one over others and not choose it, and likewise choose another.[(a)]

a) Under *the appearance* of *good,* but which is not truly good, deceiving them by their own *corrupt judgment.*

## § 49.

The *operations* of the evil angels are varied; first and foremost, but chiefly to be noted are those which are directed *at* the *destruction of both* individual human beings *and* hierarchical states.

## § 50.

Thus they try to harm, partly the *bodies* of men, by inflicting diseases;[(a)] partly external goods or *possessions*, by corrupting or taking them away;[(b)] partly the *soul* itself, by turning it away from God and drawing it to damnation through sins.[(c)]

a) Thus in *Luke 13:11* it is said that the *woman was crippled, συγκύπτουσα,* having *a spirit of infirmity,* as if that were its cause, and *in verse 16* it is said that *Satan* had bound *her* up until now.

QUENSTEDT: "Tertullian, *de fuga in persecutione*, chapter 2: 'Nor in the herd of swine,' he says, 'did the devil's legion have power, unless it had obtained it from the Lord; so far is he from having power over the sheep of God.'" I could say: even the bristles of the swine were at that time numbered with God, to say nothing of the hairs of the saints." (L. c. th. 52. f. 651.)

b) See the history *of Job*, ch. 1:12 ff.

c) For what Christ affirms of his disciples in *Luke 22:31*—that *Satan* desired *to sift* them, *as wheat*—this shows that Satan, by various temptations, sought to agitate, to disturb, and to shake their faith, indeed, if he could, to shake it and, through the scandal conceived from the passion of Christ, to lead them to total, even final, *apostasy*. Similarly, when Paul*,* in *Ephesians 6:11-12*, recommends the *spiritual armor* for the struggle against evil spirits, he presupposes their attacks, by which the salvation of souls is put in jeopardy. But *Peter,* in *1 Peter 5:8-9,* says that the Christian must resist the *enemy, who is seeking* whom *he may devour,* or whom he may lead into the utter ruin of the soul.

## § 51.

Pertinent here in a special way is *spiritual possession,* through which Satan effectively [(a)] impels the minds of wicked people [(b)] to the worst crimes;[(c)] and *corporal possession*, by which Satan, according to his substance [(d)] dwells and operates [(e)] within the bodies of people [(f)] with divine permission.[(g)]

a) See *Luke 22:3,* where it is said that *Satan entered into the heart* (that is, *the soul) of Judas;* cf. *John 13:27, that he put into* his *heart*, insinuated into his mind this counsel and purpose, *that he should betray Jesus, verse 2.* So *Ephesians 2:2* calls the *prince of the world,* the evil *spirit*, the *one who works effectively in the children of disobedience,* in unbelieving men. And *2 Corinthians 4:4* calls *the god of this world the one who has blinded the minds of unbelievers, lest the light of the gospel should shine upon them.* Finally*,* in *2 Timothy 2:26*, those who resist the ministry are said to be *ζωγρημένοι, captured* like living beasts by Satan, and as if entangled in a *snare* and led *at his* will.

QUENSTEDT: "A tremendous example of *spiritual possession* was *Judas Iscariot. . .* For already (Satan) had cast into the heart of Judas to betray Christ (John 13:2), indeed, two days before that last supper he had entered into him, when he went to the chief priests and for money promised them his Lord (Luke)." 22:3, but he had entered there not in a bodily, but in a spiritual *εἰσελεύσει,* persuading Judas to promise the Jews the betrayal of Christ; After the morsel, however, he entered into him (John 13:27), to carry out the promised crime, impelling him more vehemently and possessing him entirely—not indeed corporally, but spiritually.

Hence Augustine, tract. 62. on John, says: 'Before, he had impelled him as an alien; now he possesses him as his own.' Likewise the *Pharisees*, whom John the Baptist calls a brood of vipers (Matt. 3:7) because of the poison of sin and of malice. Hence, in John 8:44, they are said to be of the father, the devil, not by creation or generation, but by imitation (1 John 3:8) and by the conformity of their works with the works of the devil. And that such possessed persons are still found today, both within the Church and outside of it, is acknowledged by all. The *subject* of the impious soul is not merely *passive,* but *is* at the same time *active*, behaving as a *collaborator* with the devil. Hence it is said in John 8:44 that the wicked desire to do the desires of their father (the devil). For although Satan, who spiritually besets and possesses those he obsesses, incites them to sin and rules over them, they themselves not only delight in their sins but also perform them with the utmost pleasure. The *efficient cause* of spiritual possession is the devil, 1 Pet. 5:8; Luke 11:24 ff. . . *Spiritual possession* is described in its circumstances in Matthew 12:43 ff. and Luke 11:24 ff.: 'When the unclean spirit has gone out of the man and comes, finding his house swept clean, then he goes and takes seven other spirits more wicked than himself, and they enter and dwell there.' *Note*.: 1.: *Who?* The demon, that unclean spirit, who with his foul filth, namely sins, defiles all things, so that man, who is the throne and temple of God, becomes a sewer of the devil. Such a heart, such as the devil who inhabits it is. 2. *What?* He went out, cast out; he returned, invited; he wanders, going about far and wide seeking whom he may devour (1 Pet. 5:8). 3. *From whom* and from where did he go out? From the man whom Christ had delivered from Satan, who was spiritually oppressing him, through His word. 4. *Why did Satan return? a.* Because, wandering in desolate places, he did not find a pleasant and convenient dwelling for himself among empty men; therefore he thought of returning to his former habitation, *ß.* Because the man from whom he had been cast out, thinking that he had been freed from the power of Satan through Christ, was living securely in his sins and returning to his former ways. 6. *When did he return?* When he saw his house left empty, and, as it is added in Matthew 12:44, perfectly prepared for his return by idleness and vice, Empty of the fear of God, overflowing with pleasures. 6. *With whom did he come?* With seven more wicked spirits. The number seven is taken for many, as is the Hebrew custom; therefore the seven spirits are other infernal spirits. But how are *they πνεύματα πονηρότερα εαυτόν,* more wicked than themselves, worse? For just as among evil spirits there is an order, so also one surpasses another in wickedness. Therefore, with these associates of his dwelling in such a man, given over to sloth, security, and other sins, Satan dwells, as a king in his kingdom, as a lord in his own house. 7. *What is the result of this return and inhabitation?* That the final condition of that man will be worse and more wretched than the first, namely, because of his malice and ingratitude toward God, his benefactor, who had freed him from Satan's power. *The cause that merits* and moves God to permit this is the man's eagerness to sin. *A godless spirit,* as Synesius calls the devil, does not obsess people at will, but by God's permission. For seeing that a man stubbornly resists the Holy Spirit, God, by just judgment, permits Satan to obsess him spiritually and to lead him from sin to sin. The *form* of spiritual possession consists in 1. the closer presence of the devil's substance to the soul of the wicked. For it is said that he enters into him (John 13:27), and dwells in him (Luke 11:26). This *κατοίκησις (dwelling)* does not imply a mere approach of the devil through operations, but a substantial approximation and presence. 2. In *an* effective and to every wickedness-propelling *co-working [συνεργεία].* For the devil besieges the *intellect* of the wicked to the extreme, so that they do not see the light of the gospel, and do not understand the things that pertain to their salvation (2 Cor. 4:4). He besieges their *will,* so that they consent to evil, and *their appetite,* so that *they desire the poisonous delights of sin with the utmost pleasure*. He besieges their *heart,* that they may not believe; *their ears,* that they may not hear the Word of God; *their eyes,* that they may not see the work of God; *their tongue,* that they may not pray; *their voice,* that they may not praise God; *their hands,* that they may not do any good; *their feet,* that they may not walk in the way of the righteous, etc. For a discussion of spiritual obsession, see Chemnitz, *Harm. evang.*

ch. 65. p. 709. sq. 758. 978. The *outcome* of spiritual possession is usually eternal destruction, John 8:21, 24. For Satan possesses men for this reason, that they may shipwreck of eternal life; for, I say, such obstinate sinners *seldom* repent, John 8:21, 24: 'You will die in your sins.'.. Thus says *Gerhard* in *Disput. Isagog*. p. 610.: "A bodily possession is more horrible, as it attacks the senses; a spiritual one, however, is more grievous and dangerous." (L. c. s. 1. th. 44. sqq. f. 648. sq.)

b) Who are therefore called *ἐκ πατρὸς διαβόλου, of their father, the devil*, like the Jews, *John 8:44*; *sons* of that *evil one, Matt. 13:38,* or sons of that *enemy* who is the *devil, v. 39*, malicious imitators of Satanic ways, as those who listen to his words.

c) In what way *they* are said *to do the desires of their father*, *John 8:44*. It should also be noted what *Gerhard* writes in *Harm. Evang*. chap. CLXVIII, p. 1161: *This* (spiritual) *possession is so subtle that both those it possesses and others sometimes judge that what results from the impulse of the Holy Spirit proceeds from Satanic spiritual possession, as is apparent in the example of the obstinate heretics.*

d) Indeed, he is said *to be present* not only, but to be within (*κατ' οὐσίαν καὶ αὐτοπροσώπως*) in the bodies of men. Examples *of those possessed* by demons, or demon-possessed persons, are numerous in the Scriptures. See *Matt. 8:28, 31, 32. Mark 7:25 ff.; Luke 4:35, 36.*

QUENSTEDT: *"The bodily form of possession* consists in the inhabitation of an evil spirit, or even of evil spirits, in the human body, made in the human body not only *according to energy* [*κατ' ενέργειαν*] but also *according to the essence* [*κατ' ουσίαν*] itself. That the unclean spirits inhabit the obsessed not only according to energy but also according to essence is proved by the explicit assertion of Christ in Luke 11:26, as well as by the expulsion and departure of demons in Matthew 12:43; Luke 8:2; 11:14, 24. Hence the scholastics rightly teach that possession denotes the devil's 'intimate and substantial presence in the possessed,' and that demons substantially enter the bodies of the possessed. They occupy the body either totally, when they permeate and affect it as a whole, or partially, when they appropriate certain of its members to themselves, such as the tongue (Mark 9:17), the tongue and eyes (Matthew 12:22), etc. For the state of possession, however, not only the devil's inhabitation but also his torture is required; see Matthew. 9:32; 15:22; Mark 9:18; Luke 8:27. "It is not enough," says Tyrannus, "for a demon to have entered a man for him to be called possessed; it is also required that he have obtained from God the power to rage or act in that same person." Very often Satan also afflicts men most wretchedly from the outside by his presence, not however through informing or inhabiting, as Job and Paul teach by their own example, whom no sane person would consider possessed; for it does not follow: He is tormented by Satan, therefore he is possessed by the same. For possession or obsession requires both inhabitation and torture, or that he be present in the person *himself* and harm him." (L. c. th. 54. f. 651.)

e) Not only *of the wicked,* but sometimes also *of the pious;* which both experience shows and our own authorities gather from the analogy of similar afflictions, e.g*., John 2:12,* whose body Satan afflicted most miserably, and Paul in *2 Corinthians 12:7. For if Paul, so great an apostle, was struck by Satan, lest the greatness of the revelations should exalt him; what wonder, if the power of Satan is also granted for a time into the bodies of the pious?* says *Gerh.,* l. c. Disp. XIV. chap. VIII. § 13.

f) *He* evidently *tortures* the human body and performs various, *marvelous*, and *sinful actions* through its members, from which, if not from each individually, certainly *from the whole,* a true bodily possession, distinct from epilepsy and other diseases or fascinations, is recognized as *a sign*.

QUENSTEDT: "The proper *signs* of possession are: 1. Knowledge of foreign or exotic languages, as well as of arts and disciplines which the possessed have never before learned, nor do the freed remember afterward. 2. Again, knowledge of hidden things and of events that took place in the most remote regions, as well as of future things, and their indication. 3. Strength greater than human, or supernatural power. 4. The exact reproduction of the sounds of birds, sheep, oxen, etc., without the arrangement of their organs. To these add 5. impurity of speech, 6. deformity of gestures, 7. horrible shouting Mark 5:5, 8. blasphemy against God and mockery of one's neighbor, 9. then savagery and ferocity both toward the body itself and toward onlookers Matt. 8:28; 17:15; Mark 5:5; Acts 19:16. From these and similar signs, which, however, do not all occur at once in every possessed person, but sometimes more, sometimes fewer, a physical possession can be recognized. However, special caution is required here, lest we consider those afflicted with more serious illnesses to be possessed." (L. c. th. 56. f. 652.)

g) Namely, when God permits some men to be subjected to Satan, *either* immediately *or* mediately, through the intervening work of men—either good men, e.g., ministers of the church through the greater excommunication of enormous sins (concerning which see *1 Cor. 5:3, 1 Tim. 1:2*0), *or* evil men, who seek to harm others, e.g., through intervening sorceries or execrations. Although *the end* of this obsession on the part of the obsessing Satan is *partly* the damage and destruction of the obsessed themselves and *partly* of other men; nevertheless, on the part *of God,* who permits it, and *even* for more serious sins, contempt of the Word, carnal security, blasphemies, conspiracy with the devil, etc. severe judgment vindicating, *or* correcting the pious with corporal chastisement and as a surety, the end is the manifestation of His *power, justice,* and *goodness, and the repentance, faith*, and *salvation of men,* if not *of the possessed* themselves, at least *of others* who are spectators or hearers.

## § 52.

Likewise, it pertains here that demons through *apparitions* (a) deceive men (b) and seek either to destroy or afflict the soul or the body.(c)

a) The Greeks call these *ὁράματα*, while the Latins additionally call them, literally, *visa* (things seen); and in a general sense, others are purely imaginary, from a dream, illness, or a bad conscience; *others* are truly such; and these in turn *are either* divine, from the immediate operation of God, *or* angelic, from the operation of good angels, *or* natural, arising from ignorance of physical causes or superstition, *or* artificial, *or* finally diabolical, which last species of spectres pertains to this subject. Although it must be admitted that not only those things which are presented *to the sight,* but also those which are presented *to the hearing* (and perhaps to the other senses) are relevant to the present discussion.

b) Such were those mentioned in *Wisdom 17:8 ff.* concerning the plagues of the Egyptians, when *ινδάλματα,* or *images* (or apparitions), troubled them; when *disturbing sounds surrounded them and gloomy visions* (*φάσματα*) *appeared with mournful forms (τοῖς κατηφέσιν προσώποις);* when *a fire full of terror appeared of its own accord (αυτόματη πυρά φόβου πλήρης),* and they themselves *were terrified* by *a vision that was not to be looked at,* etc. And these tricks were played by the *wicked angels* (*מלאכי רעים),* of whom see *Ps. 78:49,* whom the LXX also rendered *'evil angels*'. But also belonging to the class of spectres are the שעירים, commonly called *satyrs*, who appear in the form of goats, of whom see *Isa. 13:21 and 34:14,* collated with *Lev. 17:7 and 2 Chron. 11:15,* together with *Rev. 18:2.*

c) *Partly* by frightening, according to *Wisdom 17:1 ff., and partly* by inducing superstition, avarice, etc.

## § 53.

They especially oppose the *church's* order when they watch over the sowing of heresies,[(a)] hinder the pious and salutary efforts of the church's ministers,[(b)] lead listeners away from the devout meditation on the Word so as to thwart their conversion and salvation,[(c)] and even incite persecutions against the doctrine and the Christian Church.

a) Thus the *enemy (the devil, εχθρος ό διάβολος)* is said to *sow tares* in the field of the church*, Matthew 13:27.* Paul, in *1 Timothy 4:1-2,* calls heresies *doctrines of demons,* to be attributed to these authors. That the Antichrist inflicts so much evil on the church is said to happen, in *2 Thess. 2:8, through the working of Satan*.

b) This is what happened to Paul in *1 Thessalonians 2:18,* where he writes that he was *hindered* by Satan *from coming to* the Thessalonians *again and again*.

c) For this is *to take the Word out of the hearts of the hearers, Luke 8:12.* And this is done in various ways, for example, when he sets before men things that lend themselves as material for wandering thoughts, or stirs up various prejudices and emotions by which either forgetfulness or contempt of the Word read or preached may be induced.

## § 54.

In the *political* sphere, demons suggest unjust and ruinous counsels to rulers [(a)] and in many other ways disturb the harmony of the state.[(b)]

a) Such was that *concerning the numbering of the people,* which he supplied to David, see *1 Chron. 22:1,* and that given to Ahab, that he might go to war against the Syrians, *1 Kings 22:21-22.*

b) For example, by sowing the seeds of discord, according to the well-known maxim: *Divide and rule.*

## § 55.

In the *domestic economy*, they lay in wait for the spouses themselves,[(a)] their children [(b)] and the family's goods. [(c)]

a) For example, by sowing disputes, or by stirring up lust; which twofold snare Paul warns us to be aware of and to guard against*, 1 Cor. 7:5.*

b) See the story of *Job, chapter 1,* and of the *demon-possessed* daughter*, Matthew 15:22.*

c) See the stories of *Job* and *Tobit.*

## § 56.

Meanwhile, *God* Himself also uses the *ministry of evil angels* to chastise the *godly* in this world [(a)] and punish the *ungodly*, *both* in life [(b)] *and* after death.[(c)]

a) See again the story *of Job.*

b) See *Ps. 78:49.* For *the angels of the wicked—whether* they are called angels, intent on inflicting evil or destruction, *or* the angels of wicked men, in opposition to those who are destined as heirs of salvation—are rightly understood to be evil spirits. Conf., what we have said in note *b*. to § 51 and note c. to § 52.

c) See *Matthew 18:34.* For although the words may seem parabolic, nevertheless, because it is added: *'So also will your heavenly Father do to every one of you,'* it is rightly understood to refer to torturers being sent upon irreconcilable men, by whom they are afflicted without end, and by that name are believed to be designated none more fittingly than evil angels. Nor will the misery of these be thereby lessened, the sense of which they will experience without ceasing.

> SCHERZER: "As for the devils, the question here remains: Will they also be the torturers and executioners of the damned in hell? Whatever others may have thought, we hold the negative view. *a*. God blesses in heaven without the ministry of angels. Therefore He will also torment in hell without the ministry of the devils, *ß.* The devils themselves will be tormented. Therefore they will not be the tormentors of others. Hence they entreat to be spared the abyss, Luke 8:31, because of the torments awaiting them. *γ.* The devil sinned first and most grievously of all, and he enticed men to sin. Therefore, he will be tortured more severely than men; and thus he will not be a torturer of men in the future, *δ*. It is against God's justice to make the seducer of men the torturer of men. For the seducer's lot would then be better than that of the one seduced, which is contrary to justice. *ε.* There is no testimony for this in the sacred Scriptures. . . Concerning the torturers of Matthew 18:34, the plagues of Luke 12:48, and the beatings of Proverbs 19:29. Scripture in parables is not argumentative. Nor does it follow: because the devils are tormentors in this life, they will also be so in the next. For many things are permitted in this age which, with the ends *of* limits of *μακροθυμία* (long-suffering) closed, cannot be granted in the other." (System, loc. 24. p. 649. sq.)

> RAMBACH: "The devils will not be torturers, as some imagine and Gerhard in locc. th. 1. *de infern*. § 73. and Dannhauer in *hodosoph*. p. m. 1505 suppose. Also Fecht in *Sylloge* p. 562." (*Explanation of the Foundations of Theology*, p. 1085.)

## § 57.

But the devil and his angels [(a)] also have prepared for themselves *torments* and pains from the infernal *fire*.[(b)]

a) Besides those punishments, which were treated of above in §§ 46 and 47.

b) Thus, we are taught in *Matthew 25:41* that the *devil* and his *angels* will be sent by the judge's penal sentence *into the fire prepared* for them. Certainly, beyond the punishment they have hitherto endured, it is clear from *2 Pet. 2:4* and *Jude 6* that they are reserved for a new kind of torment to be undergone at that *great* and final *judgment*. However, to attempt to explain in detail *how* fire, if it is corporeal, acts upon spirits is more curious than useful or necessary.

QUENSTEDT: "The torments . . . are described *symbolically* by *the* eternal *fire* in Matthew 25:41 and by the lake of fire and brimstone in Revelation 20:10, 14. So also Peter (2 Pet. 2:4) and Jude (v. 6)." *Observe:* 1. Peter places the negative for the contrary affirmative: God did not spare the evil angels, i.e., He punished them most severely. 2. Peter and Jude explain what kind of punishment that is. . . Three things are therefore designated: 1. the *bonds* with which they are bound, which are called the 'chains of darkness' and the 'eternal bonds under darkness.' But the chains that now serve to *keep them in custody*, so that they cannot roam about in freedom, will on that great day of judgment be turned into *punishment*, and those that are now looser will then be the strictest and most severe. 2. 'Tartarus' (which is Peter's proper name in 1. c.), in which they are detained as in a prison, and 'darkness,' under which they are reserved. For wherever the demons go and wherever they dwell, they carry their own hell with them, as Bede says in his commentary on the Epistle of James. Therefore, a distinction must be made between the infernal *state* and *the* place *[που]* of hell. They do indeed wander through the world, yet they are chained and bound with fetters and wrapped in darkness, and they always drag their prison with them." (L. c. c. 11. s. 1. th. 36. f. 644. sq.)

THE SAME: "Material fire cannot act on spirits; for nothing can act outside the sphere of its object. And if it did, the spirit would be weaker than the body, which is absurd." (L. c. c. 14. s. q. 4. f. 821.)

FECHT: "Fire is immaterial and yet properly so called, and water is non-humid and yet properly so called. What kind it will be, if it is not elementary, is not clear." ROLLIUS adds: "There are three opinions concerning the fire of hell. Some hold it to be metaphorical, consisting in the torments of conscience; others, elementary and of the same species as our own; others, in turn, properly so called, but of a nature different from the elementary. The reason for this opinion, however, is opposed by the argument adduced in the thesis." (*Sylloge*, p. 95.100.)

## § 58.

However, the punishments with which the evil angels are afflicted will be eternal.[(a)]

a) It is indeed called "*eternal fire," "eternal punishment"*; see *Matthew 25:41 and 25:46; "unquenchable fire," "unquenchable flame," Mark 9:43.*

OSIANDER: "On the salvation of the devils, *Origen*, in the older church, erred in a gross error in Homil. 9 on Jeremiah, which John Denck, an Anabaptist, at the beginning of the last century, not without disgust, revived, who held that God would eventually have mercy on all

men and devils." But this error is refuted here: . . . 3. that the devils lack a mediator; He did not assume angels, but the seed of Abraham Heb. 2:16 [text says 20]. *Τὸ δὲ ἀπρόςληπτον ἀθεράπευτον* i.e. that which Christ did not assume, He did not redeem. . . This was the motive of Origen and Denck, an argument drawn from the infinite mercy of God. But we answer that God is not only merciful, but also just, and that His justice, without satisfaction, is a consuming fire that reaches down to the lowest hell. Why God did not look with the same prospect of *a λύτρον* toward the fallen angels as toward men appears from the following consideration, because they, endowed with the most excellent gifts, not only fell by their own wickedness and rose up in rebellion with an uplifted hand against the Creator, but also seduced men and turned them away from obedience to the Creator, nor was any regard to be had for posterity in the angels." (*Th. posit.-pol*. I, 305. sq.)

AUGSBURG CONFESSION: "They condemn the Anabaptists, who hold that for condemned men and devils the end of their punishments will come." (Art. 17.)

# Chapter IV. ^

ON THE IMAGE OF GOD CONFERRED UPON MAN IN THE FIRST CREATION.

## § 1.

After the angels, men stand out most prominently in the assembly of creatures,[(a)] of whom it is most clearly stated in the history of creation,[(b)] that God created them in His own image.[(c)]

a) Thus the rationale of the *order* of doctrine is evident. And here we are to treat of man insofar as the *divine goodness* of the Creator shines forth in him, *before* he, as *a sinner to be restored* to salvation*,* is subjected to the operation of revealed theology. We do not deny that his consideration can otherwise be referred to the second part, concerning the subject.

b) For the triune God says in *Gen. 1:26, "Let us make man in our image*, *after our likeness."* And just as God decreed, so He did, and truly *created man in His own image*; *He created him in the image of God, male and female He created them, verse 27.*

GERHARD: "That God, in a new and hitherto unusual manner, as it were, enters into *deliberation* concerning this wondrous work, argues not the weakness of the Maker, but the excellence of the work." (*On the Image of God*, § 2.)

c) Or, that God conferred upon man a certain *form*, excellently *expressed* in his own *likeness* (for this is what is denoted by the name *image*). It is noteworthy, moreover, that in the said passage the word *likeness* is added to the word *image*, so that the *image* may be understood as *most similar.* And furthermore, it is established that the other creatures, although created according to a certain idea revolving in the divine intellect, are indeed called very good, yet not created in the image of God.

GERHARD: "We do not distinguish the *image* and the *likeness* in such a way that we refer the former to the essence of the soul, and the latter to the holiness, righteousness, the knowledge of God, etc., in man, but we have determined that the *same thing is expressed by both terms* and that the word 'likeness' is to be taken exegetically. . . When God, about to create man, says in Genesis 1:26, "Let us make man in our image and likeness," Moses immediately adds in verse 27, "And God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him," and there he omits the word 'likeness.' From which we conclude: that which was previously expressed by both the words 'image' and 'likeness,' is now announced by the word 'image' alone, since it had already been said before for the sake of clarification that this image would be like the archetype." (*Loc. de imag. Dei*. § 18. sq.)

LUTHER: "Above we said what the image of God was. Although almost everyone takes the *likeness and the image* of God *to be the same*, yet, as far as *I* have been able to discern through careful observation, there is some *difference* between these two words*;* for צֶלֶם they properly called the image or figure, as when Scripture says (Num. 33:52): 'Destroy the altars of your images.' There the word signifies nothing other than *figures* or statues that are erected. But דְּמוּת, which signifies *likeness*, is the *perfection of the image;* for example, when we speak of a dead image, such as those on coins, we say: "This is the image of Brutus, of Caesar, etc." But that image does not immediately convey a likeness; it does not show all the features. Therefore, what Moses says, that man was also made in the image of God, shows that man not only reflects God in that he has reason or intellect and will, but also that he has the likeness of God, i.e., a will and an intellect such that he understands *God*, wills, *and desires what* God *wills*, etc." (Opp. lat. Erlangens. II, 87. sq.)

## § 2.

Therefore, the efficient cause of the divine image that is in man is known to be the Triune [(b)] God.[(a)]

a) Who is read to have both *decreed* and *effected* it, loc. cit.

b) The *plurality* of the divine persons can indeed be inferred from the plural termination of the name אלוזים and the plural verb נעשה, *"let us make*," which is followed by a double plural suffix in the words בְּצַלְמֵנוּ and כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ; *"in our image*" (of the plural persons who make it), *according to our likeness* (of the plural persons, conferring it on man). A precise triad of persons is here presupposed from the doctrine of God, transmitted in the preceding chapter. I. Nor is it to be overlooked that it is said elsewhere that the *works ad extra [external works] are indivisible.* For such is the work by which the divine image is conferred on man.

## § 3.

The internal impulsive cause [(a)] is the goodness [(b)] of God.

a) It is sufficient to have indicated this, since *an external one* should *not* be required.

b) The same which we have seen to be the impulsive cause of creation itself. For it was so here also, that God made *man very good*, being moved by His own divine goodness, and man became good through the divine image conferred upon him.

QUENSTEDT: "Just as a prince grants his image as a sign of special grace, so God, out of a singular affection of love and favor, impressed His image upon man, not by appending it externally, but by inscribing it internally." (*Th. did.pol*. P. II. c. 1. s. 1. th. 11. f. 840.)

## § 4.

That, however, which God willed and conferred upon man by creating him in His own likeness or image, is to be sought *not* in a certain *single person*, but in the *triune God,*[a] as the exemplary cause.

a) This brings us back to the fact that in the passage cited*, Genesis 1:26*, a double plural form occurs. For the sense of the words is: *"Let us, who are several* (persons)*, make man in our* (one common) *image."*

QUENSTEDT: *"Distinguish* between the image of God and the image of the Holy Trinity. . . He indeed says, Elohim in Gen. 1:26, *'*Let us make man in *our* image*,'* but in v. 27 it is added, 'And God created man in the likeness of God, *in his* image.*'"* Therefore, what he had said before in the plural, he soon repeats in the singular; from which we rightly conclude that the image is indeed the image *of the plural*, i.e., of all three persons of the Godhead, but according to that which is *one* in these three persons, namely, the perfection of essence, which belongs equally to all the persons. In Gen. 3:22, the whole image of God is distributed to each person in these words: 'Behold, the man has become like one of us.'" (L. c. s. 2. q. 4. f. 858.)

THE SAME.: *"The opinion of the Origenists and of Osiander*, who hold that 'the soul was created in the image of the form of the human nature of Christ, as it was preconceived in the divine mind,' is refuted: 1. from Gen. 1:26, where God the Father, speaking with the Son and the Holy Spirit, does not say: *'*Let us make man in *your* image*,' i.*e., the Son's, but *our image.'* 2. From 1 Cor. 15:45, where Christ is called *'the second Adam'*; Indeed, if the idea or form of Christ's human nature, preconceived in the divine mind, preceded the creation of Adam in order, and if Adam was created in its likeness, then Christ would have been called the first Adam rather than the second; to say nothing of the fact that we are not made like Christ in this sense, but that Christ was made like us, except for sin (Heb. 2:14). 3. Nowhere in Scripture is it said that man was created *κατὰ τὸν υἱὸν,* according to the Son, but *κατὰ τὸν Θεὸν,* according to God, taken indefinitely. On the contrary*,* the Son of God is said to have been *in the likeness of sinful flesh,* Rom. 8:3, and to have taken the form of a servant Phil. 2:7. 4. The order of the divine decrees is contrary. For the decree concerning the forming of man in the image of God preceded the decree of sending the Son of God in the flesh to repair this lost likeness, and therefore the Son of God to be incarnate in the latter cannot be the exemplar of the divine image to be concreated with man in the former. 5. The very mission of the Son is an obstacle, which was accomplished not for the sake of likeness, but for the sake of the salvation of man, 1 Tim. 1:15. 6. The image of God consists in the knowledge of God, righteousness, and holiness, as also in *αφθαρσία,* Col. 3:10. Eph. 4:24; Wis. 2:23, but not in the members of the body, in the form or stature of the body. 7. Through the fall the image of God was lost, but the corporeal members were not lost." (L. c. f. 861 sq.)

HOLLAZ: "Osiander's opinion does not agree with the appellation of Christ in 1 Cor. 15:45, that he is the *second* Adam. For if the form of Christ's human nature, preconceived in the divine mind, *preceded* the creation of man in order, according to whose likeness Adam was created, Christ would rather be called the *first* Adam than the second." (*Exam*. P. III. c. 2. s. 2. q. 1. p. 167.)

THE SAME: "The Son of God is neither, nor is he anywhere in the Scriptures called, the image *of* the *Holy Trinity;* for He would then be the image of Himself and of the Holy Spirit, which is *absurd;* but He is the image of the person *of the Father*, Heb. 1:3, on account of His eternal generation from the Father. Therefore Moses does not precisely understand the *Son* of God by the image of God." (L. c. P. II. c. 1. q. 9. p. 467.)

ANTITHESES.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis: of Tertullian, the Origenists*, and Dr. Andreas *Osiander*, who first held that man was made in the image and likeness of the human nature which the Son of God was to assume in time into the unity of his person." (L. c. s. 2. q. 4. f. 860.)

PHILIPPI: "The Son of God is the image of God; man is created in the image of God, that is, after the *Son*, to his likeness." (*Church Dogmatics*. II, 361.)

THOMASIUS: "Man was the creaturely image of the *Son* who beheld the Father, willed, loved, and was willed, beheld, and loved by the Father—and for this very reason, the Father's delight in the Son rested upon Him." (*Person and Work of Christ*. I, 202nd ed. 2.)

VILMAR: "The archetype of this image is *God the Son,* and *so* the Holy Scripture of the New Testament completes the doctrine of creation, as it is given in the Old Testament." (*Dogmatic Theology*. I, 237.)

HOFMANN: "The second thing we have said about the beginning of the self-realization of the eternal divine will is this: that the relationship to God into which man was created, on the one hand as a *conscious, free self,* and on the other hand as a *nature* serving as a means to its own end, is an image of the unequalized inner-divine relationship; thus, *man* is *an image of God, the archetypal goal of the world*." (*Scriptural Proof*. I, 240.)

## § 5.

And this image of God in man should *not* and cannot be referred to *all* that is in God.[(a)] *Nor* is it in man by the same *degree* of perfection [(b)] as it is in God.[(c)]

a) Thus, for example, the fact that God is self-existent, immutable, immense, eternal, and infinite is not similarly reflected in man.

b) Thus, although God's knowledge and wisdom are infinitely perfect, in man they have only a finite place. Since God's holiness is joined with impeccability, in man those qualities were not joined together.

c) For it is also established elsewhere that it is not required for the exemplar that whatever perfection is in it should also be expressed in the exemplified. See *Mus.*, Introd. to Theol., chap. I, § 5, pp. 7, 8.

## § 6.

That, however, which man has acquired, the divine image is taken in two ways: I. *generally* and without restriction,

insofar as it contains all things in which a certain conformity of man with God the archetype has place; then II. *specifically*, or with restriction and *κατ' εξοχήν* (pre-eminently), insofar as it implies a certain principal likeness of man to God, by virtue of which man, speaking *absolutely*, can be called the express image of God.

## § 7.

The divine image, taken *generally*, besides the justice and wisdom originally co-created with the first man,[(a)] includes within its scope also the spiritual being of the human soul, its faculties, intellect and will,[(b)] as well as the immortality of the body [(c)] and dominion over other creatures.[(d)]

a) Thus *Gerhard*, in *Confessio Catholica*, Book II, Part III, Article XX, chapter II, p. 348, writes: "*The image of God and original righteousness have the relation of a whole to a part.*" *For the image of God in the first man was a certain excellent conformity with God as archetype. This conformity was twofold. One was first, primary; the other, second or secondary. The primary conformity was located in the soul, and indeed partly in the intellect, partly in the appetite, and in that which is rational and sensitive.* These *three excellences are expressed under the single name of original righteousness. The less principal conformity of man with God was partly in the condition of the body, partly in external dominion,* or, as others *proceed, the less principal conformity consists: first, in the soul, both as to substance and as to attributes; secondly, in the body, by reason of impossibility and immortality; thirdly, in the whole man, with respect to external dominion over all things. Joh. Wigand,* in *Syntagm. Corp. Doctr*. p. 402, speaking of *Gen. 1:26*, says: "*The Image of God,*" he says, "*is there to be understood of the whole substance of man: for, he says, 'He created man in his own image,' he does not say that the soul alone was capable of so great a good." We believe, however, that this generic expression refers to all the ornaments and gifts in the human soul and body, by which it represented some likeness of God, finite, however, and appropriate to a creature according to the judgment of the Almighty God.* See *Chytraeus, Comm. in Genes*. chap. I, p. 57.

b) For since there is a certain congruence between the spiritual being of God and the spiritual being of the human soul, between the intellect and will of God and the intellect and will of man, it must surely be admitted—unless we are to say that it happened by some chance—that man was created by God in this very way, and thus bears the image of God. And this is what is meant that man is also called the image of God after the fall and outside the state of renewal, *Genesis 9:6, James 3:9.* For when in *Genesis 9 homicide* (not only that by which a faithful man, renewed in the image so specially called, but by which a man, indeterminately, whatever he may be, is rashly killed) is established as *punishable by death*, and the reason for the precept is sought from this,

that any homicide implies a violation *of the divine image*, which was in the slain man and whose violation of His image God so grievously takes, that He wills the violator to be punished with death, then certainly, since original righteousness, as the image of God in a special sense, was not in the slain man, it is necessary that the concept of the divine image be broader and extend to those things of which it was spoken in the thesis. For if you say that the image of God here refers *not* to that which was *in* the *slain* man*, but* to that which was *once in* the *first* man and common parent of all, although it did not pertain to the one who was slain, this will surely be *a far-fetched interpretation* and will undermine the connection between the divine precept and its foundation. However, the *latter* passage, *James 3,* has a similar reasoning, because *a curse* on a man—not precisely a regenerate one, but any man—is condemned by this name, because it is an insult to the divine image, namely, because this image exists in the one who is cursed and can be recognized. Add *Mus., Ausführl. Erklärung* Q. XXVIII. p. 210. sqq. Compare *Grauer, Praelect. ad Aug. Confess*. art. II. membr. 2. in Respons. ad argumenta Photinian., *Haffenreffer* LL. *de Imag. Dei*, *Gerhard. Comment. in Genes*., cap. IX. p. 243., *Theol*. *Lipsienses* in *Append. Consil. Dedek*. p. 139, and, whom they cite, *Tilem. Heshusius.*

GERHARD: "Man was created in the highest innocence, in the highest purity of mind and body, so that in him, as in a living mirror of sorts, the image of God would shine forth. Thus the image of divine wisdom shone in the human *intellect*; the image of goodness, *long-suffering*, meekness, and tolerance in the human *mind*; the image of divine charity and mercy shone in the *affections* of the human *heart*; the image of divine justice, holiness, and purity shone in the *will* of man; the image of goodness, benevolence, and truth shone in the *deeds and words* of man; the image of divine power in the *dominion* granted over all animals." (L. *de imag. D*. § 37.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* ... 4. The *Anthropomorphites* or Anthropians, and the *Audians,* who placed the reason for the divine image in the structure and features of the body. . . 5. The *Papists*, and especially the Jesuits, who distinguish the image and the likeness, and refer the image of God to the very substance of the rational soul, endowed with the faculties of understanding and willing, but the likeness to the supernatural perfection, or the gratuitous gifts granted to man by God, such as wisdom, justice, and holiness; from which they further conclude that the Fall did not destroy the image of God, but only the likeness. . . 6. The *Calvinists,* who seek the image of God partly in the substance of man, partly in the qualities... 7. Of *Flacius and the Flacianists,* contending that the image of God was the very substantial form of the first man, the very essence of the rational soul, which was entirely abolished by the fall of Adam... 10. The *Jews.* Galatinus, in his *De arcanis catholicae veritatis* (Book II, Chapter 8), writes: "The ancient Jews placed the image of God in the soul." (L. c. s. 2. q. 4. f. 858. sqq.)

c) For this corresponds in a manner to the divine immortality, and we will say more about it at § 14.

d) In which a certain ray of divine majesty is revealed. See below § 15.

## § 8.

The *specially* received divine image implies certain accidental perfections, concreated with the intellect and will of the first humans, conformed to the perfections that are in God and imparted to humans for the purpose of rightly directing and perfecting their actions, for the sake of attaining the ultimate end.[(a)]

a) Thus, in *Genesis 1*, at the end, where all creatures are said to have been *very good*, it is rightly concluded that man was also very good, and therefore was endowed with the necessary perfections to attain the end set before him.

DANNHAUER: "(The image was) mutable and capable of being lost. Therefore the rational *soul* itself is not the divine image or a part of the image, because the soul is not lost; but the image is lost; the image is only in the renewed, the soul appears even in the impious; the soul is rather a map and a mirror, in which the image shone. '1. We do have memory (says Luther on Gen. 1), 2. will, and 3. mind, but they are most corrupt and gravely weakened, indeed, to speak more clearly, utterly leprous and unclean. For if these powers are the image of God, it will follow that Satan was also created in the image of God, who certainly has those natural abilities far stronger than ours. Such as memory and the highest intellect and the most obstinate will. But the *body* also bears the divine image. Although in the body Luther recognizes an even greater perfection in Genesis 1: 'For I plainly think that before Adam's sin, the eyes were so sharp and clear that they would have surpassed the hawk and the eagle. Lions and bears, whose greatest strength is their power, he treated no differently than we treat puppies. Likewise, the fruits used for food were far sweeter and more nutritious then than they are now." (*Hodosoph. Phaen*. V. p. 222.)

THOMASIUS: "To be rejected here are: a. the *old rationalist* conception, which thinks of the initial state of our race as bestial and allows man to emerge gradually from bestiality to humanity; b. the *Schleiermacher view,* which always regards sensuality as a power already in existence before higher consciousness can develop, and thus ultimately derives evil from creation; c. the *Hegelian* view, that the spirit begins with nature and only through alienation and particularization arrives at self-consciousness and freedom; d. the one represented by *Julius Müller* (and perhaps also abandoned again) of a transcendent, pre-temporal state of human souls, into which the god-opposed self-determination falls, which is then to come to temporal manifestation in the historical Fall." (*Christi Person and Werk*. I. p. 201. sq.)

## § 9.

Certainly, on the part of the *intellect*, God bestowed upon the first humans, for the purpose of imitating Himself as the exemplary cause, a certain *wisdom*, that is, a light or some habitual perfection of the intellect,[(a)] for an excellent knowledge of divine, human, and natural things [(b)] and, for the primeval state,[(c)] sufficient.[(d)]

a) So that the human intellect might know the essence and will of God, as far as was necessary, and prescribe a worship suitable to God, or as much as was sufficient for living righteously and holy. Thus in the Epistle to the *Colossians 3:10,* it is said that the divine *image* in man *is restored* in the act of renewal by this, that he is led to the salutary *knowledge of God.*

b) Namely, so that the acts of knowing could be established *in all things correctly,* that is, in accordance with the things themselves and *without error.*

QUENSTEDT: "Man was conformed to divine wisdom; which is proven 1. from the Scriptures cited Col. 3:9-10. . . 2. From Adam's deeds, such as: a. *the naming*, or the fitting imposition of names, Gen. 2:19, which was not only grammatical, with regard to the nomenclature of the animals, but especially *logical* with regard to the most accurate definition; and immediately, as the animals and the fowls of the air were brought before him, they were known to him. . . b. The *recognition of Eve,* v. 23. *Observe:* Here is a great abyss of extemporaneous wisdom. While Adam was sleeping, Eve was fashioned from his rib, and yet he *a.* recognizes the material from which she herself came forth, and as a part of his own body, he acknowledges her; *b.* shows a sex different from his own, and *c.* in this diversity of sexes, the order; *d.* manifests the law in God's counsel hitherto hidden, that is, that he himself is to be joined to Eve. . . This knowledge of Adam was excellent, full, perfect, and *so great that no one among men after the Fall* can acquire it for himself, either from the book of nature or from the book of Scripture. . . However, that it was finite and limited is evident from the fact that Adam did not know the hidden decrees of God, the thoughts of hearts, contingent future events, the number of stars, etc., the mystery of the incarnation; and indeed, it is credible that the entire gospel, or doctrine concerning Christ the redeemer, was unknown to Adam in his integrity, because it was not expedient for him to know this very thing. This very knowledge of Adam's, being created, could also have *been perfected* more and more and would have admitted of *increase*, if you consider the perfection of the degrees, both through revelation or further information from God in supernatural things, and through his own experience and observation in natural things." (L. c. s. 1. th. 15. f. 841. sq.)

THOMAS AQUINAS: "Man possessed a deep insight into nature, Genesis 2:19-20, for *language* is the objectification of thought, the word is the name, the sound-image for the thing, the naming of animals is the *designation of their essence*, and thus presupposes an inner understanding of nature, a spiritual gaze into its depths. But just as man did not acquire this understanding through reflection, so he did not learn language through abstraction; rather, both were based on a kind of immediate intuition." (L. c. I, 179.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of the ancient heretics, such as *the Pelagians*, a. who completely deny original righteousness; b. who assert that Adam was created rude, inexperienced in wisdom; c. who also make him ignorant of virtue and vice, and such as infants are now born. . . 3. Of the ancient *Fathers,* among whom some place the formal reason of the divine image properly so called in the soul alone, excluding the body, such as Basil, Ambrose, Augustine, and Nazianzus. . . Some expound the image of God from the sole principality and dominion over the rest of creation, such as Chrysostom. . . 4. Of the *Scholastics,* such as Cajetan, who deny that Adam possessed an exquisite knowledge of the heavens, the elements, and the stars. And although the Scholastics do not deny the knowledge of divine things to man in the state of integrity, they nevertheless derive it from the illumination of the Holy Spirit, dwelling in man. . . The same also themselves attribute the *rebellion* of the powers of human nature to the

nature itself, which was to be restrained by the supernatural gift of original righteousness. . . 5. of the *Papists* and especially the Jesuits, who make original rectitude *formally* proper to the *superior part of the soul*, but attribute it *effectively* only to the *inferior part*, as if in this there had always been a certain resistance and proclivity to evil, to be restrained, however, by a superior virtue, that is, original righteousness... 7. The *Neo-Photinians*, who attribute to Adam in his integrity a crude, stupid, and childish ignorance, denying that the image or likeness of God was situated in justice, holiness, and wisdom. . . They establish the sole and adequate reason for the divine image in man's dominion over the animals. . . 8. *Arminians*, who hold that the soul of Adam did not know good and evil. They assert, along with the Socinians, that the image of God consisted solely in dominion. . . They contend that man had an inclination to sin before the fall; indeed, they say that God implanted in man a resistance to the law." (L. c. s. 2. q. *5.* f. 868. sqq.)

c) Or with regard to those things which were *necessary* for a man in *such* a state, created and tending *toward the end* divinely appointed for him, to know.

d) Thus, such knowledge as *could be increased* with the passage of time, but *not* so perfect and comprehensive as to extend even to the knowledge of God's *free decrees*, *or* to bring about the most accurate *knowledge of* all *natural* things.

## § 10.

On the part of the *will*, God conferred upon man spiritual powers, that is, a *habitual inclination* and readiness [(a)] to love God [(b)] above all things and to do all things [(c)] according to the dictates of the intellect [(d)] rightly [(e)] enlightened, and to omit [(f)] but also to govern the lower faculties,[(g)] which he would judge ought to be omitted, so that they would in no way break forth into disordered and sinful acts.

a) This is that *righteousness* and *holiness of truth*, not a counterfeit but a sincere and steadfast virtue; concerning which, as pertaining primarily to the *divine image*, see *Ephesians 4:24.* Compare *Ecclesiastes 7:30.*

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Pelagians,* who made Adam in the state of innocence devoid of both virtue and vice, and such as infants are now born. . . 2. The *Scholastics and Jesuits* commonly teach that man was originally created in pure nature, without the grace of God or original righteousness and without any sin; or: that man from his very first birth existed only in a natural state, to which grace was subsequently added as something superimposed upon the already established human nature. ... 5. The *Socinians,* who teach that man was created not just and holy, but only upright, simple, and innocent, just as infants are still daily born." (L. c. s. 2. q. 1. f. 847.)

b) For this is the *first* and foremost *object* of human duty, and the love of God is considered the summary of the entire law observed.

ANTITHESIS.

HOFMANN: "God created man in His image, created him so that he is like Him: this is what the words say, and the only question is in what the divine image is to consist. . . The context does *not* allow one to think of the likeness to God of a *morally holy* being. . . Compared to the *animal world*, man is like God. . . Accordingly, that very thing which enables him to *master* the world around him is also that in which his image of God consists: he was created to be a consciously free I, a personal being. It is not a moral *disposition*, then, that signifies the image of God, but a moral *relationship*." (*Schriftbeweis*. I, 251. sq.)

c) Not only with respect to *God,* but also with respect to *himself* and to other men, if any are present.

d) For otherwise, will is a blind power; yet it must nevertheless be inclined toward that to which the practical reason would tend by its own dictate.

e) According to what was said in the preceding § 9.

f) Indeed, so that sincere and full obedience might be given not only to *affirmative* but also to *negative* laws, and everything that could incline the will to the contrary might be avoided or despised.

g) Not only the *locomotive* power*,* but even and especially the *sensitive appetite,* which in such a subject, where the sensitive is joined to the rational appetite, ought to have been conformed to it and thus subjected or governed by it.

# § 11.

But the *sensitive appetite* itself was then perfected [(a)] in such a way that the intellect, with right judgment, and the will, with holy command, would promptly and without struggle subject itself, and would give no place to any disordered motion as if it were inevitable.[(b)]

a) For just as it is otherwise clear that the sensitive appetite in man is not entirely incapable of reason and morality, so it also had to be instructed, so that it could constantly obey the higher faculties, and not be carried away by objects pleasing to the senses unless in accordance with right reason; namely, so that man might be truly and perfectly just, holy, and *very good*. *Gen. 1, at the end.*

QUENSTEDT: "If from the condition of the matter, which is from God, rebellion and an inclination to vice follows, God is altogether the cause and author of that evil, and sin was before sin, and punishment preceded guilt, and Christ in Himself was subject to sin; all of which are absurd and impious." (L. c. q. 2. f. 854.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Pelagians,* who hold that the rebellion of the lower part against the superior one was natural to man. . . 2. Of the *Scholastics and Papists,* who themselves attribute the rebellion of the powers of nature to the nature itself, which was to be restrained by the supernatural gift of original righteousness. . . 4. Of the *Socinians,* contending that the flesh was not only rebellious to reason, but also that it prevailed." (L. c. f. 851. sq.)

b) This is what the first parents in the state of integrity *did not know, that they were naked, nor were they ashamed;* that is, they were not in the slightest degree touched by any disordered concupiscence of the sensitive appetite (although the object that could entice was present). *Gen. 2:25.*

## § 12.

And this wisdom, righteousness, and holiness of the first humans so constitutes the reason for the divine image that it *alone* and uniquely [(a)] is the source from which man, speaking *absolutely*, can be called the image of God.

a) More certainly than the very spiritual substance of the soul with its essential faculties, when considered in themselves. For *without* that *wisdom*, the human *mind* would have been blind, *and* its *will*, depraved and infected with the rebellion of the sensitive appetite, would have been more *unlike* than like the most pure and holy will of God. Cf. *Mus., Ausführl. Erklärung* Q. 28. pp. 215 and 221.

ANTITHESIS.

HOFMANN: "Therefore it (the image of God) is transmitted even from the first creature who became *sinful*, and not from the *holy* man, but from *man*; because he is *a man*, it is said afterward that he bears the image *of God*. Gen. 9:5; James 8:9. . . Scripture, therefore, understands by the image of God in man *not* a *moral* disposition, so that with the entrance of sin the image of God would be *lost*." (*Schriftbeweis*. I, 252. sq.)

## § 13.

Therefore this divine image was also a *natural* gift, or *a debt* owed by nature [(a)] to man for the right exercise of his connatural acts, which, in its absence, nature was *not pure,* but [(b)] *impure.*

a) It may, however, also be called natural insofar as*, having begun* with nature*, it adhered to* the faculties of man's nature or essence*,* adorned and *perfected* them*,* and was to *be propagated* with nature itself to posterity through carnal generation. However, it is *not* called natural as if *it constituted* the essence of man or *necessarily* followed from his essence; it is certain that it was removed, the essence of man remaining.

QUENSTEDT: "Something is called *natural*: 1. *Constitutively,* that which constitutes nature itself, and is either nature itself or a part of it essential to it, such as the soul and body. 2. *Consecutively,* that which follows nature and flows from the form essentially, such as the faculties of the soul, visibility, teachability, etc. 3. *Subjectively,* that which is most closely attached to nature as a native property. 4. *Perfectively,* that which intrinsically adorns and perfects it. 5. *Transitively,* that which is naturally propagated along with nature to others. When we say that original righteousness was *natural* or connatural to Adam,

we do not take it in the first or second sense, but in the third, fourth, and fifth sense, i.e., on account of natural inherence, perfection, and propagation. As is evident from the opposite, i.e., original sin, that which, because it is innate in us, always clings fast and is transmitted to posterity, is rightly called natural. . . When some of our own say that original righteousness was also naturally *constitutive* in the first man, they are speaking not of nature itself in itself, which is now common to all, but of unbroken nature." (L. c. s. 2. q. 6. f. 888. sq.)

THE SAME.: "If the first man had persisted in the state of integrity, the image of God or original righteousness would have been propagated to posterity through natural generation and thus would have been an *hereditary good;* from which it is also manifest that original righteousness was natural to the first man. For the supernatural cannot be hereditary any more than a bridle is to foals of horses or a crown to the offspring of females." (L. c. s. 1. th. 23. f. 846.)

THE SAME: "A distinction must be made between the divine image and those things which are necessarily connected to it. The divine image is said to be natural to man because it is concreated, deeply ingrained, and could be passed on to posterity, but not things connected with the divine image, such as, for example, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit of the Holy Trinity; for wherever the divine image is, there the Holy Trinity is. But the inhabitation of the Holy Trinity is supernatural: both because it does not exist in the manner of a co-created quality, like the image; and because it presupposes man already created and established in his perfection (for the house is prior in order to its inhabitant); and because that inhabitation of the Trinity was not so deeply rooted or so constituted that it would also pass on to posterity by the force of generation, as the image did by generation in the state of integrity." (L. c. s. 2. q. 6. f. 891.)

b) For surely, *for* a man *to lack* those perfections without which his intellect, will, and sensitive appetite cannot rightly perform their function, why should this not bring some *flaw* and impurity into him? For although it is *natural* for man, insofar as he consists of body and soul, *to have a sensitive appetite* that tends toward its objects; for man is by nature ordered to a life of *εὐσεβῶς, δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως—piety, justice, and temperance*—as to acts that are natural to him and required for attaining the ultimate end toward which he tends; indeed, it is *also natural* for man to have *a sensitive appetite that is* obedient to and in exact accord with the higher faculties; and for every faculty to have such perfections as are necessary for this purpose, so that man, laboring under some defect of strength, may *not* sometimes be *compelled* to stumble or *sin,* but may rather be able to perform his duty rightly and consistently without blemish or enormity. Therefore, in the absence of such, it cannot be said that the natural faculties of man are intact or pure, for they are rather corrupt and even impure.

ANTITHESES.

QUENSTEDT: *Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Scholastics and Papists...*, who hold that original righteousness was *a gift*, not natural and intrinsic, but *supernatural and external.* . . Hence they say that original righteousness was like a wreath or garland placed upon the head of a virgin, or like a garment adjacent to a man, not adhering to him, or like the hair of Samson, by the cutting off of which his supernatural strength indeed perished, but its natural power remained, or like a bridle by which a wild horse is restrained, or like an antidote, which, though outside the nature of the body, nevertheless suppresses a pest or poison inherent in the depths of its nature, lest, bursting forth into action, it deprive a man of life." (L. c. f. 889.)

KAHNIS: "The question is whether this harmony (with God) is the product of the *nature bestowed* upon man, as the Lutheran Church teaches, or *a supernatural gift of grace,* as the Roman Church teaches. A mediation of this opposition is found in the doctrine of the Fathers, especially Irenaeus, which meets us, that Adam, who had sprung from the Spirit of God as a spirit of life, had in the *Spirit of God dwelling in* him the bond of communion with God. Since John says in the Gospel (1:9) that the Logos enlightened every man (!), the light of the Logos, i.e., the Holy Spirit, would also have dwelt in the first man. And if it is indeed the Spirit of God who renews the sinner into the image of God (Ephesians 4:24. Col. 3:10), which includes an eternal indwelling of the Holy Spirit, then the presupposition of this renewal by the Spirit into the Spirit seems to be an original indwelling of the Spirit of God. This, however, one would be justified in calling *grace*." (*Die Luth. Dogmatik*. Leipzig. 1868. III, 290.)

# § 14.

Moreover, God conferred upon man, even in the *body*, some image of Himself, insofar as not only did the 1. perfections of the soul manifest themselves through the external acts of the body,[(a)] but furthermore, 2. the very members of the organic body bear a certain analogy to the divine attributes;[(b)] 3. the countenance turned toward heaven presents a semblance of divine majesty;[(c)] above all, 4. the immortal body,[(d)] that is, one that could have lasted forever and remained free from all corruption, by God's intention bore the likeness of divine immortality.

a) And so the divine image, which was *formally in the soul*, belongs to the *body* by *participation.*

b) For thus Scripture, through *anthropopathy*, ascribes to God eyes, ears, and hands.

c) For just as by this he departs from the likeness of other living creatures, so he in a manner approaches the likeness of God and is seen as the heir of heavenly life.

d) For although the remote *possibility* of dying would certainly fall upon the body of man, being material, nevertheless the necessity of dying and the *proximate possibility* were absent, since the elemental qualities, though contrary in themselves, were nevertheless tempered by the most exact harmony, so as not to give place to a passion that would tend toward destruction; and thus man, in regard to his body, *could not have died*, by the very goodness of nature, without special help from God, as it were, averting the necessity of dying. That the body of man in the state of integrity was immortal in this sense is made clear, above all, from *Gen. 2:17. Rom. 5:12; 6:23,* where the origin of death is ascribed to sin; and therefore, in the original state, where sin had no place, death, or the necessity of dying, is also denied to have had a place. It is said, however, that the first man was *by nature* immortal in respect to the body;

*not* in the sense that *God* is by nature immortal, to whom it is essentially repugnant to be mortal or to be destroyed, *nor* in the sense that *angels,* being immaterial by nature, are also said to be naturally immortal, even though they can be annihilated by God. But insofar as the very nature of the first man's body was created such that *it could live forever* and would not be subject to death, to be undergone sooner or later.

QUENSTEDT: "With regard to *immortality*, it is not a question of an absolute and total inability to die... but of a natural, proximate, immediate, and absolute inability, which is inclined toward death as something that will certainly and naturally follow. Nor is it a question of the body considered in the abstract, but of the whole concrete or entire man. The state of the controversy, therefore, is this: Whether Adam . . . could have been delivered from death and preserved immortal, except through the supernatural grace of God: . . . *A distinction is made* between *passibility*, *or internal passion* flowing from the nature and constitution of the thing, and *external passion,* which comes *from an external principle*—heat, cold, beasts, fire, and a thousand other ways; both were absent from the whole man. . . The first man was *impervious* to external violence, e.g., lightning and the like; he was *immortal* and indissoluble by the power of divine providence, maintenance, and preservation, insofar as God was to preserve man from every external force by singular providence. *A distinction is made* between *means* that preserve and those that serve immortality, and between *remedies* that oppose a contrary that is already emerging and those that prevent it: food, the tree of life, etc., were among the former, but there was nothing in the state of integrity from the latter order." (L. c. s. 2. q. 6. f. 877. sq.)

THE SAME: "The *impassibility* of the body is proven in general*: a.* From the nakedness of the first parents, Gen. 2:25, which could not have been tolerated without pain, if their bodies had been passible and subject to rain, heat, cold, and other atmospheric inconveniences and afflictions; ***β.*** from the absence of causes, both external and internal, which arose either from the image of God or from a special providence of God; *γ.* from the full restoration of the divine image in the other life around the glorified bodies, which will be entirely impassible." (L. c. f. 881.)

## § 15.

Finally, God gave man *dominion* (a) over lower creatures, (b) especially brute animals, by which he likewise bore a certain likeness (c) to God, the Lord of this universe.

a) See *Gen. 1:26, 28; 2:16.* And it was established that this dominion was not only in man's *right* and *power* over beasts and other creatures, but also in the *force* and *power* to bend them to obedience, without difficulty and without fear of harm from them.

b) For we do not say that this dominion extended to the *stars* and *angels*. And in the cited passage*, the fish of the sea, the fowl of the air, the beasts, and the whole earth, and all creeping things* are mentioned*,* which may be sufficient for us.

LUTHER: "I believe that Adam could command a lion with a single word, just as we command a trained dog. . . Adam and Eve become rulers of the earth, the sea, and the air. This dominion is entrusted to them not only by counsel, but also by express command. . . Therefore, the naked man, without weapons and walls, indeed even without any clothing, in his bare flesh alone, dominated all the birds, beasts, and fish. . . Who can

conceive of that quasi-portion of divine nature, that Adam and Eve understood all the affections, senses, and all the powers of every animal? For what kind of kingdom would it have been, if they had not known this? ... Therefore, if we want to praise an outstanding philosopher, let us praise our first parents, when they were still pure from sin. . . They also had the most certain knowledge of the stars and of all astronomy. But the things we accomplish in life are not made by the dominion that Adam had, but by industry and art. Just as we see birds and fish being caught by guile and fraud, so beasts are tamed by art. For those things that are most domestic, such as geese and hens, are still wild by their own nature. Therefore, this leprous body still has, by the grace of God, some semblance of dominion over other creatures. But this is exceedingly small and far inferior to that first dominion, where there was no need for art or deceit, but the creature simply obeyed the divine voice when Adam and Eve were commanded to have dominion over it. Therefore, we retain the name and title of dominion, as a bare title; the thing itself, however, has been almost entirely lost. And yet it is good to know and to think of these things, so that we may long for that coming day, in which these things will be restored to us, which we lost in paradise through sin. For we await that life which Adam himself would have awaited. And this we rightly marvel at, and we give thanks to God for it, that we, thus deformed by sin, thus dull, stupid, and as it were dead, through the benefit of Christ expect the same glory of spiritual life that Adam would have expected, had he remained in his animal life, which had the image of God." (On Genesis 1:26.)

c) Indeed, if you take the image of God *in a general sense,* it cannot be denied that *a part of it* was placed in this domain, according to what we said in note *a.* to § 7. from *Gerhard* and *Wigand*. If you take it in a *special* sense, it can be called not a part, but a certain *consequence* or appendix of the divine image. See *Gen. 1:27,* where God, blessing mankind already created in His image, says: *"Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the sky and over all the living creatures that move on the earth."*

## § 16.

The subject *which* [(a)] the divine image was not borne by Adam alone, but also by Eve,[(b)] especially insofar as she was placed in original righteousness.[(c)] Meanwhile, with regard to those things that were not equally necessary for both to attain the end set before them, we do not assert a complete equality between the two parents. [(d)]

a) Or the *suppositum* (individual subsistence), which is denominated as bearing the divine image.

b) See *Gen. 1:27* and *chapter 5:1–2,* where it is expressly stated that the human being whom God created in his own image was not an individual of the male sex alone, but *male and female.*

c) Indeed, the passages in *Col. 3:10* and *Eph. 4:24,* where mention is made of the image of God *par excellence*, to which men must be renewed, or which they must recover, speak not only of *men* but also of *women*, just as in *Gal. 3:28.* of those who are in *Christ Jesus,* in whom the divine image is restored, it is said that in them there is not *ἄρσεν καὶ θήλυ, male* or *female,* as if they were different in this respect. And the very nature of the case teaches that a woman, for the right exercise of her own proper acts, was equally in need of the perfections of the soul, or original righteousness, as a man.

d) In the matter of *knowledge* of *natural* things, Eve seems to have yielded to Adam. And it is commonly taught elsewhere that Satan preferred to attack *Eve* as *the weaker one*; and this is what is meant by the statement in *1 Timothy 2:14 that Adam was not the one deceived, but Eve was.* But neither was equal *dominion* granted to both, since the *man* was also the *head of the woman,* and she was subject to him. Add *1 Cor. 11:7-8.* Nevertheless, the woman had an immortal body, and the things that otherwise pertain to the essence of man, no less than the man.

LUTHER: "These were in Eve just as in Adam, as the speech of Eve shows, when she answers the serpent about the tree in the middle of paradise. There it appears quite clearly that she knew her purpose, for which she was created, and she shows the author through whom she knows it. For she says, 'The Lord said.' Therefore, she did not hear these things from Adam alone, but nature itself was so pure and full of the knowledge of God that she understood and saw the Word of God by herself." (L. c.)

QUENSTEDT: "That *dominion* over the animals was granted not only to the man, but also to the woman (for in Gen. 1:26, dominion is granted to the woman as well, through the plural יִרְדּוּ; 'let them rule'). . . For although dominion over the man was not granted to the woman, nevertheless, dominion over the rest of the animals was not denied to her. And certainly from the passage in 1 Cor. 11:7 it is rightly concluded that the woman also is an image of God, for otherwise it could not be said that she received the image of God from the man. So that a distinction must be made between the image of God taken exclusively and that taken inclusively: the man is the image of God exclusively, i.e., of God alone and in such a way that he is not at the same time the image of anyone else; but the woman is the image of God inclusively, i.e., not only, but in such a way that she is at the same time the image of someone else, namely, the man; and in this consists the man's excellence over the woman." (L. c. s. 2. q. 3. f. 856. sq.)

THE SAME: "*A distinction must be made* between *wisdom* and the knowledge of physical things, which woman had just as much as Adam, and between the different *degrees* of that same knowledge, which were unequal." (L. c. f. 857.)

ANTHITHESIS.

QUENSTEDTI: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Encratites* and the *Severians,* who condemned the female sex as an impure and inherently evil creature. . . 2. *Diodorus of Tarsus,* whom Petavius . . . notes as denying that woman was created in the image of God . . ., and *Theodoret* himself restricts the image of God to man alone. . . 4. Of the *Socinians,* who decree that woman was not created in the image of God, on the grounds that they think the image of God consists in dominion, which does not pertain to woman." (L. c. f. 855.)

## § 17.

The subject *of which* (a) the divine image, so to speak, consisted in the faculties of the human soul: intellect, will, and the sensitive appetite.(b)

a) Or those parts of man, by which he bore the divine image.

b) See above §§ 9, 10, 11.

## § 18.

The *proximate* end of the divine image, so called in *a special* and principal sense, was the holy life of men [(a)] pleasing to God; the *more remote* or consequent end [(b)] was eternal blessedness; the common end of the divine image, taken *in a general sense,* is the glory of divine wisdom, power, and goodness.[(c)]

a) For just as the divine image itself, taken in this sense, implied in man powers pertaining to the intellect, the will, and the sensitive appetite for living holy according to the will of God, the one who bestowed these powers, so the intention was directed toward such a life of man as its end.

b) To which, as the *ultimate* good, man was to arrive, through that holy life, which he would have *pursued* without impediment had he retained and propagated this image. Indeed, He created him for eternal life in His own image.

QUENSTEDT: "The *adjuncts* of the image of God are: 1. Its natural and *mutable inherence* Gen. 1:27; Wis. 2:23; Gen. 5:3. 2. *Natural propagation* Gen. 5:3. Rom. 5:12. 3 Most delightful *habitation* Gen. 2:8. 4. The addition of *supernatural gifts*; such as the supernatural favor of God, the gracious indwelling of the Holy Trinity, and the sweetness and delight resulting from it." (L. c. s. 1. th. 23. f. 846.)

THE SAME: "The perfect man, after his translation from this world to heaven, would indeed have had eternal life, yet strictly speaking could not be said to have had eternal *salvation*, since salvation involves a twofold benefit, the privative, that is, deliverance from the evil of guilt and punishment, and the positive, that is, the grant of life; because therefore an entire man, having been translated into heaven, would not have needed liberation from these evils, for this reason he could not properly be said *to be saved,* but to live forever." (L. c. s. l. th. 22. f. 845.)

CALOV: "How long the life in the state of integrity would have been prolonged, no mortal can explain... Likewise, it is doubtful whether the sons would have been born through successive generations, or if all would have been transferred at once." (*System*. P. IV. p. 445.)

c) For what we said about creation in general in chapter II, § 23, holds here no less, and indeed primarily.

## § 19.

The divine image can be defined as *specially* [(a)] received, as a complex [(b)] of several perfections in the intellect and will,[(c)] indeed, and the sensitive appetite of the first [(d)] men, conferred by the *triune* God,[(e)] and from His goodness [(f)] in the first creation, for the sake of imitating the divine perfections [(g)] and promoting their holy life and blessedness, and ultimately the divine glory.[(h)]

a) Or *primarily* or principally so called.
b) For in this case it imports the right object, according to § 8 and following.
c) As if to the subject *by which,* according to § 17, collated with §§ 9 ff.
d) Who are the subject *that;* see § 16.
e) As an efficient cause; see § 1, note *b,* and § 2.
f) Which acts as a driving cause, according to § 3.
g) As the exemplary cause of the image (which is given to man), as an exemplar; see §§ 4 and 5.
h) In which the end of the added divine image consists, according to § 18.

## § 20.

The divine image, *generally* so called, can be defined as that which is [(a)] the complex of various perfections [(b)] of the human soul and body, and indeed of the entire suppositum of the first [(b)] parents, conferred by the Triune God, out of His goodness, according to the likeness of His perfections, in the first creation, for the sake of the holy and blessed life of men and the glory of God.

a) See § 9.
b) Substantial and accidental, internal and external.
c) These and the other things which concern the subject *that* and *by which,* and the efficient, impulsive, exemplary, and final causes, are nearly in agreement with those things which were set forth in the preceding definition.

# Chapter V. ^

ON THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD.

## § 1.

The most manifest argument for divine goodness after [(a)] creation is [(b)] divine providence.

a) Hence, the reason for the order is also clear here.
b) Indeed, its impulsive cause is the divine goodness, as we shall say in § 5.

## § 2.

The word "providence",[(a)] derived from "*providing*," otherwise seems to denote *by its native force* [(b)] a

knowledge or vision of future things before they happen; but *from usage,* and indeed in *this* very *place*, "to provide" is the same as *to consult* [c] *for the welfare* of creatures. And divine providence denotes [d] not only the act of the *intellect*, by which God knows how to dispose and confer those things which contribute to the preservation of the beings He has created and to their being brought to their ends, but also the act of the *will,* by which, in accordance with that knowledge of His, He wills and decrees to preserve and govern creatures.

a) To which in the apocryphal book of Wisdom the word *πρόνοια* corresponds*,* which in the canonical books is not read of God in the same way. From the Hebrew the word for *seeing* corresponds*,* as in *Gen. 22:8.* יְהוָה יִרְאֶה, *God will see,* that is, will provide. Compare *1 Sam. 16:2.*

b) That the preposition *pro* indeed, as is not uncommon elsewhere, in the compound with the verb *videndi* signifies the same as *prae* (before), or *ante* (ahead)*,* has long been established. Thus *Cicero* in *pro Muraena*: *providere futurum* "to foresee what is coming"*;* and *Caesar: providere et praesentire,* "to foresee and to anticipate.". Cf. Auct. L. II. *ad Herenn*., who, *on providentia*, says*, "is that by which something future is seen, before it happens."*

c) For he who sees the future in any way is not called *provident*, but he who, having regard to the present state and to the future events that are foreseen, provides for the needs of his own or others' affairs. When, however, we speak of divine providence, the term refers to things distinct from and created by God, for which God takes care and promotes the welfare.

d) Indeed, opinions differ here, in that *some* contend that by the name of providence, not so much the immanent acts of the divine mind and will, but the very external acts of conserving and governing are signified; *others* teach that the immanent act is indeed denoted by that name, but believe that, formally, it pertains to the intellect and, consequently, to the will; *others*, conversely. However, it is easy to see that this entire controversy is not so much about the matter itself as it is *about the words*. For all concede that to providence, when viewed in its broadest sense, belongs both *πρόγνωσις* or the act of the intellect, by which God foresees what is conducive to creatures, and *πρόθεσις* or the act of the will, by which He wills to order and dispose those things He has foreseen to be conducive, and finally *διοίκησιν,* or the very conservation and government of creatures. Meanwhile, if we look at the *force of the words*, providence seems to denote *not* so much *external* acts*,* like those of an executive power, as the very *care* for creatures in God, and thus the acts *of the intellect* and *will* from which those external acts proceed. However, the *order of* those internal acts is certainly such that the act of the intellect precedes, and the act of the will, or the purpose of bestowing what is good for the creatures according to the judgment of the intellect, follows. And although it does not so much follow as it does, together with the preceding act of the intellect, *intrinsically* constitute providence itself. If, however, you look at the *usage of speech*, it must be admitted that the very name of providence is not infrequently ascribed, *by a metonymy* already established, to the *acts of conservation and governance*, which are the effects, signs, and characters of providence.

## § 3.

That divine providence exists, besides being established by the light of nature,[a] is most clear from Scripture.[b]

a) Of course, *once the existence of God and the dependence of creatures* on a wise, powerful, and good God are granted, providence cannot be denied.

> DANNHAUER: "Providence is asserted for God by Scripture, nature, and conscience. . . The human mind experiences it, imbued as it is with the history of the world from its foundation to the present, an observer of fateful periods, heroic deeds, the order of things, the musical harmony of causes. For it is plain that neither the world was created by chance and accident without a cause, nor did the admirable sudden harmony and concord of infinite things responding to mutual uses arise by chance from atoms. The fact that everything corresponds to the end and use for which it was established is an indication that this world is the work of an intelligent and rational creator. Add to this the miracles, *θεῖα*, the sense of the divine, arising both from divine benefits and from those things that occur bitterly and painfully. Is the bread from the earth, the wine from the vine, anything other than an open and perpetual sign of providence? Manasseh in chains, Jonah in the whale, Julian in battle felt the power of the Deity (cf. Wis. 11:14). Add to this the variety of human physiognomy, made for the purpose that people might recognize one another. If mortals were not distinguished from one another by certain features and a diversity of forms, a marvelous confusion would follow in daily life and human society. Indeed, no commerce could take place among them; and this would be the occasion for immense evils and monstrous crimes and the destruction of all, if husbands and wives could not recognize each other, nor friend from foe, nor children their parents, nor could fathers distinguish their daughters from outsiders or from their own wives by any sign. Finally, the wicked and the violent would do whatever they pleased with impunity, since they would be hidden in that common resemblance and confusion of all. Add to this that in animals, otherwise brutish, there is a marvelous skill and industry in preserving life, in procuring food, in seeking or building hiding places and nests, in avoiding dangers, and in pursuing and capturing others." (*Hodosoph. Phaen*. III. p. 157.)

b) For not only the entire *Scripture,* communicated to men for their own salvation by the provident hand of God, is *an effect* and *index* of providence, but especially *Psalm 104* in its entirety, *Matthew 6:20 ff., and* the like, declare it. Cf. *Job chapters 38, 39, 40; Acts 17:25 ff.* Nor is it amiss that the author of the Book of *Wisdom, chapter 14, verse 3*, says to God, "*Father, your providence* (*πρόνοια*) *governs (διακυβερνᾷ) all things."*

## § 4.

The efficient cause [a] of providence is the entire Holy Trinity.[b]

a) Consider it as *virtually* causing. However, *if* you take the word "providence" for the *external* acts themselves, the *formally* efficacious cause must indeed be admitted.

> REUSCH: *"Formally causing causes* are properly called causes, which differ from the effect not only actually but also essentially, so that the cause and the effect are distinct beings." But no act of God can produce another act in God as a distinct being. . . Therefore, there can be no properly speaking cause within God of any

. . . divine act. But in the point of reason, one perfection must often be conceived before another perfection can be conceived in God; e.g., before I can conceive that God is eternal, it must be presupposed in the point of reason that He is a self-existent being and exists necessarily. Therefore, since the knowledge that must be presupposed from the nature of the object, if I am to conceive another knowledge, is called the *a priori* reason of that knowledge, and such an *a priori* reason will be called the *virtually causing cause."* (*Annotations on Compend*. p. 175. sq.)

LUTHER: "It is God who creates, works, and preserves all things through his almighty power and right hand, as our faith confesses; for He does not send out officials or angels when He creates or preserves something, but all of this is the work of His divine power itself. But if He is to create and preserve it, He must be there and make and preserve His creature both in its inmost and its outermost part. Therefore, He must indeed be present in every creature in its very inmost and outmost parts, all around, through and through, below and above, and in front and behind, so that nothing can be more present or more inward in all creatures than God Himself with His power. For He is the one who makes the skin; He is the one who also makes the bones; He is the one who makes the hair on the skin; He is also the one who makes the marrow in the bones; He is the one who makes every little part of the hair; He is the one who makes every little part of the marrow; He must make everything, both the part and the whole: so His hand must be there to make it; that cannot fail. To this the Scripture powerfully refers (Isaiah 66:1-2): 'Heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool.' He does not say: A piece of heaven is my throne, a piece or part of the earth is my footstool; but wherever and whatever *heaven* is, there is my throne, whether it be heaven below, above, or beside the earth; and whatever or wherever *earth* is, whether on the floor of the sea, in the grave of the dead, or in the center of the earth, there is my footstool. Now, guess where His head, arm, chest, and body are, when He fills the earth with His feet and the heavens with His legs? He reaches far, far beyond and outside the world, over heaven and earth. What, then, can or will Isaiah mean by this saying, for as St. Hilary also speaks on this subject, that God is essentially present at all ends, in and through all creation in all its parts and places, *so that the world is full of God and He fills it all."* (*That These Words of Christ: "This is my body," Still Stand Firm*. Opp. Hal. XX, 1002–1004.)

b) As of all other immanent acts and external works. See, however, specifically concerning the *Father,* as the provider of creatures, *Matthew 6:26 and 32,* where *our heavenly Father* is said to take care of the *birds* and of *men*. Concerning the *Son*, it is taught in *Hebrews 1:3* that *He upholds all things.* Of the Father and the Son, what Christ says in *John 5:17* applies*: "My Father has been working until now, and I am working." Of the Holy Spirit*, *in 1 Corinthians 12:11*, it is said that *He distributes* spiritual *gifts* for the preservation and government of the church.

ANTITHESIS.

HOFMANN: "It is not the case here that God only works extraordinarily, instead of through the ordinary forces of nature, through angels: in all of nature's life, the Scripture sees the activity of spirits. . . As for us, the only thing that matters is that *all good and bad* phenomena of worldly life are equally attributed to the activity and work of a multitude of spirits. . . They (the *angels)* are therefore created beings. . . Created life, into which the one fullness of the essence of God enters, in order to

become therein a multiplicity of faculties, serves the eternal God to make Himself present to His world. . . If it is a created life by which the one fullness of the divine essence spreads itself into the multiplicity of those properties which God, present to His world, exercises in it; then He can and will also be conceived *of without this self-manifestation of His to the world*." (*Schriftbeweis*. I, 282. 313. 325. sq.)

## § 5.

The impulsive cause [(a)] of it is the goodness of God.[(b)]

a) Or the reason for moving, and an internal one.

b) See *Luke 11:13,* where Christ, from the fact that *among men fathers* provide for their children, moved by that *love* with which they care for their offspring, concludes that the *heavenly Father*, by His supreme goodness and *φιλανθρωπία*, will much *more* provide for our needs. And David*,* in *Psalm 136*, occupied with celebrating the works of divine providence, always inserts this: *For* the Lord is *good*, *and His mercy endureth forever.*

FECHT: "If God were to withdraw His hand from any things, even for a moment, they would at once fall back into nothingness." ROLLIUS adds: "Scripture itself testifies that when God withdraws His hand, creatures return to dust." (*Syllog. controvers*. p. 80, 86.)

## § 6.

The object of divine providence [(a)] is the creatures [(b)] all and each,[(c)] both inanimate,[(d)] and animate, and of these, the vegetative,[(e)] the brute animals,[(f)] especially men, [(g)] and above all [(h)] the faithful.

a) That is, that for which God provides, whose care He takes, whose welfare He promotes, etc.

b) Not God himself; for He does not take care of His own preservation and governance, but of those who depend on Him.

c) Thus, in *Hebrews 1:3,* it is said that the Son of God upholds *all things*, as though created through Him, and in *Colossians 1:17,* it is taught that *all things* consist in Him. And it must be admitted that nothing so minute or insignificant in the entire universe exists to which divine providence does not extend.

J. J. RAMBACH: "The *object* of divine providence is all created things, without exception, visible and invisible, living and lifeless, heaven, earth, and sea, and everything that is in them. Just as He created all things, so His *providence* extends to all things." He preserves 1. the *invisible* creatures, the angels; for the good cannot govern themselves without His wisdom and cannot be sustained without His power, the evil cannot harm without His permission, and He sets limits and boundaries to their wickedness. 2. the *visible* creatures, and among them not only men, as the noblest creature, but also all irrational animals. In Egypt, frogs and locusts must carry out His commands. But such providence extends over all *genera,* over all *species,* even over

all individuals of each genus; e.g. God cares not only for the *genus* of creatures called birds, but for every *species*, storks, swallows, sparrows, and even for each *individual specimen* of them, for every stork, swallow, and sparrow. He cares not only that the trees remain, grow, and are preserved, but also for every tree, branch, and its leaf. Each of them is under his government, as Christ teaches in Matthew 10:29. A sparrow is one of the most despised and (seemingly) useless birds, yet Christ says that not one of them will perish, be shot, or be wounded without the Father's will. Luke 12:6: And even of them are not forgotten before God. Even the smallest, most despised, and most useless thing is subject to divine government and providence. Christ assures us of this in Matthew 10:30: "And even the very hairs of your head are all *numbered.*" This means that nothing can happen except according to the Father's will. What we consider *valuable*, we count. It therefore signifies a precise knowledge and diligence to maintain. Just as the sunlight does not despise the smallest worm, neither does the providence of God. We must therefore well understand that this extends even to the smallest things. It is not as if an earthly king, by a general decree, cares for all his subjects in general, even though there are many thousands whom the king does not know. God knows the *smallest thing* and provides for it, as Christ, the mouth of truth, assures us. Indeed, reason thinks it unbecoming of God's majesty that He should stoop to the smallest of His creatures. The pagan Pliny thinks the divine majesty is defiled if it concerns itself with despised things. But these are foolish thoughts, as the great church father *Jerome* also entertained. For thereby His *honor* is rather promoted, and specifically 1. the honor of His infinite *goodness*, when with the arms of His providence He embraces both the lowest worm and the highest angel. If it is not unbecoming for God to create them, why should it be unbecoming for Him to preserve them? 2. the honor of His *power* and *wisdom.* The *power* of God is no less visible in the creation of a fly than in that of an elephant; and likewise in their preservation. *Wisdom* shows its excellence when it directs and guides creatures, which themselves do not know the purpose of their being, to that end. There is also no difference among creatures in themselves; rather, it arises only from their relation to us. For example, one believes that a worm is more despicable than a lion. This lion is, of course, as we regard it, better than a worm; but if we disregard that relation, the humblest worm has in its own kind just as much excellence as a lion. For this excellence consists only in a certain quality of the parts of which the body is composed. Nor does it burden God, as one might think. His infinite understanding cannot be overloaded or wearied." (*Schriftm. Erläuterung der Grundlegung der Th*. 1738. p. 157. sq.)

QUENSTEDT: "Just as the sun is not defiled, though it shines upon filth, so neither is God, when with His providence He illuminates even the smallest and most abject things. A mirror represents things without any contamination of its own; how then could God be defiled by the providence of things? Which things God did not disdain to create, how could He judge it unworthy of His majesty to preserve?" An impious voice in Euripides is: 'The king of the world cares for great things, he leaves small things to fortune.' . . Ammonius rightly observes that if divine providence were to be denied, it would be more reasonable to deny it to the immortal and celestial beings, which require less care because they are subject to fewer and smaller changes, than to these sublunary, perishable, and mortal things, which require far greater care. ‘Immortal things need no guardian; but the artisan preserves these lower things,’ says Seneca, Ep. 58." (*Th. did.-pol*. P. I. c. 13. s. 2. q. 1. f. 768.)

d) This pertains to the fact that *Job, chapter 28, verse 25,* proclaims that God *gives weight to the winds, weighs them in a measure, sets a law for the rain, and a path for the thundering storms*.

e) For example, David mentions that *herbs, grain, oil, and wine are produced from the earth* by God *(Ps. 104:14–15).*

f) For example, that He gives *food to the cattle and the young ravens (Ps. 147:9), feeds the birds of the air (Matt. 6:26), and* takes care of every *sparrow (Matt. 10:29; Luke 12:6).*

g) So of the entire *human race,* as *the offspring of God,* Paul in his sermon at Athens, *Acts 17:28: "For in him we live, and move, and have our being."*

h) For on these *the eye* of Jehovah is said to be especially intent *(Ps. 33:19).* And not only *individual* believers*,* but also their *assembly*, which is called *the Church, the people* and *the special possession* of God, should be regarded *(Eph. 5:29).*

QUENSTEDT: *"Distinction* is *made* between human and divine rest and activity; human rest is joined with cowardice, laziness, inertia, and fatigue, while activity is with labor, effort, industry, and trouble; but 'God knows how to rest while acting, and to act while resting,' according to Augustine, Book XII of *The City of God*, chapter 17." (L. c. f. 770.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of *Democritus, Epicurus, Pliny, Lucian*, and other Epicureans concerning the herd of swine, who utterly deny and deride providence, and who, with C. Velleius, a Roman senator, call *πρόνοιαν,* an old woman who foretells." Epicurus, in Cicero's Book II of *De Natura Deorum*, is introduced denying the providence of God as follows: "He does nothing (he says of God), is involved in no thoughts, plots no deeds. – – We shall rightly call this God blessed, but yours the most laborious." . . . Note Pliny's *Natural History*, Book II, Chapter 7. impious voice: "It is to be ridiculed that the highest should concern itself with human affairs"; with the reason he adds: "Nothing is more futile, as if it could not be defiled by so sad and manifold a ministry." *Lucretius* the Epicurean wants the world to be carried along by chance. . . 3. *Averroes,* who, in a paraphrase of the treatise *on metaphysics*, tract 4, impiously asserts that those who attribute to God knowledge and care of particular things necessarily attribute to Him impiety and injustice. 4. Of the *Sadducees,* who say that God is placed outside all care and providence of inferior or sublunary things, as Josephus testifies in his book II of the Jewish War, chapter 7. 5. *P. Moses Maimonides,* who decrees, 'that the providence of God is only in human individuals.' . . . Dr. Hutterus in theologia loc. 4. de prov. q. 2. p. 223. St. Jerome is counted among those who judge it plainly unworthy of divine providence if it is supposed to be occupied with minute and abject things. *Jerome's* words are these: "However, it is absurd to reduce the majesty of God to the point that He knows, moment by moment, how many mosquitoes are born and how many die; what the multitude of lice, fleas, and flies is on earth, how many fish swim in the water———." We are not so foolish flatterers of God that, while we extend His power even to the lowest things, we do violence to ourselves by ascribing to Him a providence over both rational and irrational creatures.' . . Gerhard, vol. II. LL. de prov. § 58. says: ‚Unless you take this statement (already cited by Jerome) in such a way that you understand that God indeed knows each individual thing exactly, but not by the mode of knowing which takes place through successive moments and intervals, but by an intuitive knowledge, by which He beholds all *things* at once, you will detract from the praise of divine providence." (L. c. f. 768. sq.)

## § 7.

Specifically, with regard to *human beings*, providence is so occupied that it extends to their life's *beginning,*[(a)] *progress* [(b)] *and end,*[(c)] as well as to all *their actions*.[(d)]

a) So *Job*, *ch. 10, 8 ff.*, speaking to God: *Your hands,* he says, עֲצָּבוּנִי, with the utmost diligence, care, and as it were anxiety, *fashioned me and made me accurately all over; you have made me like clay.* And David *in Psalm 71:6* says to God: "*I have been leaning on you from birth; from my mother's womb you have been my helper."*

b) e.g., with regard to providing for *food*, *clothing*, and other necessities of this life, *Matt. 6:25 ff.*; with regard to averting *dangers* in whatever *undertakings* may arise, *Ps. 91:1 ff.* Cf. *Deut. 30:20; Job 10:12.*

c) Whether with regard to the *fixed* time or *the number of days* and *months of this life, Job 14:5.* More will be said about these below in § 16.

d) Both secret *thoughts*, and *words,* and *external actions* and one's conduct with others, *Ps. 139:1 ff.*

## § 8.

The acts, toward which providence is directed to be exercised with respect to creatures,[(a)] are *preservation*, or the sustaining of individual creatures [(b)] in existence, and *governance*, which *partly* includes a universal concurrence with secondary causes,[(c)] and *partly* a certain special operation, and that not of one kind, and the direction of created agents.[(d)]

a) See loc. cit. § 2 and notes.

b) Which is otherwise called the *continuation of creation*. For it implies an indefatigable influx of , suitable and necessary for each created thing according to its own nature, so that it may persist in its being and power to act. And to this belong those phrases, *φέρων τὰ πάντα,* bearing or carrying all things, lest they collapse, perish, or be reduced to nothing, *Heb. 1:3,* and *πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκε, Col. 1:17. Not only,* says Theophylact, *did He Himself create these things, but He also contains them, and so that, if they are removed from His providence, they must immediately perish.*

> FECHT: "The trite description of conservation, which is said to be *continued creation*, is in vain criticized." Rullius adds: "Conservation is not called creation here, but continued creation or the continuation of creative action. For God is said to conserve a creature in no other way than insofar as He positively continues the action by which He originally produced the creature. Hence, just as the duration of a thing in itself is nothing other than its continuous existence, so conservation is understood to be nothing other than continued creation. And just as the creation of being gives an beginning, so conservation gives the continuation of being." (*Sylloge controv*. p. 79. 81. sq.)

c) Thus *Acts 17:25, 26.* He is said to *give life and breath to all, and* to *have made the human race from one blood* (concurring with each of the generations).

QUENSTEDT: "Indeed, we are accustomed to speak in this way: that God acts through creatures; the meaning of this expression is that God gives and preserves the power to act in the proximate agent. But as for the first cause itself, insofar as it immediately cooperates with the creature and, together with it, influences the action and effect, it is false to *mediate* a second cause between the first and the effect, since the effect depends just as immediately on the first cause as on the second." (L. c. s. 2. q. 3. f. 781.)

THE SAME: "Just as the same writing, as to its number, depends on the hand and the pen, nor does one part depend on the hand and another on the pen, but the whole on the hand and the whole on the pen: so the concurrence of God is not prior to the action of the creature by a priority of causality, since in reality it is the same action altogether, and thus God produces the entire effect, just as the second cause does, which happens through the exterior action of God, which is intimately included in the action of the creature, indeed it is one and the same with it." (L. c. f. 782.)

THE SAME.: "Nor is this concurrence of the first cause to be placed in any action *preceding* the action of the second cause, which would move, excite, or apply it to these its acts. For when fire is near combustible matter, it is not necessary that it be excited by any prior action to heating; nevertheless, it is necessary for God to concur, as Becanus observes. This concurrence would also be limited only to the cause and not to the effect or action of that cause. Furthermore, that motion of God to act is distinct from the action of the second cause, whereas here we are asking about the action of God, which is the same as and not distinct from the action of the second cause." (L. c. f. 780.)

THE SAME: "If something were to come to be without God's cooperation, then at least in that first instant in which it came to be, it would be by itself and without God, which is one *of the impossible things.* Therefore, just as created things require to be immediately conserved by God as the supreme efficient cause, so too they require to be immediately created by Him. And just as God can deprive his creature of its *being* by the mere withdrawal of the influx by which he preserves it, so he can deprive the same by his natural *action* through the mere negation of immediate concurrence." (L. c. f. 785.)

GERHARD: "Created things do not subsist by themselves and their own powers, but God bears all things by the word of his power, Heb. 1:3; in him all things *hold together,* Col. 1:17; in God we live, move, and have our being, Acts 17:28. The being of creatures is a flowing being, the being of God is a fixed being; as the being of rays from the sun, of a shadow from a body, so all creatures depend on divine conservation. . . Preservation, as defined by Scaliger, is nothing other than the continuation of existence. To be and to be preserved are attributed to the same author, to the same principle. Therefore, just as all creatures received their essence, their properties, and their powers of action from God in creation and generation, so they are preserved by the same in their being and acting. Hence, there is a continuous influx of the divine power that preserves all existing things, an influx by which, if withdrawn for even a moment, they could neither act, nor even be. What is more natural for a man than to move? And yet, "*in him* we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts 17:28). What is more natural to a single thing than to rise each day? And yet God *makes the sun rise* (Matt. 5:45). Therefore, although by nature each thing has its own inherent property, it neither exercises nor can exercise it unless it is sustained and quickened by divine power, so to speak. Ps. 104:29-30: 'You hide your face, they are troubled; you take away their breath, they die and return to their dust. You send out your Spirit, they are created, and you renew the face of the earth.' Deut. 8:3. Matthew 4:4 says, "Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds from the mouth of God"; by which we are taught not only that God can nourish and preserve man without natural means, but we are also warned that the power to nourish is not so proper to bread that,

if the Word of God—by which bread was first created and received its power to nourish—were taken away, it could nevertheless sustain a man; rather, the continual influx of the creative and preserving is required for it to exercise its inherent power to nourish. We can and must pronounce the same thing concerning medicine. Man is not restored to health by herbs, but by the Word of God, which originally implanted that power in the herbs and still today, as it were, instills it." (L. *de prov*. § 61—63.)

d) Thus, for example, secondary causes, not *yet* established by nature in their action, are applied to act by divine power; see *1 Kings 18:44,* concerning the accelerated rain. Sometimes God confers on secondary causes a power to act *that is either* plainly *supernatural*, *or restores* and confirms a natural power *that has been lost* or *weakened*, or increases it; see *Judges 16:28–29*, concerning the restored and increased strength of Samson*; Genesis 17:16–19,* concerning the power of procreation granted to Abraham, a hundred years old, and Sarah, ninety years old and previously barren. Finally, God sometimes *prevents* the secondary causes, which by nature are to be in operation, from producing their effect, as He threatens (*Deut. 28:23*) to withhold the rain from an disobedient people. *For by such works God makes it manifest that He is not bound to physical causes and the order freely established by Himself,*" says *Gerh., Isag*. LL. Disp. XVI. c. V. de Prov. § 12. p. 654.

B. MEISNER: "There are common laws of nature, by which (the Calvinists) examine and measure all the mysteries of faith, so that they think God can do nothing that is contrary to the ordinary nature and constitution of natural bodies. 'Nothing is done singularly by God that overturns the nature created by Him,' says Sadeel, de sacrament. manducat. c. 3. p. 93. edit. Geneva, 1596, "If anything is taught that is against nature and overturns it, it must immediately be declared false, since it is certain that nature, established by the true God, is true." p. 91. Rather, it must be established that God can do many things that are against all nature and that depart as far as possible from the common order. ,'Nature often yields to its own laws; what to its author?' says Seneca in Hippol. v. 175. 'It commands nature; it does not obey possibility, does not gather measures, does not examine weight. Its will is the measure of things, its word is the end of the work,' with the testimony of Ambrose 1. 2. *Hexaem*. ch. 2, "Since all the courses of nature have their laws, the Creator has the power, above this natural course, to do something other than what their seminal reasons dictate," from Augustine, de Gen. ad lit. ch. 17. 'His power is not disposed or constrained by order, but He Himself is the author of order, whose necessity all depends on Him,' with the testimony of Scaliger in *Excerpta* 365, s. 8. Hence Philip piously sang:

God is not a deity of the Fates, shut in prison,
    Such was the Stoic conception of God.
He can stop the sun in its course,
    He makes the rivers stand still like rocks."

(*Philosoph, sobr*. I, 1171. sqq.) cf. *Kromayer* cited above p. 43.

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of the heretic *Pelagius* and his followers, who asserted that they could move a hand, bend a finger, sit, stand, walk, without the help of God, as attested by Jerome. . . 2. *From the scholastic Durandus* on St. Portia, who admits only a remote and accidental concurrence, teaching: ,that God does indeed concur in the acts of second causes, but not by immediately influencing them and their productions, but only remotely and by accident; insofar as, for example, he first gave to particular agents being and the faculty of acting, and

both that being and that power of acting, and furthermore preserves them.' . . 3. *Nicholas Taurelli,* who follows in the footsteps of Durandus, asserts: 'It is great imprudence, indignity, and impotence, if God concurs to the works of nature.' 'If He willed,' he says, 'that God should always work, why did He cast off nature? Or do you suppose that God, if He wants to do something, needs the concurrence of nature?' . . . 4. *Arminians,* whose standard-bearer *Episcopius* in Book IV of his Institutes, chapter 1, calls preservation "an act of divine providence, whether it is called a positive act or not, by which God immediately infuses into the essences, powers, and faculties of man and of all other things; or a negative act, by which God does not will to destroy the essences, powers, and faculties of created things, but to leave them to their own vigor, so far as they can thrive and endure by the force inherent in them from creation. For it makes no difference to us which is believed." . . 5. *Of those philosophers and scholastics* who have declined to the other extreme, denying on the contrary that the effects of second causes are properly produced by those causes, and who wish them to be effected by God alone in the mere presence of second causes, the latter acting in no way. . . Suarez . . . admits that *Gabriel Biel,* who was almost the last of those who became famous among the Germans for their writings on scholastic theology, was very inclined to that opinion. See also *Thomas."* (L. c. f. 782.)

## § 9.

Moreover divine providence also has, on the part of the acts to which it is directed,[(a)] its degrees,[(b)] and, above all other creatures, it regards men,[(c)] and among men, especially the faithful.[(d)]

a) For something has already been said about the difference on the part of the object in § 6, although this is founded in that.

b) Thus God preserves and governs some things for the sake of others, whose preservation or governance those things serve. Hence the division of divine providence into *universal* and *particular*, or *general* and *special,* to which some add *the most special* or *singular,* which, however, *Gerhard* (loc. cit.) held could be reduced to special providence.

c) For just as God first created other creatures, so He has determined to preserve and direct them: some to supply the needs of human life, others for greater convenience or as aids in the conduct of affairs, and finally as examples and incentives for the duties to be performed for God; which is evident from the *Psalms* themselves (*Ps. 104* and *136*), as well as from *Acts 17:25, 26, 27* it is manifest.

*d)* For just as *all things work together for good for those who love God, πάντα συνεργεῖν είς ἀγαθον,* as it is said *in Romans 8:28.* And concerning the Church, we know that by the power of divine providence it has been so established that *not* even *the gates of hell* can *prevail against it, Matthew 16:18.*

## § 10.

As for the *origin* of man, it seems that God concurs not only by a *general*, but also by a *special* influx [(a)] in producing man.

a) As *Gerhard* writes in *De Prov*. chap. VIII. § 71. p. 67: *the beginning of human life is peculiarly governed by divine providence.* And for this reason it is rightly established that God not only has regard to the universal cause, but also to the *particular one*, and supplies the deficiency of second causes, or at least directs and governs them in their action. Which *some* indeed explain in such a way that*, partly,* considering the variety of the body's members and their marvelous connection and structure, a particular, acting with knowledge, efficient cause is required, and thus another, and a more sublime, power than that which is in the seed *(*commonly called *δύναμις πλαστική*, or *formative power*), which can be conceived as being nothing other than that of God Himself, that they determine a special influx to cooperate; and *partly* also, considering the immateriality of the soul and that it must therefore be produced independently of the subject or from nothing, and that such a production requires an infinite power to act and is therefore proper to God alone, they conclude from this that God provides a special and determined influx for the production of the human soul. *Others*, however, although they believe that the body as well as the human soul is produced by the parents themselves, as second causes, with the concurrence of God, as the universal cause, are produced, nevertheless, because they regard the various circumstances in a man's production and birth, the averted dangers, and the many singular evidences of special divine care and favor, they attribute to God, besides the universal, a special or particular concurrence as well, and to this they refer the passages *Job 10:8, 9, 10, 11.*

## § 11.

Among the *actions* of man, to which God concurs, a distinction must be made [a] between *good* and *evil*, and within the class of good, between those that are good *in a civil sense* [b] and those that are good *in a spiritual sense.*[c]

a) For although He is concerned with both, the *manner* of His concern is nevertheless quite different, as will soon become clear.

b) They are called *natural,* insofar as they can be accomplished by human powers.

c) They are called by another name *supernatural,* because they exceed the natural powers of man and cannot be accomplished by them, but require higher powers to be conferred by God.

## § 12.

Divine providence regards *civilly* good actions not only insofar as it imparts its *general* concurrence, but also insofar as it *prescribes* [a] them, *assists* [b] them*,* and *approves them.*[c] With regard to *spiritually* good actions it behaves in the same manner, but with the addition that God Himself also concurs with them by a *peculiar* influx.[d]

a) For *the written law is in the hearts of men,* from which *the Gentiles by nature* do *what is of the law, Romans 2:15.*

b) For example, by encouraging the mind or stirring up heroic impulses, as when God is said to have *called* King Cyrus *and taken hold of his right hand (Isaiah 45:1, 3).*

c) Which specifically pertains to the fact that *He* also *rewards* such actions, as is clear from the example of the Egyptian midwives, who are said to *have been blessed by* God *and* to *have had houses built* for them after they had helped the Israelite women in childbirth. *Exodus 1:20-21.*

d) Since *we are otherwise not fit, not even to think of* such *a thing*, much less to do it, *2 Cor. 3:5.*

## § 13.

Thus divine providence terminates *evil* actions in such a way that, while they are being committed, they are indeed granted a *general* concurrence,(a) yet many actions that would otherwise have occurred *are prevented*,(b) and those that are permitted to occur are nevertheless so *directed* that they tend toward a good end.(c)

a) For in Him we live, move, and have our being*, Acts 17:28.* But it is equally true that we have hitherto considered only the evil actions as *such; not*, however, insofar as they are of that kind and are *evil*.

> QUENSTEDT: "The acts of divine *providence* concerning moral evils or sins are *antecedent*: 1. eternal foreknowledge or *foresight* of sin. . . 2. *Aversion* to it. . . 3. *Prohibition*. . . 4. *Impediment*. . . . The *concomitant* acts are: 1. *The sustentation* of the evil agent. Thus, when Eve reached out her hand for the forbidden fruit, God indeed sustained her locomotion, but did not assist the vicious act as such. And so we often, with the hand and tongue which God sustains, attack God. In the very acts of infamy and sin, God sustains the members, preserves our powers and movements, from which the astonishing long-suffering of God is made manifest. 2. The *co-efficiency* of the action itself, *as far as its material aspect is concerned.* For there are two things in a sinful action: the material and the formal. The *material* is the subject of the vice, namely the action itself, and this God co-produces. The *formal,* however, is the vice itself adhering to the action, to which God in no way concurs. 3. *Permission of disorder.* God permits sin and allows man to deviate from His law. This very permission, however, does not exclude every impediment, but only a physical one, i.e., one by which God acts on the will of man as on a natural object and places an obstacle to its very power; a moral impediment, however, is combined with this permission, since God does not cease to forbid and dissuade sin. The *consequent* acts are: 1. The *directing* of sin to a good end. 2. *Determination,* so as to prescribe goals and limits which human malice cannot transgress. Thus He set certain limits to the tyranny of Pharaoh. 3. The *remission* of sin. . . 4. The *infliction of punishment.* ." (L. c. s. 1. th. 30. f. 767.)

b) Thus God prevented the adultery of *Abimelech* with Sarah from being consummated, *Gen. 20:6.* Likewise, He hindered *Laban's* persecution of Jacob, *Gen. 31:24, 29.* And *in Ps. 33:10* it is said, "*The LORD thwarts the counsel of the nations, frustrates the plans of the peoples.*"

c) Thus God, by permitting 1) the sins of those who seem to excel others, reminds the sinners themselves of their own frailty, lest they become too self-pleasing and despise others; to which pertains the fall of Peter, *Luke 22:32.* Sometimes *2)* He intends to correct others from the harm of sinners and, by shaking off their security, to make them more watchful, *Luke 17:32.* When 3) He permits the pious to be afflicted by the impious, He exercises the humility and patience of those afflicted, by the example of *Job, chapter 1.* Cf. *James ch. 5:10, 11.* Sometimes 4) He turns the affliction of the pious into an occasion for a better fortune and even wishes to help and correct their persecutors through their deeds; which Joseph testifies by his own example in *Genesis 50:20.*

QUENSTEDT: *"Permission* is an act of governing providence, by which God does not withdraw rational creatures, who are of themselves inclined to sin, from the evil forbidden by the law, through impediments which a finite agent cannot resist or knows he will not resist, but for just reasons allows them to fall into sin, Ps. 81:13. Acts 14:16; Romans 1:24, 28. *Divine permission is not:* 1. a lenient *indulgence,* as if God plainly did not care when men commit sins, nor 2. a *relaxation of the law,* as if it granted them license to sin, nor 3. it is not an *impotence* in God or an *understanding,* as if the creature, being ignorant of Him, should thus rush into sin, nor a *will*, as if He approves or helps wickedness, nor a *defect of power,* as if He cannot restrain sin and prevent sinful acts, nor 4. makes God an *idle spectator*, who neither forbids sins, nor sets a limit to wickedness and corrects it; *but* 5. is *a negative act* of the most wise God, by which He does *not*, with a *physical and omnipotent* action, place impediments in the way of rational creatures who of their own accord incline to sin—impediments which they could not resist or which He knows they would not overcome—but He allows them to depart from their proper order and to sin, or He does not withdraw them from the evil forbidden by the law, but for just reasons He permits them to fall into sin. *Permission* 1. has as *its object* not *the action* of the creature itself, but *the evil* or defect of the action, which it neither wills, nor approves, nor helps, but only permits. 2. God indeed permits, but does not will *the* permitted *thing* that happens; *it happens not because God absolutely wills it*, that is, resists and hinders it*, but nevertheless does not will it,* Ps. 5:5; 1 John 3:8. For God not to hinder is not to will, but to permit and at the same time also to not will, insofar as He is seriously displeased with what He permits. 3. *Permission is not an action, but the negation of action.* For just as *a suicide* abuses the concurrence of the first cause to take his own life, he is denied any action placing an obstacle in the way of that wicked deed. 4. *Sin,* before it is committed, God *forbids;* while it is being committed, *He permits it,* and *directs* the permission *to a good end.* 5. Permission consists in the *suspension* of undue resistance and violent and invincible impediment. God permits sins, *when He is not bound to prevent them,* to which permission sin follows, not, however, causally, but consequentially and eventually." (L. c. s. 1. th. 20. f. 763.)

H. MUELLER: "In the government of God, evil is also included. . . In the *beginning*, He either prevents it or allows it." Sometimes He *prevents* the power, so that we cannot commit the sin as we would like; either He utterly destroys the person, as happened to Sennacherib (Isaiah 37:36), or He weakens and diminishes a person's strength, as when Jeroboam's hand withered there, the one he had stretched out to seize the prophet (1 Kings 13:4). Sometimes He hinders the ability with an equal or greater ability; as He restrained the four kings who were carrying Lot away by Abraham's intervention. He also often takes away from a person the very thing with which he intends to commit sin, as He hid Christ when the Jews wanted to stone Him, John 8:39. Sometimes He prevents a person's will from desiring to commit the sin to which an evil lust would otherwise incline them, even though

they have sufficient ability. This hindrance, however, is not coercion but a persuasion, in which a person's desire is convinced by certain reasons and restrained from evil. We are easily persuaded to do this or that, either because it is easy to do and requires little effort, or because it brings pleasure, benefit, and honor: in the same way, God persuades the will not to commit sin, either because it could hardly, or indeed not at all, be done, or because it would bring only pain, shame, and harm. In this way God moved the Pharisees and the chief priests not to seize Christ; for they feared the people, who held Him for a prophet, Matthew 21:45. Now, if God neither hinders a man's power nor his will, *He allows sin to occur;* to this He has the highest right, for He is under no obligation to prevent it. Who has given Him anything beforehand that would be repaid to Him? This permission consists in God withholding His Word, by which He could break the will, or weaken the strength, or even destroy the person. Therefore, divine permission cannot be called a cause of sin, because God ceases to act and lets the sinner act alone. In the *course of events*, God orders and confines sin. He sometimes *orders* it for something other than what the sinner intends, so that it must be fulfilled in a different way. For, "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, like the streams of water; He turns it wherever He will" (Prov. 21:1). Many think they are doing harm to the righteous, but God so wonderfully governs it that the harm must fall upon the wicked. Sometimes God orders and directs sin for a different purpose than the sinner intends; this is attested by the story of Joseph and his own words: "You intended to harm me, but God intended to do good (for me), to do as it is today to save many people," Gen. 50:20. Thus, many must often be exalted by God's providence through the very thing by which the enemy intended to humble them. God also *confines* sin when He sets a certain limit to His permission and a certain goal for sin. Often, He does not allow sin to happen at the very time the sinner desires, but wisely arranges for it to occur at another time. Thus the Jews sought to seize Christ, but no one laid a hand on him, for His hour had not yet come. Thus, many live for many years according to God's will, whom the wicked world would not let live for an hour, if the one who dwells in heaven would only say yes. Often, God allows sin to happen for only a short time, which the sinner had planned to carry on for a long time. Therefore, for the sake of the elect, the days must be shortened, so that they are not subjected to the wickedness of the wicked for too long, Matthew. 24:22. God knows how to hedge the path of sin with thorns and to draw a wall before it, so that the sinner cannot find his way, Hosea 2:6. Praise be to God! that the world cannot run further than God allows; otherwise, there would be no end to its fury and rage against the godly. Often God also does not allow sin to rise as high as the sinner thinks, for He is faithful and does not allow the righteous to be tempted beyond their ability, but makes a way of escape so that they can endure it, 1 Cor. 10:13. In the *end*, God either punishes evil or forgives it. He *punishes* it either temporally or eternally, and temporally, either externally or internally. The external punishment affects the body, taking away its power or well-being and afflicting it with all manner of misery and woe; for misery clings to sin like rays to the sun. The internal punishment concerns the soul, which God either forsakes with His Spirit and grace, so that it wills and can do nothing other than sin; like the natural body, when the life-spirit is withdrawn

from it, can do nothing other than fall into a state of powerlessness; or he delivers it into the power of evil; either that it falls into strong delusions and believes the lie, 2 Thess. 2, 11., or that it is given over to a reprobate mind to do what is not fitting, Rom. 1:28-29, or that it even falls into the power and snares of Satan and (if it does not come to the knowledge of salvation, so that the spirit is preserved) is finally cast with body and soul into the pit of hell. The *forgiveness* of sins consists in this, that He remits the guilt and takes away the punishment; yet with the reservation of discipline for the purpose of testing." (*Himmlischer Liebeskuss*, ch. 5, §§ 7–10, p. 35 ff.)

## § 14.

However, in neither good *nor* evil actions does God's providence take away the freedom of human will.

For the *general* concurrence *does not determine* the second causes, nor does it impose a necessity of acting. Likewise*, to permit* or not hinder an action and *to direct* it to a certain end is *not to determine* the agent to do this. However, that spiritual actions are thus brought about in man by God, so that man can nevertheless resist God and do what prevents them from being accomplished, we read explicitly affirmed by Christ and shown by the example of the Israelites*, Matthew 23:37.* For it is said: "*I was willing to gather you,*" i.e., I not only wished for this to happen, but did everything on my part so that you would receive the faith through which you would be joined to me and be saved (for this is indicated by the context and the force of the simile, taken from *a hen* seeking her chicks), *but you were unwilling* to be gathered and caused it not to happen. Cf. *Acts 7:51.* We will say more in the Book on Conversion.

FECHT: *"The manner in which God concurs* and cooperates with creatures is universal, indifferent, and indeterminate. For every cause is either *universal,* which concurs in the effect in such a way that it does not determine its proper species and reason. Just as the sun concurs in the generation of all things with its heat, yet this heat does not determine that what is generated must be a dog or any other species. For a dog is not from the sun, but from the dog that begets it. Or *a particular cause,* which concurs by determining the effect *to be of* this *kind*. Thus a pear tree produces a pear. Now God concurs to all things in the former way only ordinarily, not in the latter. I say, *ordinarily.* For we do not deny that God also concurs in a determinate way beyond the ordinary order and in certain objects, namely, in the spiritual things to be effected in man, as well as in miracles and any extraordinary events. For if God did not do this today, our prayers would be plainly in vain. *It is proven:* 1. *From the most clear literal text of Scripture,* which testifies everywhere that God leaves created things to their own motions, and does not necessitate anything by determining it, except outside the ordinary course. 2. *From the nature of a first* and universal *cause*, which concurs with all things by an equal operation, and in no way moves or determines a second cause, as a principal cause does in relation to an instrumental one. And therefore*,* God's concurrence imposes no absolute *necessity* on human actions*,* neither from without, which is violence, nor from within, which is immutability. He who compels necessitates from without; he who so disposes the subject that, given all things requisite for acting, it cannot but act, necessitates from within. Divine concurrence does not impose either kind of necessity, because it is indeterminate, i.e., as other theologians put it, because God *adapts Himself*

to *secondary* and particular *causes* and permits each agent to act according to its natural motions." (*Compend. th*. c. 5. § 19. 20. p. 137. sq.)

HEERBRAND: "Since all things are governed by the providence of God, do things happen necessarily, or contingently? — By the reason of God's providence, which governs all things, so that nothing is done either disorderly or contrary to His own purpose and will, and which cannot be deceived: it is said that all things *necessarily* come to pass correctly. 'My counsel shall stand, and all my purpose shall be fulfilled.' Isa. 46; but *not by compulsion.* By the necessity *of immutability,* not *of compulsion.* For man is left with the freedom of will in actions subject to reason; which, although they are governed by the providence of God, are not forced to do so, but do whatever they do of their own accord. Things therefore happen by necessity, *not a fatal* or absolute one, but, as they call it, *a necessity of consequence.* For nature could have things otherwise, and man could act, and the opposite could happen; it would not be impossible. Because by their nature they are not necessary, but truly *contingent*. But because they happen in this way, and God sees all things as they are, therefore with respect to God, who sees all things as they happen and is not deceived in His vision, they are called necessary by the necessity, as has been said, of consequence. For if they were to happen otherwise, God would see that as well. . . . Therefore, by reason and with respect to man, who is the proximate cause of his own actions, all things in human affairs happen and are done freely and contingently. Thus, although David and Paris [?] carry off the wives of others, these things do indeed flow from the providence of God; but they are not impelled or compelled by this vision of God to carry them off; rather, they do it of their own free will and contingently. For they could have abstained and not seized. Thus Joseph, even when tempted by his master's wife, nevertheless abstained. Likewise, Alexander the Great and Scipio abstain from their captives freely, willingly, contingently, and not by compulsion: the providence of God contributes nothing to either action." (*Compend. th*. p. 214—216.)

QUENSTEDT: "It does not take away the freedom of action of rational agents; but rather, man freely uses that common concurrence and influx, and (which is the astonishing long-suffering of God) abuses it, like air, bread, and wine; yet without any dishonor to the divine majesty. For these things in themselves are not open to abuse, but the external act (which is from God, not God Himself) is. Therefore, after God had decreed not only to produce secondary causes but also to preserve them, He also decreed to cooperate with their actions at the same time. This law, if taken absolutely, does not introduce necessity, but is only *a debt of connaturality,* as *Rutgers* says, speaking with *Suarez*, in his *Institutes. Metaph*. 1. 2. c. 9. Hence God also sometimes dispenses with that law by withholding His concurrence: Take for example the fire in the Babylonian furnace, which, by the sweet disposition of God forgetting its own power, did not burn the sacred three of the just nor their garments, Dan. 3." (L. c. s. 2. q. 3. f. 781. sq.)

## ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. *Cicero*, who, in disputing against fate, denied foreknowledge of future events; 1. 2. *On Divinity*. *Chrysippus* likewise rejected it; see *Augustine*, Book 1, Chapter 5 of *The City of God*, Chapter 9. And *Averroes,* who likewise impiously denied that God's *foreknowledge* embraces all things, even particulars and even contingent and evil futures which depend on human will. 2. The *Socinians,* who deny God's infallible foreknowledge of contingent future events, whether good or evil, and who hold that if God's foreknowledge is granted, it imposes necessity on the things foreknown. . . 5. The *Stoics,* who decreed that from God's foreknowledge of all things, all things happen by a fatal order and the inevitable necessity of things. See *Homer,* who reveals the Stoics' delusion with an elegant commentary in the Iliad. π. Cf. *Cicero,* 1. 1. *de divinit*. 6. The *Scotists* and *Dominicans,* who contend that a certain foreknowledge of contingent future events does not exist, except from the determination of the divine will. . .

7. The *Calvinists,* who also suspend divine knowledge from the divine ordination and effective, properly so-called, decree. Thus *Piscator* in his notes to Vorstius's *libellus*. p. 261.: '*Whatever God knows to be future, He has decreed',* which he also extends to sins. Thus *Calvin Institut*. 1. 8. c. 23. f. 6. The words of *Zanchius* are in *Disp. de Provid. th*. 7. T. VII. col. 594.: *That God by His unchangeable providence not only constituted that which happens, but also from eternity ordained that all things should happen in the manner in which they do.*" (L. c. s. 2. q. 2. f. 772. sq.)

## § 15.

Divine providence regards the *term of* human *life* not only insofar as, according to the *common law*, [(a)] each person is endowed with his own temperament, by the force of which he, with the general concurrence of God, can attain a certain span of life,[(b)] but also insofar as the lives of certain men *are prolonged* beyond that term,[(c)] to which they were destined to reach by the powers of nature; the end of life comes *sooner* for others,[(d)] than was fitting according to the course of nature.

a) Indeed, *after the Fall;* since man was otherwise immortal in his original state, as we saw in the preceding chapter, § 14, p. 155.

b) It is otherwise called the *natural* term of life*,* of which *Aegidius Hunnius*, in his *Qu. et Respp. de Provid*. T. I. Op. fol. 714 writes: *To the goal of human life, God leads man ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ* (for the most part) *by means of nature. For when the humors fail radically, along with the native warmth, when the κράσις* (temperament) *of the human body is disturbed and its powers are overthrown, man dies.* But *He concurs in establishing this term not only by the reason of His foreknowledge, but because He Himself sustains and governs nature and second causes. And thus, through these, God, as it were the first cause, prefixes the term of which we speak.* And to this is usually referred what is said *in Psalm 90:10: "The days of our years in them* are *seventy years*, *and if in strength* (if the power of nature prevails, according to *Kimchi,* or according to *others,* if the number of years prevails), *eighty years."*

c) A clear example is provided by the story *of Hezekiah, 2 Kings 20:1 ff.* And in this sense, some say that the fatal *limit of physical life is extendable.*

d) Thus, *bloody and deceitful men* are said to *not live out* even *half their days (Ps. 55, last verse).* And in *Ps. 102:25*, David prays to his God *not to cut* him *off in the midst of* his *days*. And this is what others call the natural limit being *curtailable.*

## § 16.

But divine providence *changes* the natural term of human life [(a)] both with regard to *pious* men [(b)] and with regard to *impious men*.[(c)]

a) Hence arises the *supernatural* term of life, which some call *hyperphysical*. See *Gerh., Isag. L. de Provid*. chap. VI, Disp. XVI, § 23, p. 667.

b) It is called the term of *grace.*

c) It is called the term *of wrath, loc. cit.*

## § 17.

God *prolongs* the lives *of the pious either* as a reward for their own obedience,[(a)] *or* for the public good.[(b)] *He shortens* the lives of the same*, partly* so that they may not be corrupted by the wicked examples of others,[(c)] *and partly* so that they may not see the calamities to come and be distressed.[(d)]

a) This pertains to the promise of the fourth commandment, *Exodus 20:12.* Compare *Proverbs 3:1-2,* where *long and prosperous life* is promised *to those who keep God's commandments.* And in chapter 4:10, *the multiplication of the years of life is promised to those who receive the words of God.*

b) That this happened to *Paul* is gathered from *2 Cor. 1:8 ff.,* since he says he was rescued *from* a most imminent danger *of death* by *the auxiliary efforts* of those who ministered to him *through* their *prayers*. The same thing happened to *Epaphroditus, Phil. 2:27–30,* whom the apostle says was healed for the good of the church and for his own comfort, when he *was truly near death*.

c) Thus the author of the Book of *Wisdom* teaches in chapter 4, verses 10 and 11.

d) This is attested by the example of *Josiah* in *2 Chronicles 34:28.* Compare *Isaiah 26:20; 57:2.*

## § 18.

God in just judgment more swiftly *cuts off* the lives *of the impious*, when *either* He Himself inflicts on them a fatal disease or death,[(a)] *or* commands death to be inflicted,[(b)] *or* permits them, through their own intemperance [(c)] or other crimes,[(d)] to bring on themselves diseases or violent death.

a) For example, when *a plague* is sent, or, as Scripture speaks, when *God strikes* men *so that they die.* Cf. the divine threat *Deut. 28:21-22* and the examples *of Er* and *Onan Gen. 38:7, 10,* of *Nabal 1 Sam. 25:38, and* of *Hananiah* the false prophet *Jer. 28:16-17.*

b) E.g., murderers *Gen. 9:6; Exod. 21:12, 14 ff.,* and more so sodomites, idolaters, and incestuous ones *Exod. 22:18 ff.; Lev. 18 and 20.*

c) See the example of *Ben-hadad, 2 Kings 8:15,* although daily experience abounds with them. Cf. *Hunn.,* 1. c. p. 715.

d) To this belong the fates *of Absalom (2 Sam. 18:14) and of Ahithophel (ch. 17:23).* And concerning this latter, it is said that God did *not* so much *positively* determine the end of his life, and the means by which it was to be brought about, as that He did not hinder or *permit it*.

# § 19.

And so it also is established that it is *not absolutely* necessary [(a)] for every person to die at the time and in the manner in which he dies.[(b)]

GERHARD: "When the question is asked about the end of human life, we must first of all distinguish between death considered simply and absolutely, and between the time and the manner of death. Death itself, after the Fall, is necessary for man according to the ordinary state and course of corrupt nature. Heb. 9:27*:* 'It is appointed*,* it is fixed and determined, for men to die once.' If one asks about the manner and time of death, one must be careful not to be plunged either into the Scylla of Epicurean recklessness or into the Charybdis of Stoic necessity." (*Loc. de provid*. § 78.)

a) Or that it is not from God, absolutely and immutably decreed, apart from and before any regard to causes or circumstances to be found outside of God. For otherwise, the *prayers* and vows of the pious, the divine *promises* and *threatenings*, would be in vain. Cf. *Hunnius,* loc. cit., p. 713. And *Gerhard,* in *Disp. Isag*. l. c. p. 667, writes: *The hyperphysical or divine term is always hypothetical, including the condition of piety, or impiety*, *or contempt of the means.*

b) In the meantime, we are *not* permitted to inquire *too curiously* into the reason which divine providence regards concerning the end *of each* individual's life, according to that in *John 21:22,* where Christ, speaking to Peter, who was concerned about the end of John's life, said: "*If I will that he remain until I come, what is that to you?"* And just as in other things, so in those which pertain to the end of men's lives, the divine *judgments* are often *ἀνεξερεύνητα, inscrutable*, *Romans 11:33.*

DANNHAUER: "What is to be thought, you ask, of *the fatal term of life*? I say, *that it is fatal.* For the testimonies of Scripture are too clear, when *days* are called חֲרוּצִים, *defined, decided, measured, decreed,* Job 14:5. So that the mouth may be stopped of the Epicureans' *τῷ αὐτοσχεδίως ('improvization')*. If the hairs are numbered, Matt. 10:29, 30, how much more the days of life? If a sparrow does not fall to the ground without the divine will, how can a man fall by chance without providence? *By fate or absolute decree:* 1. As to the determination to this *particular thing and now*; for although long life is promised to the obedient son, the precise *limit* of that long life is not designated—not the year, not the hour, not the moment; just as the hour of birth is absolutely decreed, so is that of death. 2. As to the manner of death. Eccles. 3:2. For although a robber deserves the gallows, it is not always inflicted; thus, ordinarily, the blood of the one who sheds blood must be shed again, Gen. 9:6; but a thief is often punished in a way other than by the shedding of blood, or goes completely unpunished. 3. Regarding the *inscrutable* and *arbitrary nature* of divine judgment*,* by which it happens that a young son, though pious, is more quickly cut off sooner than expected. *Or* 2. by *hypothetical* or *physical fatality*, estimated from the course of natural causes, by which human life is defined *as* seventy years *on the average*, Ps. 90:11... *Or a moral one,* necessary by hypothesis, the connection of which is as it were choral: If David honors his parents, i.e., all who are in the place of parents, not even excepting his father-in-law Saul, if he religiously worships the heavenly Father, if he lives piously, justly, and temperately, let him be long-lived; but if not, he will not grow to maturity. This term, taken by itself, is *shortened* by apocope, and *is* either *lengthened by* the aforementioned temperance, medical care, piety toward parents, and an extraordinary grace of God,

such as happened to Hezekiah 2 Kings 20:1 ff. Isa. 38:1ff., or *curtailed* by intemperance, neglect of medicine, Absalom-like impiety (for who would doubt that Absalom, endowed not only with such beauty of form but also with robust health and strength, could have drawn out his thread of life longer than he did, had he not brought about his own ruin by rising up against his father?), *by his own hand, by* the just wrath of God the avenger, 'this year you shall die, because you have counseled apostasy,' Jer. 28:16, or by His same secret and inscrutable counsel. Otherwise, the promises of long life and the prayers of the pious for it would be in vain, Exod. 20:12; Deut. 5:16 and 33; Eph. 6:3, and the threats of the wicked's *short life*, Lev. 26:25 ff.; Ps. 55:24; without repentance, security would rush on with full sails; if the end of life were plainly fatal, it would be ridiculous for anyone to either flee dangers or seek a remedy for preserving life. For that which happens by a wholly inevitable necessity can neither be postponed by any means nor cut short by any dangers." (*Hodos. Phaen*. III. p. 170.)

## § 20.

The *proximate* end of divine providence is the utility of men, especially the pious;[(a)] the *ultimate end* is the glory of divine wisdom, power, and especially goodness.[(b)]

a) Thus in *Ps. 33:18-19* it is said that the *eye of Jehovah* is *on those who fear Him and hope in His mercy, to deliver their soul from death and to revive them in famine.* And *Rom. 8:28: For those who love God all things work together (συνεργεῖ) for good.* See what we have said about the degrees of providence, § 9. Here, however, it must be observed at the same time that the discourse is about the benefit of pious men not precisely temporal, but chiefly spiritual, to the promotion of which God above all things tends through various circumstances and many trials.

b) See *Ps. 104* and *136* in their entirety. And God always attains this end, even if men, through their own fault, sometimes prevent the benefit which God intends does not redound to them.

## § 21.

Divine providence can be defined as the practical direct knowledge of God's divine will,[(a)] a benevolent [(b)] purpose concerning all creatures,[(c)] especially men and the faithful in the society of men, to be preserved and [(d)] governed, for [(e)] the benefit of those very men and for the glory of divine wisdom, power, and goodness.

a) For we have thus admonished that providence in its proper sense is an act of both the divine intellect and will. § 2, note *d.*

b) By which name we designate the impulsive cause; of which we spoke in § 5. The efficient cause, however, is involved in the very terms of the divine will and the knowledge of God; cf. § 4.

c) To those who constitute the object of providence, see § 6.

d) Which are the acts to which divine providence is directed, see § 8.

e) These pertain to the end, concerning which see § 20.

# Chapter VI. ^

ON ETERNAL BLESSEDNESS.

## § 1.

Since it is established that God is our supreme good and the objective end of theology, [(a)] further, the operation by which we fully and perfectly [(b)] possess and enjoy God as the ultimate [(c)] formal end [(c)] must be examined from the Scriptures.[(d)]

a) See above Proleg. chap. I. § 4. Vol. I. p. 9. and § 17. p. 38.

b) For our blessedness consists in the most perfect vital operation, which has its perfection *partly* from the object, *partly* from the mode by which it attains the object.

c) Once this is obtained, our appetite is completely satisfied.

d) For although man in his present state can, by the guidance of the light of nature, know that after this life there is another, and that in it the good will fare well, God rewarding good deeds, and that the blessedness of souls also consists in knowledge; however, a more distinct knowledge of that blessedness and of the clear knowledge of God cannot be obtained by the guidance of the light of nature, but must be learned from divine revelation. Compare, *Mus., Introd*. chap. II. § 9. no. IX. p. 38. 39.

> GERHARD: "Just as the most grievous fall has almost completely extinguished and obliterated the image of God in man and the good of eternal life has been lost, so also the knowledge of that supreme good, for which man was first created, has been miserably obscured and its desire has almost entirely languished. Augustine, serm. 19. *de verb. Apost*.: 'This principally distinguishes Christians from the error of the Gentiles, that they believe not only in this life, but also in the future one.' Meanwhile, however, just as certain remnants of the divine image and faint little sparks of that most brilliant light remained in the human soul, so too a faint knowledge and a certain general appetite for that blessedness remained, from which source flowed whatever the Gentiles had concerning the rewards of the good to be expected after this life, concerning the immortality of the soul, of the Elysian fields is found. But this *knowledge,* as I have said, is not only *imperfect* and *obscure,...* but also the *assent* arising from it is *feeble and weak,* indeed, it easily vanishes in temptations and adversities. Plato in the *Phaedo*: *τὸ μὲν σαφῦς εἰδεναι περὶ τῆς μελλοῦσης ζωῆς ἐν τῷ νὴν βίῳ ἢ ἀδυνατόν ἐστιν, ἢ παγχάλεπον* [to know the truth about the future life in this life is either impossible or very difficult]. . . When, therefore, it is said, 'that every will tends to happiness,' this is to be understood of happiness in its generality, in the appetite for which all share; but as happiness is taken specifically for that which consists in the vision of God, it is neither desired by all, nor do all tend to it." (*Loc. de vita aeterna*, § 33.)

## § 2.

Man, however, can attain to God, as the supreme good, by this, that God is made intimately present to his intellect

through the most perfect act of cognition, occupied with God; which is commonly called the *beatific vision.*[(a)]

a) Or *the clear* and *intuitive knowledge* of God. This is called *vision*, in a *metaphorical* sense, because by it we are to know God as distinctly and clearly as we know an object that we see with our eyes; and *beatific*, because it is the formal reason by which we are constituted blessed. To which pertains what is said in *Matthew 5:8*: "*Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God."* Of these words, *Gerhard* in his Commentary p. 259. *Most,* he says, *take it of the beatific vision in eternal life.* And he adds: *They will see God, i.e., they will dwell with God in eternal life and will know Him perfectly.* He also brings together the passages *1 Cor. 13:12, 1 John 3:2, Heb. 12:14.* And indeed, in *Matthew 5:8*, an *intellectual* or spiritual vision of God is clearly indicated, corresponding to the spiritual purity of the heart. And so also the passage in *Hebrews 12:14* is understood. But what is said in *1 Corinthians 13:12*, *that* we *now see through a mirror in an enigma,* someday (with the imperfections of this life removed) *face to face*, is also explained by *Baldwin* in his Analysis or Exposition as referring to *a more exact knowledge,* by which *we shall know God intimately and perfectly; for it is a Hebraism in the phrase 'face to face'; otherwise God would not have a face. And these things, which* Paul *has hitherto taught by means of similitudes*, *he now proceeds to state more clearly, as the sum of the whole matter,* (when he says:) *Now I know in part, then I shall know fully, even as I am fully known*. See the Paraphrase of this passage, and Questions II. and III., also Aphorism 8. And the matter speaks for itself, that in the very nature of *intellectual* vision, *opposite* members are presented for the state of *this* life and of the *other* life. Which, finally, is said in *1 John 3:2*: "*Beloved, now we are children of God, and what we shall be has not yet appeared." but we know that when He appears, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is.* This concerns *the knowledge* of God (whose children we are) and *that perfect knowledge, as far as it is possible for a creature,* which is to be expected *in the future age*, which was long ago explained by *Hunnius* in his *Commentary*. Compare on these and other places *David Chytraeus, Lib. de Morte et Vita Aet*. P. I. p. 172. sqq.

> GERHARD: "Whenever either Holy Scripture or the ecclesiastical writers establish beatitude in *the vision* and knowledge of God, it is not the bare act *of the intellect* that is noted, but the act *of the will* is also connoted, and thus the full possession and attainment of that supreme good, which is obtained through knowledge and love in eternal life. For as is most common, the words of knowledge among the Hebrews connote the affections and effects that follow; on this matter, Bonaventure discusses it thus in 4 Sent. dist. 49, q. 5, art. 1: 'The three glorious or beatific acts, perfect vision of God, perfect charity, and perfect fruition, are joined and connected to one another; therefore, by and because of this connection, what is common to all is attributed to one; but it is attributed more to vision, because in vision the state of the homeland is distinguished from the state of the journey; not so in charity, because in both there is charity. (*Loc. de vita aeterna*. § 119.)

## § 3.

For a more accurate understanding of this very operation of the intellect, a *comparison* must be made [(a)] between the knowledge we have of God *in this life* and the kind that is to be expected *after this*

life. Indeed, in this life we can form only *inadequate* concepts [c] of God from intelligible *species* drawn from created things and from the revealed *Word*;[b] after this life we shall know *God*—and all that is *formally* in Him [d] — in *a single, simple act*, without any intelligible species.[e]

a) As Scripture itself leads us*, 1 Cor. 13:12,* comparing what *now and then,* with regard to the knowledge of God and divine things, befalls us. And *1 John 3:2: "οὔπω ἐφανερώθη, ἐὰν δὲ φανερωθῇ, it has not yet now appeared; but when He shall appear, etc.*."

b) This is commonly called *abstractive* cognition, and is described in another way as being cognition *either* of an object *not* actually *existing* (which account does not fit here, since God always and necessarily exists), *or* of an object that does exist, but *not* through *its proper* species*, nor immediately* and by being joined to the intellect through its own substance. Cf. *Musaeus*, *Libell. de aet. beat*, § 19, pp. 8–9.

c) As we said above in chapter I, § 6, note *b,* p. 14, we *do not have* in this life *a cognitive and adequate understanding of the divine essence, its proper and adequate reason.*

d) Namely the divine *essence, persons*, and *attributes*. But the free *decrees* of God (which, although on the part of God, insofar as they are concerned with what is directly involved, are within God, as acts of the divine will, nevertheless, with respect to what they imply indirectly, involve something outside of God, and contingent, that is, insofar as they are terminated to things outside of God, to be future in time) and likewise the *perfections* and *actions of creatures* are *not* equally attained by the blessed by virtue of that knowledge. This pertains to the fact that in *Matthew 24:36* and *Mark 13:32,* the *angels,* though blessed, are said to be *ignorant of the day* of the final judgment. And concerning *Abraham* and *Israel,* though blessed and clearly seeing God, *Isaiah (ch. 63:16)* says: "*He does not know us; he has forgotten us."* Meanwhile, it is not denied that the blessed can know certain things from *a special manifestation* of God that they do not know by the power of beatific vision; as we will say in § 6 and the notes.

e) Hence it is commonly called *intuitive* cognition and is described as being not only of an object actually *existing,* but also as a cognition that is further *conjoined* and present to the intellect*, either* by *its proper* species *or immediately* by its very substance. And in this place the *latter* account is in effect. Scripture calls *it a face-to-face vision in 1 Cor. 13,* and *the vision* of God *as He is* in *1 John 3.* The term *comprehensive* knowledge is also known, from which the blessed are also called *comprehenders*, according to *1 Cor. 9:24 and Phil. 3:12–13.* For they are said, in *opposition* to the *runners* in the stadium, *to lay hold of the prize,* which is *formally* accomplished by this very vision of God. However, this must *not* be understood as if the intellect of the blessed is to comprehend God in the same way that God Himself comprehends Himself; *but* only that *nothing of those things which are* formally *in God will be hidden from* the glorified intellect. Cf. *Augustine.* Epist. CXII. c. IX. Certainly that knowledge is *τέλειος, perfect*, contradistinguished from that which is made ἐκ *μέρους, in part*.

## § 4.

Therefore, for this knowledge or beatific vision of God, it is necessary that, in addition to the human *intellect*,[a] the *light* of glory [a] and the divine *essence* and *persons* themselves,[c] with their *perfections,* also concur.

a) For that vision is a *vital* act*,* formally pertaining to the intellect.

b) For otherwise our intellect is not proportioned and able to know God *perfectly*, since all our natural knowledge in some way depends on the senses. Therefore, it needs another principle. It is, however, the *light of glory*, insofar as it is a spiritual habit, supernaturally infused into the intellect and elevating it beyond its natural powers to know God clearly in Himself, and, in place of an imprinted species, determining it to elicit the act of intuitive cognition. And it is called *light,* because it provides the intellect, like the eye of the mind, with the same function that proper light, for example that of the sun, provides for the bodily eye by illuminating the air and making colors visible, enabling the eye to receive the species it perceives and to know them. It is called the light *of glory* because in the state *of glory,* or of the future life, according to *1 Cor. 15:40,* it is granted to our intellect to behold God, who is our *glory*, and makes us *glorious*; just as Moses received rays from the presence of God, *Exod. 34:29.*

c) For it is not the knowledge of any object whatsoever, but *of God,* and indeed a *clear* knowledge. See *Mus.,* 1. c. § 32. pp. 17-18.

## § 5.

This beatific vision is not a free act,[a] but *a necessary one*, *both* with respect to its exercise *and* to the species of the act,[b] and therefore the blessed will never cease from it, nor will they be able to cease.[c]

a) For other acts *of faith*, indeed, depending on the light *of grace*, are *freely* elicited, so that they could also not be elicited, and the intellect, negligent in its duty, could form another conception of spiritual objects for itself. But here the case is different.

b) For the *intellect*, since it is not a free but a necessary power, given all that is required for this action (see § 4)*, cannot but* act; and *the will cannot turn* the intellect *away* from the exercise of that act*,* because it cannot remove or hinder *either* the influx of the glory of grace *or* the conjunction of the divine essence with the intellect. But the will *also* does not wish to turn the intellect away from the contemplation of its object, which is the supreme good and is perfectly represented to the intellect.

c) For what is said of the holy angels in *Matthew 18:10,* that *they always see the face of the Father who is in heaven,* will also hold true of the blessed.

# § 6.

Although the beatific *vision* is occupied *exclusively* with contemplating God and those things which are formally in Him;[(a)] nevertheless, the intellect of the blessed in this state will also be competent *to know other* things, so that each one will perfectly and clearly know *his own* condition or felicity, as well as *his companions* in beatitude,[(b)] through proper species, *whether* infused *or* acquired.[(c) (d)]

a) For it is the vision *of God,* not of other objects.

b) See Matthew *17:1-3,* where the apostles, having only a foretaste of eternal life, recognized Moses and Elijah. Cf. *David Chytraeus*, *Lib. de Morte et V. Aet* (1650), Part I, pp. 65 ff.; *Aegidius Hunnius*, Tom. I. Dispp. Marp. disp. XLIII. (1650), Disp. XLIII. p. 543., *Hutter.* Comp. L. XXXIV. Qu. 5., *Gerh.,* T. VIII. L. ult. § 147. p. 1002.

GERHARD: "At the Transfiguration of Christ, Peter, James, and John see and recognize Moses and Elijah, never before seen. . . Just as Christ restored to His mother the widow's son whom He had raised from the dead at Nain (Luke 7:15), and as Peter *presented* Tabitha, whom He had raised from the dead, *to* her friends and relatives (Acts 9:41), so on the day of the restitution of all things (Acts 3:21), the pious children and relatives will be restored to their blessed parents, relatives, and friends, some of whom they did not see in this life, and vice versa, parents will be restored to their children for the sweetest and most delightful conversation in the same *fellowship* of happiness and joy. Gen. 15:15: ,'You shall go to your fathers.' Deut. 32:50: 'You shall be gathered to your people.' 2 Sam. 12:23: 'I shall go to him.' Heb. 12:22-23: 'You have come to the city of the living God and of the spirits of the just made perfect.' ... If the rich man, in the flames of hell, recognized Lazarus in Abraham's bosom, Luke 16:23, how much more will the blessed recognize the companions and sharers of their blessedness? If John, still hidden in his mother's womb, recognized the present Christ, Luke 1:41, how much more will the blessed, introduced into the full possession of heavenly happiness, recognize Christ, the patriarchs, the prophets, the apostles, and all the partners of their blessedness? If in this life children recognize their parents and parents recognize their children, then surely in the future life Abraham, the prophets, and the apostles, as spiritual parents, will recognize their spiritual children, that is, all the elect, and vice versa. For it would be absurd to posit a greater knowledge in this life than in the life to come." (*Loc. de vit. aet*. § 147.)

THE SAME: "Will the blessed in eternal life see and recognize their kinsmen among *the damned*? — Just as Abraham saw the rich man in Hades, whom he calls his son by the bond of carnal generation, Luke 16:25., so the blessed will also see their own acquaintances and relatives, whom they held dear in this life, among the damned, whenever they wish; but without any feeling of compassion and without any disturbance of their own joy, because their will will be perfectly conformed to the divine will. Therefore, those whom they know to be eternally cast away from the face of God will not in the least desire any help or consolation for them from an inordinate affection; as the example of the rich man in the same parable teaches, for he cannot even obtain a drop of water from Abraham. Ps. 58:11: 'The righteous will rejoice when he sees the vengeance.' Therefore, a disturbance of joy is not to be feared from that vision, because every carnal affection, by which the blessed in this life pursued their relatives, will have been abolished. God has loved the human race far more ardently than any parent in this life

can love his own son, because He gave His only-begotten Son to the world and delivered Him to death to redeem the human race; yet his happiness and joy will in no way be disturbed by the sight of the damned. Prov. 1:26 [text: 1:24]: 'I will laugh at your destruction.' A greater affection will extinguish a lesser one, the spiritual and heavenly the carnal." (L. c. § 148.)

c) For in the same way, by the virtue of the light of glory, which perfects the intellect and supplies its natural defect, it can penetrate more intimately not 'the nature of a single object, but of several.' Cf. *Mus.,* 1. c. § 42. p. 25.

d) And thus the intellect of the blessed will also be able to know the free *decrees* of God, not through the beatific vision itself, but through *a special revelation,* if God should will to communicate any to them, the light of glory at the same time making the intellect fit to assent, so that it may give its assent without any hesitation. See *Mus.,* 1. c. § 41. sqq.

GERHARD: "In the future life, a perfect knowledge of God and divine mysteries will take place. Then we will fully and perfectly understand those things, to whose intuitive and clear knowledge we could not penetrate in this life; how, for instance, God is one in essence, three in persons? How the Son of God is eternally begotten of the Father? how the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son? why the Son of God, and not the Father or the Holy Spirit, assumed human nature? why it was necessary for our mediator to be both God and man? how the divine and human natures are personally united in Christ? how God created all things out of nothing? on what day He created the angels? etc. Then we will fully and perfectly understand the reasons for the divine counsels and works, namely, creation, redemption, sanctification, resurrection, and glorification; how God created man with immense wisdom, preserved him with ineffable goodness, and redeemed him with infinite mercy? how by His eternal omnipotence He has defended the Church against its enemies and raised the pious from death to eternal life? Then we will fully and perfectly know the nature of the new heaven and the new earth, and thus the innermost secrets and deepest recesses of all creatures; then we will no longer be forced to complain, like the Aesopian stork, 'licking the glass, not reaching the porridge,' but we will behold the inner forms and properties of things with the present intuition of the mind. For if Adam, by the light of the wisdom with which he was created, could so accurately discern the natures of the animals that he gave each one a name fitting to it, Genesis 2:19, and could understand that Eve, previously unseen, had been formed from his own flesh and bones, verse 28, how much more will the blessed, enlightened by divine light, be able to perfectly behold the mysteries of heaven and earth.' . . Augustine, *de triplic. habitae*, ch. 4.: There, whatever is now hidden from us will be made manifest; there the reason will be clear why this one was chosen and that one rejected, why this one was taken up into the kingdom and that one reduced to servitude, why one dies in the womb, another in infancy, another in youth, and another in old age. Why one is poor and another rich; why the son of an adulteress is baptized, and sometimes the son of a legitimate wife dies before baptism. Why he who begins to live well sometimes ends badly. All these things and many such like will be plain and open to all in the book of life, that is, of eternal truth and supreme wisdom. There all will know each other's thoughts, etc." (L. c. § 73. sq.)

## § 7.

In the meantime, that vision of God is truly *beatific* (a) and, just as it makes man a partaker of the highest good,(b) so it leads him to that state in which he becomes as much *like to God* as possible.(c)

a) Indeed, our *blessed life* will *formally* consist in this very thing: that our mind will operate most perfectly within itself concerning the most perfect object.

b) By uniting God, the most perfect being, to us, and doing so most intimately within us.

c) Thus *it* is stated explicitly in *1 John 3:2: ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ ἐσόμεθα*, we shall be like Him. And this pertains to that *participation (κοινωνία) in the divine nature,* of which Peter speaks in *2 Peter 1:4,* which is indeed in some way begun in this life, but perfected in the other. Compare *Gerhard,* in *Comment*. ad h. l. p. 39.

## § 8.

However, that same vision of God, although formally pertaining to the intellect, will necessarily [(a)] draw the *will* of the blessed man to a *love* of God [(b)] *most intense*;[(c)] and thus it will come about that man *will enjoy* God as his highest good.[(d)]

a) Of course, by the very fact that the supreme and infinite good is clearly known, there is no room in the intellect for any *indifference* of knowledge (see notes a and *b* to § 5), or *comparative* knowledge, as some speak, or such knowledge by which other goods, as equal to this good, or superior to it, or to be preferred and more desirable, can be known.

b) For Scripture connects the knowledge of God most closely with His love, as we read in *1 John 4:7-8*: "*Everyone who loves is born of God and knows God. Whoever does not love does not know God, because God is love.*" Hence it is certain that the blessed, the more perfectly they know God, the more they love Him. And Paul says that *charity will never fail,* that is, will have its place not only in this life but also in the other, and, in this respect, *is superior to faith*, in *1 Cor. 13:8.* But the chief object of charity is God. Compare *Chytraeus*, 1. c. p. 173. 174., where he also refers to this the fact that, according to *the most common phrase in the sacred Scriptures, the words of knowledge and of the senses do not encompass a bare and solitary cognition, but the recognition or apprehension of the object in the mind or sense, and even the unfeigned affections in the will and heart, and the effects or actions following that knowledge and vision.* Add what he has on p. 197 ff.

c) So indeed, that although the *understanding* is by nature *prior to the love* of God, it nevertheless finds its place in the soul of the blessed man at the same time and in the same moment (if one may speak thus of the state of eternity) as that love.

d) For *to enjoy a good* is nothing other than *to cling to it in love for its own sake,* as *Augustine* says in Lib. I. *de Doctr. Christ*, chapter III.

## § 9.

Therefore, the will, being perfectly [(a)] determined and holy [(b)] to the love of God, will not *be able* to fall away from God [(c)] *nor sin*.[(d)]

a) See what was said in § 5, note *b,* and § 8*, a.* Of course, when the will cannot turn the intellect away from the exercise of intuitive vision of God, the intellect itself, being fixed on God and representing Him as the supremely good thing, always affects, yearns for, and delights in the good.

> GERHARD: "God is life itself, light, essential blessedness; therefore, from the vision of God, the elect partake of life, light, and blessedness. The perfectly known supreme good cannot but be loved; therefore, from the vision of God arises perfect love of God. The perfectly known and loved supreme good cannot but be praised and glorified; for what one loves, one also praises; therefore, from the vision and love of God arise glorification and exultation." (*Harm. ev*. c. 176. f. 1271.)

> THE SAME: "Because the blessed will know God, the supreme good, *intuitively and perfectly*, they will therefore, having perfectly recognized that supreme good, adhere inseparably to it through a holy movement of the will, and consequently, just as all cloud of ignorance will be expelled from the mind, so every inclination toward evil will be expelled from the will. In God, as the infinite good, all goods are eminently contained, and thus the entire scope of the object of the will, to which it is naturally directed, is found, so that nothing better can be conceived or desired by man; From this it follows that the blessed cannot, by their own will, turn away from God or desire anything else, except in relation to that adequate object, since in it are contained the highest perfection of man, the complement of all desire, and the ultimate end at which the will rests, desiring nothing else. Therefore, from the very nature of their state—that is, from the beatific vision of God—and not merely from an extrinsic law of God, as some scholastics hold, the blessed will be *confirmed in good.* Just as in Christ there was no disordered movement of the will, no stain of sin, no blemish of iniquity, but the most exact conformity with the norm of divine law: so in the blessed the will immutably chooses the good recognized and shown by the intellect, without any proneness to sin whatsoever. Just as the angels, because they 'always see the face of the Father who is in heaven,' Matt. 18:10, are confirmed in good and freed from the danger of sinning: so the blessed, as they will be *ἰσάγγελοι* [equal to angels], perfectly holy and confirmed in good, will be through and because of the beatific vision of God." (*Loc. de vita aet*. § 75.)

b) Separated from the common, profane, and impure way of living in this world, consecrated to God and conformed to the most holy God, so that the holiness will be greater than that which had been bestowed upon the first-formed [Adam and Eve].

c) Not only because the blessed will no longer be exposed to the snares of Satan and the scandals of the world, to its threats and seductions, and because the temptation of the flesh and the struggle, and the very root of original sin, will have entirely vanished, but also because of that full adhesion of the will to God. And this is the *ἀναμαρτησία* or *impeccability* that is usually ascribed to the blessed, similar to that which we observed in the blessed angels in chapter III, § 30.

d) *This* pertains to that *righteousness* in which David asserted that he would see *the face* of God after this life*, Psalm 17:15,* and to the fact that *the church* is called *ἔνδοξος, glorious* or triumphant, *having no spot or wrinkle, Ephesians 5:27*—a description which is most rightly understood of inherent and perfect holiness. Some call this holiness of the blessed *"angelic-like,"* alluding to *Matthew 22:30.* They also refer to that *pure* and *splendid fine linen,* which consists in *the righteousnesses of the saints, Revelation 19:14.*

## § 10.

Although through that determination of the will to embrace the highest good constantly, the freedom or indifference toward good and [b] evil is removed;[a] yet a more excellent *freedom* will in fact be present, since with respect to many good things, finite and particular,[c] the blessed will be able to act or not act, to undertake this or that action.

a) Nor is this perfection spoken of *absolutely*, but only *in comparison* to a power which is uniquely determined to evil and cannot do good, indeed, is at the same time an imperfection, being able to sin. Compare, ch. III. on angels § 31.

b) For it has been stated in § 8 that the supreme and infinite good cannot be indifferently desired or hated by the blessed.

c) For among such things, comparative knowledge has its place. Meanwhile, it is certain that whatever the blessed do concerning various particular goods, all of it is precisely referred by them to the glory of God. And such freedom, properly speaking, and perfection simply speaking, therefore also pertains to the angels (see above ch. III, § 31), and even to God in His own way.

## § 11.

Finally, from the vision of God is born an ineffable delight [a] or joy [b] which affects those who behold [c] and love [d] God.

a) As *a kind of ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος,* or *a* supervening *end,* or one that comes of its own accord, as Aristotle elsewhere speaks, when he teaches that delight or pleasure arises from every perfect operation, X. *Ethic*. chap. IV.

b) Or that by whose power the blessed soul peacefully acquiesces in the possession and enjoyment of the good present. Hence it is rightly called a *heavenly* and *spiritual* joy*, Rom. 14:17, intimate and most full,* or the joy *of the heart, John 16:22. 1 John 1:4*, like *that of a wedding (Revelation 19:7),* or *a festive one (Luke 22:30)*, amid *songs and dances,* like *that of the triumphant* or *of those freed* from prison *(Revelation 5:9; 14:3).* Ep. *Jude v. 24.,* to which also pertains that of *Isa. 35:10.,* where the joy of the blessed is graphically described under the type of the returning from Babylonian captivity: *The redeemed of the Lord shall return and come to Zion with joy; and everlasting joy* shall be *upon their heads; they shall obtain joy and gladness, and sorrow and sighing shall flee away.* Cf. *Chytraeus*, 1. c. p. 207 ff.

c) For *seeing* and *rejoicing* are joined together in *Isa. 66:14 and John 16:22.* And in *Ps. 16:11,* these are joined together: You will *show me the path of life* (and) *the fullness of joy in your presence* (i.e., in your sight, or, when I see you), *pleasures forever at your right hand.* Likewise *Ps. 17, last verse: I shall see your face* and *be satisfied,* and thus seeing I shall rest

in you. Indeed, even the very words *for 'to see'* in the holy language, especially when they are constructed with the preposition ב, are accustomed to import a certain resting in the good, or delight. See *Ps. 50, last verse: I will let him see the salvation of the Lord.* Cf. *Tarnov.* on *Micah 4:11, Obadiah 12,* and *Geier* on the Psalms, passim.

GERHARD: "Since God is the supreme and infinite good, the highest sweetness, the highest delight, etc., therefore from the vision of God there cannot but arise an ineffable joy and an inexpressible pleasure. If the created sun has such power and efficacy that by its heat it not only imparts life to growing things, but also most sweetly refreshes and wonderfully delights the minds of men, nay, all creatures, by the diffusion of its rays of light: how much greater the joy must be believed to be poured into the breasts of the pious, when they behold the Creator of the sun, the Sun of righteousness, the cause of all gladness and salvation, not only with their eyes, but also, the darkness of sin being utterly dispelled, partake of His very essence and enjoy Him most fully! The secondary and less principal causes are the other goods of eternal life, both internal and external, of the body and of the soul, both privative and positive, to be sometime conferred upon the elect in eternal life. The elect will rejoice *above themselves* in the vision of God, *within themselves* in the glorification of the soul and body, *around themselves* in the association of holy angels and all the blessed, and *below themselves* in their escape from hell. They will have joy *from* Christ, *in* Christ, *with* Christ, *after* Christ, *through* Christ, *for* Christ's sake." (L. c. § 65.)

d) For otherwise, people can *languish* or *wither from love*, *either* when they love someone of whom they cannot become fully aware, *or* when imperfection and disgust can find a place in the good thing loved itself, *or when* the appetite itself becomes fatigued: *here,* however, the perfection of both the beloved *object* and the *act* itself excludes all tedium or sorrow and, on the contrary, is a source of perpetual joy.

## § 12.

However, that beatific vision, together with the love and joy born of it, will be in *all* blessed men [(a)] *equally perfect.* [(b)]

a) For Scripture here makes no distinction that would apply to different subjects (see the cited passages: *1 John 3:2, 1 Cor. 13:12),* but the very nature of the case shows that, when God is seen as He is, that knowledge cannot be intensified or diminished, while still remain clear and intuitive. And, if the vision is the same in all, the love and joy that spring from it will likewise be equal.

a) It is clear, however, that the discussion is about the perfection of knowledge as regards its intensity. For we do not deny that, *extensively* speaking, not indeed the beatific vision of God, but the knowledge of other objects, *greater* or *lesser,* may exist in the blessed. See § 6 above.

## § 13.

Besides these, however, which pertain to the essence [(a)] of beatitude and which furthermore [(b)] formally consist in the soul,

it pleases God to add other gifts,[(c)] by which the *bodies* of the blessed are perfected and made blessed as much as possible.

a) For the *very first* concept of blessedness, which has no other prior to it (since it imports the attainment and possession of the highest good, which is to be sought for its own sake, and which primarily pertains to an intelligent nature), consists in the *vision of God* itself joined with perfect *love*; yet between these there is a certain order, in that *love* presupposes *vision*, although they are not separated in time.

b) E.g., the knowledge of other objects, by which the intellect is perfected; see § 6 and notes.

c) Just as beatitude is elsewhere called *a state perfected by the aggregation of all good;* such as when it is to be given to man, all the faculties of the soul and the body itself must be perfected, so that it may be the beatitude not of the soul only, but of the whole man.

GERHARD: "The body was the organ of good works in this life, 2 Cor. 5:10; therefore it is fitting that it be taken into the communication of the reward and fellowship of glory. The body, made conformable through sufferings and the cross to the image of Christ crucified; Gal. 6:17: , 'I bear the marks of Christ in my body'; it is therefore just that it be conformed to the image of the glorified Christ. Between the body and the soul there is a most close union and intimate conjunction even in this life, so that sadness, sorrow, and other affections of the soul affect the body itself; therefore, in the other life as well, because of the most close and indissoluble union of the soul and body, the glory and joy of the soul will overflow into the body of the blessed." (*Loc. de vita aet*. § 80.)

## § 14.

But the beatitude of the blessed bodies will consist, first of all, in this, that the bodies will be *spiritual*,[(a)] that is, subject in the most perfect way to the soul, which is the spirit, and indeed *partly* as the informing form,[(b)] *partly* as the moving principle.[(c)]

a) See *1 Cor. 15:44.* However*,* the *change* of the body *into a spirit,* which is immaterial by essence, must *not* be understood.

LUTHER: "It is not called a *spiritual* body for the reason that he should not live corporally, nor have flesh and blood; otherwise it could not be called a true body. Now, however, it is called a spiritual body, in such a way that it is to have life, yet will no longer be an eating, sleeping, dying body, but will be spiritually nourished and sustained by God and have life in him in its fullness. Afterwards, when it thus lives spiritually in God, it will also go forth into heaven and earth, playing with the sun and moon and all other creatures, and also having his joy and pleasure in them, and being so full and blissful from them that he will never again think of eating or drinking, and thus will be, and be called, a wholly spiritual being or life of the entire man, which will spring from the spirit and go from or through God without a mediator; so that we will not only be enlightened and know Him by the soul, but he will also pass through the whole body, making it as clear and light

as the air, so sharp in sight and hearing, as far as the world extends, that we will need no other thing to sustain and keep us alive, and yet have a true body. Just as the stars in the sky are now made so that they need nothing for their being, and yet are also corporeal creatures; although they do not have such an earthly, but a heavenly body." (*Ausl, des 15. Cap. der 1. Ep. St. Pauli an die Cor*. 1534. VIII, 1539.)

b) This is the *subtlety* of bodies, by whose power bodies will thus sustain their souls without imperfection, as if they themselves were spirits; and thus they will also be able to *penetrate* other solid *bodies*. See Epist. ad *Phil. 3:21,* collated with *John 20:19 and 26, and also Luke 24:37 and 39.* For the proof comes down to this: If Christ, with His glorified body, penetrated through doors that were truly closed at the time and could be seen substantially present, and if our bodies, in the state of a different life, are to be conformed to the glorious body of Christ, then it follows that our bodies will likewise be so subtle that, without any new change or injury to themselves or their bodies, they can penetrate another solid body. The former is proved partly from the cited chapters of *John and Luke,* partly from *Phil. chapter 3.* E. The latter is also true. Cf. *Ausführl. Erklärung* L. IV. Q. XXI. p. 175.176.

GERHARD: "We say, the bodies of the blessed will be *subtle and penetrable. . .* A subtle body is one that penetrates and from which the repugnance of existing in the same place as another body has been removed. . . The blessed will be *ἰσάγγελοι* [equal to angels]. Now indeed the angels are of a very subtle essence, endowed with the faculty of penetrating. Acts 12:12. The angel, leading Peter out of prison, could not be held back by any doors or bars from standing before Peter in the prison. Therefore, the bodies of the blessed will also be subtle. . . Christ at the resurrection penetrated the closed sepulchre, after His resurrection entered the closed doors to His disciples, at the ascension He penetrated the heavens, as has been demonstrated by many in the treatise on the resurrection. Therefore, the bodies of the blessed will also be endowed with this property." (L. c. § 98.)

QUENSTEDT: "The bodies of the blessed will be *illocal*, i.e., not circumscribed by a physical, corporeal place. They will not be everywhere, but in a certain *τόν* [place], definite, not circumscriptive; for they will be immune from the circumscription and boundary of the external place, e.g., from the air or another surrounding element; for those elements will be abolished." (L. c. f. 800.)

c) And this is the *agility* of the bodies, by which they will be able to move most easily and swiftly, wherever their souls will wish to move them. See *1 Cor. 15:43,* where it is said that the *bodies* of the pious, which are sown in weakness, will rise *in power (ἐν δυνάμει),* which means that, since in this life the human body is heavy, slow, sluggish, and lazy, it will receive a special *δυνάμιν* or power and agility at the resurrection, so that it can move very quickly. Conf. *Ausführl. Erklärung* 1. c. p. 176. It also refers to the same power of the bodies of the blessed, which is stated *in 1 Thess. 4:*77, *that the faithful will be caught up to meet the Lord in the air.* But if you were to ask me to explain the *mode* of motion, I think I would rightly say, with *Augustine* (L. XXII, *de Civ. D*., cap. XXX): "*What* the *motions of such bodies will be, I do not dare rashly to define, because I am not able to conceive it."*

GERHARD: "We say that the bodies of the blessed will be *agile,* that is, endowed with a supernatural faculty or quality for moving expeditiously, because glorified bodies will be able to move very swiftly by this gift, not only with a progressive motion, but also with one that will be like flying;

Rather, the necessity of moving slowly and locally will be completely absent from the bodies of the blessed. . . Christ walked on the waters, Matthew 14:25. After the resurrection, He was at one moment by the sepulchre, at another in Jerusalem in the midst of the disciples, at another he joined himself to those going to Emmaus; nor did He approach slowly, but suddenly, and thus in an instant he was in different and various places. If Christ had ascended to heaven in a local and successive motion, He could not have penetrated its height in a space of several years. But in truth, the glorified bodies will be conformed to the body of Christ. . . If the blessed could not be in an instant wherever they wished, it would greatly detract from their desire and therefore also from their felicity. For if they had to move successively and locally, those who were established in one part of heaven would scarcely reach in several years the others who were established in another part of heaven." (L. c. § 96.)

THE SAME: It is asked, whether the blessed can move themselves *in an instant,* without passing through the medium? Thomas denies this in Supplement, Q. 84, Art. 3, since the glorified body is moved in time, though imperceptibly because of its brevity. But the modesty of Augustine is proven to us, who in L. 22, *de Civ. Dei*, chapter 30, writes thus: 'What kind of motions such bodies will have in the future, I do not dare rashly to define, because I am not able to conceive. There will be no time there any longer, Rev. 10:6, therefore they will also be able to move themselves in an instant ." (L. c. § 153.)

THE SAME: "It is certain that if any *weight* remains in the glorified body, no impediment will be offered to its motive power, which would prevent it from being moved in an instant to whatever place it desires; for it will be a spiritual body, that is, one perfectly obedient to the spirit." (L. c. § 153.)

LUTHER: "We know that as weak as he (the body) is now, without all strength and power, when he lies in the grave, so *strong* he will become afterward, when the time comes, that with one finger he will be able to carry this church, with one toe move a tower, and play with a great mountain as children play with a ball, and in a moment jump up to the clouds or travel over a hundred miles. For then it will be called pure *strength* (as now it is pure weakness and powerlessness), that no thing will be impossible for him, if he only sets his mind to it; that he alone might strike the whole world and become so light and agile that in an instant he will float both here on earth and above in heaven." (L. c. p. 1356. sq.)

## § 15.

Therefore, the bodies of the blessed will also be [(a)] *incorruptible*, so that they will not be subject to any corrupting passion, *whether* arising from internal *or* external causes,[(b)] and thus will be *immortal.*[(c)]

a) And perhaps indeed through that same supernatural quality by which they will be made spiritual. See above, § 14.

b) E.g., that they will be able to be harmed by *neither* heat *nor* cold, and therefore will *not* need clothes to protect them from the weather; that they will not be afflicted by hunger and thirst, *nor* in need of food or drink; that they will be subject to *no* bodily intemperance, *nor* to any internal and adverse disturbance of the soul. Compare *Rev. 7:16.* The same is usually referred to that *ἰσαγγελότης* [equality with angels] of the blessed, of which *Matt. 22:30* [text: Matt. 21:30].

GERHARD; "In a twofold respect the bodies of the blessed will be *impassible:* 1. *with respect to internal passions,* because in those bodies the spark of concupiscence, producing vicious passions, will no longer dwell; there will be no stain of sin in them; no disordered *πόθη* [passions] will be in them, but in every way they will be pure, holy, and immaculate; 2. *with respect to external passions*, because there will be nothing that can inflict suffering and pain on them; there will be in them a certain divine quality that will defend them from every corrupting alteration; they will not be harmed by heat or cold; no danger will threaten them from a wild beast; nor can they be penetrated by fire or sword." (L. c. § 89.)

c) Thus, *incorruptibility* and *immortality* are expressly attributed to the bodies of the blessed, *1 Cor. 15:42, 50, 52, 53, 54.* It is very clear that it is very different from the one it had in the state of integrity that the first parents possessed. For not only will they be able not to die, but the bodies of the blessed will not be able to die. For although God can dissolve them, He will never will to do so. Outside of God, nothing will be able to corrupt or destroy them.

## § 16.

Nevertheless, the blessed will be able to exhibit their bodies to be touched and seen [(a)] whenever they [(b)] wish.

a) Likewise, as Christ showed his glorious body to the disciples to be seen and touched, see *John 20:20, 27; Luke 24:39.* Compare *Philippians 3:21.*

b) For they can also withdraw from the senses of others whenever they wish, just as Christ did, appearing *not* to *all the people, but* to those who *were appointed as witnesses*, *Acts 10:41*, and the saints, rising with Christ and *appearing to many* (not indiscriminately to just anyone), *Matthew 27:53.*

QUENSTEDT: "It should be noted that the bodies of the blessed are called *invisible* in relation to unglorified eyes, at least with regard to the possibility of *not* appearing to the eyes of others. For glorified bodies can also be seen by unglorified eyes, if a divine dispensation intervenes. Thus the saints who rose with Christ appeared alive not to everyone, but only to those whose eyes were divinely opened. The eyes are said to be opened by which an object that is invisible by its nature and perhaps heavenly is rendered visible *by κατ' οἰκονομίαν* [by dispensation]. And thus this power to appear and not to appear depends on the economy of the divine will, even if that economy is exercised through the glorified soul as the proximate cause. Hence, of the saints rising again with Christ it is said, that *they ἐνεφανίσθησαν,* appeared, Matt. 27, 53, i.e., made themselves visible (for the Greek word has, according to Pasor in his Lexicon, a hithpaelical, i.e., reciprocal, signification), but to whom? *πολλοῖς* [to many], therefore not to all, to whom they were present." (L. c. P. I. c. 14. s. 1. th. 20. f. 800.)

GERHARD: "We say that the bodies of the blessed will be *impalpable,* that is, that they will not necessarily be touched in act by those whose sense of touch has not yet been glorified; for here too a distinction must be made between *δύναμιν* [power] and act, and likewise between the glorified and the non-glorified touch. . . Christ after His resurrection offered Himself to His disciples to be touched and handled not out of necessity of nature, but by free will, not out of some essential disposition of the glorified body, but by divine dispensation, *οὐ νόμῳ φύσεως, ἀλλ' οἰκονομίας τρόπῳ* (*Damasc*. lib. 4. orth.

fid. cap. 1.), to prove, of course, the truth of the resurrection; just as He also ate and drank with the disciples for the same purpose, Acts 10:41, not out of necessity of nature, but by free *οἰκονομία* [dispensation] through a certain *συγκατάβασιν* [condescension] (*Theoph*. in c. 24. Luke, Bede in ch. 20 Joh.) and showed them the scars of the wounds in His glorified body; meanwhile He could truly be present with His body, although He was neither seen nor touched; as appears from the fact that, while sitting with the disciples at Emmaus, He suddenly becomes *invisible*." (L. c. **§** 102**.)**

# § 17.

A *glory* will also be added to the bodies of the blessed, or [(a)] splendor [(b)] immense.[(c)]

*a)* So that they may shine *like the sun*, *Matt. 13:43. Compare 1 Cor. 15:41 ff. Dan. 12:3.*

b) He who is more exalted in his unglorified eyes will nevertheless greatly delight in the glorified.

QUENSTEDT: *"Clarity, not transparency,* such as that of glass, but a refulgence, such as that of the sun and moon, such as was on the face of Moses when he came down from the mountain, and likewise on the face of Christ, Moses, and Elijah on Mount Tabor, Matt. 17:12. In Dan. 12:3. it is said: 'But the wise shall shine like the brightness of the firmament.' Matt. 13:43.: 'Then the righteous will shine like the sun in the kingdom of my Father.'" (L. c. f. 801.)

c) And thus also the elegant proportion and beauty of the bodies of the blessed, with respect to their individual parts, is gathered.

GERHARD: "The greatest deformity before God is sin, which is the stain and blemish of the soul; when this deformity of the soul is removed, the body cannot but be most beautiful. The *deformity* of the body arises either from the mutilation of a limb, as in those who are one-eyed, lame, etc., or from a disproportion in quantity, from a lack of the proper amount, or from the addition of something incongruous, when a limb is either too large or too small, or from a disorder of the color, etc. But all these and similar causes of deformity will be far from the blessed. Sickness and old age destroy beauty. But in the eternal life, neither sickness nor old age will have a place." (L. c. § 94.)

# § 18.

And because the soul, insofar as it is sensitive, uses certain parts *of the body* as *organs*, the blessedness of the pious will be increased for this reason also, so that *the eyes,* by beholding the incarnate Son of God, their Savior,[(a)] and the blessed men [(b)] *their* friends, may perhaps also delight themselves with more elegant hymns.[(c)] [(d)]

a) Thus *Job hoped to see his Redeemer with his own eyes,* chapter 19, verses 25 and 26. However, that the blessed, *with their* glorified bodily *eyes*, will see *the divine essence* itself, *we do not dare to assert.* For *God,* who is an infinite spirit, does *not* occupy *a place* among *the proper objects of sight,* as a corporeal power does, with respect to His essence, attributes, and persons;

but also, even if it could be most clearly shown, that sight, insofar as it is regarded as a creature of God, *can* be assumed *by an* obediential *power* as an instrument for producing the vision of God, nevertheless, that this will *actually happen*, God *has never promised* in the Scriptures. Indeed, we have seen above in § 2, in the note, that the passages *Matt. 5,* 1 *Cor. 13, 1 John 3,* and *Heb. 12* speak of intellectual vision. *Balduin,* in his Commentary on *1 Cor. 13,* P. III. Q. IV, established that the *essence of God* is *invisible* to the *eyes of the body, even though they are glorified*. p. m. 490. And, lest you think he forgot this himself, he repeats and shows more at length in his Commentary on Colossians 1. P. II. Q. II. p. 1054. 1055., *that there is no proportion whatsoever between the essence or face of God and the corporeal eye.* He also appeals to the consent of the Fathers, *Ambrose, Jerome, Nazianzus, Augustine,* and others. Again in the Comm. on *1 Tim. 6.* P. II. Q. III. p. 1383. 1384., where he says *that the Epithet of God,* by which He is called *invisible*, is perpetual*, and will not cease even in the next life,* and, repeating from the previous passage, the Commentary on chapter I. Ep. to the Colossians with four arguments; he orders one to see more in *Chrysostom, Tertullian, Nazianzus, Hilary, Basil, and Irenaeus, who all show in many ways that the nature of God cannot be apprehended by the eyes of the human body, neither in this life nor in the life to come.* Whatever, however, may be said of these, it is certain that the opinion which holds *the beatific vision to be purely intellectual* is *a probable one,* even though the contrary is not for that reason immediately rejected as false; which also *Gerhard* acknowledged in Tom. VIII. LL. § 144. p. 997. Cf. *Ausführl. Erklärung* L. IV. Q. XX. and XXII. p. 172. sqq. And *Cundis.* Not. ad Comp. Hutt. p. 1385. 1386.

> QUENSTEDT: "Will the blessed see the Divine Essence itself with *their* glorified *bodily eyes* in the eternal life? — Ans. I. *Some of the Fathers deny it:* 1. Irenaeus, Bk. 4, ch. 37., Origen, *Against Celsus* 1.7; Athanasius, Oration Against Idols; Theophylact on 1 Cor. 13; Ambrose, Book 1.1 on Luke 1; especially Augustine, Epistle 112 to Paulina. 2. *Most of the Scholastics, all the Papists, and Calvinists.* Thomas p. 1. q. 12. a. 3.: 'It implies a contradiction,' he says, 'that God be seen with the bodily eye. Therefore not even by absolute power can that be done.' Becanus p. 1. Theol. Schol. c. 9. q. 6.: 'It is the common opinion,' he says, 'that it is impossible to see God clearly and intuitively with the eyes of the body.' From the Calvinists, P. Martyr Class. 1. Loc. Com. c. 4. § 2. says: 'They err who suppose that the essence of God is seen by the eyes of the blessed.' To these is added Dr. Calixt the elder, *Concord. Evang*. 1. 2. c. 1. . . II. The *affirmative* is embraced by some of our own, such as *Chytraeus* 1. de vita et morte p. 157., *Schilter* disp. de vita aeterna th. 65., Dr. *Cramer* tr. *de sublimi corporis glorificati mysterio* c. 16. p. 187. . . III. *They hold a middle position, and* determine nothing: *Augustine,* 1. 22. *de Civ. Dei* c. 29., *Gerhard,* Loco *de vita aeterna* § 143. and 144., *Dorscheus*, Considerat. Titulor. of God from 1 Tim. 6:32 in the Pentateuch. They state, I say, that it is not to be rashly denied that the divine essence can be seen with bodily eyes, since God can raise the eyes of the blessed beyond their own nature, so that they may see the Deity itself, because for physical reasons, drawn from the common and ordinary course of nature, the infinite power of God cannot be limited; nor yet that this is to be precisely defined, since Scripture does not define the mode of vision (whether it will be mental or truly corporeal), although it asserts that God is to be seen by the blessed." (L. c. s. 2. q. 2. f. 812. sq.)

b) See above, § 6, and note *b.* For that mutual recognition of the blessed in the state of restored bodies seems to extend even to the sight of them. Compare the authors cited there.

c) Thus it is gathered from *Revelation 7:10 and chapter 19:4.*

GERHARD: "A question is raised concerning the glorification of God: I. Will the blessed also *glorify God with an external voice? . . . Augustine*, Book 22 of The City of God, chapter 30, asserts that all the members and viscera of the incorruptible body will be employed in the praises of God; whose praise and proclamation, what their nature will be, who in this infirmity of the flesh can comprehend, either by thought or by word? Scripture asserts that the blessed will glorify God not only with vocal praise (Apoc. 7:12), but also with golden harps (Apoc. 5:8). 14:2, 15:2, but anyone can see that this latter, spoken after the manner of this age, is to be taken *μεταφορικῶς* [metaphorically]; whence they are called *κιθαραὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ* [harps of God], that is, divine harps. II. *In what language* will the blessed glorify God and converse with one another? It is believed probable that there will be *one* language for all the blessed, 1. because we shall all be one people, one city in the heavenly homeland; 2. diversity of languages was sent upon the world as a punishment, but from the triumphant church all punishment is removed; 3. the triumphant church will not be in a worse state than the militant one was, but the latter once used one common language. III. *What, then, will that language of the blessed be?* Galatinus, in his book 12. De Arcanis, chapter 4, posits that the blessed will use the *Hebrew* language for the praises of God and for mutual conversations. . . . Others, on the contrary, maintain that all the languages we use in this life will cease, since the apostle speaks generally in 1 Cor. 13:8, and that some other sensible language, far nobler than our own and *heavenly*, will be infused into the blessed, one that is fitting for a glorious mouth and body, by which they may also praise God vocally. Some think that the blessed will speak *whatever language they please,* because everyone will understand everyone else; consequently, they will be able to use whichever they wish, at their leisure. But these things are more properly reserved for the future blessed experience than they are for scrupulous dispute." (L. c. § 146.)

d) However, it is scarcely permissible in this life to define more about these and other perfections and operations of the senses that will take place in the state of eternal life.

## § 19.

Alongside these accidental gifts of beatitude, however, especially the clarity of bodies,[(a)] a certain inequality among the blessed [(b)] will be discerned, according as one has given more proofs of Christian virtues [(c)] than another in this life.

a) See *1 Cor. 15:41; Dan. 12:3.* As for the inequality of other gifts, although it is not as easy to determine anything, one can nevertheless see the passages in *Matt. 19:28. Luke 22:30,* where a special honor and glory is promised to the apostles on the day of judgment, under the imagery of this world, of *a table* furnished with all delicacies and *of a seat* as on *thrones*, etc.

b) However, this is so that those who will possess a lesser accidental glory will not for that reason be any less satisfied, or more envious of others who are more glorified, but each will be content with his own lot, whether he be the least or the greatest. *Gerhard* also states in his *L. de Inferno,* § 52, p. 616: *Whatever happens to one of the elect will affect the others with such joy, as if it had been given to them themselves. Hence, there will be no envy of differing glory there, where the unity of charity will reign in all.*

GERHARD: "It is certain that the *happiness* and glory of all the blessed *will be one objectively,* because the object of beatitude is common to all the blessed—God; *one subjectively,* because all the powers of the soul and

all the members of the body in all the blessed will be adorned with heavenly glory; *one in regard to continuous and eternal duration,* because the happiness of all the blessed will be continuous, never to be interrupted and everlasting, never to be ended; *one in regard to security*, because all the blessed will be equally certain that no danger of losing this happiness and glory threatens them; *one reason of satiety,* because all the blessed will be most fully and perfectly satisfied with that glory which each one will receive from the fount of divine benevolence; *one reason of immunity from all adversities,* because all the blessed will be freed from all evil whatsoever; *one reason is* the prevailing *love* and communion among all, because by reason of the most sincere charity, the joy of any one blessed will be common to all the blessed. It is also certain that there will be a certain *inequality and diversity of glory* among the blessed. . . . However, it can be debated whether that diversity is to be understood only in the *accidental* glory of the soul or body, or also *in the essential,* so that in some blessed there will be a greater light of glory, in others less, on account of which one blessed person will see the divine essence more perfectly and clearly, love God more ardently, and enjoy Him more sweetly, which is indeed taught with great consensus by the scholastics (with the sole exception of Durandus, who in 4 Sent. dist. 49 disputes: 'All the blessed see the divine essence equally and all are equal in the essential reward'); but our own position is more correct, that a difference is to be established *only* in the *accidental* rewards:

'For all the saints salvation is one, but glory is unequal.'" (L. c. § 120.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of certain *Calvinists,* such as Peter Martyr in Loc. Com. class 3. c. 17. § 8, who was the first in the last century to depart from the common consent of the fathers and, while not denying that there will be degrees of reward and glory in eternal life, did so timidly and hesitantly. ... 2. Of certain *Neo-Photinians,* who hold that there will be no degrees of reward and punishment after this life, like Smalcius... 3. The *Jovinianists,* who once said that all sinners would be equal in guilt as well as in punishment, following the Stoics, who themselves also made all sins equal." (L. c. q. 3. f. 814.)

c) Thus we read *in Matthew 10:41-42 and Luke 19:17, 19.* But these things should *not* be taken concerning the *merit* of works. For it is *one thing* for God, out of His liberality or undue favor, to give unequal rewards to those who work unequally; it is *another* for God, to those who merit unequally, by virtue of meritorious works, to give to each the wage he is due, and a different or unequal one to each.

# § 20.

And just as what we have said thus far about eternal blessedness is rightly held according to the Scriptures, so no one in this life has found its full and perfect declaration. [(a)]

a) For *we have not yet received what we shall be, 1 John 3:2.* And in *Isaiah 64:4,* and hence in *1 Corinthians 2:9,* it is said, "*Eye has not seen,* nor *ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man what God has prepared for those who love Him."* Peter also, in *1 Peter 1:8*, promises the faithful that they will *rejoice with an inexpressible and glorious joy.*

ANTITHESIS.

GERHARD: "*Antithesis:* 1. Modern *Jews* conflate the joys of eternal life with corporeal pleasures, food, drink, sex, etc. . . 2. *Muhammad* in the Qur'an and Zuna, books authentic and undoubted to his own followers of the faith, promises the blessed in paradise splendid palaces, royal feasts, dances, and embraces of virgins, and fashions such a life after the resurrection of the blessed, in which they enjoy the sweetest waters, healthful drink, fruits of every kind, various fruits, most beautiful and pure women, golden rings, silk garments, canopied couches, etc., that the blessed will enjoy. . . 3. The *Chiliasts, Cerinthians*, *Nepotians*, etc., taught that the kingdom of Christ would last for a thousand years on this earth in bodily pleasures. . . 4. *Origen*, hom. II. in Num. thinks, 'that in the future life some men will see not God, but only angels, and that God will subject some men to some angels and others to others.' The same, I. 1. *περὶ ἀρχῶν* [On First Principles] ch. 9, constructs 'a certain perpetual circle of happiness and misery.' . . . 5. *Methodius*, in his sermon on the resurrection, seems to feel that the blessed after the resurrection will not be in heaven, but in paradise. For it is necessary,' he says, 'that each created thing remain in its own proper form, so that all things may be fulfilled for all: the heavens for the angels, the thrones for the powers, the lights for the ministers, the more divine places and pure lights for the Seraphim themselves, who stand by the great senate which contains the universe, the world for men. 6. The *Pepuzians* established eternal life and the heavenly Jerusalem in this life. For they called Pepuza, a certain place in upper Phrygia, to be the heavenly city and Jerusalem, of which the prophets had prophesied, of which Hebrews 12:23 and Revelation 21:2 speak, and to which we all ought to aspire. Epiph. haer. 49., August, de haer. c. 27. 7. The *Eternal Ones*, as reported by Augustine in his treatise on heresies, chapter 67, from Philaster, taught that this world would remain in the same state in which it is now even after the resurrection of the dead, and that it would not be changed to become a new heaven and a new earth, as the Holy Scriptures promise. . . 10. The *Armenians* taught that moderately evil people after the judgment will not go into the heavenly paradise, but will remain on earth, and that the souls of the good are to be led to the earth and are to fly like birds over the trees. . . 11. The *Papists*... devise certain aureoles or laurels, which they decree are to be placed on the heads of virgins, martyrs, and doctors. . . If you ask, what finally is this adornment of the body, Scotus answers in 4. Sent. dist. 49. q. 5. art. 2., that the aureoles are crowns, so that on the head of a martyr a red crown is seen, on the head of a virgin a white one, on the head of a doctor a green one; he adds, that martyrs will perhaps also hold palms in their hands, virgins white lilies, doctors green, incorruptible branches. . . Concerning the heavenly joys, exercises, and dwellings of the blessed, they foster earthly, carnal, and childish thoughts. Cassanæus, part. 3, preface to the catalog of the glories of the world, considerat. I: there are twelve principal seats in paradise, namely the seat of the Trinity and Deity itself, the seat of the Son with respect to His humanity, the seat of the blessed Virgin Mary, and nine other seats of the nine orders. From Bernardino, tom. 8 of the works of Dr. Brenz, page. 890. A discourse is offered concerning the exercises and dances of the blessed in heaven: "What will the blessed do in the empyrean heaven? What exercise will they have? Will there be dances and leapings there?" Another, indeed, responds that in glory there will be no such gesticulations; but Bernardino thinks differently. 'Do not be moved by the words of that doctor,' he says, 'for it is more likely that there will be dances and leapings there. For everything that is sufficient for and required by a dance is found there.'.. Lest anyone should think that those foolish fables, invented by idle monks, are repudiated by more recent popes, we therefore command that one examine what Barradius writes in book 10, commentary on the council. Evang. chap. 3. .. Compare what they discuss about the limbo of infants being locally distinct from the kingdom of heaven and hell, and what Bellarmine writes in book 2. of Purgatory, chap. 7. has something about a certain most flourishing, most luminous, fragrant, and pleasant meadow, in which souls dwell who suffer nothing, but nevertheless remain there because they

are not yet fit for the divine vision,' etc., and it will appear that the poets' Elysian fields are being posthumously brought back into the Church by the Papists. 12. Of the *Calvinists* . . . almost all *think* of the joys, exercises, and dwellings of the blessed as *earthly.* For they define heaven as some definite corporeal place, situated above all visible heavens, distinguished by very spacious mansions, in which one may locally sit and walk. .. Of the gifts of the glorified body they think too meanly and poorly: 1. They flatly deny invisibility. . . 2. They also attack illocality no less. . . 8. They likewise explain the gifts of agility and subtlety less correctly; for they deny that Christ rose with the sepulchre closed; they deny that He entered to His disciples through closed doors, etc. *Zwingli*, Part I, Reply to the Confession of Faith of Luther, p. 405. denies that the glorified body of Christ passed through the sealed stone of the monument, and, that the sepulchral stone was rolled away by the work of an angel, asserting, "that a stout prefect, dressed in red stockings, could go out in the same way that Christ came out of the monument." (L. c. §§ 156—164.)

THE SAME.: "They attribute to *Luther* and the doctors of our churches what they themselves have also done, namely, to have strayed from the path of truth in this part of heavenly doctrine, by seeking the happiness of eternal life in bodily pleasures. They prove this from the fact that Luther, in table-talk, fol. 454 and 455, speaks as follows: "God will create a new earth and a new heaven, and will even create new little animals and puppies, whose skin will be golden and whose hair will be of precious stones," etc. . . *Answer:* Why do they not also add the letter which Luther wrote to his little son about the joys of paradise? The man of God imitates the style of Scripture and, speaking of the state of the future age, which has not ascended into the heart of man, speaks with a certain *συγκατάβασιν* [condescension] in the words of this age, which we have heard was customary for the church's doctors, from Otto of Freising § 156." (L. c. § 165.)

## § 21.

The causes of this blessedness [(a)] are: The principal *efficient* cause, the triune God; the *internal impulsive* cause is the goodness of God; the *principal external cause* is the merit of Christ; the *less principal* (impulsive) *cause* is faith in Christ.

a) According to what we have said in the prolegomena, chap. I. § 21. sqq. Vol. I. p. 40. sqq. More about each has been and will be set forth distinctly in its proper place.

## § 22.

Subject*: That* they are men [(a)] *who believe for the sake of the end* [(b)] and *who have departed* from this life,[(c)] *all* [(d)] and *only* [(e)] these.

a) For the place to treat the beatitude of the angels was not here, but it has also been treated sufficiently above in its proper place.

b) For it must pertain to them, that which is the impulsive cause of blessedness.

c) For in this life no mortal actually attains to beatific vision, and thus neither to those things which follow it. See *1 John 3:1; 1 Cor. 13:9–12; Phil. 3:12–13.* Cf. our Disputation on the foretaste of eternal life.

ANTITHESIS.

GERHARD: *"Antithesis:* 1. *Origen*, Homilies 10 on Leviticus, disputes that those 'who believed indeed, but applied no amendment of life, are saved, but not without a mark of infamy.' The same man held that the damned would eventually be freed and made partakers of heavenly glory. . . 2. *Some of the Papists* grant salvation to certain Gentiles who lack true faith in Christ. . . 3. The same doctrine pleased some *Calvinists. Zwingli,* in Expos. Fid. p. 159, places Numa, Aristides, Socrates, etc., among the blessed in heaven, whose patronage was taken up by *Rudolph Gualter,* his son-in-law, in the Apol. published in 1545. *Bullinger* adorned that fruit of Zwingli's with a certain preface, in which he calls it a swan's song. That dreadful utterance of Zwingli (as Bucer rightly calls it in a letter written to him) is partly defended and partly excused by the *Emden theologians* in their comment on the book of Dr. Hunnius, p. 416. *Sohnius* in Exeg. Aug. Conf. tom. 2. p. 828., *Tossanus* in a writing against Marbach., *Pareus* in Iren. p. 245., *Pelarg.* in Comp. Theol. corrected p. 289., but with very frivolous arguments. . . To this must also be added another error of the *Calvinists*, by which they completely deny faith to infants, even baptized ones, from which it follows that either all infants are damned, or that some people without faith in Christ are saved; both of which are directly contrary to the Scriptures. *Calv.* lib. 4. *Inst*. chap. 16. § 20.: 'Infants are baptized for a future faith.' Sibrandus *Lubertus* in his commentary on Vorstius's 99 errors, p. 780, writes: 'God has decreed to save some infants, who, as long as they are pilgrims in this world, have not believed, do not believe, nor will they believe.' *Piscator* in chap. 19. on Matthew, observ. 11.: 'The kingdom of heaven can be of infants, even if they do not yet believe, provided they are elect.' Likewise: 'Faith is required in Scripture nowhere except from adults.' . . 4. *Franciscus Puccius Filidinus* published a work in 1592, 'On the Effectiveness of Christ the Savior in All and Every Person, insofar as They Are Human,' in which, among other monstrous opinions, he also promises heaven to pagans outside the church. . . 5. George Zarnovecius the Pole shows that the *Photinians* embrace this hypothesis, that anyone in his own religion, whatever it may be, can be saved, whether he is a Jew, a Turk, an Anabaptist, an Arian, or a Christian." (L. c. § 168.)

HOFMANN: "The Apostle speaks (Rom. 2:14) of the case that *Gentiles*, without a law, possessing a revelation of the demanding will of God, do that which the revealed will of God in Israel demands, and says of such an action on their part that it happens *φύσει* [by nature] .... So much does the Apostle consider it possible that one, by virtue of this law, may be able to do so, even if only in particulars, to act in accordance with the divine demand, so much so that he suggests that perhaps on the day of judgment, from the thoughts awakened by the testimony of the conscience, a *self-justification before God* might *arise*, *which can be graciously accepted* by Him who exercises His judgment through Jesus Christ, the Mediator of grace." (*Schriftbeweis*, I, 494, 495, sq.)

THE SAME: "How the Apostle in Romans 7:14–25. is not meant to deny all good deeds of the Old Testament believers, so he says at the present place even of individual cases of good deeds of *the Gentiles;* without thereby contradicting what our church confession teaches about man, as he is in himself and apart from all gracious workings toward God, that he is unable to do any good and inclined to all evil. He is aware of a gracious work, not only of the God who sent Christ, but also of the God who will send Christ, and he is aware of it not only within the Old Testament community of salvation, but also outside of it.... The Spirit of God, who dwells in them to make them live,

does not leave them without that testimony of God, by which they come to know both His holiness and their sin, but also His goodness as their nothingness. Through this, however, an attitude toward God can be worked in them, which He *will repay with the reward of eternal life* on the day of that judgment which John saw after the resurrection of the believers. But this is God's work and not their own. It is God's love that lets them live, and through His Spirit, the Spirit of their life, He testifies to them." (L. c. 2. 5th ed., p. 570 sq.)

d) See *John 3:16 and 36.*

e) By the force of the opposition, *John 3:18 and 36.* Compare *Matthew 24:13; Revelation 2:10.*

## § 23.

The subject *by which* (*subjectum quo*) of blessedness is [(a)] the *soul* in its *intellect* [(b)] and *will,* [(c)] and the *body* [(d)] and its organs.

a) When viewed in their integrity.

b) To which beatific vision formally pertains, and whatever is of the accompanying cognition. See § 2 ff. to 7.

c) To which pertain love and joy, of which we have spoken in §§ 8 and 11.

d) Regarding those faculties which we saw in § 14 and following, see § 18.

## § 24.

The end of human blessedness [(a)] is the eternal glory [(h)] of the divine [(b)] goodness,[(c)] wisdom,[(d)] truthfulness,[(e)] and [(f)] power.[(g)]

a) Which we do not here distinguish into ultimate and intermediate, since beatitude itself, on the part of men, is the ultimate end, and no further end is given, except that which is simply ultimate. We have also seen that the joys of the blessed are contained within blessedness itself.

b) Of the triune God, the author of our happiness.

c) For just as the end of election to eternal life is the *glory of divine grace, Eph. 1:6*, so also the actual bestowal of eternal life has the same end.

d) *Partly* because of the sublimity of the goods themselves, which exceed the grasp of our minds, and *partly* if we consider the blessedness to be given to such a subject, that is, a sinful man, with justice preserved. Compare *Ephesians 3:9.*

e) Or of *faithfulness* in keeping the promises and fulfilling the calling to life, *1 Thess. 5:24.*

f) For we have seen that those supernatural gifts are to be expected only from an infinite power and are directed to its praise.

g) Some make a separate mention here of the glory of divine *justice*; but it must be admitted that it pertains partly to the *goodness* of God (as it is called *remunerative*), and partly to *truth* (that is, the conformity of words and deeds).

h) As we read in *Revelation 7:11-12*, the angels and heavenly men, *falling down before the throne, on their faces, and worshipping God*, *say: "Amen, blessing, and glory, and wisdom, and thanksgiving, and honor, and power, and might be to our God forever and ever. Amen."*

## § 25. ^

Eternal blessedness can be described as a complex [(a)] of several supernatural perfections,[(b)] from the triune God,[(c)] by sheer grace,[(d)] on account of the merit of Christ,[(e)] by faith [(f)] apprehended by men who believe finally and have departed this mortal life [(g)] especially on the part of the intellect and will, yet at the same time also of the body itself [(h)] obtaining, by which the human appetite is fully satisfied [(i)] to the eternal glory [(k)] of the Triune God.

a) For it is indeed eternal blessedness, when viewed in its proper order and integrity, a composite arising from the convergence of various goods; see § 13, note *c.* It also agrees in this respect with the concreated image of God (whose restoration it implies); see chapter IV.

b) In this respect it *partly* differs from the image of God created anew, and *partly* still agrees with the gifts of grace in this life.

c) d) e) f) Thus the efficient and impulsive causes of beatitude are indicated, about which were treated in § 21.

g) Which are the subject of the "*What,"* according to § 22.

h) Thus the subject *of the 'By Which'* is indicated: partly primary, by reason of the essential beatitude in which our formal end consists; partly secondary, by reason of the other parts which pertain to the integrity of beatitude. Compare § 24.

i) For thus the reason for blessedness, absolutely or ultimately speaking, is made clear; see §§ 2 and 11.

k) In which the end of blessedness consists, according to § 24.

# Chapter VII.

### ON DEATH OR ETERNAL DAMNATION.

## § 1.

Opposed [(a)] to blessedness is damnation, partly *privatively*,[(b)] insofar as it involves the deprivation of all the goods that enter into the felicity of the blessed, and partly *contrarily*, whereby

to some extent, does not call it a mere absence of blessedness, but contains positive adversities and torments [(c)] and the keenest sense of evils.

a) And therefore this second doctrine is rightly appended to the doctrine of beatitude, so that the opposites, placed side by side, may shine more clearly; as it must also be admitted that those who are not easily moved by the goodness of the end of theology (being corrupted by the love of earthly things) can meanwhile be terrified by the consideration of misery otherwise to be expected. For a third alternative is not given, and those who do not attain the highest good will not escape the greatest evil; which is evident from the force of the propositions by which the final destiny of all men is reduced to two classes. *Dan. 12:2; John 5:28, 29; Matt. 25:32, 33 and 46.*

b) To this is usually referred the fact that the state of the damned is called the *second death, Rev. 2:11; 20:6*. For *death* is the privation of life. And it is called the *second,* because it involves the deprivation of a life other than the one we could have had after this life was completed. Church writers call it the *punishment of loss*.

c) Thus the same state is sometimes called by the name of *reproach* or *shame,* and sometimes *eternal fire*. See *Daniel and Matthew.* Elsewhere it is called *punishment or torment*.

GERHARD: "If the impious were not to fear a punishment more severe than annihilation, it would not have been better for them not to have been born." (*Loc. de inferno seu morte aeterna*. § 78.)

ANTITHESIS.

GERHARD: *"Antithesis:* 1. *Philo* seems to have been of the opinion that hell is nothing other than the horror of the conscience. . . Jerome, in his letter to Avitus, enumerating the heresies *of Origen*, also lists this one among others in these very words: ‚Origen, in book 2 *of περὶ ἀρχῶν*, places the fire of Gehenna and the torments which the Holy Scriptures threaten to sinners not in the punishments, but in the conscience of the sinners.' . . 2. *The Photinians* hold that the impious are either never to be resurrected, or after the resurrection and judgment are to be reduced to nothing; they therefore define damnation as *ἀνυπαρξίαν* [non-existence]." (L. c. § 77. sq.)

## § 2.

First of all, the damned will be deprived, on the part of the intellect, of the *beatific vision of God,* [(a)] nor will they be granted the *light of glory*, [(b)] bestowed upon the blessed by God.

a) This is, *not to see life, John 3:36.* The same is usually referred *Ps. 49:20,* concerning the impious, that *they are not to enjoy light for eternity,* and in the New Testament the damned *will be cast into darkness, Matt. 8:12; ch. 22:18,* as if *expelled by the Lord, who is the light of minds,* according to *Prosper.* lib. III. *de vit. contempl*. c. 12. (Conf. *Gerh.,* T. VIII. *L. de inferno*, § 42. p. 590.) That they are said to *depart* from Christ, *Matt. 25, 41*, and *to be left behind, Luke 17, 34.*

b) Indeed, they will also lack the *light of grace*, which they despised in this life, and the right judgment concerning divine and human matters.

LUTHER: "In the damned, the same rational light remains; indeed, it only grows brighter, so that they are more tormented by it." (Opp. T. XI, 256.)

## § 3.

And thus it is also readily apparent that *the love* [(a)] of God, as the clearly recognized supreme good, and the *joy* [(b)] resulting from it, will be entirely absent from the damned.

a) For it is born uniquely from the knowledge of God as our good.

b) To which the *lack of water, Zech. 9:11,* i.e., of refreshment, joy, and pleasure, refers.

## § 4.

The *gifts* of the blessed *bodies,* by which they themselves are glorified, will in the same way be denied to the damned.

a) Clarity, subtlety, agility, and impassibility will be absent. These have been promised only to the pious and elect.

b) Although indeed the bodies of the damned will be *incorruptible*, yet *neither* will that incorruptibility proceed from impassibility or spirituality, as if from an intrinsic perfection, *nor* will it contribute to the glory of their bodies, but to the increase of their misery, so that this may be eternal; of which more will be said below.

GERHARD: "That the bodies of the damned are called *spiritual* is not to be taken in the sense of Origen, as if they will have neither flesh nor bones; nor in the sense in which the bodies of the blessed are called spiritual and glorified (1 Cor. 15:45), but in *a broader sense*, as opposed to the animal body, which needs the support of food, drink, clothing, etc." (*Loc. de morte aet*. § 66.)

THE SAME: "Just as the bodies of the blessed will be glorious (1 Cor. 15:44; Phil. 3:21), so the bodies of the damned will be *deformed,* hideous, and abominable. Just as the glory of the blessed will shine through their bodies like light shining through glass, so the *ignominy* of the damned will flow from the soul into their bodies. For if in this life malefactors and criminals testify of the hidden impiety of their hearts with a gloomy countenance, 'murder and theft are seen in their eyes,' how much more will the indelible stains of sins appear on the bodies and faces of the damned?" (L. c. § 52.)

## § 5.

Among the *positive* punishments, the first is that *cognition* of the intellect, by which the damned know *God* abstractively and from the punishments,[(a)] *partly* as the Lord of supreme majesty, but as having been gravely offended by them;

*partly* as a just judge, yet in that very capacity the most vehement avenger of their sins; *partly* as a most benevolent father, but not to themselves, rather to others who have believed and been made blessed, whom they will recognize.[b]

a) Thus they are described in *Revelation 6:17*, as if they know *the one who sits on the throne*, or God, who is endowed with supreme majesty, whose *face,* threatening the worst, indeed inflicting it, they cannot bear.

b) Therefore, although to know God pertains to the perfection of man, yet to know Him in this way is not of perfection, but of the gravest misery.

## 6.

Likewise, they will contemplate *themselves* in such a way that they will consider in their minds the multitude and gravity of their *sins*, and the merit, bitterness, and eternity of the *punishments* with which they are afflicted.

Thus, in *Wisdom 5,* at the beginning, the complaint of the damned is presented, in which they accuse their own *folly* and confess that *they went astray, that they were filled with the paths of iniquity and perdition instead of the way of truth, and wandered through pathless deserts*, *etc.*, meditating on the vanity of their *pride, their riches, and their boasting*.

## § 7.

They will look upon *other men*, who are *blessed*, as partakers of that happiness of which they themselves are destitute, and as free from the calamities by which they themselves are oppressed.

*Wisdom*, l. c. describes the *spectators seeing the just man standing before them with great confidence and being amazed at his unexpected salvation, etc.*

GERHARD: "They will not see the happiness of the blessed in heaven in its specific reality, nor *practically*; yet they will see it in general and *θεωρητικῶς* [theoretically]." (L. c. § 52.)

## § 8.

Accordingly on the part of the will there will arise *hatred of God*, inasmuch as He is utterly hostile and implacable toward them;[a] hatred *of* themselves, since they will be the cause of their own misery;[b] *envy*, arising from the sight of another's happiness;[c] *pain* and sorrow and anxiety [d] because of the immense accumulation of present evils and impatience [e] and perpetual *despair*.[f]

a) See *Revelation 6:16–17,* where a great aversion for God, whose presence they cannot bear, is indicated. And the very nature of the case teaches that the will of the damned cannot be borne toward God, as if He were a good to them, for they have and know Him to be irreconcilably opposed to themselves. Nor will the will refrain from any act occupied with God, since God is ever before their intellect, showing them how He treats them, and they themselves are perpetually afflicted with the sense of divine wrath. Therefore, since they can no longer love God, they pursue Him with *hatred,* which is the opposite of love, like the evil angels, enemies of God and of men, the *implacable.*

b) *Wis. 5:4–6, 7.* For that accusation indicates displeasure and self-detestation.

c) Thus, in the same passage, verses 3 and following, they are said to speak of the blessed *just* man: *"This was the one we once held up to scorn and common reproach. How has he been numbered among the sons of God, and what share is his among the saints?"*

d) This pertains to that *θλίψις καὶ στενοχωρία*, *tribulation and anguish,* of which *Romans 2:9* speaks. Compare *Wisdom 5:3,* where they are said *to groan because of the anguish of spirit.* And thus we read that *terrors, confusions, groanings, indignation, gnashing of teeth, and* the most bitter *torments* are ascribed to the damned.

e) Finding no way to escape their evil, *they seek* and *desire to die*, or to cease to be altogether, or to be utterly destroyed, *Revelation 9:6.*

f) Also fitting here, and presenting a sort of summary of the preceding evils, is *the mania,* or that *horrible fury,* which, as *Gerhard* says, makes the damned *fight against God and all creatures, and even against themselves. They will be angry with God,* he says, *and will blaspheme him because of the magnitude of the pains and punishments which they will feel to have been inflicted on them by him. They will be angry with all creatures, because, deprived of all their comfort, they will remain in eternal darkness. They will wish death and destruction upon themselves because of the atrocity of the torments and the bitterness of the pains, even though by nature they abhor death and* seek *self-preservation*. *L. de inferno* § 52. p. 617.

> GERHARD: "The question is: Do the damned retain the *faith* and *hope* that they had in this life? Some of the scholastics, such as Alensis p. 3. q. 64. art. 7, Durand. 3. sent. dist. 23. q. 9. and others affirm... *Resp.:* 1. Saving faith, constant knowledge, assent, and confidence, are not in the damned, as is evident; for otherwise they would not be damned. 2. It is rightly doubted whether historical knowledge of the articles of faith will have a place in them, *ἡ γὰρ γνῶσις καταργηθήσεται* [for knowledge will be done away], 1 Cor. 13:8. For the intensity of sickness and pain induces oblivion of human knowledge in this life, much more so the infernal torments of divine knowledge! 3. The assent concerning that article of faith, that God is and that He is the avenger of crimes, will be in the damned, just as in the demons, but coerced and wrung out by the sense of their own self-inflicted torments. Augustine, Book on Faith and Works, chapter 16: 'The faith of demons is expressed through fear.' 4. It could also be applied not inappropriately to the course of this life, that which James asserts about the faith of demons, that while this life still lasts, before the devils are thrown with the damned into the infernal fire, they believe that there is a God, by whom they will one day be cast into Tartarus; but when they actually experience those torments, they no longer believe, but know and feel. 5. The damned know that they are to be tormented forever, not by some supernatural act of faith, but by the judicial sentence which they receive at the point of death and especially on the day of judgment. 6. There will be in the damned a continuous and perpetual despair, and therefore also no hope. For the slightest hope would lessen the magnitude of their torments." (L. c. § 72.)

# § 9.

By this very fact, the *will* of the damned, completely turned away from God, will be *determined* [(a)] to evil, so that whatever they do displeases God,[(b)] and they themselves *will sin* unceasingly [(c)] in their thoughts, words, and deeds.

a) For just as the love of God above all is the sum of the divine law, so the absence of divine love and perpetual hatred of God cannot but involve *ανομίαν* [lawlessness] and perpetual disagreement with the law in the faculties and operations of the damned.

FECHT: "It cannot be that they are not always either sinning or without the law, which is absurd, 1 John 3:4." (*Sylloge controvers*. p. 95.)

b) For that which proceeds from an impure heart neither regenerated by grace nor abandoned by God as a punishment for sins cannot please God.

GERHARD: "The question *is*: *Are all the actions of the damned evil?* The passions of the damned will be morally good, because they proceed from the divine justice and will, the rule of all goodness; although physically and naturally they are evil to the damned, that is, adverse and hostile. However, all of the damned's actions will be evil: 1. Because the damned will be obstinate and hardened in evil. The depravity of the will, in and with which they were dead, will adhere to them immovably and unchangeably for all eternity. 2. Because they will always be in the actual hatred of God, which arises in them from the perpetual and unchanging consideration of the most wretched state in which they know themselves to be destined to remain for all eternity. Hence, they also perpetually and directly turn away from God, the supreme good, to whose glory all things ought to be referred. 3. Because they will blaspheme God on account of the greatness of their pain and torments, Revelation 14:11. Indeed, where there is blasphemy against God, to whom alone supreme honor is due, there can be nothing good. 4. Because also all the actions of the devils are evil." (L. c. § 76.)

c) For where *there is lawlessness*, there is sin. And the law of loving God (which at the same time involves the negative law of not hating God) is unchangeable. Therefore, the damned, although on account of the present state they cannot love God, but can and do hate Him; for although they are considered to have fallen into this state by their own fault and from previous sins, they do not thereby escape the obligation of the unchangeable law, which natural death neither removes nor can remove, since a creature, by nature obligated to the law, will not entirely cease to be, nor does it cease to be a rational creature. Therefore, the end of a man's life and of divine *forbearance* is not for that reason the absolute end of sin. And so there is a place for the punishments of sinners after death, in such a way that sins may nevertheless be punished with sins. Nor is it absurd for the divine majesty to leave the damned in a perpetual state of sin and thus of their own offense, since those damned do not escape punishment for their sins, as they endure the utmost misery at the very moment they sin and are never to be freed from their misery. Although we do not therefore assert that the divine majesty is perpetually offended by the blasphemies of the damned, committed as they are by an *external* act and as it were with one mouth. Our discussion is only of the most profound corruption of the will, which cannot but be sinful.

J. AD. OSIANDER: "It is not probable that the damned in hell are always sinning, especially by blaspheming." (*Colleg. th.* P. VI, 229.)

DANNHAUER: "It is the second death, inflicted in hell by the immediate punishment of the whole person and sense by an angry God, . . . the loss and deprivation of all good (expressed by outer darkness), and consequently also of that consolation which they might derive from *blasphemies* as a kind of revenge on God. 'Vengeance is a good more pleasant than life itself.' For it seems more probable and more just to the divine glory (although here we modestly submit our judgment) that there would be a limit and an end to the blasphemies and sins against God (whose *long-suffering* with this world comes to an end). The damned despair, but without sin; for despair is not properly a sin, but only sorrow and *the* consciousness of sin, *a damning judgment*, an assessment of the impossibility of deliverance, and the abandonment of the attempt to attain glory. Nor, however, are those therefore blessed who do not sin in act, since they still have sin, but it is restrained." (*Hodos. Phaen*. 4. p. 197.)

# § 10.

The *bodies* of the damned will be tormented [a] *by the true* and *proper fire* of hell [b] and *by an unquenchable one*.[c]

a) For it is certain that these will be punished, as is clear from *Matthew 10:28,* where it is said that *bodies are lost in Gehenna.* Cf. *Gerhard*, *L. de Inferno*, § 83, pp. 683–684.

b) See especially *Matthew 25:41,* where Christ, the judge, is about to pronounce sentence from the tribunal, and is read to indicate this kind of punishment to the damned, which we certainly believe He will speak of *properly, not tropically* and obscurely. And elsewhere it is very frequent in Scripture for the punishments of the damned to be called by the name of *fire*. See *Isa. 66, last verse; Mark 9:47-48; Rev. 21:8.* It is also certain that this fire will *not* be *a spiritual one* (for a fire so called would not be literal), but *a material* and corporeal one. To attempt to explain its nature more distinctly, however, is more curious than useful.

QUENSTEDT: "When it is asked what is to be understood by *the infernal fire*, to which devils and the damned are already sentenced or are to be sentenced, doctors, both ancient and more recent, diverge into different opinions. I. The first opinion is that of those who hold that the infernal fire will be *material*, *corporeal, and elementary.* Indeed, the Fathers hold this view, such as *Tertullian*, L. de anima, c. 7, n. 30 and 40; *Augustine*, T. 5, l. 21, *de Civ. Dei*, c. 10, where he says: ‘Why should we not say that, although in marvelous ways, yet in true ways, even incorporeal spirits can be afflicted by the punishment of a corporeal fire? Rather, the spirits of demons, though incorporeal, are to be tortured with corporeal fires.' And a little later: 'That Gehenna, which is also called a lake of fire and brimstone, will be a corporeal fire.' . . . Almost all the *Scholastics* and *Papists* follow these. . . The chief reasons for this opinion are these: 1. Because we must not depart from the letter, unless an evident necessity leads us away from it, therefore, since Holy Scripture describes the punishments of hell, this must be taken *ῥητῶς* [explicitly] and in its plain sense. 2. Because flame, sulfur, smoke, and wood are attributed to the fire of hell, it is therefore a corporeal and properly so-called fire. . . But these reasons do not yet sufficiently prove that the fire of hell will be material and elementary; for 1) Holy Scripture explicitly says that all the elements are to be dissolved and conflagrated on that day of judgment, 2 Pet. 3:20.; but with this conflagration and substantial destruction of the world, which almost all theologians approve, the assertion of a material and properly so-called hellish fire cannot

stand. 2) This opinion rests on the false hypothesis of certain Fathers, Scholastics, and Papists, namely, that the world will not perish *κατ' ουσίαν* [in substance], but only *κατὰ ποιότητα* [in quality], or, that the world, without a destruction of its substance, will be changed for the better with respect to its accidents. Given this opinion, they must be granted that even after the final judgment there will still be, as with the other elements, a proper fire by which the damned can be tormented. 3) Matthew 25:41. The hellish fire is called the eternal fire. But a material, properly so-called, fire cannot be eternal, for it requires fuel to sustain itself. 4) Because the fire of hell will act even on the devils and souls, whereas a material fire cannot act on spirits. For nothing can act outside the sphere of its object. And if it did act, the spirit would be weaker than the body, which is absurd. . . The Scholastics . . . say that the infernal fire is elevated by the primary cause, so that it can act on the spirit. . . For in truth: 1) This opinion presupposes a fire of a kind not yet proven by the Scholastics. 2) It does not follow: God can raise this fire, therefore He uses this fire so raised. 3) Nor does it matter that Scripture describes this fire by means of flame, sulfur, smoke, and wood; for Scripture is accustomed to speak of things pertaining to the future age in the phrases of this age, just as it also describes the joys of heavenly life through weddings and banquets (Matt. 8:11). Luke 22:30. . . II. is the opinion that the fire, by which the mechanism of heaven and earth will be dissolved and destroyed, will, by divine decree, envelop the damned in its grosser part, and that this fire will be *supernatural* and the instrument of perpetual torment. So also does Dr. G. *Calixt.* . . Affinity to this opinion is found in some Calvinists, such as Keckermann, *System. Th*. 1. 2. c. 7., who holds that 'the subterranean fires, divinely kindled and intensified, will torment the bodies of the impious.' The same is the opinion of *Zanchius* in 2 Thess. 1. Com. 6. Op. f. 458., *Alstedii* in *Theol. Polem*. P. 4. controv. II. p. 376. But 1) from where such a fire, after all the worldly creatures have been consumed by the fire? 2) Dr. *Dannhauer, Hodosoph. Phaen*. 12. p. 1500. says: 'The fire, after it has consumed the world laid upon the pyre, will return to nothingness through lack of fuel.' 3) It follows from this opinion that the infernal fire does not yet exist, nor are the souls of the damned tormented by it. For the fire that is to come after the conflagration of the world does not yet exist. . . III. The opinion is that of those who hold that Holy Scripture describes the *state and condition* of the damned by fire, not because there is properly any fire in Hell, but to signify thereby *the most bitter torments and pains* of the damned. For the pains that come from fire are the sharpest and greatest of all. This opinion is embraced by the Fathers*, Ambrose,* who in 1. 7. on Luke, chapter 14. discusses this fire thus: ‘Nor is there any corporal gnashing of teeth, nor any perpetual fire of corporal flames, nor is the worm corporal.' *Damascenus,* who in Book 1, Chapter 4 of the Orthodox Faith, Chapter 28, in his final words says: ‘the impious and sinners are to come into eternal fire, *not* a material one*, like the one we have, but such as God* knows.' From our theologians, *Aeg. Hunnius* . . . Dr. *Gerlach* . . . *Balduin.* ‘In this place we note this,"' says *Gerhard Harmon. Evang*. c. 165. p. 910a,. that just as in the first part of the sentence (Matt. 25) by the kingdom to which the righteous are called, the highest happiness, blessedness, joy, and glory are understood, so in this latter part of the sentence by the fire into which the damned are sent, the highest misfortune, misery, pains, and torments are signified, *either metaphorically or certainly synecdochically*. Dr. *Dannhauer* in his *Hodos.* (p. 3) teaches: ‘The words of Christ in Mark 9 should not be taken of an elementary and corporeal fire, of corporeal worms, but of an immaterial fire and the most exquisite pains.’ Of the same opinion *among the Calvinists* are *Francis Junius, Tilenus, Danaeus, Raynolds, and others.* This opinion is confirmed 1) from Isaiah 66:24: ‘Their worm will not die, and their fire will not be quenched.’ But whatever kind of worm it is, such will the fire also be.

But by the worm, the Fathers and the Scholastics understand a spiritual and analogical worm of a gnawing conscience. Therefore, through fire, the most exquisite metaphorical meaning is signified: pain and torment. 2) From Matthew 25, where the Savior, speaking on the subject of the last judgment and infernal punishments, after saying, 'Depart from me, you who are cursed, into the eternal fire,' immediately adds, 'and they will go into eternal punishment.' These last words seem to imply that by the infernal fire in general, the most severe punishment of hell is designated. . . IV. Finally, the opinion of those who prefer to *suspend judgment* here rather than establish something certain. *Augustine* embraces this opinion in Book 20, Chapter 16 of *de Civ. Dei*, where he says: 'I think that no one knows what kind of fire this is, or in what part of the world or of things it is to be, unless perhaps he to whom the divine Spirit has shown it.' …The same is followed by *Gerhard* in *Loc. de Infern*. § 69., where he says: 'We do not doubt that, by divine power, it is possible for a corporeal fire to torment devils and incorporeal souls, but whether that fire will be truly corporeal, material, and visible, or whether it will be incorporeal, invisible, and immaterial, we leave in the middle (although we lean more toward the latter). And we earnestly pray to God not to manifest it to us through experience. It is better, with all diligence through true and serious conversion, to be concerned about fleeing from the fire, than to argue hatefully and idly about the nature of that fire.' The same is found in Dr. *Althofer, Harm. Evang*. in Luke 16:25, and Dr. *Glassius, Phil. Sacr*." (*Th. did.-pol*. P. I. c. 14. s. 2. q. 4. f. 820—824.)

FECHT: "Fire, not being elementary, and yet properly so called, is water not humid, and yet properly so called. What kind it will be in the future, if it is not elementary, is not clear." (*Controvers. syll. Giessae* 1768. p. 95.)

c) See *Matthew* 3:*12,* where it is called *πῦρ ἄσβεστον* [unquenchable fire], and cap. 25:41, where it is called *αἰώνιον* [eternal].

## § 11.

But it is not improbable that the *organs* of the senses and the *senses* themselves will be tormented with special punishments.(a) And as for *touch*, certainly, with the doctrine of fire properly so called still standing, there can be no doubt.(b)

a) For indeed, those who sinned through the organs of the senses are punished through the same.

b) See the preceding §. As for the punishments of the other senses, *there are those who,* with regard to *sight,* suppose horrible spectacles of demons appearing in a certain form, and the sight of other damned; with regard to *hearing,* the groans of the condemned themselves and of their companions, who weep and gnash their teeth; with regard to *taste,* foul flavors and thirst; as for the *sense of smell,* they think that the stench of sulfurous fire is involved. *Others*, however, take those things which are brought to this subject from the Scriptures to be understood *metaphorically* and *parabolically*, as depicting the most severe pains through the most bitter things that can happen to a man in this life. See *Gerhard, L. de Inferno* § 71, pp. 665, 666, 667.

HAFENREFFER: "What are those torments? They are the most exquisite pains of mind and body (for it had sinned with both), arising from terror and the sense of the most just wrath and divine vengeance against the sins, of which it carries with it the most sorrowful consciousness, the turpitude of which is manifest, and for which no future remission and hence

no mitigation or end of the punishments can be hoped for. From this, with a horrible lamentation and wailing, they will detest their former impiety, by which they securely neglected the Lord's commands, fraternal admonitions, and all the means of attaining salvation, but in vain. For in perpetual anguish, in a horrible trembling, in shame, confusion, and ignominy, in unquenchable fire, in weeping and gnashing of teeth, in eternal and horrible darkness, torn from the grace and favor of God, they will be horribly and endlessly tormented among the devils forever. — I still do not understand, however, what those torments are like? *Resp.:* Because the future torments of the damned far exceed all the power of the human mind, so that we can never grasp their magnitude even in thought, it cannot be adequately expressed in words what they will be like. Scripture, however, to show that these are the greatest and most exquisite torments, likens them to those things by which in this life the greatest pain of mind and body is usually stirred up. Therefore they are now compared to fire, now to the gnashing of teeth, now to worms, now to the darkest darkness, and whatever other things can be named that are fullest of sorrow and pain." (*Loc. th*. 1. 3. loc. 9. p. 484—486.)

GERHARD: "The *eyes* will be tormented by the sight of demons, the *ears* by the shrieking and groaning of fellow sufferers, the *sense of smell* by an intolerable stench, the *taste* by the most rapid thirst and hunger, the *sense of touch and all the limbs* by cold and fire. *Imagination* will suffer from the apprehension of present torments, *memory* from the recollection of past pleasures, *intellect* from the consideration of the goods lost and the evils to which they have come, present and future. The same judgment is to be made of the members of the body, in each and every one of which the damned will suffer, because they have turned all of them, one by one, into weapons of iniquity for the dishonor of the Creator, having abused them. Rom. 6:13." (L. c. § 53.)

THE SAME: "The gnawing *worm* is almost always joined with the burning fire. By it, however, the perpetual and continuous bite of conscience seems to be understood, arising from the remembrance of sins, a certain rabid displeasure and fruitless repentance, the greatest and never-ending anguish of the heart. For just as worms with their constant biting consume corpses, so that inner worm of conscience will perpetually torment the souls of the damned. Just as worms are born in decaying corpses, so a corrupted conscience gives birth to spiritual and immortal worms." (L. c. § 51.)

THE SAME: "The question is: Are there, besides the fire and the worm, other corporal punishments truly and properly so called to be established in hell? 1. *Bonaventure*, in 4 Sent., dist. 44, art. 2, q. 2, argues that in hell there is not only a punishing fire but also the *four elements* by which souls and bodies are punished. . . 2. He established that there is true *cold* in hell, *Bede.* The same appears to be the opinion of *Jerome* in his commentary on Matthew, chapter 10. . . and others whose footsteps most of the Papists follow, holding that in hell there is a vast receptacle of ice-cold water like a sea, into which the damned, snatched by demons, pass from the fire, and after the burning they suffer the cold, from which the gnashing of teeth arises. But the saying of Job is not correctly rendered from the Hebrew text. . . 3. They assert that there is *a gnashing of teeth* in hell, attributing true cold to it; but some of the ancients more correctly explain it metaphorically about the lividness and fury of the damned, as we have seen above. 4. They explain the *weeping* as continuous groans. *Hugh of St. Victor*, d. 1.: 'In hell there is no sound but a wailing, wailing voice.' *Thomas*, in Supplement, q. 97, art. 3: 'Weeping can exist in the damned according to a certain agitation and turmoil of the head and eyes, but the dissolution and flow of tears cannot be in them.' They will utter great groans, and do what those who weep are accustomed to do, although they shed no tears.' But if they recognize a metaphor in the weeping of the voice, why do they so strongly reject it in other places and insist simply on the letter? 5. *Bonaventure* established that in hell there is a real *smoke*, not a metaphorical one, born from the matter of eternal

sulfur. . . 6. Almost all recognize the so-called *sulfurous stench* here, and even add that the bodies of the damned emit a foul odor through intentional species, just as a sweet fragrance exhales from the bodies of the blessed. 7. It is the opinion of many that the damned are to be tormented by *hunger and thirst* properly so called. But it seems simplest, on account of the arguments previously set forth, to take all of this metaphorically and parabolically concerning the supreme and ineffable torments of the damned, which are depicted by means of those things that can befall man in this life and are by far the most bitter and distressing." (L. c. § 71.)

# § 12.

That there will be *degrees* of infernal punishments,[(a)] cannot be denied. However, to define them more distinctly according to the diversity of their subjects,[(b)] is not so easy.

a) Thus Christ*, in Matthew 10:15; chapter 11:22 and 24; Luke 10:12*, denounces the Jews of his time, and especially the inhabitants of the cities *of Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum*, with severer punishments than the citizens of the cities of *Sodom, Gomorrah, Tyre, and Sidon.*

b) Indeed, it is probable that the pangs of *conscience* will be found to be more vehement in those who have sinned more frequently and grievously against conscience; and that the *bodily* pains inflicted will be more intense in those who have made their bodies more instruments of sin in this life. However, concerning the *infants of the Gentiles*, it is commonly inquired: *Whether the punishment for them, besides the deprivation of beatific vision, also consists in real infernal torments?* In this very question, *Musaeus* preferred *to suspend judgment;* see *Ausführl. Erklärung* Q. ult. p. 704. 705. To which are consonant the writings of *Huelsemann* in *praelect. F. C.* Art. VIII. 8. II. M. I. § 3. p. 444. Prop. IX., *that concerning the infants of the Gentiles we can indeed pronounce this, that according to the norm of the revealed Word they have no part in eternal beatitude, John 3:36. 2 Thess. 1:8; but that we can determine nothing about the quality or quantity of the punishment.* And if, indeed, as is the opinion of some of our own, some hope of salvation is to be conferred on these infants by the extraordinary grace of God (although perhaps a hope combined with a greater fear of the opposite, than is the case when speaking of the salvation of Christian infants departing without baptism) we conceive and therefore think that they will not be damned, the question of the punishment of damnation alone, or even of feeling, with respect to them, will not be necessary.

QUENSTEDT: "It is not for us to judge concerning the infants of parents who are outside the pale of the Church or who are outside, according to the apostle's saying in 1 Cor. 5:13: *'The one who is outside, God will judge,'* cf. v. 12." (L. c. P. IV. c. 5. s. 2. q. 10. f. 1165.)

LUTHER: "In what state they are (unbaptized infants) or what becomes of them, we commend to the divine *goodness.* They have neither faith nor baptism; whether God indeed receives them in *a special way* and gives them faith is not found in the Word, nor do we dare to decide." (On Gen. 25, 10. Exeget. opp. lat. Cur. Elsperger. Erlang. 1830. Vol. VI. p. 123.)

CARPZOV: "What is laid down here by the Augsburg Confession (art. 2) has been accepted and understood by some doctors absolutely, as if

all the children of unbelievers born outside the church are here condemned, and a condemnatory sentence is absolutely passed upon them; as Dr. *Paul Tarnov*, Prof. Rostock., in his Commentary on John, part 1, chap. 3, question 5, p. 265, refers this article not only to the Apology but also to the antithesis of Article IX, and, regarding those who suspend judgment on the salvation of the children of unbelievers, he refers to Hunnius in chap. 7. Genes, q. ult. p. 183, refutes Meisner in Decad. 1. Anthropol. disp. 7. q. 5. p. 208. and sqq., and Gesner disp. 14. in F. C. cap. 11. H. 52. p. 352. Augustine speaks of those who are plainly not regenerated. However, Augustine does not say that it is impossible for these infants not to be regenerated *in an extraordinary way* and become members of the church. Therefore, that passage from the Apostle in 1 Cor. 5:12 is rightly applied to the question of the salvation of these infants: 'What business is it of mine to judge those outside?' For in this statement the apostle is not speaking only of the jurisdictional judgment that the Church has through its binding and loosing power over its corrupt and wicked members, but in general of the judgment that Christians pass on pagans and outsiders; nor, as Tarnov objects and thinks, who thus suspends his judgment in this question, does he pronounce a different judgment than that which Christ has revealed in the Scriptures (John 3:18, 36; 2 Thess. 1:8). For what Christ and the apostle have declared in the cited passages remains forever true, and is likewise proven and asserted by us concerning those who persevere in their unbelief. But there is another judgment concerning the state of unbelievers, insofar as they are and remain such; and another concerning the ways of converting unbelievers, by which we judge and think that even if they are not ordinarily converted and regenerated, nevertheless, in a way known to Him and in an extraordinary manner, God can grant the children of unbelievers saving faith, even if this is unknown to us, and that it does not follow that, if they are not regenerated ordinarily, they must therefore be damned, since God can extraordinarily grant them saving faith." (*Isagog. in libros symb*. p. 153.)

DANNHAUER: "It remains to say something, or rather not to say something, about the infants, *τοῖς ἔξω* (those outside). For concerning adults, who, on account of neglecting baptism—to which, as well as to repentance, they are obligated—are to be brought before the final judgment, there is no question, by the express testimony of St. Paul in Acts 17:30-31; the only question remains concerning infant heathen who are snatched away by sudden death; but the question remains. Here let there be a hinge and a line, where Scripture (which describes the divine *order*, not *the dispensation)* expressly defines nothing. Although the fact that we hope well of them is due to 1. the analogy of faith, from which it is clear that no one is absolutely reprobated, but only actual resistance to the means of faith is condemned; a kind of contumacy which is not present in those infants. 2. The example of the infants of Nineveh. They were born outside the Church to idolatrous parents; and yet the Lord looked upon them with *an eye of mercy* (Jonah 4:11), not to destroy them with the first death, but to grant grace through the calling of their parents and spare them. It is a wonder that these infants were spared, and that a first death was granted them *as a refuge*, but not so for the infants of the Sodomites, the antediluvians, and the inhabitants of Jerusalem; but he will cease to marvel who considers that those Ninevites also, along with their parents, repented in their own way: they were deprived of their mothers' milk, and from this, with their cries, implored divine clemency, and were even laid by their mothers as an entreaty for mercy. Now if the Father of mercies provides for infants born outside the church from the *first* death, he much more provides for them from the *second* death, which is the greatest of all evils." (*Hodosoph. Phaen*. X. p. 506—508.)

SCHERZER: "As for the infants of Christians who die without baptism, this remains: it is not the deprivation, but the contempt of the sacrament that damns. But concerning the infants of the Gentiles who die, as for *those who are outside,* we do not judge, 1 Cor. 5:12. But that all are indiscriminately damned, as we would assert, is forbidden by the infinite mercy of God, the universal will of God to save men unless they place a hindrance, the universal merit of Christ, the extraordinary power of the Lord's hand to save also not being

> shortened, and the prayers of the Church, from the command of the Apostle 1 Timothy 2:1, offered for all men without exception and founded on the universal merit of Christ (loc. cit. vers. 3 sqq.). Who but a rash man would say that these are in vain? It would certainly be harsh to condemn an infant heathen absolutely for not having taken care to be baptized himself, which, however, was not in his power. Therefore, the contempt of the sacrament, since it has no place in them, cannot condemn them. Accordingly, neither do we, with Meisner (Anthropol. Decad. I. disp. 7. q. 2. p. 215), doubt, nor with the Papists do we plainly condemn them, but we hope the best for them. . . In the meantime, whoever is saved, even outside the church, is not saved by any absolute decree, nor apart from Christ, nor without faith. For no one can please God without faith in Christ (Heb. 11:6), nor is the hand of the Lord shortened that it cannot extraordinarily kindle faith in them." (*System, loc*. VII. p. 169. sq.)

## § 13.

The *efficient* cause of the evils, whose complex [(a)] implies damnation, can be *neither* transmitted *as a single entity nor in the same manner.*[(b)] For since damnation implies the *privation* [(c)] of beatific vision and of the love and joy that would arise from it, its efficient cause, properly speaking,[(d)] does not exist per se. The cause of the *positive* acts *of intellect and will* [(e)] that pertain here is the soul itself [(f)] abandoned by God. The causes of the *body's punishments* are partly the fire [(g)] of Hell, partly the evil [(h)] angels. However, insofar as damnation is regarded as a *punishment,*[(i)] it can be referred to God [(k)] the Trinity [(l)] and Christ [(m)] the *God-man* as its cause.[(n)]

a) According to what we have distinctly taught from § 2 to § 11.

b) Certainly, our own theologians do *not* dare to call *God* the efficient cause of damnation in an *absolute* sense. But *they do distinguish* the *meriting* cause from the *efficient cause,* not without reason. Moreover, the *evils* themselves of the state of damnation *vary,* so that not all of them can be regarded as genuinely caused in the proper sense by a truly and really causing cause, especially a single and proximate one.

c) See § 2.

d) For this is only of *real* and *positive* effects, not *of privations.*

e) On which see § 5 and following up to § 9.

f) Eliciting such acts within itself, although the objects, for their part, also contribute what is theirs. Certainly, the will, deprived of the light of glory and grace without any hope of restoration, determines itself to evil.

g) According to §§ 10 and 11.

h) See chap. III. on angels § 56, p. 141.
(Cf. the testimonies of Scherzer and Rambach cited P. I. c. 3. § 56.)

i) Where the cause of the *punishment* is the one who *punishes*, or who by His authority and power brings it about that men are subjected to the evil of punishment; which others here call the *inflicting cause of the punishment* of damnation.

k) Who *is able to destroy* (and does destroy) both *soul and body in hell, Matt. 10:28.* Who *will render tribulation* (eternal damnation, as is clear from the context) *to those who afflict* the faithful, *2 Thess. 1:6.*

l) For that act of punishing is a divine work *ad extra* (external work).

m) This is, indeed, the executor of divine judgment, using divine authority and power, who will effectively command the wicked, as if *accursed, to depart from Him into eternal fire,* so that they will soon enter *into eternal punishment, Matt. 25:41, 46.* He *will inflict vengeance with a flaming fire on those who do not know God,* etc., *2 Thess. 1:7–8.*

n) He will certainly withdraw all influx of grace, denying the influx necessary to confer the light of glory and beatific vision. Hence it is necessary that there follow a deprivation of this vision and of the other goods that depend on it. *Nor*, however, should it be concluded from this that the cause of damnation is an *absolute* decree or will of God. For this is an act of God's *consequent*, *not antecedent*, will, by which He inflicts punishment on the impious and thus on those He has foreknown, insofar as they are such. Likewise, it should *not* be thought that *a special positive influx* is attributed to God, by which the will of the damned *is determined* to those things that are morally *evil*. For it is clear from what has been said that this too is alien to God. However, if any of our own *deny that God* is *the cause of damnation, they* nevertheless *affirm* at the same time *that* God is *the author of the decree of damnation and its severe executor.* See *Brochmand*, *System. T. I. L. de Praedest.* cap. II. Sect. II. p. m. 253. Who also, in his Tom. II. L. *de Inferno* cap. I. Sect. III. p. 616, writes: That God is *not the author of hell, neither as far as it is damnation and perdition itself, Hosea 13:9, nor as far as the sin that leads to it is the medium, Psalm 5:5. James 1:13, but that for three other reasons God is to be considered the author of hell: 1) because He prepared the place of hell*, etc., *Matthew 25:42; 2) because He judges the wicked to hell, Mark 3:29; John 8:18, 36; 3) because God Himself inflicts these punishments, which are indeed horrible but most just,* etc., *2 Pet. 2:4; Jude 6; 2 Cor. 5:10.* But also *Gerhard*, in his *L. de Inferno*, § 27, teaches that God is in a certain way *the cause of hell*, p. 559, and § sq. 31, says this happens by reason *of preparation, threatening, infliction, and preservation,* p. 565 sqq. He is followed by *Scherzer*, System. L. XXIV. § 5. p. 644 sqq.

## § 14.

The *internal impulsive* cause [(a)] of the punishment of damnation on God's part is God's [(b)] vindictive justice. [(c)]

a) Accordingly, the *internal* cause is recognized as the same by *Gerhard*, loc. cit. § 33, p. 570.

b) Which must be satisfied by those who have offended the infinite majesty through their own sufferings, after they have refused to another's satisfaction their own.

c) Some add to this the *truth* of God, or the infallible truth, by which He is moved to fulfill His threatenings. And not without reason. Although both the threatenings and their fulfillment proceed from divine justice.

# § 15.

The *external* [(a)] impulsive cause is the unexpiated [(c)] *sins* [(b)] of the damned, especially [(d)] *proaeretic* [deliberate] sins, and above [(e)] all*, final unbelief.*

a) Others call it the *exterior* and *προκαταρκτικήν (preliminary)*, meaning the same thing in substance.

b) Each of these, and all of them together, constitute *a rebellion of the rational creature, bound to obedience to God,* as *Gerhard* rightly teaches (loc. cit.), and thus they are worthy to be punished with rejection from the face of God.

c) Indeed, among faithful people, heirs of eternal life, sins also occur; yet, because they are expiated through faith in Christ, they do not become the actual cause of their damnation, but are prevented from causing it, since it is certain that the faithful are not actually damned.

d) For thus, *consummated sins* (which, having their origin in evil concupiscence, are fostered and brought to light by the full consent of the will) are said to *beget death*, *James 1:15.* Compare *Rom. 8:13; 1 Cor. 6:9, 10; Gal. 5:19-21.*

e) Which some have called the *immediate* cause of damnation in the state of the new covenant, since it *alone damns by act, proximately and immediately*, *whereas otherwise it damns every sin only meritorily,* as *Dannhauer* speaks in his *Hodosoph. Phaenom*. XI, p. 1412. (915.) Compare *J. Fr. Koenig*, *Theol. Pos*. P. I. § 328. p. m. 65. They prove this from *Mark 16:16; John 3:18, 36;* indeed *Gerhard, L. de Inferno* § 29. p. m. 563. writes: *Although only unbelief is the formal and adequate cause of damnation, nevertheless, the remaining sins should not be excluded from the cause of damnation, both because they damn meritoriously, and because they are the fruit and effect of unbelief, etc.* He also appeals to *L. de Bon. Oper*. § 34., where similarly p. m. 41-42. He used the distinction between the *immediate* or *formal* cause and the *meritorious* cause to explain the mind of Luther, who in the Book *on the Christian's Liberty* [or *Bondage of the Will*] wrote that *no evil work makes* a man *evil and damned*, *but only unbelief.* Compare the same *L. de Inferno* § 82. p. 681, which also *states* that *unbelief, by which the merit of Christ is rejected, is the greatest of all sins, and is the cause why the other sins* (which could have been forgiven) *are not forgiven; that while it remains,* the other sins *also remain*, as Augustine reminds us from his Commentary on John XVI, l. c. *de Bon. Op*. § 34. p. 41. However, it is clear that the phrase, that original sin is a sufficient, but not an adequate, cause of damnation, has become a matter of dispute, and therefore, and because the Arminians were perceived to have abused this distinction to lessen the guilt of original sin, the pious Musaeus rightly taught to abstain from it in his *Ausführl. Erklärung* L. VII. Q. XXXIX. p. 308., he nevertheless confessed, as must be admitted, that those who are actually damned, if they had been without unbelief, would not have been damned on account of original sin alone. For if they had not been without faith, they would have believed in Christ, and for the merit of Christ, apprehended by faith, they would have been saved, not withstanding the original sin which still remained in them.

> QUENSTEDT: "All sins are *by their nature* mortal, that is, they of themselves merit eternal death or damnation, because every sin

is *ανομία*, lawlessness, and transgresses the law of God, and makes a man guilty of the whole law, James 2:10; Deuteronomy 27:26; Gal. 3, 10; Rom. 6, 23: 'the wages of sin is death.' . . . First of all, actual sins are meritorious causes of damnation, that is, those which are committed with a customary and deliberate mind. Hence St. James ch. 1:15 'Sin, when it is full-grown, gives birth to death,' i.e., the mature fruit of sin, committed with full and joyful assent, is death, not so much a temporary as an eternal one, as is clear from Rom. 8:13; 1 Cor. 6:9–10; Gal. 5:19–21; 2 Thess. 1:6, 8, 9. Although indeed all sins, as such, are a meritorious cause of damnation, the formal, proper, immediate, and adequate cause of damnation is final *ἀπιστία,* or unbelief, which not only merits, but also actually inflicts eternal death and damnation, by the force of the words of Mark 16:16: 'He who does not believe will be condemned.' And John 3:18: 'He who does not believe is already judged,' v. 36: 'He who does not believe the Son will not see life, but the wrath of God remains on him.' Observe: 1) 'He who does not believe,' i.e., he who pertinaciously perseveres in unbelief to the very last breath of life, he is actually damned. Just as all diseases by their own force bring about death or are in themselves lethal, and in fact the one who rejects medicine dies, so every sin, though it damns meritoriously, only unbelief (apistia) in act, proximately and immediately damns—or only he is actually damned who has pertinaciously rejected the heavenly helps. 2) It is said, 'the unbeliever is already judged,' not according to the manifest promulgation and publication of the final, damning sentence, which will occur at the last judgment, but because of the certainty of the divine decree made from eternity and the reason for the judgment, manifested in the Word and proclaimed to unbelievers, the execution of which will follow on the Last Day. 3) The word *μένει* not only points to the presence of divine wrath, into which we have already fallen because of our sins, but also to the continuous and perpetual act of that presence on account of the contempt of Christ's gospel, so that the meaning is: 'The wrath of God will remain upon the damned like the heaviest of burdens for eternity.' (L. c. P. I. c. 4. s. 1. th. 30. f. 806. sq.)

LUTHER: "Through Christ, original sin is abolished, and no one is condemned after Christ's coming except the one who does not let it go, i.e., the one who will not *believe*." (Marginal gloss, on John 15:22.)

SCHERZER: "Although original sin *of itself* deserves damnation and the torments of hell, and is therefore a *sufficient* cause of damnation, it is not, however, an *adequate* cause for the damnation actually inflicted (which is the goodness of God). 'It is false,' says Menzer, 'that original sin in infants outside the church is an adequate cause of reprobation; nowhere in Scripture are men said to be reprobated for that reason alone,' Defens. part. II. Conversat. Prutenicae Doct. Crocii cap. 9. fol. 83. col. 80. 81. 82. Vol. I. Works, fol. 951. 'No sins, however atrocious, *actually* bring about death and are directly and immediately deadly and actually deprive of the salvation of grace, *except for* unbelief," Hoepfner, Disp. X. de justlf. chap. II. Aphor. III. § 21. fol. 911. For just as faith alone justifies, so 'unbelief alone condemns,' according to Luther in Menzer, fol. 954 f., i.e., actually, proximately, and immediately. Otherwise, every sin condemns *meritoriously*, Dannhauer, *Hodosoph*. 1412. coli., fol. 368. 585. sqq. 1405.: 'Sins, insofar as they are such, are not the proximate cause of damnation, but insofar as they remain under unbelief.' Luther, in *Bondage of the Will* and *On the Babylonian Captivity*, so much so that, 'if it were possible to separate unbelief from them, there would be no sin,' the same in *Response to the King of England* near the end of Vol. II, Jenensis, p. 144. Altenb. Tom. II. f. 204. As he also breaks out into these words: 'That a Christian, even if he wanted to, cannot lose his salvation even by the gravest sins, unless he refuses to believe,' *Lib. de Captiv. Babyl*. Tom. II. Jen. Lat. fol. 285. and Tom. II. Witteberg. f. 78. In what sense it is to be understood that: 'Unbelief alone condemns,' which he proves from the words of Christ ('The Holy Spirit will convict the world of sin because they do not believe in me,' John 16:9). Vol. VII. Jenens. fol. 85. Altenb. Tom. VIII. fol. 198. sq." (Syst. loc. VII. p. 170.)

## § 16.

The subject *which* [a] of damnation [b] are impious [d] men,[c] finally [e] unbelieving.[f]

a) Or *supposita* [subsistents], which in the proper case are said to be damned. Some call it the *object for which* hell is prepared, others the *subject receiving infernal punishments*.

b) With regard to privative and positive evils, internal and external, which accordingly affect the subject not in one way but in various ways.

c) This, indeed, in this place; for elsewhere we have also said that the devil and his angels are subject to damnation, ch. III, on Angels, § 45 ff.

d) In which it is the case that external impulsive causes of damnation have force and reason, according to the preceding § 15. For a catalog of those to be damned, see *Romans 1:29–32; 1 Corinthians 6:9–10; Galatians 5:19–21. Eph. 5:3-4; Col. 3:5-6; 2 Tim. 3:2-5; Rev. 21:8; 22:15.*

e) *Those who do not know God and who do not obey the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, 2 Thess. 1:8. Those who do not believe in the Son, Mark 16:16. John 3:18, 36.,* and therefore *do not have the Son, 1 John 5:12.*

f) And the number of these is much greater than that of the heirs of blessedness; see *Matt. 7:13; 41; Luke 12:32; chap. 13:23, 24*.

## § 17.

The subject *in which* [a] is the soul [b] and likewise the body [c] of those impious men.

a) Or that part of man, by which he suffers punishment.

b) To which formally pertain the privations of beatific vision, of love and joy, and the positive evils of the intellect and will, which have been treated of in §§ 2, 3, 5, etc., up to § 9.

c) To which will be lacking the gifts of glorified bodies and to which will adhere the torments of infernal fire, according to § 4 and 10.

## § 18.

To seek or define the *location* of hell in this life is needlessly curious;[a] but that a certain place is destined for the damned is not in doubt.[b]

a) Cf. *Gerhard*, 1. c. § 84, p. 686 sqq. And it is certainly easier to show the difficulty of the individual sentences that define something here than to confirm even one of them sufficiently.

b) For Scripture itself makes very frequent mention of *hell, prison,* etc.

QUENSTEDT: "Where hell is is certain, distinct from the *where* of the blessed and separated from it by a great interval, Luke 16:26. As for *what kind* and *where* that place is, it is not certain. Some place it in the world, and indeed specifically at the center of the earth, like the Papists; others, which is also probable, *outside the world.* Chrysostom rightly says: '*Let us not seek where it is, but how to escape it.'* " (L. C. th. 34. f. 810.)

DANNHAUER: "This descent is into the *lower parts,* indeed the *lowest parts of the earth* (Eph. 4:9), or, according to the nature of Hellenism, into places which are themselves lower than the earth and are not contained within the earth's body; which is truly the lowest of all, *not geometrically,* but mystically. Not *according to the letter,* as Theophylact says, but *according to the sense, by way of likeness and analogy.* 'For just as (says Augustine) 'according to the body (*physically)* the lower things are heavier, so according to the spirit (*supernaturally*) the lower things are more sorrowful." (*Hodos. Phaen*. 8. p. 372.)

FECHT: "Nor is it clear where hell is, which, however, since it is 'prepared' (Matt. 25:41), was created." (*Syllog. controvers*. p. 95.)

GERHARD: "Since the hypothesis that hell is in the center of the earth is still doubtful, and since it has not been revealed to us in the Scriptures whether the place of hell, in which the damned together with the devils will endure their punishments, is created or uncreated, corporeal or incorporeal, within or outside this visible world, it is therefore better to be concerned with the escape from hell rather than with its creation." (L. c. § 32.)

HUTTER: "There were, in times past, not a few, both from the Fathers and from the Scholastics, who contended that hell, into which Christ descended, is a certain corporeal place, sunk deepest in the bowels of the earth; or, as Bellarmine writes, situated in the center of the earth. But this assertion is so vain, futile, and trifling that it requires no lengthy refutation. For if hell is some subterranean place, indeed situated in the center of the earth, and truly this earth will be consumed by fire on the Last Day, 2 Pet. 3:3, then it would necessarily follow that hell itself must also be reduced to nothing at that time. Which is false and absurd. The purer and truly orthodox view is that which holds that hell is in no way to be defined by any physical or corporeal place, nor by any other part of this universe; but outside this universe, through some spiritual, localless, and utterly incorporeal system or *'where,'* in which the eternal torments of divine fury, with ineffable suffering, will rage and assail both the bodies and the souls of men; just as, conversely, heaven or the seat of the blessed is not any corporeal or physical place, nor any part of heaven, but *a* certain spiritual and illocal *πού* or 'where', in which the elect will be filled with eternal felicity and ineffable joys. However, we certainly cannot define where that system of hell will be, or even where it is now: especially since Scripture itself says nothing openly on this matter. This is the reason why the ancient Fathers had such varied and uncertain opinions about hell; whose primary ones, however, have nothing in common with the fables of the Esauites and the Papists. Augustine certainly writes in Book 12 of *On Genesis* chapter 33: 'There is indeed a substance of the lower world, but I believe it to be spiritual, not corporeal.' And a little later: 'The lower world is called 'inferi' in Latin because it is below.' For just as according to the body, if they maintain the order of their weight, all heavier things are lower, so according to the spirit, all sadder things are lower.' To this opinion, Brenz also writes: 'When it comes to spiritual and heavenly things, these terms, *above* and *below,* are indeed used according to human custom, but they are not defined by place, but by dignity and indignity, majesty and abjection, joy and horror, gladness and sorrow." (*Book of Concord*, explanation, pp. 945–947.)

## § 19.

That the punishments [d] of all the damned,[b] perpetually surviving,[c] will be *eternal* [a] is *most* certain.[e]

a) So that they will never have an end; just as *Dan. 12:2* mentions *eternal shame, Matt. 25:46 eternal punishment, 2 Thess. 1:9 eternal destruction.* Cf. *Jude 6 and 13* and what we have said to § 10, note c.

> GERHARD: "The *eternity* of the punishments of hell is proven: I. *from the sacred Scriptures,* in which it is described 1. *κατηγορηματικός, affirmatively...; 2. αποφατικός, negatively...* They object: 'God threatened eternal punishments to sinners in order to restrain them from committing sins, because He ought to *threaten* His creatures *with* eternal torments, not *inflict them*.' I answer with the words of Gregory, Book 1, Moral 34, Chapter 16: 'If He threatened falsehoods to correct them from injustice, He also promised falsehoods to invite them to justice. Who would tolerate this madness of theirs, who try to assert that what the truth has threatened is not true, and while they strive to show God as merciful, they do not hesitate to proclaim Him a deceiver?' II. The eternity of the punishments of hell can be proven by *arguments* drawn from Scripture: 1. From the perpetual duration of *divine wrath*. . . 2. From the confirmation *of the chasm*, Luke 16:26. . . 3. From *the shutting of the door*, Matthew 25:10. . . 4. From the *contrast with blessedness* Matt. 25:46. . . 5. From the *removal of repentance*. . . 6. From the description of the *fire of hell*. . . 7. From the turpitude and confusion of *sin*. Sin is committed against God, who is infinite good; therefore it also merits infinite punishments. 8. From the *wish* [for death], Revelation 9:6. . . 9. From the *imposition of bonds*, Matthew 22:13. ... 10. From *association with demons*, Matthew 25:41." (L. c. § 57. sq.)

b) *Whether* they have borne the name of Christians in this life, and *perhaps* even for a time been truly faithful (but *πρόςκαιροι, only for a season), or whether* they have been altogether unbelievers.

c) *Not* that they are to be finally *annihilated*, but that*, remaining* in existence*,* they will suffer punishment.

d) Not only *privative*, but also *positive*, of *the* very hellish *fire*, which *will* never *be extinguished*, *Mark 9:44, 46, 48.* Compare *Revelation 14:11; chapter 19:3; chapter 20:10.*

e) Notwithstanding divine mercy, after the limit of *long-suffering* has passed.

ANTITHESIS.

> QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Origenists,* or, as some wish, the Cerinthians, who hold that the torments of demons and wicked men are temporary and will have an end at some time, when God's vengeance is as it were sated, and that the devil, by the efficacy and power of Christ's merit, will at last receive his former happiness. . . Augustine, in his book On Heresies, heresy 43, writes that Origen believed that 'even the devil, along with all the damned, has hope of deliverance from hell.' . . There are, however, those who try to clear Origen of this error, contending that the earlier opinions were inserted by his unjust rivals into his own writings, since in many places he seems to explicitly assert the eternity of the punishments of hell. . . 2. Of the *Pseudo-Ambrose [Abrosiaster],* who fosters the same error. For he writes in his exposition on Ephesians 3:3, 'the preaching of Paul also benefited the evil angels.' . . 3. It cannot be denied that *Jerome* writes hesitantly in his commentary on Isa. 24, toward the end: 'It should be known,'

he says, 'that human frailty cannot know the judgment of God, nor pass judgment on the magnitude and measure of the punishments, which has been left to the Lord's discretion.' 4. The *Anabaptists,* who in the last century began to teach that all the damned, and even the devils themselves, will finally be saved, and that an end will at some point be put to the very punishments or torments they have deserved for their sins; an error which the Augsburg Confession, Art. 17, condemns and rejects. 5. Of the *Libertines*, who promise the mercy of God to all men and even to demons after the judgment. 6. Of certain *Socinians*, who teach that evil angels and the impious are not to be eternally tormented, but are to be destroyed, abolished, and reduced to nothing by eternal fire. . . 7. *Arminians*, in whose confession the Leiden theologians desire that it be made sufficiently clear whether they hold that those infernal torments will last forever and that the wicked themselves, afflicted with those punishments, will live forever in those penalties; since the words are so ambiguously conceived that a Socinian could also understand his impious opinion about the eternal extinction of wicked men at the last judgment under those very words. . . 8. *Thomas* with his followers, p. 1. q. 64. a. 2. and *contra gentes* 1. 6. c. 9., where he argues that the devils could have done penance, if God had granted them the time and the help of grace. 9. *The more merciful ancient doctors*, against whom Augustine disputes in 1. 21. *de C. D*. c. 17., who did not indeed give the devils, but nevertheless gave men condemned to hell, hope of deliverance." (L. c. s. 2. q. 5. f. 826—828.)

## § 20.

The end of that damnation on God's part [(a)] as judge is the glory of vindicative justice,[(b)] of truth,[(c)] and of divine power.[(d)]

a) Who*, in Himself* and by a kind of native inclination, would rather not condemn; certainly He cannot even will to condemn a creature who has not yet been seen as fallen or about to fall, on account of His infinite goodness: but insofar as He is *the judge* of the whole earth *(Gen. 18:25).* And sinners and despisers of the offered grace turn away from him; *He hates those who work iniquity (Ps. 5:6)* and, after the long space of his forbearance, He casts them from His face and condemns them.

b) For from this proceeds that act of punishment, and thus it tends to His glory by the intention of God. For this reason it is said that *it is just before God* (and thus contributes to the glory of divine justice) *to inflict vengeance (διδόναι ἐκδίκησιν) on those who do not know God, so that they may pay the penalty, eternal destruction, ὄλεθρον αἰώνιον, 2 Thess. 1, 6. 8. 9.* And *Rom. 2:5, that on the day of wrath the righteous judgment of God will be revealed*. Compare *Ps. 11:7; Ps. 58:11-12; Rev. 19:1-3.*

c) Regarding *the threats* made against the impious, the fulfillment of which is their actual damnation. For thus it appears that those *words* are *faithful and true (λόγους ἀληθινοὺς καὶ πιστοὺς),* that *for the unbelieving and detestable, etc., there is a part in the lake that burns with fire and sulfur, which is the second death, Rev. 21:5, 8.*

d) As if prevailing over all the efforts and schemes of the wicked in this life. Hence the blessed, beholding the judgments of God against the unrepentant, acclaim the Judge: *Hallelujah. Salvation, and honor, and glory, and power (ἡ δύναμις) to our God, Rev. 19:1. 2 Thess. 1:9.* The wicked are said to suffer punishment *ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης τῆς ἰσχύος, from the glory of the might* (or power) *of the Lord.*

## § 21.

The state of damnation can be described [a] as a complex [b] of several [c] evils, which God [d] the triune, by the force of His [e] vindicative justice, inflicts upon impious [f] and ultimately unbelieving men, in respect to both soul and body,[g] for their sins and their own unbelief [h] in hell [i] inflicts, to be endured eternally,[k] to the glory of divine justice, truth, and power.[l]

a) According to the analogy of the description of the opposite state of blessedness, preceding ch. VI. final §.

b) For in this case it properly imports.

c) See the series in § 2 ff.

d) According to § 13 on the efficient cause.

e) Which is the internal impulsive cause, according to § 14.

f) As to the subject 'Which'; see § 16.

g) Which pertain to the subject By Which, according to § 17.

h) For this is the external impulsive cause; see § 15.

i) Or the *place* of the damned, according to § 18.

k) Which is the affection of condemnation, indicated in § 19.

l) To which the end of condemnation is indicated; see § 20.

# Chapter VIII. ^

ON TEMPORAL DEATH.

## § 1.

Since the highest or ultimate blessedness does not occur in this life but in the other,[a] and likewise the opposite, supreme misery, after this life,[b] it is now to be considered those things which, according to divine revelation, pertain to the end of this life and the entrance into the life or state that follows.[c]

a) See Prolegom. chap. I. § 4. note e. Vol. I. p. 10. And P. I. chap. VI. § 3. and 20.

b) See ch. VII, § 1, note *a.*

c) They are also called the *last things,* in Greek *τά έσχατα,* and are distinguished because *some* are last with respect to *individual* men*, others* with respect to the *universe* and the whole world. The *first* class pertains to *death and the state of the soul* after death. The *second* pertains to *the resurrection* of the dead and the analogous transformation of the living, the *final judgment, and the conflagration of the world;* each of which must be treated separately.

QUENSTEDT: "We have hitherto considered the *means of salvation* properly so called... Now follow the means taken more loosely, i.e., the four last things, . . . which are not so much means to obtain salvation, as *the way* by which we tend to the goal or end to which we are directed." (*Th. did.-pol*. P. IV. c. 17. s. 1. th. 1. f. 1697.)

GERHARD: The four last things are commonly numbered, this one included, by the distich:

Your death, the final judgment, the glory of heaven,
And the pain of hell are to be meditated upon by you...

The last things, taken in general, are twofold in regard to their twofold object: 1. *of the macrocosm*, 2. *of the microcosm*; the last thing *of the macrocosm* is the consummation of the world; the last things *of the microcosm* are four: 1. death. 2. resurrection. 3. judgment. 4. eternal abiding, of the righteous in heaven and of the damned in hell." (*Loc. de morte*, § 7.)

## § 2.

And first of all, we must consider [(a)] *death*, which is the privation of [(b)] the natural life of men,[(c)] resulting from the separation of the soul and body.[(d)]

a) As if imposing an end to the journey of each individual wayfarers. Although it itself is called *the way of all flesh (Josh. 23:14)*, that is, the path by which one passes to the end.

b) For death is opposed to life only *privatively*, and it signifies the absence of life in a subject that was fit to have life and that had life for some time.

c) Or, as others put it, *the privation of animal life.* For here we are not considering *spiritual* death*, whether of the faithful* or *the unfaithful,* nor *eternal* death*,* but *temporal death,* which is also called *bodily* death.

d) These, which are otherwise naturally ordered and united to constitute man, as essential parts of the whole, so that the soul exercises vital operations in the body and the animated body lives by this very fact. Conversely, when that union is removed, the human subject ceases to live the animal life or is deprived of life; yet for this reason, that dissolution of the soul and body is not itself the *form* or formal principle of death, but differs from it, as the antecedent from the consequent. Although it is not uncommon for death to be described by the name *ἀναλύσεως* (release) or the verb *ἀναλῦσαι* (to depart/loosen), e.g.*, 2 Tim. 4:6; Phil. 1:23,* this is not, however, its formal appellation. The body*,* on the other hand*,* is said to be *καταλυθῆναι* when it is putrefies or falls apart, *2 Cor. 5:1.*

QUENSTEDT: *"The form* of death is not the annihilation of the soul, but its loosing from the body and departure from the body's dwelling, or the local separation of the soul from the body, the divulsion and distraction of the soul and body; I say *local separation,* because the soul truly departs from the body and no longer remains in it, leaving it both *in terms of presence and in terms of its informing influence;* Luke 12:20: 'This night your soul will be required of you.' The Savior uses the word *απαιτεῖν,* "to demand back," as if it were a foreign thing, granted for temporary use. Thus the soul of the converted thief was with Christ in heaven, while his body remained on earth. The essence of death, if we wish to speak accurately, consists in *λύσει* (loosening) alone, but its necessary consequence is *διάστασις* (separation)" (L. c. th. 11. f. 1701.)

## § 3.

The *efficient* cause of death, *properly and strictly* speaking,[a] is *not* given. In the meantime, we must consider the causes *of the dissolution of the soul and* body,[b] which are partly *physical* [c] and partly *moral*.[d]

a) For it is a privation, as we have seen. But efficient causes properly speaking are of real and positive effects.

b) Since the causes of privations are otherwise called the causes of some effect, with which privation is per se and necessarily joined.

c) Or those which actually act upon the union of the soul and body and destroy it.

d) Or those which, while not in fact destroying such a union, nevertheless contribute something to its destruction, so that this is rightly imputed to them.

## § 4.

Among the *moral* causes of death, the *devil* is to be counted first,[a] insofar as by his persuasion [b] he induced Eve to sin and thus brought the guilt of death [c] upon her and the companions in sin.

a) Who is therefore called a *murderer, John 8:44.*

b) See *Gen. 3:1 ff.* Thus, the cause of the cause of death (i.e., sin) is also the cause of the effect (i.e., death itself).

c) For without sin the first humans were immortal; through sin they ultimately became mortal, according to the preceding chapter. IV. § 15. note *d.* Compare *Gen. 3:3, 4, 19 and Wis. 2:24*, where it is said that *death entered* the world through *the envy of the devil*, and *Heb. 2:14, that the devil has the power of death, the dominion of death,* just as a tyrant condemns those he has conquered to death. For although we must confess that the discourse there is not only of bodily death, but also of eternal death, this nevertheless holds true: that the devil, by inducing men into sin, has acquired *κράτος* or power over them, so that they are subject to death, even temporal death.

> MEISNER: "If death had arisen from a physical necessity and the condition of nature, that threat in Genesis 2:17 would certainly have been futile and void. For the Lord wanted to decree a penalty that, outside of the state of sin, would never have had any place. However, it is not understood to be only eternal death, but everything that is called by the name of death in Scripture, for which reason theologians rightly believe that the word 'death' is used in the plural and 'you shall die' was said by the Lord… Death in general and universally is called the *wages of sin* (Rom. 6:23). Therefore, if death first proceeded from sin, it is not a consequence of nature as God created it, and so man was not created mortal from the beginning. For one thing is the punishment *of sin* and another the condition *of the substance.* Scripture affirms the former of all death; therefore the latter must be denied, because two opposites cannot coexist." (*Philos. sobr*. P. I. p. 883. f.)

## § 5.

Furthermore, the first parents are rightly said to be the cause of death not only for themselves but also *for their posterity*;[(a)] Eve indeed, insofar as she did not sin alone but, obeying the devil's persuasion, also drew Adam into the fellowship of sin [(b)] and thus brought the guilt of death upon *herself* and *Adam*; *Adam*, however, by listening to his wife and breaking God's law, when *he himself* fell under the necessity of dying, then became for all his natural *descendants*—just as the cause of sin—so also the cause of death. [(c)]

a) Although they did not directly intend death, but rather thought that something else would happen. See *Gen. 3:3-4.*

b) *Gen. 3:6; 1 Tim. 2:14.*

c) *Gen. 3:6, 17, and 19; Rom. 5:12.*

## § 6.

*God*, however, is *not the author of death*, [(a)] *except* insofar as, as *a* just *judge*,[(b)] He deprived [(d)] the first parents of the gift of immortality because of their neglect of the prohibition and the severe threat [(c)] and thus subjected mankind to the death they had deserved.

a) Absolutely speaking, let it not be thought that He instituted it this way without regard to sin. For He created the first men *in incorruptibility*. Nor does He delight in the death of men, but in their preservation and life, *Wis. 1:13; ch. 2:23.*

b) Death is therefore regarded here as the evil of a punishment, inflicted on account of the evil of the intervening guilt. Compare *Ps. 90:7,* where the *wrath of God* is said to *consume* us*,* and what we will say at § 7, note *c.d.*, and § 14, note *d.*

> Fecht: "God is not the cause of death, either by its preceding merit or by inflicting it, Ezek. 33:11, nor can He be so by His own nature, Matt. 19:17. He is, however, the cause of death when merit has preceded, and of the one who terminates life, Ps. 7:13-14, and inflicting it, 1 Sam. 2:6." Rollius adds: "In what way death is regarded as the evil of a penalty, inflicted in view of the evil of a preceding fault. " (*Syllog. controvers*. p. 373. sq. 376.)

c) Which is added to the same law*, Gen. 2:17.*

d) For this is what is meant when it is said that man, deprived of the gift of immortality, *must return to the earth from which he was taken (Genesis 3:19).*

## § 7.

The *internal impulsive* cause of death on *Satan's* part [(a)] is his supreme hatred for God and mankind;[(b)] on *God's* part, however,[(c)] the internal impelling cause is His vindicative justice,[(d)] *externally* the fall [(e)] of the first parents.[(f)]

a) Who, without a doubt, directly intended the death of the human race, and thus, being thus impelled, is rightly known as one who willed death.

b) For he could scarcely bear to look upon a creature endowed with the gift of immortality for the praise of its Creator and its own happiness. And this is what that *envy* refers to, of which the author of the Book of *Wisdom (ch. 2:24*) speaks—whether you call envy born of hatred or hatred born of envy. Hence, perhaps, you might also say that the *external*, impulsive cause of death on Satan's part was the gift of immortality bestowed upon humans by God, which Satan could not look upon with an even mind.

c) Although *not* by a *prior* will*,* yet by *a consequent one*, the death of the sinner whom he wills and inflicts, according to what we said in § 6 and in notes *a and b.*

d) Which he calls *wrath* in *Psalm 90:7.* It is said*,* however*,* that it *consumes* us because it moves God to subject us to death.

e) For by *sin death entered into the world, Romans 5:12.* Compare here §§ 5 and 6.

f) On the part of the first parents themselves, we do not assign a motivating cause, because they did not directly intend death, according to § 5, note a.

## § 8.

However, if we look at *particular* examples of death,[a] the moral cause of death varies greatly, and sometimes it is constituted by the *dying* themselves,[b] at other times by *other* men,[c] and by *good* [d] or evil [e] *spirits*; sometimes the dying men and others, perhaps also spirits, concur *simultaneously;*[f] Hence, the impulsive cause is also *manifold*.[g]

a) For what we have seen so far pertains, as a rule, to death as *it was* first *introduced* into the human race, setting aside certain cases of individual deaths.

b) *Some* of these are simultaneously the physical cause of violent death by applying lethal things to themselves, and are commonly called *αὐτόχειρες* (suicides); to this category belongs the example of *Saul, 1 Sam. 31:4. Others* demand to be killed by others, like Abimelech by his armor-bearer, *Judges 9:*54, *or* at least knowingly and willingly offer themselves to their killers, as Paul did when he journeyed to Jerusalem, *ready to die for the name of the Lord Jesus, Acts 21:13. Others*, though not with a direct but an indirect intention, expose themselves to the dangers of death and perish, like King *Josiah*, *2 Chronicles 35:20 ff. Others* provoke God or the magistrate to their own death by their sins. See what we have said about the abrupt end of life, P. I. chap. V. *de provid*. § 18.

c) E.g., *those who* hire robbers or murderers for a price, *who* by their command, persuasion, threats, or promises induce *or* otherwise promote human slaughter in any way, just as *David* is said to have killed Uriah, when he ordered him to be placed in the front line and left unprotected while fighting, *2 Sam. 11:15 ff., 12:9. Absalom* killed his brother Amnon by the hand of his servants, *ibid. ch. 13:28–29.* The same applies to *those who*

do not keep watch over a goring ox, *Exodus 21:29,* much more so to *those who* incite beasts against a man, as the enemies of Christians have been accustomed to do in the theaters. Finally, *those who* do not avert or remove the dangers and causes of death of their neighbor, which they could, are like watchmen who do not warn the citizens of an approaching enemy, according to *Ezek. 33:6.*

d) Executors of divine will are also punished by the angel of the Lord in such cases, as was Herod, who was struck so that he would be eaten alive by worms and thus perish, *Acts 12:23.*

e) Who, *partly* because they themselves desire to harm human life, and *partly* because they have authority granted by God to chastise the pious and punish the impious, are not without reason attributed to the author Satan, as in the violent destruction of the house of *Job's* firstborn sons and the violent killing of all his children *(ch. 1:19).* Cf. Book I, Chapter III, *on Angels*, §§ 51, 52, 56, 2.

f) Thus, indeed, in the slaughter of *King Ahab* in the battle with the Syrians, *Satan*, together with the *false prophets* he controlled, and *Ahab* himself—by entering an unjust war and spurning the warnings of the prophet Micah—are recognized as having intended Ahab's death, *each in his own way*: *Satan* directly, the *others* indirectly, and thus as having fully accounted for the cause, *2 Chronicles. 18:2, 19, 21, 25, 33, 34.*

g) There is certainly a greater variety here, on account of the difference between the human agents and the spirits, than to allow all classes of motives to be distinctly presented in summary.

## § 9.

*Physical* causes [(a)] are divided [(b)] into *natural, supernatural,* and *violent.*

a) The dissolution of the soul and body is *partly* introduced as a first principle, and *partly* as something that later happens in the case of mortal men.

b) Others establish *two* species or classes, but *in* almost *the same sense.* For those things which here are called supernatural, they refer *either* to the natural *or* to the violent.

## § 10.

*Natural* cause [(a)] of death is the radical consuming of moisture and the extinction of the native heat,[(b)] arising from the first qualities gradually acting upon one another,[(c)] and proceeding from them.[(d)]

a) Namely, that which arose most proximately from the necessity of nature (corrupted, not whole).

b) Such as occurs in long-lived men who have enjoyed robust health, with no more serious disease intervening, just as *Cicero* described the long-lived in *De Senectute*, who *depart only when heavily burdened with years and by a natural death.* And *Aristotle* said that natural death is that whose beginning is in the animal itself and is called *γήρας, old age,* in his book *On Respiration*, chapter XVII.

c) Either because the vigor of the native heat, which from the fall of the first parents has had an impure nourishment, gradually languishes and converts the food it takes in less effectively, and so, with the proper fuel lacking, that native heat or vital flame is more and more weakened and at last is extinguished, which Aristotle called the natural corruption of life, *τὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ μάρανσιν διὰ χρόνου μῆκος γινομένην καὶ τελειότητα, the decay of the hot element through the length and completion of time,* l. c. chap. XVIII.

d) And so the *only* cause of death is *a natural one,* the proximate one, indeed. For otherwise, besides the natural *temperament*, they also tend to attribute *diet* and, in its own way, *medicine* (which, since they cannot grant immortality, contribute to longevity and thus, not so much to keep a man from dying, but to ensure that he dies not by any other means than a natural death) to this.

## § 11.

To the *supernatural* causes (a) belong more vehement *diseases*,(b) by which likewise the native heat is extinguished along with the radical moisture, but contrary to (c) nature.

a) These, although they occur within the human body, nevertheless arise *not* from the *ordinary* necessities of nature, but *from other causes,* e.g., from faults in diet—in food, air, sleep and wakefulness, motion and rest—or even from the admission of the passions of the sensitive appetite.

b) For example, *fevers, dropsy, consumption, plague*, *and other* diseases, which are excited by powerful causes and overturn the substance, temperature, and entire constitution of the body's parts, and so dissipate or suffocate the spirits that nature has no means left to defend itself or to return to its former state.

c) Thus the philosopher says that *the extinction and withering of heat, θερμοῦ σβέσιν καὶ μάρανσιν,* even has a place in unnatural death, but that its beginning is *a certain acquired passion,* l. c. cap. XVII. and XVIII.

## § 12.

*External* causes (a) are referred to *violent* causes, by which such violence is inflicted on the body, or on a nobler part of the body or one necessary for life, that the generation and distribution of the nourishment of the blood and spirits is impeded or destroyed.(b)

a) e.g. a deadly *weapon*, *fire*, *water,* etc.

b) For without these, the body itself is rendered unfit for the functions of the soul and life cannot continue.

## § 13.

The subject of death [a] are men, not only the first after the fall,[b] but also the rest, propagated from them by carnal generation,[c] all.[d]

a) That is, that which is subject to death and is called mortal. Others call it "*matter in which*" (*materiam in Qua*).

b) According to the divine threat *in Gen. 2:17; chap. 3:19,* and the corresponding event in *Gen. 5:5.*

c) For Christ, conceived *by the Holy Spirit*, was not subject to the necessity of death.

d) Thus, *death* is said to *have passed into all men (Rom. 5:12).* And in *Hebrews 9:27, it is said that it is appointed for* all *men to die once.* That *Enoch and Elijah* were translated alive into heaven, and *that those* people whom the last day of the world finds alive will not die (even though they too are mortal and would truly have died, if the last day had not anticipated the end of life, or the death they would otherwise have had to undergo), is a special and extraordinary thing. And that these are to undergo *a change analogous to* death, the apostle testifies in *1 Corinthians 15:51.* However, that transformation *does not* consist in a distressing or painful suffering of some adverse thing, which would be like the separation of the soul and body, *but* in the end of mortal or animal life, and in the passage to another life or state (which otherwise, by the common law, does not occur except through the dissolution of the soul and body), with the soul and body meanwhile remaining joined by an essential bond, and such a change is of course *analogous to* death, yet it does not have the formal ratio of death. For then it would not even be *analogous to* death, but death itself. *Nor* will it *only* happen to those who survive on the Last Day, *but* it is also rightly said that it once happened to Enoch and Elijah.

## § 14.

The *final* cause of death [a] on *Satan's* part [b] is the fulfillment of his hatred toward God and men;[c] on *God's* part, however,[d] the end of death *in itself* [e] is the punishment of sins, and thus also the declaration of divine justice.

a) Which must *be varied* according to the diversity of the efficient or inflicting cause; on which see above §§ 4, 5, 6, 8.

b) Who undoubtedly directs it immediately according to § 4 and 7, and this is the end of someone, though not a true good, since he himself is the most corrupt.

c) For although the hatred of that evil spirit is insatiable, he nevertheless strives to satisfy it in whatever way he can.

d) Compare §§ 6 and 8.

e) That is, insofar as death, in *its* own *nature*, and as it was first sent by God upon the human race, is considered. However, *by accident* and *by the grace* of God, it has come about that for certain individuals, namely *those who believe* in

Christ, are reconciled to God, and freed from the guilt of sin, death is *not a penalty,* properly *speaking,* but *an end of* temporal *misery* and *a transition (μετάβασις) to a* better *life*, see. *John 5:24,* and that it is called a *sleep Matt. 9:24. John 11:11, the release from the body of this death (Rom. 7:24), the desired departure (release, απολύσις) (Phil. 1:23; Luke 2:29), and entering into rest from labors (Isa. 57:2; Rev. 14:13) are called such.*

LUTHER: "The tree of life had the power to preserve life because of the Word, and would have preserved life for Adam as well. But God, being angry, does not want to permit him after the fall to return to that tree, not only so that he might be admonished of the sin he committed, but also because Adam now had a better promise, that the seed of the woman would crush the serpent's head, so that, although he was subject to bodily death, he might nevertheless retain the hope of immortality through the Son of God; just as an angry head of the household, even though he does not strip his son of his right to the inheritance, nevertheless chastises him, casts him out of the house, etc. Therefore, the Lord God wills that man be content with the promise of a better life than the one Adam was created to live. For even if Adam had eaten from the tree of life and been restored to his former life, he would not have been safe from Satan, lest he fall from it again through temptation. God has therefore prepared for man such a state, in which we may be certain that we shall never die the eternal death through the blessed seed, even though this bodily life is variously afflicted." (*On Genesis 3:23, 24*. Exegetical Works, Latin I, 291 ff.)

# § 15.

After the dissolution of the soul and body, and thus the occurrence of death, the *surviving soul* nevertheless remains [(a)] and, by its own *operations,*[(b)] functions outside the body [(c)] separately.[(d)]

a) Thus Solomon *in Ecclesiastes 12:7* says that the *dust*, or the body of man, *returns to the earth as it was,* but the *spirit returns to God* who *gave it.* And Christ in *Matthew 10:28* says that those *who kill the body cannot kill the soul.*

GERHARD: "The arguments that are offered from the light of nature can induce a certain persuasion of the immortality of the soul, but they in no way provide a firm, immovable, and *unchangeable* foundation for faith. 'For who knows,' says the wise man in Ecclesiastes 3:19, 'from the natural principles and reasons I know, whether the spirit of man goes upward and the spirit of the beasts goes downward?' . . . This very thing is also clear from a passage in Cicero, Book I of his *Tusculan Disputations*, not far from the beginning. For there Atticus is introduced speaking as follows: 'I am delighted by that opinion, that souls, when they have departed from the body, can arrive at heaven as their dwelling; and I would like to persuade myself that this is true, first, if it is, and then, even if it is not.' Marcus replies: 'What use, then, is our labor to you? Can we, by our eloquence, surpass Plato? Read his book on the soul carefully, and you will find nothing more to desire.' Atticus replies: 'I have, by Hercules, and many times, but I don't know how; while I'm reading, I assent, but when I put the book down and begin to think to myself about the immortality of souls, that whole assent slips away.' The same doubt is raised in Cicero's Cato, in the *Dialogues on Old Age*. Therefore, the philosophers' opinions on the immortality of the soul are subject to many doubts, and are not unlike the storms of winds and waves, by which a ship *tempest-tossed* on the sea is shaken and tossed to and fro." (*L. de morte* § 147.)

b) Namely those things which *formally* pertain to *intellect and will,* as powers *of the soul* insofar as it is *human* or rational, *are essential;* that the *intellect,* for its part, can retain the intelligible species it had in the body and even elicit further acts of cognition, to which then some *voluntary* act responds concerning the objects presented by the intellect, is rightly believed. And to this is usually referred what is said of the souls of the martyrs in *Revelation 6:10, that* they have knowledge of their former state and a certain desire.

GERHARD: "Because he *(Moses)* appears with *Elijah* at the Transfiguration of Christ, speaking with Christ Matt. 17:3, it is therefore probable that Moses was divinely resurrected immediately after his death and translated into heavenly paradise; in which sense it is taken by some that no one found his tomb, Deut. 34:6." (*Loc. de resurr*. § 28.) DANNHAUER: "That he (Moses) rose before the transfiguration on the mount is more than probable; for he appeared not as a ghost, but as a fellow-citizen and associate of Elijah, as a witness to the resurrection and glory of Christ. Although Dr. Winckelmann on Luke ch. 9 follows a different opinion." (*Hodos. Phaen*. VIII. p. 375.)

*c)* For we are said *to be traveling* (according to the soul, by which we are most truly human) *from the body, ἐκδημῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος;* whereas previously *we were* as if *at home in the body, ἐνδημοῦντες ἐν τῷ σώματι, 2 Cor. 5:6, 8, ὄντες ἐν τῷ σκήνει, existing in the tabernacle,* previously, *ibid. v. 4.*

d) However, we do not say that the souls of the departed know distinctly and specifically the actions and individual affairs of the living, which occurred after their departure from the body, especially the various prayers and worship directed to them.

DANNHAUER: "The Romanists themselves deny that the *damned* souls can return after death. I. *That holy souls, or the heavenly ones*, can *return*, the sacred Scriptures deny (2 Sam. 12:23): 'Can I bring him back (by prayers)?' likewise: 'He will not return' (Sirach 38:22), i.e., from the genius of the language, he can return; *'οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐπάνοδος* (Luke 16:26), *'ὅπως οἱ βούλοντες διαβῆναι* (scl. from heavenly glory) *ἐντεῦθεν πρὸς ὑμᾶς μὴ δύνωνται.'* If not to the damned, then neither to mortals. The same reason for the impossibility in both cases: the filth must not be mixed with that sort. I add a reason: A holy soul either appears in *its own* body, or in *another's,* or *in* one newly formed *of air*. None of these! Not in *its own,* because it is neither honorable nor decent for glorious souls to undergo the anguish of their own decaying and putrefying bodies before the resurrection, especially if they have long been corrupted; not in *another's,* because that is less fitting and moreover contradicts the purpose of the apparition, which is to be recognized by one's own features and the marks of one's former body; not *by air,* because a separated soul, according to the more correct view, cannot move anything other than itself by its own power; for it lacks corporeal organs. Furthermore, it must be denied: II. *that the holy celestials* ought *to return,* because those *ψυχοφανείαι* would be of no benefit to mortals, indeed, would be detrimental. First, this is not useful to the living, who, if they do not believe while the living are present, will not believe even when the dead are present, as Abraham answers the rich man. Furthermore, this matter could be the cause of many errors, since a demon, pretending to be the soul of a deceased person, would deceive men. III. *To deny*, *prudently.* For why would those who are freed from all torments and are now blessed serve mortals with the *δουλείᾳ,* as they say, of worship? *To deny* IV*., that it ever happened.* For whatever is preached about those apparitions could also have been done by Satan, transforming himself into an angel of light or, like a hyena, imitating the voice of a shepherd in order to devour the sheep." (*Hodosoph. Phaen*. IV. p. 213. sq.)

QUENSTEDT: "The one whom *we religiously invoke* must be omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, and we must believe in and hope in him. But the saints are not omnipresent, not omnipotent, not omniscient, and we do not believe in or hope in them. Therefore. the *major* is established; i.e., that the one who is invoked is *omnipresent*, is taught in Deut. 4:7; Ps. 91:15; 145:18; Isa. 55:6. Therefore the prophet Elijah laughs at the prayers of the priests of Baal, because Baal, when invoked, does not appear. That he is *omniscient* and *a* searcher of hearts (*καρδιογνώστης*) (a knower of hearts) is emphasized in 1 Kings 18:27; Ps. 18:7; 38:10; 79:11; Matt. 6:6. That he is and must be *omnipotent* (i.e., that he can help in our weaknesses) is shown throughout Scripture; see Ps. 46:1, 2; 62:10, 11, etc. That we must *believe and hope* in the one whom we call upon is taught by the Apostle in Rom. 10:14.: 'How shall they call on him in whom they have not believed?' The truth *of this* is not in doubt, since God alone is *a heart-searcher,* he alone is everywhere present, he alone is omnipotent, so that he can both hear and answer. And since the aforementioned axiom of Paul is immutable—that we should not invoke anyone but Him in whom we have believed (Rom. 10:14)—I do not see on what grounds the saints and angels are said to be invoked, unless they are thereby constituted the very object and focus of our faith. How foreign this is to Scripture will be clear to anyone who reads Jer. 17:5. That the same is the object of adoration in the Decalogue, the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and Baptism is evident from the very coordination of these heads of religion. But in the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and Baptism, the object of adoration is none other than God, cf. Luke 11:12-13. Matt. 6:9. Hence Celestine is said to have declared, ‘The law of prayer is the law of believing and acting.’ . . Those who are ignorant of our failings and private miseries, cares, groans, and sighs are invoked in vain. But the holy inhabitants of heaven are ignorant of our failings, etc. Therefore, however, *distinguish* here between general and special knowledge, as well as between the *recollection* of past things and the *knowledge* of present things. Thus that rich man carried the memory of his five brothers with him, etc. Although therefore the blessed *in general* know certain things about the state of the militant Church, with which they once merited under the banner of the cross, and from this *in general pray for the Church,* nevertheless they are altogether ignorant of the *particular things,* the private miseries, cares, groans, and sighs of each individual. And therefore, it is clear that nothing can be obtained from those who have been taken from this life by us: 1) from the clear testimonies, Job 14:21: ‘Whether his sons be honorable or dishonorable, he shall not perceive it.’ Eccles. 9:5: ‘The living know that they will die, but the dead know nothing more.' Isa. 63:16: 'Abraham does not know us, and Israel does not recognize us'; cf. 2 Kings 22:20. 2. From the perpetual joy of the blessed, 2 Kings 22:19-20. Isa. 65:17-18; Rev. 21:4. Therefore they are ignorant of the miseries of their posterity, since their own joy would be disturbed by them." (L. c. P. IV. c. 11. s. 2. q. 4. f. 1446. sq.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Collyridians,* who paid the worship and adoration of religion to the blessed virgin, against whom Epiphanius, disputing in heresy 79, speaks thus: 'Let Mary be honored; but let the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit be adored; let no one adore Mary.' Also: 'Although Mary was beautiful (*καλλίστη*) and holy (*άγία*) and honored (*τετιμένη*), she is not therefore to be adored.' 2. Of the *Papists,* who 1) *in general* defend the invocation of saints. For thus the Council of Trent, Session 25, p. 290: ‘The holy synod mandates to all bishops and to all others who have the duty and care of teaching, that, according to the use of the Catholic and Apostolic Church, etc., they diligently instruct the faithful concerning the invocation of the saints, teaching them that the saints, reigning with Christ, offer their prayers to God for men, and that it is good and useful to supplicate them humbly.' The Catechism of Trent, published by decree of the council and by order of Pius V, exposition of the Lord's Prayer, p. 544, says: 'That prayers are to be made to the saints who are in heaven is so certain in the Church of God that no pious person can possibly have any doubt about it.' . . 2) *Specifically*, they make the deceased saints or blessed men a. *intercessors.* Hence the common saying: "Pray for us." . . .; b. *mediators,* who intercede for us not only by prayers

but also by the presentation of their merits. . . They are also, c. *redeemers, according to* the papists. Bellarmin, Book 1, on Indulgences, chapter 4, pronounces it ‘not absurd,’ ‘if the holy men are called our redeemers in some way.’ . . . d. *Bestowers* of bodily and spiritual goods. Council of Trent. Sess. 9. and ult. wills that 'the saints are to be invoked with confidence, having recourse to their help and aid with a suppliant mind.' . . However, what we have said thus far about the saints and their cult and adoration, according to the mind and practice of the Papists, is to be understood principally of the *canonized* saints, that is, those who have been included by the Pope in the canon or number of saints. For although the papists concede that each of the saints can be honored and invoked, they nevertheless decree that public worship is to be rendered only to those who have been canonized." (L. c. f. 1444. sq.)

## § 16.

Rather, we believe that the souls *of the pious immediately*, after being separated from their bodies, attain *essential blessedness*,[(a)] while the souls *of the wicked* undergo their *damnation*.[(b)] [(c)]

a) See *Phil. 1:23,* where Paul desires *dissolution* so that *he may be with Christ* more quickly, that is, in the glorious kingdom of Christ; so that to be with Christ is for him the same as to enjoy blessedness with Christ. And Christ Himself said to the penitent thief: *'Today shalt thou be with me in paradise,'* that is, you will enjoy heavenly glory with me, *Luke 23:43.* What Christ says in *John 5:24, that believers in* Him *pass from death to life,* indicates that the faithful, upon dying, are immediately made partakers of eternal life. And in *Revelation 7:4 and 15, the souls* of the *blessed* martyrs are said to be *before the throne of God and to serve Him day and night; which is certainly a description of blessedness.* See *Mus., Ausführl. Erklärung* L. XIX. Q. XCII. p. 700. sqq.

QUENSTEDT: "There are three principal opinions concerning the state of souls separated from the body. The *first* of these holds that they neither feel, nor understand, nor rejoice nor grieve, but are detained in oblivion of all things and sleep, as it were, a deep *sleep*. Hence the defenders of this opinion were called Psychopannychists. The *second* is that the souls of the pious, after death, are indeed in rest and quiet, and already have a *foretaste of* that heavenly blessedness, but that they will only attain its full and complete possession on the last day. The *third* and more correct view teaches that the *full and complete blessedness,* which consists in the clear and immediate vision of God, is attained by the souls of the righteous immediately upon death and before the universal resurrection of bodies. This blessedness of the separated souls Dr Koenig, in *Theol. positiva* §291, calls 'partially consummated'; he calls it absolutely consummated, however, that which is *of the whole composite* after the reunion of the soul and body. . . Therefore, the soul, before it is united to the body, has not yet attained absolute perfection, but it expects the absolutely consummate, or full and perfect, blessedness—viewed *extensively*, of course, through the glory of the body—only on the last day. The blessedness of the soul will therefore not be increased *intensively and in itself,* but extensively and extrinsically, i.e., through the glory of the body, when the resurrected body is assumed into the communion of heavenly joy and glory. And this is what Gerhard means when, in his *Lectiones de Vita Aeterna*, loc. ult. § 109, he says: ‘The elect in this life perceive a certain *foretaste* of heavenly goods and joys.’" (L. c. P. I. c. 14. p. 1. th. 3. f. 789. sq.)

DANNHAUER: "*Soul-sleep* (*Ψυχοπαννυχία*) is a doctrine contrary to the sacred Scriptures, in which the martyrs in Revelation 6:10–11, with a loud voice under the altar, cry, 'How long, O Lord, will You not avenge our blood from those who dwell on the earth?' They were given white robes, and it was said to them that they should rest for a little while longer, etc. But white robes, which are signs of glory and festivity, are put on not the sleeping, but the watching. Nor are those called asleep who cry out and follow the Lamb wherever He goes; for them the death of the pious is called a gain and *a* 'passing into life' (*μετάβασις εἰς ζωήν*) (John 5:24). What does he gain who sleeps for so many ages? It would have been better to have remained in the body and to have enjoyed the first fruits of the Spirit. Does he who snores enjoy life to the full? Why does Paul desire to be released, if he were to have to migrate to a sleep of so many ages? 'If,' says Cicero (Book 5, *de finibus*, § 55). p. 154, 'anyone wished to live ninety years in such a way that, having lived sixty, he sleeps for the rest? Not even pigs would want that." Did Moses and Elijah sleep when they were delighted by their conversation with Christ? Did Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, Matt. 17:4, when they reclined at the heavenly table? Matt. 8:11. Surely, just as Moses, Aaron, Nadab, and Abihu feasted, delighted in the vision of God, Exod. 28:11." (*L. c. Phaenom*. p. 719.)

LUTHER: 'A man, wearied in this life by the labors of the day, enters his bedchamber at night as if in peace, to sleep there, and enjoys the quiet of that night, knowing nothing of any evil, whether of fire or of slaughter. But the soul does not sleep like this, but *is awake and has visions, the words of angels and of God.*' (Exeget. opp. lat. Tom. VI. p. 120.) IBID.: 'Therefore the end makes a very great difference between the suffering of Christians and that of the wicked. For even if both are stabbed and killed at the same time, a Christian is led from this straight into eternal joy, but the wicked one into the abyss of hell.' (Ad Joh. 1, 11. Tom. Hal. VII. p. 1518.) THE SAME: 'Therefore we should also be assured by our U. Rhegius . . . that he *is blessed* and *has* eternal life and joy in the fellowship of Christ and the triumphant Church in heaven, where he *now* learns, sees, and hears those things which he taught here in the militant Church according to the precept of the divine Word.' (*Preface to Rhegius's Explanation of the Old Testament Prophecies concerning Christ*. 1542. Tom. Hal. T. XIV, 166.)

DANNHAUER: "Something must be said here about the appearance of *Samuel*, which we prove not to have been a true one, but a personation, by this *syllogism*: He appeared to Saul, who 1. was not *a prophet*; for God was not going to answer him through a living prophet, v. 6.; who 2. could be *disturbed*, v. 15.; who 3. could say that Saul would be with him tomorrow, not only in status but also by reason of place, v. 19.; who 4. permitted himself *to be worshipped*, v. 14. But in truth, 1. Samuel was a prophet, Acts 3:24; 2. he could not be disturbed, for he had already been secured to eternal rest; 3. he could not speak without lying when he said that Saul and the sons of Saul would be with him tomorrow; for how could the kinsman of Samuel (whether in limbo, according to his adversaries, or in heaven, according to us), who died in sin, have departed from the station of life without the command of the supreme Emperor? 4. He would never have endured being worshipped with prostration to the ground. This, too*, presents a dilemma:* Either these spirits were evoked by the most impure Pythoness, or they came of their own accord, or they were sent back by God Himself through the power of incantation. All of it is absurd! All impious! First, for how could demons, cast down from heaven, have *the right to judge* triumphant citizens of heaven? Second, because it is incredible that a spirit would come of its own accord, knowing that *necromancy is forbidden* by law. Third, because *it is blasphemous* to think that God, against the law He Himself had enacted, would, for the preliminary rites of necromancy, have willed to disturb the most blessed soul in an act most worthy of eternal flames, for the curiosity of the most wicked king. . . . 'But then, one must say either that Scripture is lying when it *calls him Samuel,* or that prophecy could have been by a power other than divine.' *Resp.:* Neither follows; for Scripture also calls Baal a god, and yet it does not lie. . . If then neither the damned nor the blessed souls

can return, it remains, as we have said, that the prince of darkness lurks under these masks; for no yet-offered persuasion has been able to convince of a third state of souls, a conflict in that kingdom where the air is a fog, impudence a wall, the purgatorial flame the light of faith. (L. c. p. 214.) Cf. *Luther,* Opp. Hal. XIX, 1392 ff.

FECHT: "Just as the twice-dead, outside the ordinary order, to declare the divine power, twice paid nature's debt, so it is not absurd that their souls, outside the ordinary order, were in a third place or state and remained stained by original sin." (*Syll. controv*. p. 375.)

ANTHITHESES:

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Psychopannychists,* who dreamed of a certain dormition of the souls in the sepulchre or a common receptacle of the quiescent; an opinion which Jerome attributes to *Vigilantius* (rather a Dormitant, because he did not look more vigilantly to the salvation of his own soul) in his book against the same. The same was held by the *Armenians* among the ancient heretics, who taught that all souls, however holy, are kept until the last day of judgment in certain hidden repositories, where they neither see God nor can be called blessed, except in hope. To this opinion (which Sixtus of Siena calls the error of the Armenians, *Biblioth. s*, lib. 1, cap. 6, annot. 345, p. 714), condemned by the decretal letters of Innocent III and Benedict XI, Roman pontiffs (of whom Innocent III reigned at the beginning of the 13th century), *John XXII*, Roman pontiff, after the beginning of the following 14th century, subscribed to and confirmed by decree, as the thing to be believed.… 2. *The opinion of some fathers* of both the Greek and Latin churches, asserting that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are not immediately admitted to the beatific vision of God, but are received into certain and fixed receptacles outside of heaven, where they neither suffer anything evil, nor experience joy and refreshment, are detained until the last day, and only when that day finally dawns, and they themselves, reunited with their bodies through the resurrection, become partakers of their beatitude.' . . Thus *Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen, Lactantius, Chrysostom, Theophylact,* and others. . . 3. The *Socinians,* according to whom the separated soul before the resurrection feels, acts, or suffers nothing, i.e., neither enjoys heavenly beatitude nor is afflicted with infernal punishments. . . 9. Of the *Papists,* who (if their hypotheses are considered) are forced to concede that the souls of the pious after death, if not all, at least those which bring with them unremitted venial sins and temporal punishments for mortal sins to be paid for, do not immediately arrive at heavenly beatitude and are not admitted to the vision of God, but to be deprived of this glory for a certain time, and sometimes for a very long time." (P. IV. c. 17. s. 2. q. 5. f. 1745. sqq.)

HOFMANN: "The state of the dead is uniform in body and soul. Whoever departs without the hope of salvation has a body that is also hopelessly subject to death; whoever dies in faith has a soul in a state corresponding to the state of his decaying, yet resurrected-awaiting, body." (*Schriftbeweis*. 2nd Ed. P. II, 480.)

THE SAME: "Since the glorified body of Christ has become the house of God, and the communion with God of the believer is communion with Christ, who lives supernaturally in glorified human nature, the Christian has the blessed certainty that his communion with Christ, when he departs from earthly life, continues in the heavenly house of God. *Though himself incorporeal, he will have for his dwelling the body in which the fullness of the Godhead dwells.* If Christ has allowed His own, while they were separated from Him by the nature of their condition, to live personally in Him, the one who lives in the flesh; so now He allows them, having been deprived of their own nature, to have His instead of their own." (L. c. III, 434.)

THE SAME: "In bodily death man ceases to possess himself as the means of his self-realization. But neither what is called the spiritual death nor what is called the eternal death is anything other than this." Physical death is in itself a death for all time, and the fact that a second one follows it comes only from the fact that the *destruction of the material substance*, which belongs to the individual for his self-realization, takes place only with the end of all the history of the race, with the transformation of the entire physical creation." (*Schriftbeweis*. I, 430.)

b) For the reasoning concerning opposites is similar. And see *1 Peter 3:19,* where Christ, descending into hell, is said to have preached to the *spirits* then *in prison*—to those *who were disobedient in the time of Noah,* but who were therefore imprisoned. And the souls who are in that prison have undoubtedly been rejected from the face of God and are afflicted with the connected punishments.

c) Certainly, *purgatory*, or the penal state of the faithful—heirs of eternal life, but not yet fully cleansed from sins in this life—should not be conceived as a middle state between life and damnation.

S. NIEMANN: "Scripture recognizes only two orders of men, of whom some are believers, others unbelievers, Mark 16:16. John 8:18, some blessed, some cursed, Matthew 25:34, 41, some sheep, some goats, ibid. v. 33.: so also it mentions *only two receptacles*, namely heaven, into which the souls of the faithful or pious are received, and hell, which is destined for the souls of the unfaithful or impious; *likewise a twofold state* of souls, namely eternal life or salvation, and eternal damnation or punishment, Luke 16:22-23. sqq. Mark 16:16. As for any *intermediate* place or state, Scripture is profoundly silent." (*Disp. th. de receptaculis* etc. th. 30.)

ANTITHESES.

GERHARD: *"The Papists fabricate five receptacles for souls.* 1. *Hell,* into which they send the souls of the most impious men, who depart this life in unbelief, impatience, and graver crimes or mortal sins against conscience. 2. *Purgatory,* next to hell, into which they relegate the souls of those who have not yet been fully cleansed from venial sins, nor have they yet perfectly satisfied for the temporal punishments of sins, but nevertheless departed from this life in the faith of Christ; for them they decree that they must sweat in purgatory until, the stains of their sins cleansed, they are pure and holy and fly up into heaven. 3. The *limbus of infants,* to which they assign the souls of unbaptized infants, who, because of the original sin in which they died without the remedy of baptism, are excluded from the joys of heaven, yet are not subjected to the punishments of hell. It is called Limbo because it is like a sort of border and extreme end of hell, just like the hem of a garment. 4. *The Limbo of the Fathers,* into which they say the souls of the patriarchs and all the saints of the Old Testament, who died before Christ's descent into hell, were introduced; asserting that these souls endured a temporal punishment of damnation in this cell, until, the debt of original sin being canceled by the death of Christ, they were freed from it and admitted to the fruition of heavenly blessedness, when Christ descended into hell. Council of Trent, Session 5, chapter 6. Sonnius, in Demonstration of the Christian Religion, Book 2, Treatise 3, Chapter 15, etc. 5. *Heaven,* into which they admit the souls of the saints, fully cleansed from all sins. The order of these storeys, according to the Papists, is as follows: hell is situated in the very center of the earth; next to it is purgatory, which is a kind of second storey; contiguous to it is the limbus of infants, upon which the limbus of the fathers rests immediately above, which today, since the fathers were translated into heaven by Christ, is completely empty." (*Loc. de morte* § 166.)

THE SAME: "This is how the Papists describe *Purgatory*: that it is ‘a certain place, in which, as in a prison, souls are purged after this life, those which were not fully purged in this life, so that, thus purified, they may enter heaven, into which nothing defiled shall enter.’ Bellarmine, Book 1. on Purgatory, chapter 1. *Concerning the circumstances* of purgatory, namely concerning the persons to be purified there, the place, 'time, punishments, suffrages, and other such matters, vary greatly among themselves. They believe concerning the *punishment* of purgatory, that the fire by which souls are purified is a real and proper fire, and therefore of the same kind as our elementary fire.' Bellarmine, Book 2 on Purgatory, chapter 6: ‘All theologians teach that the damned and the souls in purgatory are tormented in the same place and by the same fire.' As for the severity of the punishments, they hold them to be atrocious, and that no punishments of this life can be compared to them. There is as great a difference between the fire of purgatory and that with which men are burned in this world, as between glowing embers and the breath of a human mouth, and by no kind of torment can human flesh endure as much suffering as the soul afflicted by the ardor of that purgatorial fire." c. Nullus in fin. *de poenit. dist*. 7. (L. c. § 181.)

LUTHARDT: "Related to the pagan views of *Hades*, as the place of departed, shadowy souls, partly connected with the idea of retribution, are the Old Testament statements about Scheol. שאל, . . The New Testament first takes over the Old Testament view of Hades in a developed form; so in the parable, Luke 16:22. ff. Christ himself went into this Hades through his death, but he was at the same time in Paradise, and with him the thief, Luke 23:43, and takes the pious of the Old Testament with him out of Hades Matthew. 27:52 f. Since then, believers no longer go to Hades, but as blessed and perfect spirits Heb. 12:23. to heaven to Christ 2 Cor. 5, 6, 8. Phil. 1:23; Rev. 7:9 ff., to blessed rest (6:11; 14:13), while Hades only releases its dead at the end, to cease to be thereafter (Rev. 20:13 ff.). . . Dogmatics, unhistorically, holds that the decision is already completely concluded with death. The righteous go immediately to heaven, the wicked to hell: . . . Since the time of the Pietists, however, the doctrine of an *intermediate state* has again emerged and become popular in modern times, in which the special questions concern the intermediate body, the possibility of development and conversion, and the possibility of perfect holiness." (*Comp*. pp. 290, 291, 293.)

KAHNIS: "Thus we have reason to assume in that world an *intermediate state* in which a *decision* is still possible for those who in this world were not yet able to decide. Also, according to medieval belief, there are transitions between hell and purgatory. But in the idea of *purgatory* there lies undoubtedly a *truth,* namely that for many Christians a *purification* is still necessary. Great is the number of Christians of whom it cannot be said that Christ is their life. Yet they have a longing for him and confess what they have known of him in a purity, selflessness, and faithfulness of conduct that can only shame many Christians who are stronger in words than in deeds. Is there to be no hope for them? Finally, not small is the number of Christians who, as far as human judgment can tell, stand in the true faith, but whose faith is still heavily mixed with the dross of the old man, so that one might judge that they cannot enter Paradise as they are, if Paradise is to remain Paradise. Let no one say that with the body much of the old man will also be cast off. Why is the believer allowed to receive what is not granted to the unbeliever? A person's character cannot be eliminated by a magic

stroke. How can a Christian who lacks love suddenly be flooded with it upon death? And so we must well assume that in the other world there is still room for purification and development. Accordingly, in that world there would be *three places* and with them states to be distinguished: the *place of punishment (φυλακή),* the middle *place of decision and purification,* and the *place of joy (παράδεισος)*." (*Die luth. Dogm*. III. p. 558. sq.)

# § 17.

The *bodies* of the deceased are to be committed to [(a)] the earth [(b)] with honor, but without immoderate luxury [(c)] and superstitious rites,[(d)] so that there they may be resolved into ashes,[(f)] *unless* the preceding offenses of the dead have merited that they *either* be left unburied,[(h)] as a form of punishment,[(g)] *or* at least to be buried without honor.[(i)]

a) They are not to be cast into *water* or *fire*, much less be torn apart by *beasts* or *men*, for it is rather for them *to sleep in the dust of the earth, Dan. 12:2, to be sown* or committed to the earth like a seed, *1 Cor. 15:37,* namely*,* as by *common law.*

GERHARD: "The rites of those profane and pagan rites of handling the bodies of the dead show that what the apostle said of the Gentiles, Eph. 2:12; 1 Thess. 4:13, was truly said*,* namely, that *they had no hope,* namely*,* of the resurrection of the bodies to eternal life. But in the Christian Church, the bodies of the deceased, especially those of the pious, are rightly treated with greater honor. . . How great an office the burial is before God is gathered from the fact that the Holy Spirit calls it 'mercy' Ruth 1:8; 2 Sam. 2:5. . . Christ, in Matthew 26:9, calls the act of the woman anointing his body for burial a 'good work'. . . We take care to *commit* the bodies of the deceased to the earth *and* to burial: 1. by the promulgation of divine oracle. Gen. 3:19: 'You are dust, and to dust you shall return'; Dan. 12:2: 'those who sleep in the dust of the earth'; Eccles. 12:7: 'the dust returns to the earth as it was.' 2. Because of the appellation of the earth; it is called 'the mother of us all' (Sirach 40:1), because it receives the dead in its bosom and preserves our bones in its embrace until the day of judgment, which will be the day of regeneration (παλιγγενεσίας) (Matthew 19:28). . . 3. Because of the comparison of Christ and the apostle Paul, by which the grains cast into the earth confer upon the bodies of the piously departed the hope of the resurrection, John 12:24; 1 Cor. 15:37–38. Hence, in our vernacular, cemeteries are most beautifully called 'fields of the Lord,' in which, of course, the bodies of the pious are sown like grains for the hope of a future harvest. 4. Because of the imitation of the example set forth in the holy men of God. It was received by the most ancient and perpetual custom of the Church to commit the bodies of the dead to the earth, Gen. 23:19; 50:13; etc.; indeed, God Himself confirmed this custom of burying the dead, Deut. 34:6. 5. Because of the consecration of our graves accomplished through Christ. Just as Christ, for our sake, suffered death on the cross, so also did He will to be buried for our sake, that by the contact of his most holy flesh He might sanctify our graves, making them בתי־חיים, a house of the living, and *κοιμητήρια,* or dormitories. Therefore, just as we were spiritually buried with Christ through baptism into death (Rom. 6:4), so it is also fitting that we be conformed to him in bodily burial." (*Loc. de morte* § 79, 80.)

b) Taking into account not only the excellence of the *human nature*, *which is* superior to that of brute animals, and *state* and *merits* acquired beforehand in this life, but especially, if men have been *Christians*, a holier dignity, inasmuch as the bodies of the faithful have already been temples *of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. 3:16),* their *members*, *members of Christ, 1 Cor. 6:19, instruments of righteousness, Rom. 6:19,* but are to be resurrected hereafter and conformed to the *glorious body of Christ*, *Phil. 3:21.*

c) Which consists *either* in the excessive adornment of the bodies of the deceased *or* in more sumptuous funerals, is contrary to both Christian order (*τάξιν*) and to Christian decorum (*εὐσχημοσύνην*).

d) E.g., consecrating a cemetery or tomb with holy water, ringing consecrated bells as if to drive away demons, etc.

e) As they call one *buried*, who is covered with earth. Although it is *not* necessary for the earth to touch the body *immediately*, or for coffins to be excluded. For *vaults* or *caves* are *also* sufficient. We say, however, that bodies ought to be laid to rest, *so that* we may indicate the superstitious rites of men and the honorable desires of the dead, *although* we do not deny that the denial of burial by adversaries should be borne with moderation by the pious and confessors. Beautifully *Augustine: The earth did not cover many of the bodies of Christians, but no one has separated any of them from heaven and earth, which is filled by the presence of Him who knows from where to raise what He has created.* Book I. on *de C. D*, chapter XII., where he soon adds that line *from Lucan: "He is covered by the sky who has no urn."*

f) According to that: "*You are dust, and to dust you shall return," Gen. 3:19,* which denotes not so much the burial itself, as the resolution of the body into dust or ashes. Cf. *Ps. 104:29; 146:4.*

g) E.g., the tenacious defense of heretical doctrines, combined with the seduction of others: notorious crimes continued to the very end of life without any signs of repentance.

h) Which God calls the *burial of an ass, Jer. 22:18.*

i) Or, without the usual ceremonies of the people, psalmody, commendation of the deceased, perhaps even outside the cemetery. More is taught about these in the schools of moral or casuistic theology.

## § 18.

Temporal death [(a)] may be described as the deprivation of animal life,[(b)] from the separation of the soul and body, brought about by the sin of the first [(c)] parents, with Satan [(d)] hostile and instigating, proceeding from the just judgment of God,[(e)] and to be undergone by all [(f)] men by the necessity of nature, to the glory of divine justice.[(g)]

a) As it is *in itself* and by reason of its *origin* or introduction into the world. *Not* as it is seen *by accident* and with various intervening circumstances concerning different subjects.

b) For this implies a proper case. Cf. § 2.

c) By which the moral and meritorious efficient cause is indicated. Cf. § 5 and 7.

d) This also pertains to the moral cause, whereas hostile hatred pertains to the impulsive cause on his part; see § 4 and 7.

e) Which is the cause of death in the manner of an imposed penalty. And when we call it a *just* judgment, we simultaneously indicate the internal impulsive cause on God's part; see § 6 and 7.

f) Which are the subject of the "What"; see § 13.

g) As to the end, according to § 14.

# Chapter IX. ^

ON THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD.

## § 1.

Just as the human soul after death remains [(a)] surviving, so also the *body*, which by death has been destroyed,[(b)] *will rise again* and return to life, which is most clear from the Scriptures,[(c)] but by natural reason alone it certainly cannot be known,[(d)] although it does not contradict it.[(e)]

a) See preceding chapter VIII, § 15.

b) Dissolved, putrefied, reduced to ashes; see loc. cit. § 17, note *f*.

c) So *Job* believed and professed in chapter *19:25, Isaiah* also foretold it, chapter *26:19, and Daniel, chapter 12:2;* Christ confirmed it*, John 5:28; chapter 11:23; and Paul* adds*, 1 Cor. 15:12 ff. and 1 Thess. 4:16.*

d) For although this doctrine follows from the immortality of the soul, it cannot be definitively determined *whether* the soul will live without a body, or whether it will at some point be reunited with a body, and with which one. See also *Mus., Introd*. chap. II. § 9. p. 39.

e) For when Scripture reveals the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, reason, which acknowledges God as the avenger of evils and the rewarder of good, finds it more *consistent* with itself, rather than the contrary, that the bodies of those who have done good or evil should be resurrected for the purpose of sharing in rewards or punishments. And *although* reason does not find how the same bodies in number, which have been resolved into ashes, can be resurrected, it is so far from being able to prove the impossibility by an irrefutable argument, that it is rather compelled to leave it to the divine power. Cf. *Mus., Introd*. in *Th.* P. II. cap. V. § 12. p. 330, 331.

ANTHITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Gentiles* outside the church, to whom the resurrection of the body seemed *a 'foolish talk'* (Acts 17:32; Acts 26:27). *Pliny*, Book 2 of Natural History, chapter 7, and Book 7, chapter 55, he calls the resurrection of the dead 'childish nonsense,' and adds: 'What, by Jove, is this madness, that life should be repeated after death?' *Aeschylus* in the Eumenides*: 'Once one has died, there is no* resurrection'; *Theocritus:* 'There is no hope at all for the buried'; *Catullus* to Lesbia: 'The sun may set and rise again; for us, when brief light has died once, there is but one perpetual night to sleep through.' . . . 2. The *Epicureans* in the visible bosom of the Old Testament Church, of whom see Isa. 22:13; Wis. 2:1-3. of the *Sadducees* in the New Testament, who said in the time of Christ, that a resurrection was not to be hoped for, Matt. 22:23. Mark 12:18. Luke 20:27. Acts 23:6, 8. 4. *Of Hymenæus* and *Philetus* in Paul's time, saying that the resurrection was already past. For they believed that no other resurrection was promised than a mystical or spiritual one (which is effected from sins through regeneration), 2 Tim. 2:17–18, as explained by Haimo and Liranaeus, or because they regarded the resurrection as consisting in succession, which is effected through the procreation of children. 5. Of *certain ones in the Corinthian church,* 1 Cor. 15:12. . . 7. Of *heretics* in the primitive church, among whom the *Simonian*, *Carpocrates, Saturninus, Basilides, Valentinians, etc.,* denied the resurrection. . . See Epiphanius, who teaches that the resurrection was rejected by *Simon Magus*, the parent and leader of the heretics in the New Testament Church, and that the sects originating from him persisted in error. Philastrius also attributes to *Dositheus* the statement that 'he does not hope for the resurrection of the flesh.' In summary: 'In no matter is the Christian faith so contradicted as in the resurrection of the flesh,' as Augustine says, on Psalm 89. 'As far as I gather from the authors and history,' says Dr. George Calixt, 'the heretics of the earlier centuries have almost all stumbled on this rock.' *John Philoponus* the philosopher, nicknamed the grammarian, also wrote a book on the resurrection, in which he rejected the resurrection of the *body*, as Photius writes. . . 7. The *Albigenses*. . . If the writers of those times are to be believed, they erred in the same error. . . 9. *John XXIII,* Pope of Rome, who, just as he denied the immortality of the soul, so also he denied the resurrection of the flesh... 10. The *Libertines,* who mock the resurrection of the flesh and refer to the passages of Scripture that speak of it only to souls; as attested by P. Martyr. Calvin, in his book *contra Libertinos*, chapter 3, says: 'Whatever Christians hold concerning eternal life and the resurrection is, to them, a fable'; and in chapter 22: 'They mock every hope we have concerning the resurrection, and say that what we are still awaiting has already happened to us.' . . . 10. The *Socinians,* who utterly deny the article of the resurrection of the dead... *Ostorodus*, in his *Institutes*, ch. 41, does indeed protest, 'that he believes in the resurrection of the body,' but he understands by that the bodies which will one day be ours, not those which we now carry about... He also miserably corrupts the words of the Apostles' Creed: 'I believe in the resurrection of the flesh,' to which he attaches this meaning: 'I believe in the resurrection of the flesh, that is, of that which was flesh, but not of this our very flesh.' . . . 12. Of the *Arminians,* who are in suspense as to what is to be decided about the resuscitation of the bodies." (Th. did.-pol. P. IV. c. 18. s. 2. q. 1. f. 1770. sqq.)

## § 2.

Resurrection [(a)] consists in this: that the *body,* destroyed by death, is *reproduced* from the matter into which it was converted and is *reunited* to the soul

or, in a word, it rises again and thus, together with the soul, will arrive *either* at blessedness *or* at the damnation appointed for it.[(b)]

a) For by these *two* acts the formal principle of the resurrection is constituted, insofar as it is indeed spoken of *transitively* or is called a *resuscitation*. And thus we also believe that the resurrection (*ἀνάστασις*, which is called by this name in *John 5:29*, elsewhere *ἐξανάστασις*, *Philippians 3:11*, and is by the force of the word *δευτέρα τοῦ πεπτωκότος στάσις*, the repeated standing of that which has fallen) and the quickening (*ζωοποίησις*), or vivification, as it is called according to *Romans 8:11*, *1 Corinthians 15:22*, are as to the matter one action; to which also corresponds the word *παλιγγενεσίας*, or *regeneration* (of bodies returning to life), *Matthew 19:28.*

b) And so, *just* as death, so also the resurrection of the dead, is a *condition* or *medium*, so to speak, without which, by the common law, the full blessedness or misery of the whole suppositum does not occur. Cf. *John 5:28; Dan. 12:2.*

## § 3.

The *principal efficient* cause [(a)] of the resurrection is God [(b)] the Triune and Christ the God-man.[(c)]

a) Or which, by its own power, and thus according to the infinite demands of the work and effect, will restore bodies and animate them.

b) For he is said *to open the tombs Ezek. 37:12, to redeem from death Hos. 13:14, to quicken the dead Rom. 4:17, to raise the dead 2 Cor. 1:19.*

> HANEKEN: "The resurrection takes place not by the powers of nature, from which those who labor in vain seek sparks and seeds of life in the dried-up ashes of men; but by the immense power of God Almighty, which rightly throws a bridle on the stubbornness of a reasoning mind that opposes it." (*Verae th. Synopsis*. Marburg, 1629. p. 155.)

c) For the resurrection of the dead is a work directed outward *(opus ad extra).*

d) Through the omnipotence which, as *God,* He has essentially, and as *man*, through communication, see *John 5:21,* where the *Son* is said *to give life to the dead,* just as *the Father raises and vivifies* them. It is also said *in verse 28 that the dead in the tombs will hear the voice of the Son of God and come forth* to judgment. However, just as *the power to judge* is *given* to him, so also is the power to raise the dead who are to be judged, *ὅτι υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶ,* that is (with the particle *ὅτι,* which is to be taken *specifically*), *insofar as He is the Son of Man,* or *according to* that *nature* by which He is the Son of Man or a man, *verse 27.*

> WALCH: Reduplicative is contrasted with *specificative*, which are words of this kind of sentence, where the predicate belongs to the subject either necessarily or by chance. If it is *necessary,* they say that the object must be explained *reduplicatively* and repeated by the little word quatenus; e.g., the king of Sweden has authority to command in Uppsala; here one could say: The king of Sweden as king of Sweden has authority to command in Uppsala.

If it is *accidental,* then it is merely a description and, as it were, a *specification* of the subject; e.g., the student is a painter; here the subject is not to be repeated: the student, precisely because he is a student, is considered a painter, but it is merely a description to the effect that the person who is among the students has also done something in painting." (*Philosoph. Lexikon*. Lpz. 1733. p; 2132. sq.)

## § 4.

The *internal impulsive* cause of the resurrection of the dead *in general* is divine justice,[a] and *specifically*, with respect to *the pious*, remunerative justice,[b] and with respect to the *impious*, vindicative justice.[c]

a) Thus the dead are said to be raised and manifested, so that each one may receive *τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος,* that is, *whatever he has done through the body, whether good or bad, 2 Cor. 5:10.*

b) Or, that God, moved by His *goodness*, will transfer the bodies of the blessed, the instruments of holy actions, into the fellowship of blessedness; see *2 Thess. 1:5. Scherzer* calls this *distributive justice,* which *absolutely requires that the very body, in and with which the pious contended, be crowned.* Compare what we have said about remunerative justice, Chapter I, § 12, note *e.*

c) Or, that God, by that perfection of His which inclines Him to *avenge* sins, is also moved to punish the sins of the wicked in their restored bodies. Cf. 1 *Thess.*

## § 5.

The *external impulsive* cause with respect to the resurrection *of the pious* is the merit of Christ, apprehended by final faith,[a] with respect to *the impious,* final impenitence.[b]

a) As Christ says *in John 11:25*: "*I am the resurrection and the life; he who believes in me will live, even though he dies."* And *in 1 Cor. 15:22* it is said that *through Christ all are made alive,* not indeed men of whatever condition, but all who are descended from Christ through spiritual birth; *just as through Adam all die,* who are descended from Adam through carnal birth; as the context indicates. To be given life through Christ is to be given life by the virtue of His merit. Hence Christ is also called the *meritorious cause* of the resurrection of the righteous.

b) See *2 Cor. 5:10.* Indeed*,* the *evil deeds that each person has done in the body* move God to will to *manifest* him *in the body, to render* the penalties *in the body*. But for us to call the *merit of Christ* the impulsive or meritorious cause of the resurrection, even with respect to the *wicked*, we have no grounds. For indeed the merit of Christ, provided by the Mediator on our behalf and for our good, is called the meritorious cause in respect to some *good* to be obtained for us, whereas the resurrection of the wicked has no regard to their good. Cf. *Gerhard*, on *de Resurrect. Mort.*, § 55 ff.

ANTHITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Calvinists,* who assert that the resurrection of the wicked depends on the merit of the resurrecting Christ, or that the damned and the wicked will also rise again by the virtue and efficacy of the merit of Christ. So *Calvin.* . . 2. Of *some of our own*, such as Dr. Henry *Boethius,* professor of Helmstadt, in a special treatise on the resurrection of the wicked, in which he contends that 'the infidels are also to be resurrected by the virtue of the merit of Christ,' an opinion which Dr. *Brochmann* also made his own in *System, theol*. art. XVI. de servatore Christo p. 16. q. 6." (L. c. q. 3. f. 1784.)

## § 6.

The subject *which* [*subjectum Quod*] of the resurrection (a) are dead men (b) all (c) not only the *pious* and faithful, but also the *impious* and the infidels.(d)

a) Or that which is *ultimately* called to rise again, or in one word, the resurrected *suppositum*.

GERHARD: "It must be said that, since actions and passions belong to the suppositum, the *whole* man, considered *ὁλικῶς* [as a whole], is rightly regarded as the subject of the resurrection, but *not the whole* of man, when considered *in part*, or all of his parts. For the soul, being immortal by nature, does not partake in that resurrection of which we speak here, but in another, namely a spiritual one, which John calls the first resurrection (Revelation 20:6), which takes place only in this life. . . For since we have said above that the form of resurrection consists in two things, the reformation of the bodies from the dust of the earth and their animation, or the reunion of the souls with the resurrected bodies, therefore with respect to the latter work, resurrection can also be attributed to the souls, but *κατ' ἄλλο* [in a different sense], because they are again united to the rising body and return to their former office of animation, which had been suspended in and by death." (*L. de resurr. mort.* § 106.)

b) For those who are found *alive* on the last day, strictly speaking*, will not be resurrected,* since they have not fallen through death; *they will* nevertheless *be changed* and put off their mortal condition, according *to 1 Corinthians 15:51 ff.* See preceding chap. VIII. § 13. note *d.*

c) Indeed, *John 5:28* expressly states that *all who are in the tombs will hear the voice of the Son of God* and will rise in a single *hour.* For the phrase, *'to be in the tombs,'* is a general description of the dead, taken from the more prominent part. Hence, we do not exclude from this *embryos* that died in their mothers' wombs. That *some* people were not to be resurrected only at the universal resurrection, but are read to *have already risen* when Christ rose, *Matt. 27:53,* and are believed to *have ascended* to heaven with Christ, was an *extraordinary* event. Those who in the Old Testament by the prophets, and in the New Testament by Christ before His passion and by the apostles after the ascension of Christ from the dead to this *natural life* were *raised*, are rightly said to *have died again* and thus to be raised at the last resurrection to immortal life. See our treatise, in which we examine *this matter* and the *state of separated souls, who are again ordered to natural life*.

d) Whether *the just and the unjust, Acts 24:15,* who have done *good*, and who have done *evil, John 5:29.* Compare *2 Cor. 5:10.*

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Jews,* who restrict the resurrection to the pious only, and indeed believe that those pious ones will be resurrected first who lie buried in the blessed land of Canaan; and wish to gather this from the desire of certain patriarchs; while others, outside of Canaan, must be conveyed to that same land through hidden passages in the earth with great torment; and they outright deny the resurrection of the impious. . . 2. Of the *Socinians,* who hold that the impious will remain in death forever, both in soul and body, and will not experience any other punishment or torment after this life." (L. c. q. 2. f. 1777. sq.)

HOFFMANN: "In fact, the destruction of Hades and the cessation of the reign of death are one and the same thing. We thus arrive at the fitting idea that the wicked, with the morning after the night of death, when the reign of death ceases, come under the dominion of the righteous, and through the destruction of the underworld, to which their corporeal part also falls, lose their final sad dwelling, and thus their corporeal being itself, which now has no further reason to remain." (*Schriftbeweis*. II, 469.)

## § 7.

The Subject *by Which* (a) [of the resurrection] is the same body in number,(b) which each one had (c) in this life.(d)

a) That essential *part* of man, *by which* he is said to be resurrected, or which, having been destroyed, will be reproduced by the resurrection and united to the other surviving part.

b) Indeed, the very word *ἀναστάσεως,* or resurrection, implies the *repeated standing up* of that which had previously stood and fallen, according to § 2, note. *a.,* so that *if* you suppose that one body stood in this life and fell by death, and another will be produced at some future time, there would have been *no* true resurrection, *but* a new creation, or something like the Pythagorean *μετεμψύχωσις* [transmigration of souls] or *μετενσωμάτωσις* [transmigration into bodies]. Compare *2 Cor. 5:10*, where the identity of the body in which one has done good or evil in this life and in which one is to receive rewards or punishments at the final judgment is clearly indicated. Add *Daniel 12:2 and John 5:28-29,* where the same are said to awaken who have hitherto slept. Since, therefore, they have slept not according to the soul but according to the body, they are to be resurrected according to the very body in which each one slept. In the Old Testament *Job 19:25*, about to make a confession of faith worthy of eternal memory, said that he knew that after the long lapse of time, or *in the latter time* (אחיין) *in his flesh,* before it was corrupted and *consumed* by worms*, with* these *eyes* which he had here, He will see his *Redeemer* (גאל), who is related to him (the redeemed man) by kinship or blood (a description that can apply to no one but the Messiah), appearing in a *living* and visible form and, like a mighty victor*,* will *rule over the dust*. Similarly, the Messiah Himself in *Isa. 26:19,* concerning his martyrs, or the faithful, who were killed for His sake and for the confession of Him, says נבלתי וקומין, "*my corpse,* i.e., those who have become corpses for my sake*, will rise again."* Therefore, very thing, having been a corpse for some time, will be revived.

GERHARD: "The arguments of the adversaries are these: 1. From the oracles of the Savior Matt. 22:30. Luke 10:36: 'The sons of the resurrection will be *like the angels and as the angels*.' Therefore they will be changed into an angelic nature. Reply.: a. Resemblance is not identity; *ὁμοιότης and ἰσότης* [likeness and equality] do not immediately imply *τάντότης* [identity] . . . c. The blessed will be equal to angels, *ἰσάγγελοι,* not by the essence of their nature, but by a conformity of qualities and glory, which is why they are not called *ἀγγελοι*, but are said to be future *as angels,* d. The same is concluded from the purpose. . . 2. From the apostolic passage 1 Cor. 15:51: ‘Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God.’ Therefore, resurrected and glorified bodies will not have flesh and blood. Resp.: a. The Apostle in the same chapter clearly asserts the resurrection of the same number and substance of the body; b. therefore the apostle speaks not of the *very* substance of the body, considered by itself, but of the adhering corruption of the flesh and its condition in this life, that is to say, the body, insofar as and for as long as it is animal, mortal, corrupted by sin, prone to vicious inclinations, etc., cannot inherit the kingdom of God, but it is necessary that it be changed in respect to its qualities, not its substance. . . For just as our corrupt nature cannot attain the kingdom of heaven unless it is regenerated and renewed by the Holy Spirit (John 3:5), so our bodies cannot become partakers of the heavenly kingdom unless they first put off decay [*φθορὰν*] and corruptibility; and accordingly, it is not on account of the substance, but on account of the guilt, that flesh and blood are excluded from the kingdom of God. . . 3. From the apostolic analogy 1 Cor. 15:37–39: ‘That which you sow is not quickened unless it dies; and that which you sow, you do not sow the body which is to be, but a bare grain, for example, of wheat or of some other grain.’ But God gives it a body as He willed, and to each of the seeds a body of its own.' Therefore, other bodies will rise than those that were, like a certain seed entrusted to the earth. Resp.: a. Similitudes are not to be extended beyond the third point, in relation to which the comparison is made. . . d. Christ compares His body to a grain of wheat, which is cast into the earth and perishes before it rises, John 12:24. Yet the body of Christ was neither corrupted nor another, but the very same was raised from the dead. Therefore, from the similitude of the seed, by no means can a diversity of substance be inferred, but only a different quality of the bodies, e. From the apostolic words, therefore: 'You do not sow the body which is to be, but a bare grain,' it must not be inferred: therefore, not the same body in number that is sown will rise again; but this only follows: Therefore, the body that is raised is not the same as the one that is sown. For the word 'the same' *(ταὐτό*) can be understood in two ways: either by reference to essence or by reference to qualities. The grain and the stalk that grows from it are the same in species, in that from the matter and form, the substantial parts of the grain, the stalk is generated; nor is the body of the wheat grain constituted by the accidents of the seed, but the same nature and form of the seed is retained and the substance is preserved in the same nature. However, the grain and the stalk are not the same with respect to accidents, which are different in the stalk than in the grain. Chrysostom, Homily 41 on the First Epistle to the Corinthians: ‘The ear is the same and not the same.’ It is the same, because the substance is the same; not the same, because it is better.’ (Gregory, Book 14, Morals, Chapter 29: ‘The grain of seed does not lack what it was; but it has what it was not.’” (*L. de resurr. mort*. § 76.)

FECHT: "The resurrection of the same flesh, conceived in the same way that a river, although always having water changed, remains the same river (as the same is represented in T. Brown's 'Religion of a Physician'), is not the resurrection of the same flesh numerically." (*Syllog. controvers*. p. 375. sq.)

GERHARD: "The principle of resurrection is one thing, that of accretion, or growth, another. In accretion, the assumption of new matter takes place successively, and the prior matter is not entirely removed, but new matter, altered in various ways, is added to it; hence the numerical unity of the composite is in no way overturned by accretion. . . In physical accretion and alteration, matter is changed only with respect to quantity, not with respect to its essence." (*L. de resurr. mort*. § 81.)

ANTITHESES.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. *Origen,* who thought that not the same flesh would be resurrected, but a heavenly body, endowed with its former figure and appearance. . . 2. *Socinians,* who decree that the same bodies we now bear will not rise on the day of judgment, but that others will be given to us, and that these will be spiritual and heavenly in substance. . . 3. *Arminians,* who concerning the resurrection of bodies . . . are suspended in doubt, *debating* whether the same bodies of the saints are to be resurrected, or whether others are to be created by God." (L. c. q. 4. f. 1789. sq.)

KAHNIS: "The resurrection will not be the revival of the buried flesh, but the clothing of the soul with a glorified body." (*Der innere Gang* etc. ed. 3. II, 279.)

THE SAME: "The elements of which our body consists on earth are by no means essential to it. The matter of which our body is composed today will sooner or later be separated from it again. We lose some parts, such as hair, nails, teeth, etc., on earth, without the loss impairing the integrity of our body. When the Apostle Paul says that flesh and blood do not inherit the kingdom of God (1 Cor. 15:51), this can only mean that not this body of flesh, which is subject to sin and liable to death, but a spiritual body, made by God, untouched by sin and death, enters into eternal life (2 Cor. 5:1 ff.)The image of the seed used by the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:36) nevertheless states that it is not this buried body that is raised, but a new one sprung from it. And also the transformation which the bodies of the living experience demands a much greater difference between the new body and the old than dogmatic theology states, which, so to speak, teaches only an improved form of the old body. Let us suppose that even in this life the Holy Spirit forms the germ of the resurrection body from the earthly body, which envelops the soul in the state of its spiritual life in the realm of the dead; then we must conceive of the resurrection as a creative act, through which Jesus Christ prepares a body from the earth in which that germ finds its completion, while our earthly body finds its archetype. But the matter which we bury will not be resurrected." (*Die luth. Dogm*. 2. Ausg. 1875. II, 523. sq.)

c) They will also receive *their sex, and* all *the parts* or *members* they had in this life, not for the restoration of the old use, but for the integrity of the organic body. The bodies of the *pious*, however, will be made *glorious* at the resurrection itself, according to what we have said in chap. VI. § 13. sqq., and if they were *deprived of* certain members in this life, *they will* then *receive* them.

GERHARD: "The question is asked: If not a hair of the head will perish, how will resurrected bodies not be deformed and monstrous because of the length of the hair? . . . Answer: . . . We have pointed out that the ancient pious applied those words to the article on the resurrection in this sense, that not even the smallest particle of the body will perish; in the meantime, it cannot be inferred from this that superfluous and excrementitious humors, the superfluities of hair and nails, which are rather rejections and excrement than members and ornaments of the body, and which weigh down and burden more than they adorn, are to be restored to man at the resurrection." (L. c. § 90.)

d) As for what *stature* the bodies will have at the resurrection, we do not determine.

GERHARD: "The question is: Of what stature will the resurrected bodies be. Schmaltz. cont. Disp. 7. poster. D. Frantz. p. 416., writes that the students of theology should be ashamed of that question. But this proceeds from the false hypothesis that the same bodies are not to be resurrected. 1. Lombard, lib. 4. sent. dist. 44. lit. a., relates that some have thought that all the faithful will be resurrected according to the measure of Christ's stature; to prove this, they have adapted the apostolic saying in Eph. 4:13: 'until we all attain to the mature man, to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ.' . . 2. The opinion of Augustine is this: that what the apostle asserts concerning the conformity of the resurrected bodies with the body of Christ is to be understood not of the measure of the body or stature, but of age, since each one will receive that measure of body which he either had at the age in which Christ died and rose again, or would have had, had he died earlier. . . But the opinion of those who hold that each one will rise in the age and stature in which he died seems more probable, a. Because John sees the dead, great and small, standing before God, Rev. 11:18, 19:5, 20:12.; but if the little ones as well as the great will stand before the judgment seat, then the little ones will also surely rise again, b. That which fell will rise again; but when the infant died, it was not some man of great stature who fell, but a little infant. c. Scripture nowhere asserts equality of quantity in the resurrected bodies; for those things which are brought forward to establish it are twisted to another sense. . . Therefore the bodies of the resurrected will be *characterized,* marked and as it were characterized by their own certain and determined accidental forms. For to each one's proper and characteristic form also belongs the stature of the body, which varies greatly with the progression of age. e. Shortness or tallness of stature will not bring any deformity to the resurrected and glorified bodies. . . f. That variety of stature, in no way detracting from the perfection of wisdom and the fullness of joy in the elect, will rather add a certain marvelous beauty to the assembly of the triumphant church. God desires to adorn the heavenly paradise with these tender plants, just as a skilled gardener beautifies his garden with flowers and trees of every size. g. ‘There is a difference between one star and another star in glory, and so there is between the resurrection of the dead,’ says the apostle in 1 Corinthians 15:42–43. But star differs from star not only in quality but also in quantity, namely in size; which difference of stars in brightness and size bestows the greatest beauty on the heavenly bodies. It is held, not improbably, that the same will be the case in the resurrection and eternal life." (L. c., § 87.)

## § 8.

The end of the resurrection of the dead, with respect to the *faithful,* is the full participation of blessedness; with respect to the *unbelievers*, the consummation of damnation.(a) The *ultimate* end is the glory of the divine justice that is both retributive and vindicative.(b)

a) For they will be raised, to receive the things done through the body, etc., 2 Cor. 5:10. And in John 5:28 it is said that the resurrection is either of life or of judgment, the designation being taken from the end.

b) For just as God is moved to raise men by that justice of His, partly retributive and partly vindicative, according to what we said in § 4, so it is rightly said that He intends the glory of both.

## § 9.

The resurrection of the dead is described as the work [(a)] of the Triune God [(b)] and of Christ the *θεάνθρωπος* [God-man], proceeding from divine justice [(c)] retributive and vindicative, by which men [(d)] all, and the faithful indeed or the pious on account of [(e)] the merit of Christ, apprehended by final faith, the infidels and the impious on account of [(f)] they will receive the same number of bodies [(g)] that they had in this life, reunited [(h)] to their souls; the former to the full participation of blessedness, [(i)] the latter to the consummate participation of damnation, both to the glory [(k)] of God and of divine justice.[(k)]

a) The *work,* I say, or the *terminus* of the divine action. If the *resurrection* of the dead is to be defined, it would have to be said that the very *action* (transitive) is denoted in the objective case.

b) We indicate the efficient cause, according to § 3.

c) Which is the internal impulsive cause; concerning which see § 4.

d) Which are the subject of the resurrection; see § 6.

e) f) Thus we indicate the external impulsive cause, according to § 5.

a) For this is the subject of the Quo [by Which] of resurrection; see § 7.

b) In which the formal reason for the resurrection consists, according to § 2.

c) The proximate end of the resurrection is indicated here, § 8.

k) In which the ultimate end consists, according to cited § 8.

# Chapter X. ^

ON THE LAST JUDGMENT AND CONSUMMATION
OF THE AGE.

## § 1.

Since the universal resurrection of the dead has this end, that men may receive either rewards or punishments, it now remains to treat of that *judgment* by which rewards and punishments will be assigned to men.

## § 2.

That there will be a certain *solemn* judgment is most clear from the Scriptures.[(a)] It is also certain that on one and the same day

both the final judgment and the resurrection of the dead will occur.[b] But God has not willed that we should know distinctly when that day will come.[c]

a) See *Matt. 25:81 ff. and following; Acts 17:81; 2 Thess. 1:6 ff.* It is especially noteworthy that *in Jude v. 6* it is called *the "judgment of the great day" (κρίσις μεγάλης ἡμέρας),* from which the solemnity of the future judgment can be recognized.

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Epicureans* and mockers, who, upon hearing that Christ would return for judgment, with the Athenians and Stoic philosophers *χλευάζουσι* [scoff], Acts 17:32. . . 2. Of the ancient heretics, such as the *Dositheans, Samaritans, and Prodians.* Philastrius attributes the same error to the *Floriani,* the *Manichees,* and the *Gnostics,* whom Augustine also asserts were called *Borborians*. 3. Of the *Libertines* and David in the year 1525, who also denied the future judgment." (*Theol. did.-pol*. P. IV. c. 19. s. 2. q. 1. f. 1809. sq.)

b) See *1 Thess. 4:16-17.*

c) See *Mark 13:32.* And experience thus far has shown how far those who believed they could do something by divining have fallen.

## § 3.

Meanwhile there are no lack of *signs* by which God shows that judgment is drawing near in a certain way,[a] which are generally divided [b] into *common* ones, that is, such as occur in the world not in a single age, and often recur or continue, e.g., heresies,[c] wars and similar public calamities,[d] the security of men;[e] and *proper signs*, which, as the judgment draws nearer, are not to be seen in the same way as in earlier ages, e.g. the revelation of the Antichrist,[f] singular eclipses of the stars and events in the earth,[g] and perhaps others.[h]

a) He warns of the *judgment* to come itself, *not* that he signifies the *time* of the judgment, although he teaches that it draws nearer and nearer, just as *summer* is known to be *approaching* from *the tenderer branches and leaves of the fig tree*, *Matt. 24:3, 33; Mark 13:29. Luke 21:25,* where they are also expressly called *signs.*

LUTHER: "I will not argue here, but command the Christian to consider whether the signs in the sun, moon, and stars have occurred. But this is my faith and certain hope, that such signs have already occurred for the most part and that not many others are to be expected." (Tom. Hal. VII, 1360.)

b) Others distinguish between *distant* and *near signs*, with almost the same meaning. Of course, those *common* and *more distant* signs, although they do not seem to signify the time of judgment, nevertheless, by the institution and intention of God,

signify, and ought to admonish Christians, *that* some solemn judgment is to be expected from the force *of* divine *justice* and the *truth* of the predictions. The difference between the more *remote* and the nearer signs is that *some* precede the judgment by a longer interval, *others* by a shorter one; and so they themselves do not signify a definite time, except that certain ones (or at least that one, which will be treated in § 4 below) are believed to be connected with the very beginning of the solemnity of the judgment.

c) Thus Christ, *in Matthew 24:24*, mentions *false prophets* who will lead many into error. And Paul predicts that *in the last times seducing spirits* and *doctrines of demons* will be detected (*1 Timothy 4:1).* Compare *2 Tim. 3:8,* where mention is made of men *who resist the truth, corrupt in mind, rejected concerning the faith, seducers* of the simple, etc. Therefore, considering these things, the faithful must also remember the final judgment, by which the truth will triumph over the heresies that have oppressed it.

d) To be ended by the coming of the Lord; see *Matt. 24:6 and following.*

e) Just as the people of the *antediluvian men* were then abruptly cut off by a particular judgment, so the universal one must finally be brought to an end, *Matthew 24:37-39.* And in *2 Tim. 3:1 ff.*, an immense catalog of vices, which in the last times will publicly prevail not only among those who are entirely outside the Church, but also among those who have a *form of godliness* and are Christians in profession, is recorded. Hence the opinion of a *golden age* to arise before the final judgment is also manifestly refuted. See our Disputation on the Glorious Kingdom of the Church, chapter III.

PFEIFFER: "Chiliasm has its own distinct degrees, and so we must carefully observe them here and, from the very beginning, make a reasonable distinction (between the grossest, the coarse, and the subtle chiliasm) among the crudest, the coarse, and the subtle chiliasm. The *crudest* chiliasts were Cerinthus and the Cerinthians . . ., who introduced Epicureanism into their chiliasm, believing that one would live in Christ's kingdom in eating, drinking, and carnal pleasures. . . But we call the *subtle* chiliasm the opinion of those who do hold that the thousand years of Revelation 20. are not yet fulfilled, but that the glory promised there is still to be awaited, yet so that they posit no visible return of Christ to an earthly kingdom, no personal reign, no double resurrection, but only halcyon days and a peaceful state of the Church, while they leave the actual manner, indeed even the time (how long it would actually last) to leave with God, as do Launéus, Rallius, Cocceius, Brenius, and others. Such Chiliasm we now hold to be *false and erroneous,* but since it does not touch the fundamental articles of the Christian faith, we *do not* consider it *heresy,* especially if one treats it as a matter of dispute and does *not* impose his opinion on anyone; rather, the question now is about the *middle* Chiliasm, which we call the *coarse* kind, and those who defend it according to its principal circumstances, whom we call the gross Chiliasts." (*Anti-Chiliasm*, p. 111. sq.)

GERHARD: "We consider that the mask must be pulled off the *chiliastic* opinion, however it may at last be painted with red lead and coated with white lead, and therefore we attack it with the following general argument. 1. ἄγραφος [unscriptural], 2. ἀντίγραφος [anti-scriptural], repugnant to Scripture, and 3. contrary to experience, that opinion is rightly to be rejected. Such, indeed, is the chiliastic opinion we have described so far. Therefore I. That it is *ἄγραφος* [unscriptural] is evident

from its first author in the Church. *Papias,* bishop of Hierapolis, traced its origin back to the apostolic *traditions*, but it is likely that the impure doctrines of *Cerinthus* were instilled in him under the false pretext of apostolic traditions; for it is by no means probable that the apostles would have handed down some things by word of mouth while committing others to writing. It is clear from 2 Thess. 2:2 that among the proofs by which the seducers tried to persuade the Thessalonians that the day of the Lord was at hand, there was also the *λόγος,* i.e., the pretext of apostolic tradition; there is no doubt that the same argument was also used by others to cover up their errors. . . Whatever is, however, brought from the prophecies of Scripture to establish that opinion, it is either *about the first advent of Christ* in the flesh, or *about the state of the New Testament Church* in general, or *about the heavenly glory of the triumphant Church* in the eternal life to be finally expected, and are therefore used *ἀπροςδιονύσως καὶ ἀπαιδεύτως* [inappropriately and ignorantly] to confirm chiliastic dreams. II. What *αn ἀντίγραφος* [anti-scriptural] is*,* we prove from reasons drawn from Scripture: 1. *from the nature of Christ's kingdom.* The kingdom of Christ is described in the sacred Scriptures as spiritual and eternal, not as corporal and earthly. Therefore, chiliasts hope in vain that Christ will administer some earthly kingdom for a thousand years. . . 2. *From the condition of the pious on this earth.* The lot and status of the pious on this earth is described in the sacred Scriptures in such a way that it completely excludes any opinions and imaginations of a very peaceful and happy kingdom. . . 3. *From the approach of the last day.* If the thousand years, during which Christ is said to be reigning on earth with His own in every abundance of good, have not yet begun, much less ended, it follows that our times are still distant from the day of judgment and the consummation of the age by more than a thousand years. The reason for the connection is manifest, because they hold that, before the day of judgment, that chiliastic kingdom is still to be begun and ended. This conclusion contradicts the statements of Scripture, which testify that the end of the world is near 1 Cor. 10:11, 1 Pet. 4:7, James 5:8–9, 1 John 2:18, Rev. 6:11, and with those signs which are predicted by Christ and the apostles as immediately preceding the end of the world, Matt. 24, Mark 13, Luke 21, 1 Thess. 5, 2 Thess. 2, 1 Tim. 4, 2 Pet. 2, of which the greater part have either already been fulfilled or are at the very point of their fulfillment. . . It is therefore vain to indulge in sweet dreams of a certain blessed millennial age still to be expected on this earth, and far more prudent to prepare oneself for the imminent coming of Christ and the soon-to-follow final judgment with true repentance, faith, prayers, the practice of piety, and patience. . . 4. *From* the *substantial* destruction and ruin *of the world*. At the second coming of Christ, 'the heavens and the earth will pass away, and they will flee from the face of him who sits on the throne, so that no place will be found for them,' Revelation 20:11. . . Therefore, Christ will not reign on earth for a thousand years after His return from heaven, for otherwise the earth would have to remain alive. . . 5. *From the immediate connection of Christ's coming* with the universal resurrection of all men, the administration of the final judgment, the consummation of this age, the creation of a new heaven and earth, the meeting of the righteous to meet Christ, the heavenly rewards of the righteous and the eternal punishments of the wicked. . . 6. *From the assertion of the simultaneous resurrection of all men.* Scripture testifies that at the second coming of Christ all men, both the wicked and the righteous, will be raised at one and the same time, indeed in one hour, indeed in one moment. Dan. 12:2, John 6:39. etc. . . 7. *From the description of the pious being restored to life and of the rewards to be given to them*." (*Loc. de consummat, saeculi* § 80—87.)

HOLLAZ: "We prove the assertion: 1. That the kingdom of Christ is threefold, we learn from the *divine* Word. For the kingdom of Christ is either the kingdom of power, or of grace, or of glory. The millennial kingdom is neither the kingdom of power, nor of grace, nor of glory. . . We conclude: Whatever kingdom is neither the kingdom of power, nor the kingdom of grace, nor the kingdom of glory, that is not the true kingdom of Christ, but is an entity of reason and a dream of waking men. . . 2. In the millennial kingdom there cannot be a greater illumination of the Holy Spirit than there was in the kingdom

of grace in the times of the apostles: but the *knowledge of God* in the kingdom of grace in the times of the apostles was imperfect. Therefore. . . 3. The citizens of the millennial kingdom cannot excel in holiness beyond what the apostles possessed: but they were endowed with an imperfect holiness, of which the apostles themselves complain. . . Therefore on this earth until the day of final judgment, perfect saints will not live. 4. Christ teaches in Matthew 13:30, that 'the tares will grow together with the wheat until the harvest,' and He understands by the tares the sons *of the evil one,* i.e., of the devil, by the wheat or the good seed the sons of the kingdom, by the harvest the consummation of the age, and He asserts that the reapers or angels will finally at the harvest gather the tares and burn them with fire. Therefore the field of the church will not be without tares before the conflagration of the world, but the separation of the wicked goats from the holy sheep will take place at the end on the day of the final judgment, Matthew 25:32. 5. Whoever in this world is subject to the greatest afflictions and persecutions cannot promise themselves a perpetual periods of tranquility on this earth: yet all are beloved sons of God, etc. .. 6. The state of the church or the kingdom of Christ at the end of the world, because of the most corrupt morals of the wicked and the most bitter afflictions of the righteous, will be the most turbulent and the most sorrowful. Therefore, the kingdom of Christ at the end of the world will not flourish or excel in exceptional holiness and earthly happiness... 7. He has revealed from the sacred Scriptures and the more ancient creeds that the solemn advent of Christ, distinguished from the daily advent of grace, is only a twofold one, the former humble, the latter sublime and majestic. Paul explicitly says in Hebrews 9:28: ‘Christ, offered once to bear the sins of many, will be seen *a second time,* without sin*,* by those who are eagerly awaiting him for salvation.' . . 8. At the time when all the wicked, unjust, and reprobate will rise again, at the same time all the pious, just, and elect, and indeed all the pious martyrs, will also rise again: but on the last day all the wicked, etc. . . 9. It is incredible that the souls which receive in heaven the retribution of the most splendid reward for temporal affliction should be sent back from heaven by God into bodies for the fellowship of earthly happiness. . . 10. True Christians watch for their salvation at every moment for this reason, that they expect the sudden and unknown coming of Christ for judgment: therefore true Christians do not expect the blessed millennium, which precedes the final judgment. . . 11. The hypothesis of the millennial reign of Christ does not kindle piety, but extinguishes it, or at least hinders its course. For a) by the chiliastic hypothesis, people are turned away from the desire for heavenly and spiritual goods, which desire is nevertheless that of true Christians (Rom. 8:23; Phil. 3:20). b) The chiliastic opinion feeds the security of people who think little or nothing about the final judgment. Indeed, fascinated by this unstable opinion, they persuade themselves that the coming of Christ is very far off and that they should therefore live for the day, c) an occasion for stirring up rebellion against the regular magistracy is furnished to those who are eager for novelty and more apt at disturbing things than at conducting them. This perverse opinion in the last century stirred and raised the minds of the common people to despise the authority of magistrates." (*Exam*. P. III. s. 2. c. 10. q. 15. p. 1256. sqq.)

GERHARD: "They press the most urgently from the Apocalypse, because in chapter 20, verse 2, Satan is said to be bound for a thousand years, and in verse 7 the saints are said to reign with Christ for a thousand years, in which prophecy they establish the proper seat of the chiliastic kingdom... Although, indeed, both on account of internal *criteria* and the testimonies of the very earliest Greek and Latin Fathers, we readily acknowledge this book to be canonical and written by the Apostle John, nevertheless, since in the primitive Church there was at one time a doubt about the author of this book, we therefore refer it *to the books of the second order of the canon*. Therefore, we also rightly and justly demand of the chiliasts that they offer such an interpretation of this book, and especially of that most controversial passage*,* that it *in no way conflicts with the rest of the canonical writings,* but agrees with them most exactly." (L. c. § 93.)

LUTHER: "One must here, at the very beginning, remind the Christian reader to beware with the utmost diligence of the false dreams of the Jews and *Chiliasts*, who draw such spiritual promises of God down to a carnal and earthly kingdom, and thus fall into two kinds of gross errors. For they thus lose sight of and do not recognize the Lord Christ, who has a spiritual kingdom, and wait in vain for Christ to establish a bodily kingdom on earth." (*Exposition of the Prophet Micah*. 1542. VI, 2846. sq.)

THE SAME: " 'I have other sheep, which are not of this fold: and them also I must bring, and they will hear my voice, and there will be one flock and one shepherd.' Some have also interpreted this passage to mean that it must be fulfilled soon before the last day, when the Antichrist will come, and Elijah and Enoch. That is not true, and it was actually the devil who arranged for people to believe that the whole world would become Christians. The devil did this in order to obscure the true doctrine, so that it would never be properly understood. Therefore, beware of this: this saying has been fulfilled and will soon be fulfilled, for when Christ ascended into heaven, it is still in effect. When the Gospel began, it was preached to the Jews; this people were the sheepfold. So he now says here: 'I have other sheep, which are not of this fold; them also I must bring.' By this he meant that the Gospel was also to be preached to the Gentiles, so that they too would believe in Christ, and thus a Christian community would be formed from Jews and Gentiles. This he afterward did through the apostles, who preached to the Gentiles and converted them to the faith. Thus, everything is now one church or congregation, one faith, one hope, one love, one baptism, and the like. This continues to this day, until the last day. Therefore, you must not understand it so that the whole world and all people will believe in Christ; for we must always have the holy cross, that they are the greater part who persecute the Christians; so the Gospel must always be preached, that some may always be brought in to become Christians; for the kingdom of Christ is in the becoming, not the done." (*Postill. eccles. de ev. Dom. Misericord*. Dom.)

J. E. GERHARD: "In the Augsburg Confession, Article 17, not only a crude chiliasm, but all of it is rejected and condemned." (*A. C. enucleata*. Ed. 3. p. 85.)

S. J. BAUMGARTEN: "In the second part (of Article 17 of the A.C.) . . . the expectation of a worldly kingdom of Christ before the resurrection, which likewise was taught by some Anabaptists, is rejected; therefore the defenders of such opinions cannot be true confessors of this article, and . . . nor can they defend themselves . . . by the evasion of a distinction between their opinion and the dreams of the Jews, and of a resurrection preceding such a kingdom of Christ as they expected, or of a worldly kingdom which they did not maintain with the complete cessation of all the godless, nor by the pretense that they do not spread such opinions." (*Explanation in the Book of Concord*, etc. p. 102 sq.)

ANTITHESES.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Jews*, who dream that the Messiah will be a future earthly king... 2. *Cerinthus*, the heresiarch, who even in the time of the apostles . . . held that Christ would at last be resurrected and would spend a thousand years on earth with his own in pleasures in Jerusalem. ... 3. *Certain of the Fathers*, Greek and Latin, who also embraced the chiliastic error, teaching: that Christ would descend again to earth before

the final judgment, raise the most faithful of the dead, and reign with them for a thousand years before the last day of the world in the greatest splendor, with an abundance of all good things, both of body and mind. And they call this the first resurrection, the second, the universal one, to follow only after that time has passed on earth. Eusebius relates that the author of this fable was *Papias*, bishop of Hieropolis in Asia, a man close to the apostles. . . *Justin* is not mentioned by Jerome, but he reveals himself sufficiently in the dialogue with Trypho... Eusebius also associates *Irenaeus* with the chiliasts.... As for *Tertullian* ... it cannot be denied that at the end of book 3. against Marcion, chapter 24, words are found that favor the millennial error. .. .. *Lactantius* recalls various and wonderful things about the end of the world in his *Institutes*, book 1, chapter 7, section 24. .. .. 4. Of *certain Papists;* for the book, which was published in 1524 under the title, 'The Burden of the Church,' its author, a Papist who is thought to be John Chemmensis, bishop, shows himself to be very addicted to the millennial error; this author also cites other Papists in favor of this opinion. .. 5. Of *some Calvinists,* who defend chiliasm, such as Piscator, Alsted, etc. 6. *Arminians;* Stephen *Curcellaeus* presents the Arminian view of the glorious kingdom of Christ on this earth. ... 7. *Certain Socinians.* Indeed, Smalcius and Socinus himself reject chiliasm. ... 8. *Anabaptists*, who in the last century reintroduced chiliasm into the Church. See Augsburg Conf. art. 17... 9. *Weigelian...* 10. *Methists,* new enthusiasts, followers of Ezekiel Methe;.. also the *Brethren of the Rose Cross*;.. Francis *Puccii*, who among other errors also fostered this one... 11. Of the new prophets and fanatics, such as a. the *Quakers* .. b. Paul *Nogelius..* c. Adolph *Held,* a follower of Elias Praetorius or Christ. Hohburg.. d. Frid. *Breckling,* pastor of Zwolle .. d. *John de Labadie* .. e. H. *Ammersbach*." (L. c. c. 20. s. 2. q. 3. f. 1862—65.)

GERHARD: "We cannot deny that Lactantius and Nepos make a passing mention of corporeal delights and that Jerome, in book 11 on Ezekiel, indiscriminately presents those ancients of the Church as patrons of Jewish fables; to which Chemnitz doubtless has regard, when he speaks in his *Oratio de Lectione* asserts in the preface to the first volume of the Theological Patrons: "Irenaeus, addicted to the chiliastic opinion, *erred in his foundation*." (L. c. § 69.) Cf. "Do the Church Fathers Really Teach a So-Called Biblical Chiliasm?" See *Lehre und Wehre*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 97–112.)

DELITZSCH: "To whom do we owe it that the orthodox church of the present day no longer brands the chiliastic view of the end times, as is done in all the old textbooks of dogmatics, as heterodox, but has instead so absorbed it into its innermost life that now scarcely a believing Christian can be found who does not share it? To whom do we owe it that the Church now believes in a glorious future for the people of Israel and for this very reason recognizes in its Old Testament prehistory a forecast of its final history, in Old Testament prophecy a vision not only of the glory of the Gentile Church but of Israel in the truest sense? To whom do we owe it that the Church, in recognition of the sensual reality in which the supernatural salvation is to be ultimately manifested, is enabled to restore the sensual reality of Old Testament history to its rightful place and to perceive the spiritual and the corporeal in their organic interconnection? We owe it to *Bengel* and to no one else." (*Die biblisch-prophet. Theologie*. Lpz. 1845. p. 6. sq.) "Crusius, however, rejects the expression *regnum millenarium* as unscriptural, because the Apocalypse does speak of a *millennium regni martyrum* in heaven (20:4), but, like the whole Scripture, knows only one *eternal* kingdom of Christ (11:15). . . . In any case, the expression 'regnum millenarium' is misleading, and Revelation 20:4 by no means provides a sufficient scriptural basis for it." (L. c. p. 136.)

f) This is what Paul says in *2 Thessalonians. 2:3 ff.*, that the *adversary* of Christ *(the Antichrist) will be seated* in *the temple of God*, that is, the Christian Church, as its head or monarch*,* after he has*, by the power of Satan, with signs and lying wonders*, *deceived* a great number of people and established his kingdom, so that for some time and by many, the nature or identity of the Antichrist will not be recognized; yet in its own time he will be *revealed* and acknowledged as the Antichrist. *However, even then the day of the Lord will not come immediately*; rather, the Antichrist himself, now revealed, will continue on, until *he is abolished by the brightness* of Christ's *coming.* The revelation of the Antichrist to the faithful, therefore, should signify, like a sign, the following judgment, by which the Antichrist, now manifested, will finally be abolished.

g) See *Matthew 24:29.* For although we do not have a detailed and specific explanation *of* those *heavenly signs,* and especially *of the falling of the stars on the earth*, it is nevertheless better to leave the Scripture's meaning in these matters *free*, and to leave the *manner* of the thing to the wisdom and power of God, rather than, by abandoning the literal sense, to seek or embrace a *metaphor*, especially since elsewhere express mention is made of *heavenly* signs*,* as contrasted with *earthly* ones, in *Luke 21:25.*

h) For indeed, 1) according to the opinion of some, *a notable conversion of the Jews* (I do not say a completely universal one, from which none of them are excepted, but a very broad and remarkable one of many)*,* so that in their public assemblies the doctrine of the gospel concerning Christ Jesus, the Nazarene, hitherto rejected by them, is preached and entire congregations subscribe to it, and thus many are saved through faith in Christ, according to *Romans 11:25 ff.* For that Israel, upon whom blindness has come until now, is the one who is described in the same chapter by the name of *natural branches of the olive tree* in opposition to the *wild olive branch*, denoting Israel according to the flesh, in opposition to the Gentiles, as Paul also states above in *ch. 9:3–5,* had described, as *kinsmen according to the flesh*, etc. Although it should not be thought that the promise was therefore of the rebuilding of the city of Jerusalem, or the restoration of civil government, the occupation of the land of Canaan, the finding of the Ark of the Covenant and other lost sacred things, etc. 2) The desolation of the seven-hilled city (Rome) from *Revelation 18* and the destruction of Gog and Magog from *Revelation 20* are usually referred to this.

> LUTHER: "Whoever wants to can hope for the whole multitude; I have no such hope, nor do I know of any scripture for it. For we cannot convert our Christians, the great multitude, we must be content with the small flock: how much less is it possible to convert all these children of the devil. For that some from the Epistle to the Romans, chapter 11, derive such a fancy, as though all the Jews were to be converted at the end of the world, is nothing; St. Paul means something very different." (*Vom Schem Hamphoras*, 1541. XX, 2529. sq. cf. III, 2506. sq. VI, 1706.)
>
> THE SAME: "In this same way one should also approach the word Israel in these two chapters (Ezek. 38–39.). For the Apostles and other disciples of Christ, who came from the Jews, were the true Israel, and also inherited the name of the whole people of Israel, just as St. Paul inherited the name Ben-Jamin. Therefore, the name Israel has henceforth remained with the apostles and been inherited by all their disciples, so that now the holy Christian community, and we also, and all who believe the word of the apostles and are their disciples, are called Israel. . . I say this because

one should not turn to the interpretation of the Jews; this text has nothing to do with them. Daniel 9:26–27 has shown them their end, that they may hope for no more assembly. We are the ones who have been brought together from various peoples under one Lord, Christ." (*Preface to the Translation of Ezekiel 38*, 39, VI, 1410, 1411.)

QUENSTEDT: "A universal conversion of the Jews is not to be expected before the end of the world... *Antithesis:* 1. Of many of the *Fathers*..., who held that all the Jews, or at least most of them, were to be converted to God before the end of the world. 2. Of almost all the *Papists*... 3. The *Calvinists*... Above all, this opinion was defended by John Hoornbeck from among the Calvinists... 4. *Many of our own,* such as Dr. *Aeg. Hunnius*, Comm. in 1 Tim. 3. tom. IV. p. 782, *Winkelmann's* Comm. on Romans chap. 11., Dr *Hafenreffer* in *templ. Exech* p. 313., Dr. *Menzer* in the analysis of Romans chap. 11. th. 63., Dr. *Balduin* in the *Comm. on the ep. to Romans* chap. 11. p. 2. q. 11., Dr. *Meisner's* book IV on the Law, sect. 17. q. 18. and his Commentary on Hos. ch. 3., who also teach that almost all the Jews will be converted to God before the end of the world." (L. c. c. 19. p. 2. q. 11., Dr. *Meisner*, lib. IV de leg., sect. 17, q. 18 and Comm. on Hos. c. 3, who also teach that almost all the Jews will be converted to God before the end of the world." (L. c., c. 19, s. 2, q. 2, f. 1813 sq.) "Defending the thesis: Blessed Luther, Philip Melanchthon, Brentz, Osiander, Pappus, Cramer, Gerhard, Brochmann, in passages in the explanation and vindication of the oracle of Paul, ch. 11 to the Romans, v. 25. Add to these blessed Dr. Hülsemann in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans not yet published and in the Calixt *Gewissens-Wurm*, c. 8, Weller, *Comm. on the Epistle to the Romans*, c. 11, p. 644, Dr. Georg Grossehein in his diatribe on the catholic conversion of the Jews, Wigand, Comm. on the Epistle to the Romans, Dr. Calov in *Bibl. illustrat*. on Hosea 3:4–5, and in *system. theol*., tom. ult., art. 4, c. 1, q. 1." (L. c., f. 1819.).")

Cf. "Does Romans 11:25–26 Teach a Future Solemn Conversion of the Jews?" See *Lehre und Wehre*, Vol. V, pp. 307–310, 321–331. — "On the Hope of a Still-Pending General Conversion of the Jews." See *Lutheraner*, Vol. XIII, 84–87, 91–93, 97–99, 105–107, 130–133, 137–140, 147–148, 161–165.

## § 4.

At the very approach of judgment a special sign will be seen, which is called the *Son of Man.*[(a)] But what it will be like is difficult [(b)] to explain.

a) Thus it is called *Matt. 24:30.*

b) A more probable view, however, is that which teaches that this sign consists of the brightness of Christ's own body, the splendor of the clouds, and the angelic accompaniment, according to Matthew, loc. cit., and chapter 25:31, as well as the great sound, of which we read in 1 Thessalonians 4:16.

LUTHER: "The sign of the Son of Man in heaven on the day of judgment is uncertain. The phrase, 'sign of the Son of Man,' is used in the Hebrew manner, for: the sign of the Son of Man. For it is nothing to understand the cross by that sign; this is my opinion." (Briefe etc. von de Wette. II, 400.)

GERHARD: "We confess with Luther and Brenz that the coming of Christ for judgment will be local and visible, but we add that it will not be successive, as if He were to descend from heaven into the clouds over a period of time, just as in the ascension He was gradually lifted higher from the earth into the clouds, in the sight of the apostles, Mark 16:19. Luke 24:51; Acts 1:9, but sudden and momentary. . . Therefore, the comparison between Christ's ascension into heaven and His return at the judgment (Acts 1:11) is not to be extended beyond that third point, in which it is established." (*L. de extr. jud*. § 35.)

THE SAME: "It is preferable to take the appellation 'clouds' in its proper sense, since in the articles of faith one should not depart from the letter without urgent necessity. As for what kind of cloud that will be, we think that no one knows for certain." (L. c. § 36.)

## § 5.

The *Judge* will be Christ himself,[(a)] who, in his assumed humanity, appearing gloriously and as if seated on a tribunal, visible to all, will pronounce judgment with divine authority.[(b)]

a) See *Matthew 25:31 ff.,* where *the Son of Man, sitting on the throne of glory* and about to judge *all the nations gathered before Him*, is described at greater length. Cf. *Acts 17:31*; *John 5:22.*

b) Which is one of the whole Holy Trinity, and belongs to Christ the man by communication. In respect to Him, the *cause* of the judgment *is efficaciously effected* by the others of the whole *Holy Trinity.* the *Trinity* is spoken of. Compare the cited passages *from John and Acts,* where, while it is denied that *the Father* judges *anyone,* that is, by appearing *in person* and passing sentence, it is nevertheless added that the *Father has given all judgment and the authority to judge to the Son, John 5:22 and 27.* And in *Acts 17,* it is said that *God judges the world through a man.* Therefore, persons distinct from the Son are not excluded, but divine authority is jointly granted to that act. To this belong the passages *Romans 2:2, 3, 5, 6, 16; Hebrews 12:23,* where *God's judgment, God the judge of all,* is mentioned.

GERHARD: "Christ will administer that judgment not only as God, but also as *man*. Therefore, just as He will be a *visible* and conspicuous judge, so also will He pronounce a sentence *that can be heard.* . . The sentence of judgment will be heard not only inwardly in the conscience, but also outwardly in a certain form of words." (L. c. § 69.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Calvinists*, who... a) leave to the human nature of Christ only the naked promulgation of the decisive sentence, which can be performed by any minister of the judge, b) They themselves deny *καρδιογνωσίαν* [knowledge of hearts], while asserting that Christ, as man, will administer that judgment, with His human mind being revealed to the hearts and consciences of all men by His own Deity. They also deny the judicial decree and execution of the judicial sentence of Christ's human nature, which is openly *νεστοριανίζειν* [Nestorianizing]. . . 2. The *Papists,* who blow the same trumpet as the Calvinists, while by *the ἐξουσίαν κρίσιν ποιεῖν* [authority to execute judgment] *communicated* to Christ, insofar as He is the Son of Man or a man, through and by reason of the communicated hypostatic union (John 5:27), understand at least the external visibility of a judicial act." (L. c. s. 2. q. 3. f. 1820.)

## § 6.

The *internal driving* cause is the justice of God,[(a)] *partly* remunerative,[(b)] *partly* vindicative.[(c)]

a) See *2 Thessalonians 1:6–7.*
b) Which pertains to the goodness of God.
c) Or the wrath of God, to be fulfilled by the punishment of sinners.

## § 7.

The *external impulsive* cause is *partly* the merit of Christ apprehended by faith,[a] *partly* sins,[b] and especially [c] the final impenitence of those who are to be judged.

a) For this moves God to will, in the final judgment, not only to grant eternal *life*, but also, according to the diversity of works proceeding from faith, *degrees of glory,* with respect to accidental rewards, to believers.

b) See *2* Cor. *5:10* and conf., what we have said to chap. IX, § 5, note *b.*

c) Thus also in John 12:48 Christ says: "He who rejects me and does not receive my words has one who judges him; the word that I have spoken will judge him on the last day." This is the same as if he had said that the unbeliever, by the very fact of his unbelief, moves the judge to condemn him at the final judgment.

## § 8.

Christ will have partly *assessors* and *ministers* [a] of the judgment, partly holy men [b] and partly good angels.[c]

a) Who, for this reason, can rightly be called *ministers* of the judgment, and even of a *lesser,* rather than *a principal*, nature. For assessors, such as these are, are rightly said to minister; they certainly do not have an authority equal to that of the judge, but one that is plainly dependent on Him and very limited.

b) Just as *the apostles* are said to *judge the twelve tribes of Israel (Matthew 19:28; Luke 22:30),* and *1 Corinthians 6:2* Paul asks*, "Do you not know that the saints will judge the world?"*

c) See *Matt. 25:31.*

## § 9.

And indeed the duty of the *angels* [a] will be not only to accompany Christ as He approaches for judgment [b] and to announce His coming by a mighty sound,[c] but also to gather men, when resurrected from the dead and when the living are apprehended, from all parts of the world,[d] then to separate the pious from the impious,[e] placing the former on the right and the latter on the left,[f] finally to cast the damned into hell.[g]

a) Whom we have already mentioned above, chap. III, on the angels, § 40.

b) See *Matt. 25:31.*

c) *1 Thess. 4:15.*

d) *Matt. 24:31. Mark 13:27.*

e) *Matt. 13:41, 49.*

f) *Matt. 25:32.*

g) *Matthew 13:42, 50.*

## § 10.

But the holy *men* will be witnesses and approvers of Christ's judgment.

a) Although they themselves are to be judged first, as will be said shortly.

b) However, they themselves appear to be placed in the *higher position* according to *1 Thess. 4:14, and* indeed *very close* to Christ, who appears in a visible form beside the apostle, see *Matt. 19:28. Luke 22:30; then* the patriarchs, prophets, martyrs, doctors, and other faithful, in their proper order, will behold the impious, placed in a lower position, and will approve their condemnation. Cf. *Revelation 19:1 ff.*

## § 11.

The object of the final judgment [(a)] is twofold: the *material*, which is the persons to be judged,[(b)] and the *formal,* or that according to which [(c)] each person is judged.

a) According to others, the *subject is the one to be judged,* not the judge.
b) Others have said, the subject is *That.*
c) So that it may be the subject *Quo* [By Which].

## § 12.

The *material* object pertains to all men,[(a)] both the *pious* and the *impious;* both those whom that day finds *alive* and *those who have died* and are to be resurrected on that day;[(b)] besides men, also the evil angels.[(c)]

a) For *we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in the body, according to what he has done, whether good or bad,* as the apostle pronounces in *2 Cor. 5:10.* And *Rom. 14:10: We shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ*. Cf. *Jude 14–15 and Isaiah 66:16. Matt. 25, 32.*

b) For thus Christ is said *to be the judge of the living and the dead, Acts 10:42; 1 Thess. 4:15–17; 2 Tim. 4:1; 1 Pet. 4:5.*

c) *2 Pet. 2:4,* where it is said *that the angels who sinned are reserved in chains for judgment.* Cf. *Jude 6.* And *Matt. 25:41; chap. 8:29.*

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of *Peter Thyraeus,* who in his book on the glorious apparition of Christ, chapter 12, asserts that even good angels are to be judged. . . 3. Of *certain Fathers,* who decree that neither the faithful nor the infidels are to be judged, but a middle class. Thus Lactantius, Hilary, Augustine, and Gregory." (L. c. q. 5. f. 1831.)

## § 13.

The *formal* object on the part of the *pious* is faith, on the part of the *impious* unbelief, *insofar* as each is recognized [(b)] from works.[(a)]

a) For Christ will judge, so that to each one He will render a clear testimony according to the works of faith or of unbelief (*2 Cor. 5:10;* cf. *Rom. 2:6 ff.; Matt. 25:35, 36, 42, 43; Rev. 20:12, 13*).

b) However, one must be careful not to confuse the *formal object* (especially on the part of the pious, who, although they will receive that joyful sentence from the judge *according to* their works, will *not* receive it *because of* their works) with *an* external *impulsive cause*.

## § 14.

The judgment itself [(a)] is, however, usually distinguished into a judgment of *discussion* [(b)] and *retribution.*

a) Distinct from the preliminary acts is the approach of the visible judge, the assembly of those to be judged, and their division into two classes.

b) *Not* that the judge*, the heart-searcher*, Christ, needs a discussion of causes or an inquiry to be instituted only then (for He could also, apart from such a solemn process, lead the pious whom He knows to eternal life, and precipitate the impious, whom He knows just as distinctly, into hell); *However,* so that the reason for the just judgment may be most manifestly revealed to those who are judged, that judgment will freely enter into the discussion, and by doing so will give to each his due.

## § 15.

This is called the judgment of *discussion,*[(a)] by which the works of all [(b)] will be brought to light, both hidden and manifest;[(c)] primarily, so that each person may sufficiently understand what pertains to them [(d)] and concerns their salvation or damnation.

a) Scripture calls this *giving an account to God,* that is, as a judge calling the life and actions of all to account, *Rom. 14:12.*

b) *Not only* of those whose faith or unbelief could be in doubt in this life, *but* also of the rest, whose faith or unbelief was established by public testimony. For the apostle's assertion is universal, where*,* speaking of all *the dead* and *living* over whom Christ *has dominion*, He pronounces that *all shall give an account to God.*

c) The good works of the *pious* to manifest their faith, and how great the difference is between them and the infidels; the evil works of the *impious* and their shame, and to show that they are justly punished.

d) And so also the *sins of the pious,* though not to be publicly recounted, will be brought back to their own memory, some think, so that they will *not* indeed be put to shame or in any way distressed, *but* will nevertheless, acknowledging their own unworthiness, more admire and celebrate the greatness of divine grace toward themselves. Cf. *Matthew 25:37 ff.*

GERHARD: "That everything must be revealed in judgment is to be understood not collectively, as if the sins of the pious as well as those of the impious are to be revealed to all, but distributively, that the *good* works of the pious, and indeed the *evil* works of the impious, even those done without witnesses or arbiters, are to be brought to clear light, as is gathered from the judicial process in Matthew 25:34 ff. . . The *legal precepts* must therefore be distinguished from the properly evangelical; the legal precept is: 'Men shall give account on that day for every careless word'; the evangelical is: 'He who believes does not come into judgment'; the legal precept is: 'You are treasuring up wrath for yourself on the day of the revelation of the righteous judgment.' evangelical is: ‘Lift up your heads, for your redemption is near.' . . (The righteousness of Christ) covers all the sins of the pious, so that they may not come into the sight of God, the angels, and men." (L. c. § 65.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Scholastics and the Papists,* who decree that not only the sins of the impious and unbelievers, but also those of the pious and faithful, are to be exposed and made public at that most solemn judgment before all angels and men. Thus Thomas Aquinas. . . 2. Of *some of our own,* as Jonae Heuleri teaches the same thing." (L. c. q. 6. f. 1833. sq.) J. FECHT: "The sins of the elect will be publicly displayed in this judgment, not, however, with any reproach, but rather with praise on account of the repentance performed concerning them." (*Sylloge controvers*. p. 383. sq.)

## § 16.

The judgment of *retribution* will consist in the pronouncement of the sentence [(a)] that is fitting to each case, and by which some will be sent to life,[(b)] others to eternal damnation;[(c)] where the execution of the sentence [(d)] will immediately follow.

a) See *Matthew 25:34 and 41.*

b) Which some call the judgment of *absolution*, although the award of life imports more.

c) Hence it is called the judgment of *condemnation*.

d) *Matt. 25:46; chap. 13:39–43.*

SCHERZER: "*The standard* of this judgment will be the law and the gospel in one word, but with a different and properly noted respect. The *gospel* indeed with respect to the elect... The *law*, however, with respect to the reprobate, but so that it is illuminated by the light of the gospel." (*System*. 1. 21. § 9. p. 598. sq.)

## § 17.

The *end* of the final judgment [(a)] is the glory of God’s wisdom,[(b)] power,[(c)] goodness,[(d)] and vindicatory justice.[(e)]

a) Which the judge himself, or the author of the judgment, intends.

b) Or the most wise government in this universe, hitherto not rightly acknowledged by many.
c) Which the impious for a time seemed to have eluded or escaped.
d) Made manifest through the very solemn reward of the pious.
e) Whose full work will be shown to have been delayed, not abolished. Compare *2 Thess. 1:10.*

## § 18.

The final judgment can be described as a solemn act [(a)] of Christ [(b)] appearing in His assumed human nature, by which He, with divine authority and power [(c)] and for the sake of divine justice [(d)]—both rewarding and punitive—judges all men [(e)] and evil angels, through the mediation of the good angels [(f)] deeds, will bring before the tribunal [(g)] and, after the cause of each has been discussed and account has been taken [(h)] of final faith and of sins, especially final unbelief, from the works themselves as they appear, will assign to the godly and faithful full blessedness, and to the ungodly and impious men and demons consummate misery, with the approval of the saints [(i)] to men, will assign [(k)] and confer for the glory of His wisdom, power, goodness, and justice.[(1)]

a) For this imports the nominative case, yet common to several, so that it may rightly serve as the place of the genus.
b) Who is the efficient cause, yet not excluding the other persons, according to § 5.
c) This is the reason for causation, truly common to the three persons. Ibid.
d) Which is the internal impulsive cause; see § 6.
e) Which are the material object; see § 12.
f) Thus the ministers of justice are designated, according to § 8 and 9.
g) These and the following pertain to the formal mode or reason of the process, with respect to the prior act of judgment; see §§ 14, 15.
h) By which the formal object is indicated; see § 13.
i) As assessors of the court (who pertain to the ministerial aspect of the case); see § 8, 10.
k) The latter act here is, with respect to the form and process of the judgment, according to §§ 14 and 16.
1) As the final cause; see § 17.

## § 19.

After the judgment is completed, *the consummation of the world* [(a)] will immediately follow, in which the heavens and the earth, and likewise the other elements and bodies composed from elements, as far as their substance is concerned,[(b)] by means of fire,[(c)] will perish.[(d)]

a) Or the *consummation of the age,* since the word *αιών* denotes both the world and the age. Certainly, when the world is destroyed, time will end along with it. The Hebrews themselves also distinguish between עוֹלָם הַזֶּה and עוֹלָם הַבָּא, this age and the age to come. Cf. our Disputation on *Romans 1:12:2,* on avoiding conformity to the world, in the prologue.

b) See *Ps. 102:26-27* and *Heb. 1:10-11,* where it is said of the *earth* and the *heavens*: *they will perish, they will grow old like a garment; they will be changed like a robe.* However, in this passage, the immutability of God in His being is opposed to the mutability and change of heaven and earth; the first, when by creation they passed from non-existence to existence, and the latter, by which they are to pass from existence to non-existence; which change is certainly substantial. Cf. *2 Pet. 3:10 and 3:12.*

GERHARD: *"Man* was not created primarily for this animal, but for a heavenly life, so that, having completed the course of his transient life on earth, he may live with his Creator God in eternal glory and joy. Therefore, the *world* also was not created to last forever, but to supply man with the necessities for this life for a certain and definite time; accordingly, when the number of the elect is complete, it will be abolished and the creation of a new heaven and a new earth will succeed, in which perfect justice will dwell, 2 Pet. 3:13. The earth was created for this purpose, that it might be a dwelling of man as a wayfarer; the whole universe was created for this purpose, that it might be a kind of mirror *of the knowledge of God* and serve man on the journey of this life; therefore, when man shall see God face to face and have arrived in His homeland, and thus cease to be a wayfarer, there will be no further use for this world. Our *Luther* was accustomed to say: 'The present world is only a preparation and scaffolding of God for that world; when the house is finished, the scaffolding is taken down.'" (*L. de consumm. saec*. § 11.)

THE SAME.: "The consummation of the age also seems to have had a place in the state of integrity. For God did not create man to lead only an animal life in this age, but that after the course of animal life on this earth is completed, he might be elevated to a heavenly and glorious life; Therefore, the world also was not created by God for this purpose, that it should endure forever, but that, when the number of those whom God willed to be born of men and to be fellow-heirs of the heavenly kingdom was completed, it should be annihilated again, because, the animal life of all men having ceased, there would be no further use for the world. Thus, just as the generation of men was not to be stretched out indefinitely, but was to have a certain end and term, at which time all and every man living on earth would be translated to a spiritual and glorious life in heaven, so also the duration of the world was not to be endless and perpetual, but, together with the animal life of men, was to have its end. But the *manner* of the consummation seems to have been different, by simple annihilation, not by conflagration *of fire*." (L. c. § 66.)

KROMAYER: "The argument for the opinion that the world perishes according to its accidents, not according to its substance, is drawn from Romans 8:19 ff. But we answer that this liberation takes place not by a change for the better, but by annihilation and its own abolition. For creation would rather not be than, being subject to the abuse of men, fight against its Creator. Thus wine, when it is forced to serve drunkenness, would rather not be than be subject to this vanity. Groans and expectation are ascribed to irrational creatures through personification. . . 3. From Ps. 102:25–28. God is said to change the heavens, as a garment is changed. But we answer that the term change, as is apparent from physics, is of so broad a signification that it includes within its scope both *φθορά* . . . and *ἀλλοίωσις*. Here it denotes annihilation, as when a garment is worn out and is finally reduced to nothingness.

This usage of the word is clear from the text itself, since the heavens are said to grow old like a garment; which change is certainly not for the better, but for the worse... 5. That according to Luther the world is already dressed in its everyday clothes (*habe das Werkeltags-Kleid an*), and will one day have to put on its change of clothes (*werde das Feier oder Sonntags-Kleid anhaben*). But we answer, that by these words at least a comparison is established between the old and the new world, but that no transformation of one into the other is taught, cf. Rev. 21:1." (*Th. posit.-pol*. I, 1191 ff.)

GERHARD: "We do not defend the doctrine of the *substantial φθορμ* or destruction of the world as *an article of faith*, simply necessary to be known and believed for salvation, but we say that it is more conformable to the emphatic sayings of Scripture which speak of the end of the world." (L. c. § 38.)

ANTHITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of *certain of the Fathers,* who defended an accidental change of the world; namely, that the heavens and the earth will be changed for the better with respect to their accidents only, without a destruction of substance, was first asserted, if I am not mistaken, by *Origen*... After Origen, Jerome ..., Augustine thus disserts: The very substance will have those qualities which are suited to immortal bodies by a marvelous change, so that, for example, the world, renewed for the better, may be aptly adapted to bodies, even in the flesh, renewed for the better. .. 2. Of the *Scholastics,* who hold that the world will perish not according to substance (*κατ' ουσίαν*), but according to quality (*κατά ποιότητα*)... 4. Of *certain Calvinists,* who also incline to that opinion of accidental change, i.e., that a restoration of heaven and earth is to be expected, not an annihilation. . . 5. Of *some of our own,* who hold that the world will pass away only by a change of qualities. . . *Brenz* hom. 53. in Luke fol. 621.: ‘Will the heaven and the earth, he says, pass away so that nothing of them will remain at all? By no means! They will not pass away entirely, but will be changed. They will cast off the garment of corruption and put on a new garment of incorruption; a future change of heaven and earth, indeed, but not an entire abolition.' The same is taught by *Althamer* ... and *Phil. Nicolai*." (L. c. P. IV. c. 20. s. 2. q. 2. f. 1852. sqq.)

c) Thus *Peter* expressly *states in 2 Peter 3:7, 10: "The heavens and earth that now are are reserved for fire for the day of judgment*, etc." As for the nature of this fire, it is discussed more curiously than usefully.

d) Meanwhile the pious will have *new heavens and a new earth,* i.e., a glorious dwelling, *2 Peter 3:13* and *Revelation 21:1 ff.,* while the impious will have a *prison and a hell* destined for themselves; cf. *Revelation 20:14–15.*

GERHARD: "*The heaven of the blessed...* can be taken in three ways: first, *objectively* and efficiently; second, *formally;* third, *subjectively.* If it is taken in the first way, the heaven of the blessed is *God Himself* the Creator; if in the second way, the heaven of the blessed is something distinct from God, namely the *heavenly glory and joy* in the saints themselves, yet it is not a corporeal substance produced by God in the first creation; if in the third way, we say that the *very* essence, quality, and location of that heaven are not revealed to us in the Scriptures; therefore, it is better to be concerned with its possession than with its precise definition in this life." (*L. de vit. aet*. § 40.)

# PART TWO

## Chapter I. ^

ON SIN IN GENERAL.

### § 1.

Since the *subject of the operation* of revealed theology is man as a sinner,[(a)] therefore, considering the end of theology and what pertains to it, we must now speak of sin.[(b)]

a) See Prolegom. chap. I. § 20. Vol. I. p. 40.

b) See loc. cit. § ult. Indeed, just as in other practical disciplines, when the reason for introducing an end into the subject is to be considered, the *subject* must first be considered as *lacking an end;* and whether and to what extent *the end* is *capable*; so in theology, after the blessedness has been treated, *man* must be considered*,* not only as *lacking blessedness,* but also as turned away from God by sin and *lacking the strength* to obtain blessedness from God, namely, that he be delivered from sin and reconciled to God and brought to blessedness. Cf. *Mus., Introd.* chap. III. § 1. p. 214.

### § 2.

However, in this place [(a)] sin is taken partly *abstractively,* for the very lack of conformity with the law, as it pertains to the life and actions of a rational creature,[(b)] in which respect it is a mere *privation,* and not something positive [(c)] is; partly *abstractively*, insofar as, besides the absence of conformity with that law, it also includes some subject to which that privation adheres, *whether* it be an innate quality, an acquired habit, *or* an act that is otherwise than it ought to have been according to a certain law, and therefore deviates from the law, or is not in accordance with the law;[(d)] in what sense sin is something *positive* is certain.[(e)]

a) Elsewhere, sin is said *more generally* in relation to any rule prescribing a certain mode of operation, in which sense there is

a sin of *nature* (which is called a monstrosity), as well as a sin of *art.* In this place, however, the word is taken in its *special and proper* sense, and denotes sin in relation to the rule of morals, which is called a *moral* sin.

b) Thus explicitly *1 John 3:4: Sin is lawlessness" (ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία).* Moreover, *lawlessness* [*ἀνομία*], is the very formal principle by which something has what is *ἄνομον.* And thus it signifies in the abstract.

c) For it imports nothing other than the negation of a positive entity, namely of rectitude, or conformity with the law that ought to have been present. But no substance or positive accident is formally a privation; that would be a contradiction.

d) Thus, concupiscence, being evil by nature; vicious habits contracted by wrongdoing; and all acts that are contrary to the law are customarily and correctly called sins.

e) For although that from which it has, as from a form, what it is and is called sin, is not something positive, but a mere privation; since, however, in sin concretely understood, besides that formal element, something material is also involved, therefore, as far as the material of sin is concerned, it can certainly involve a positive entity. Cf. with what we have said on this §, *Mus., Theses Theol. de Peccato*, printed in 1651 and publicly circulated, at the beginning.

## § 3.

By *law*, however, the eternal [(a)] and unchangeable wisdom and judgment [(b)] of God must be understood, concerning those things that are fitting or unfit for a rational creature as such, combined with the will, so that they be done or not done.[(c)]

a) For since sin, in its formal character implies a deviation from a norm or rule, a norm of this kind must be sought, one that is *first and adequate* to all sins. For a secondary norm is resolved into a primary one; whereas a particular norm is such that many things, some right and some wrong, do not conform to it.

b) In this respect, it is formally in God Himself, even though it is determined to creatures and to what pertains to them. And thus, sin must be considered insofar as God judges it to be contrary to the rational nature as such, and wills that it not be done, or that the opposite be done.

c) It is also called the *law of nature,* because it concerns those things which are by *nature*, or *in themselves*, honorable or shameful, or which are consistent with, or inconsistent for, a rational nature as such. It is also called the *moral law,* insofar as it pertains to *morals,* or the way of life that befits or unbecoming to a rational creature.

## § 4.

It is *promulgated* [(a)] *first* in the very creation,[(b)] when knowledge of practical principles [(c)]

and the ability to apply them to individual actions and the circumstances of actions was given to men.[(d)]

a) For here we are dealing with the promulgation of the law, so that the nature of sin may be made all the more clear. For it is certain that a law does not bind unless it has been promulgated, so that those who act contrary to what the law demands are not considered to be acting *ἀνόμως* [lawlessly] when the law has not been promulgated.

b) See what was said above about the image of God in respect to the intellect, Part I, Chapter IV, § 9. p. 149. For the law of nature, implanted in the minds of men, is a certain express image of the eternal law itself, which exists in God, or a communication or promulgation of the divine law, by which those things which God judges to be convenient for man, to be done and to be avoided, were manifested to man, as things to be observed by the authority of God the creator.

c) Which universally prescribe what is to be done and what is to be omitted. The schools call that knowledge *συντήρησις* [synteresis].

d) So that it would be clear what, according to those general precepts, should and should not be done here and now. The schools call this *φρόνησις* [prudence]. Although this is not so much the law itself as the application of the law, or the power to apply it.

REUSCH: *"Conscience* and practical reasoning, by which we determine the morality (i.e., *ἐννομίαν* [conformity to law] and *ἀνομίαν* [lawlessness]) of free actions." Hence it requires: 1. *a habitual knowledge* of practical *principles* or general judgments about the morality of a free person's actions, which is called *συντήρησις* [synteresis] and constitutes the *major premise* of that practical reasoning we call conscience; 2. a *habitual knowledge* of any individual *actions*, by virtue of which those individual actions can be subsumed under those general practical principles, which is called *συνείδησις* [consciousness] and constitutes the *minor proposition* of that practical reasoning, which is called conscience; 3. the *faculty*, from the two premises supplied by *συντήρησις* and *συνείδησις*, of *drawing* the practical *conclusion* that determines whether this or that action is morally good and therefore to be performed, or morally bad and therefore to be omitted; this conclusion is called the judgment of conscience." (*Annotatt*. p. 392. sq.)

BALDUIN: "In this place, *synteresis* is the faculty of the soul, which *always* opposes vices and immediately points out committed evils, and thus always desires to keep the soul immaculate from sin. And some have called this synteresis the very conscience itself. But the distinction between these two is manifest. *Synteresis can never err;* conscience sometimes errs in its judgment." (*Tract. de cas. consc*. p. 9.)

AD. OSIANDER: *"A mistaken conscience,* arising from invincible ignorance *concerning what is honorable and shameful,* especially in matters of intrinsic character, as well as in the precepts and prohibitions of divine law, *does not oblige, but it binds. . .* To bind, however, is to constrain someone so that they cannot proceed lawfully while such a conscience persists; so that *it is a sin to act against it, and it is also a sin to act according to its prescription.* Hence it is rightly said, 'An erroneous conscience is sufficient for vice, not for virtue, and it ensnares, not obliges.' . . An erroneous conscience, proceeding from invincible ignorance *in an indifferent and actual object,* and also in certain (remote) consequences, the principles of natural or divine law *oblige,* excuse from sin, and finally diminish." (*Colleg. th. system*. P. V. Loc. 14. th. 48. 49. p. 288. sq.)

## § 5.

Later, after those perfections previously received by the image of God were lost through the Fall, that law was indeed greatly *obliterated,*[a] but nevertheless some *vestiges* or traces of it remained;[b] God, however, besides other revelations,[c] above all in the Decalogue, *repeated* the sum of the law both in word and in writing [d] and more clearly explained the individual precepts throughout the sacred Scriptures.[e]

a) As will be stated more distinctly below in the section on original sin.

b) As it is said in *Romans 2:15*: "*The Gentiles, who do not have the law* (given to them externally through a special revelation)*, are a law to themselves, showing the work of the law written in their hearts*, etc.," since they have a certain knowledge, discerned by their hearts, of what is honorable and dishonorable, inscribed as it were by the finger of nature; by whose force also, when after various actions committed they reflect on themselves, *they* either *accuse* themselves as violators of the law laid down above*,* or, perceiving that they have acted rightly, *excuse* and defend themselves (at least in a certain way).

> APOLOGY OF THE A. C.: "Because the natural law, which corresponds with the law of Moses or the Ten Commandments, is innate and written in the hearts of all men, and thus reason can in some measure grasp and understand the Ten Commandments, it fancies that it has enough in the law and that through the law one can obtain forgiveness of sins." (Art. IV. p. 87. sq.)

c) Which did not happen to the patriarchs, and through them to others, all at once. Compare *Gerhard, De Lege*, § 15 ff. to 24, where he shows that the practice of the moral law, as contained in the Decalogue, had a place even before Moses.

> KROMAYER: "A pre-Mosaic Decalogue could easily have been constructed. The *first* commandment may be found in Gen. 12:1–16:7: 'I am the God who brought you out…' etc. By these words God sets Himself apart from other gods to exclude idolatry. The *second* is Genesis 18:4, when Abraham invoked the name of God by erecting an altar. The *third is* Genesis 2:3, when God sanctified the seventh day and consecrated it to divine worship. The *fourth* is Genesis 9:5, when he cursed the descendants of Ham, the mocker of his father. *Fifth*, Genesis 9:6, when the divine majesty commands that whoever sheds the blood of a man, his own blood shall be shed by men. *Sixth*, Genesis 2:24, because God joined a single woman to a single man and commanded that the two should become one flesh. *Seventh*, Genesis 44:8, because Joseph's brothers are greatly distressed by the fear of punishment on suspicion of theft. *Eighth*, Genesis 3:14, because a very severe punishment is inflicted on the devil and the serpent, his instrument, for lying. *Ninth* and *tenth*, Gen. 39:8–10, that Joseph avoided wicked concupiscences, which provoke divine wrath, as much as he could. (*Th. posit.-pol.* II, 266 sq.)

d) *Exod. 20:1 ff.* and *chap. 31:18* indicates that God, *after finishing speaking with Moses on Mount Sinai, gave him the two tablets of the testimony,* which contained the summary of the statutes, *tablets written by the finger* (or by the immediate operation of power) *of God.* Cf. *Deut. 4:18; chap. 9:10.*

e) See *Gerhard, L. de Lege*, Sec. IX, concerning the individual precepts of the Decalogue, with other scriptural passages brought in for explanation. It must be noted *at the outset* how Christ *purged* the *old* law of the corruptions of the Pharisees, *Matthew 5:20 ff., chapter 19:8 ff.,* so that He takes account of sin not only in what is *expressed* in the *commandments* of the Decalogue, but also in what is contrary to the *sense*, declared through Christ. He also shows that the *sum* of the law is comprised in the commandments to *love God and one's neighbor, Matthew 22:37-40*, and thus signifies that every sin is at war *either* with the love of God, *or* with the love of one's neighbor, *or* with both.

## § 6.

And thus the binding force of this law [a] can be known to be most great [b] and most universal,[c] which no man can escape.

a) As a primary and adequate standard.

b) For it concerns 1. things that are good or evil *in themselves*, and 2. has *God*, the most wise, most holy, and most powerful, as *its author*.

c) For it is a contradiction that a man should be a man, yet not be obligated by the authority of the legislator, who is the creator and lord of all, to do those things which are fitting for a rational creature as such.

## § 7.

It is also truly a sin when something is committed against any *positive* law, whether *divine* [a] or *human,*[b] *provided that* the human law does not contradict [c] the divine.[d]

a) About a matter *not* simply and in itself necessary, *but* only because of the free will of God, who could have not prescribed this, or prescribed the opposite, e.g. in ceremonial or judicial matters. Where, however, just as the law of nature commands us to obey God in all things, so the *obligation* to obey these precepts is *founded* on the obligation of the law of nature, so that he who acts otherwise sins.

> FECHT: "Some add a third class of *positive-moral* laws, which are called *positive* because they depend on the mere will of God, not on a natural necessity, since, if God willed it, they could be otherwise and change; but *moral*, because they are similar to the perpetual moral obligations of all men; examples of which they cite are the forbidden degrees in Leviticus and the law about celebrating the Sabbath each week. But truly, this class of laws is proven to be a *vain invention*: I. *From the perpetual silence of Scripture.* For a positive-moral law can in no way be proven, since in the examples given, whatever is *moral*, whether in the forbidden degrees or in the Sabbath, is also *natural*, and whatever is *not natural* is *ceremonial* and Jewish. II. *From the consensus of the ancient theologians of our church,* who, until almost the time of Gerhard, were completely ignorant of this positive moral law, and referred whatever laws occur in Scripture, to either natural or positive laws. — Most theologians defend this positive-moral law. *They prove:* I. *By examples of forbidden degrees,* which nature does not simply forbid, and which, nevertheless,

are commonly esteemed forbidden as an indispensable divine law, so that when the Roman pontiff sometimes dispenses from them, he is said thereby to violate the rights of God and to exalt himself above God. Resp.: 1) All earlier theologians have referred these degrees to natural law, either because He punished the Gentiles for transgressing them, who, since they did not know that positive moral law, could not therefore have been bound by it. . . 3) We have said above that a distinction must be made between natural law as taken in a somewhat looser and a stricter sense. II. For example, the Sabbath law concerning the observance of a festival on any seventh day, which, since it obligates all men, does not descend solely from nature but is a positive moral law, is necessary. Resp.: 1) In the third commandment, the only moral and natural part is that there should be a public celebration of God at a certain time, whatever that time may be. That we celebrate on the seventh day, or on any other particular day, is a matter of the Church's free determination and therefore pertains to rites. 2) In the third precept it is commanded, not just any seventh day, but the specifically determined seventh day, that is, the Sabbath day, to be kept holy. This pertains to the Jews, not to Christians. For from a determined precept to an indeterminate precept, the conclusion does not hold." (*Compend*. Ed. 2. p. 660—662.)

b) For because these principles—that *what the magistrate*, who is the ordinance of God, *prescribes* to those under his authority, saving the divine law, *is to be done*; and that what the magistrate similarly prohibits them is *to be avoided*—are of eternal truth and are implicitly contained in the Decalogue; therefore no one can act against a positive law enacted by a superior without also acting against the eternal law of God.

c) For otherwise that apostolic saying would hold true, *Acts 4:19: "Judge whether it is right in the sight of God to listen to you rather than to God,*" and *chapter 5:29: "One must obey God rather than men."* On the other hand, it is clear that the commands of *inferior* magistrates cannot repeal the laws of a *superior* magistrate, nor does one who, not observing them, does not obey those contrary to them sin.

d) We add no more about the law here, as we will treat the matter more fully below in Part III, Chapter VII, on the word of the law and the gospel.

## § 8.

A *physically efficient* cause [(a)] of sin, when considered *abstractly*, properly speaking does *not* [(b)] exist. However, for the *acts* and *habits* [(c)] to which sin adheres, insofar as they are acts and habits, the physical cause is rightly sought.[(d)]

a) Or by its real influx producing it, as a true and real effect.

b) For sin, as such, is a privation (see above § 2, note c.), which is incompatible with being actually produced by a physically efficacious cause.

c) Which are *material* in sin concretively received, distinct from the *formal*. See note *e.* to § 2.

d) Thus, the physically efficient cause of *Cain's* sinful action, by which he killed his brother (or of the sin, which they call fratricide or parricide, insofar as it is a positive action), was Cain himself, who struck his brother. A vicious habit, e.g., of intemperance, is the cause which, by frequent acts, has acquired for himself a fixed inclination to similar acts, or the habit itself.

## § 9.

Meanwhile, sin, as such, is rightly assigned as a *moral* cause.[(a)] And it is always of a *nature* endowed with *intellect and will.*[(b).]

a) Or which, although it does not provide a real influx into that which is a mere privation, as if it were to be truly produced by itself, nevertheless contributes something, by virtue of which that (that is, *ανομία* [lawlessness] itself) is imputed to it as an effect, no differently than if it were to influence it in reality. Others prefer to call it a *failure*, with *Augustine* (Book XII, *The City of God*, Chapter VII). This is because, if the agent is considered precisely in relation to *ἀνομία*, its cause is said to be not any influx, but a defect in causing—that is, the fact that it does not act in conformity with the law. Cf. *Mus.,* Thes. cit. η. IX.

b) See *1 John 3:4,* where it is expressly said that he *who commits sin* also *commits lawlessness,* namely, by the very fact that he does what is *lawless.*

c) Indeed, *brute animals and other agents*, devoid of reason, when they do that which, if a human were to do it, would be considered sin, are *not* themselves, *strictly* speaking, believed to *sin*, just as they are not considered to act in accordance with the law when they do things that the law prescribes for rational creatures, since they are plainly devoid of the faculty to know what the law commands and forbids.

## § 10.

*God* indeed can be rightly said to be *neither* morally,[(a)] *nor* physically [(b)] the cause of sin.[(c)]

a) For the one who is supremely good and perfect cannot intend sin, either *directly* or *indirectly*.

b) For although God concurs as a universal cause in all the actions of secondary causes, and thus in evil ones as well as in good ones; nevertheless, because those actions are not sins by reason of their positive being, but by reason of their *lawlessness,* God also does not provide a special influx for their positive being (for He *neither* wills *nor* decrees that they should be; does *not* determine the sinner's will to sinful acts, *but* the particular agents themselves, by their own will, determine themselves to that species of action), it is manifest that God can in no way be called the cause of sins.

c) That God *does not prevent* sins which He could, but ought not to have prevented, and that He sometimes *withdraws from* sinners *the grace* necessary for avoiding sins (by which they themselves have rendered themselves unworthy)—yet for that reason*, sin* itself does *not* become *an effect,* or *an object*, of God and His actions.

> FORMULA OF CONCORD: "It must be carefully considered, when the Lord *punishes sins with sins,* i.e., when He punishes those who had at one time been converted, on account of their subsequent carnal security, impenitence,

contumacy in sins and for willful crimes *punishes with blindness and hardening*, this is not to be understood as if God had never seriously willed that such should come to the knowledge of the truth and attain salvation." (*Declar*. art. 11. p. 722.)

GERHARD: "How God punishes sins with sins, and yet is not the cause of sin, you will easily understand if you observe that in five ways a sin can be the cause of another sin: 1. when, after one sin is committed, the grace of the Holy Spirit is lost, and with it lost, man can do nothing but slide into crimes; 2. when God delivers the sinner into the hands of Satan, who drives him to various sins; 3. insofar as one sin makes a person prone to similar ones, for acts cause dispositions and habits that incline toward similar actions; 4. insofar as one sin cannot be committed without others; thus, avarice is called the root of all evil by the apostle; 5. insofar as another sin is often committed because of one sin; thus Judas betrayed Christ out of avarice. According to the first and second modes, God punishes sins with sins, and yet is not the cause or author of sin." (*L. de prov*. § 140.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of *Simon Magus*, who blasphemously taught that God was the creator and author of all evils. . . 2. Of the *Valentinians*, who assert that wickedness inheres in men from the very origin of things. . . 4. the *Libertines*, who by a distinct affirmation establish God as the author of sin; for they assert that God wrought the sin of Cain, of Saul, of Judas. . . 5. *Calvinists,* who . . . make God the direct and immediate cause and author of sin. For those who assert that God is the cause of all crimes and sins: a. first, b. supreme, c. principal, d. willing, e. decreeing, f. instigating, g. creating, h. presenting occasions, i. compelling, k. impelling, 1. not only permitting, but also effecting, m. that men and Satan are indeed only instruments of evil actions, n. and that these are often unwitting and unwilling: they nevertheless hold that God is altogether the author and efficient cause of sins. .. With what face, then, did the Reformed, by public decree in the Synod of Dort, Article 15 on Predestination, enact: 'that to constitute God the author of sin is a blasphemous thought'?" . . . 6. Certain *Roman Catholics*, who likewise assert in explicit terms that God is the cause of sin, such as Gabriel Biel, Ockham, Major, and Costerus in their Enchiridion. Chiefly the Dominicans and Thomists (who also hold predetermination)... 7. The *Calvinists and Papists,* who make God the cause of sin through their hypotheses, stating: a. that God influences by his efficacious predetermination not only natural, but also moral actions, good and bad, and is therefore the cause of everything material that is in an evil act, even if the malice is inseparable from it, both as a moving principle and by way of concurrence . . . b. contending that contrary inclinations and the rebellion of the flesh flowed from the very condition of nature, created by God. . . 8. Of the *Socinians,* who likewise make God the cause of sin." (L. c. P. II. c. 2. s. 2. q. 5. f. 973. sqq.) FECHT: "Improper and never to be imitated, indeed unjust toward God, is the expression of certain ones: that God punishes sins with sins." (*Syllog. controv*. p. 109.)

## § 11.

The *Devil* [(a)] and other *rational creatures*, not determined to good,[(b)] can and do become the efficient cause of sin.

a) See *John 8:44,* where the devil is called *a murderer, that he does not stand in the truth, that he speaks a lie from his own, a liar and the father of it* (of the lie), to each of which, as if he were a failing agent, sins such as murder and lying are attributed as to an acting cause.

b) For those who are determined to good, e.g., by the light of glory, cannot fail in acting, but are impeccable, as we said in the chapter on angels and eternal blessedness.

## § 12.

However, the universal truth is not that a sin is not a sin unless it is *voluntary* on the part of the one who is thereby considered a sinner.

For *the philosophers*, the term "sin" applies only to that in which some element of volition appears; thus, things done against the law are called sins only insofar as they involve volition. In the *Scriptures*, however, sin is taken in a much *broader sense*, as *1 John 3:4* is content to define sin by *ἀνομία (*lawlessness), without expressly mentioning the *voluntary element.* Cf. what we shall teach in chapter II on original sin.

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of *certain Scholastics,* such as Pierre d'Ailly, who in his 1. *sentent. lit. E*, says: 'Nothing is a sin in itself, but because it is forbidden by the law. Transgression is a violation of the law. For according to the apostle in Romans 4:15, 'where there is no law, there is no transgression.' 2. *Durand* and others, who contend: 'Even those acts which are condemned by natural right and law are not in themselves evil, but because they are forbidden by divine law, and therefore if God were to remove the law, they would not be sins.' 3. Of *those Scholastics* who assert that all actions are by their nature indifferent, even to love God and to hate God, to honor parents or not. And Pierre d'Ailly, the Cardinal of Cambrai, cited above, notes that many scholastic doctors hold, 'that God could command the hatred of Himself.'" (L. c. q. 2. f. 965.)

THE SAME: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of *certain Papists,* like Andradius in his book 3, *Defense of the Council of Trent*, who denies that *ανομία* [lawlessness] is a sin... 2. Of the *Pelagians, ...* who contend that original sin is not a sin, because in infants it is involuntary. 3. Of the *Papists,* who decree *that* the voluntary element is of the very essence of sin, so that it is not a sin which is in no way voluntary. So Bellarmine. . . 4. Of the *Socinians,* such as Socinus, Osiander, and Smalz, who for the same reason (i.e., because it is not voluntary) flatly deny original sin. . . 5. Of the *Arminians,* in the synodal acts, defense of art. 4 and in the apology of the confession, ch. 7, requiring the voluntary for the nature of sin... 6. Of *Zwingli and Calvin,* in chap. 3 of Genesis, who deny original sin for the same reason, that it is involuntary." (L. c. q. 3, f. 967.)

## § 13.

The subject *Which* (*Quod*) of sin is a rational nature,[(a)] not determined to good,[(b)] that is, a man as a wayfarer,[(c)] who is called a sinner.[(d)] [(e)]

a) For *brute beasts* and *inanimate* agents are not said to sin, nor are they considered the moral cause of sin. See § 9, note c.

b) For thus God, the good angels, and blessed men are excluded; although the first men, though fallible, were not the subject of sin until they freely determined themselves to sin.

c) For this is what we are considering here, when we treat of the subject of theological operation. And so we likewise leave the *evil angels and the damned* to their proper place.

d) *Either* with respect to the act of sin, *or* with respect to the evil habit, or the absence of the act and habit of the precept which ought to have been present.

e) However, we understand the term 'subject,' in the sense of a suppositum, which others call the *ultimate*, and therefore call the *total subject* here.

> J. SCHARF: "*A subject* is that which, besides its own essence, receives something into itself. For example: a substance is the subject of accidents, because these are received in it and are subject to it. Thus a wall is the subject of color, whiteness, and blackness. — A subject is, however, either of inhesion, of consideration, or of predication. A *subject of inhesion* is, in general, whatever is said to have something in it in any way. — A subject of inhesion is either total, primary, or of denomination; or partial, secondary, and of information. A *subject of denomination* is that which is denominated by its adjunct. For example: a man is the subject of learning, and a body of quantity; for a man is called learned by virtue of learning, and a body is called a quantity by virtue of quantity. Hence there is that which is called the *subject as that which is subject.* And this primarily and properly sustains accidents, and is always a substance. The *subject of information* is that to which an adjunct inheres directly by itself. For example: the soul is the subject of learning and teaching; for learning is directly in it and informs it. Likewise, matter is the subject of quantity, because quantity accidentally informs matter. This pertains to what is called the *subject as by which*, because it is the medium by which the accident is in the whole composite. For example, a wall is the *subject as that* of whiteness, but a surface is the *subject as by which,* because it is through the surface that whiteness is in the wall. Furthermore, the *subject as that* is either universal or particular. That (*the universal subject)* is called *πρῶτον δεκτικόν* [the primary recipient], in which the adjunct is present first, adequately and reciprocally, so that it extends as far as its adjunct. Thus man is the first subject of discipline, of the faculty of laughter, of docility; thus a body is the universal subject of quantity; thus being is the first subject of unity, truth, and transcendental goodness. A *particular subject* is secondary, which is narrower than its adjunct and inadequate. Thus man is the subject of quantity; thus a wall is called white." (*Metaphys*. p. 229—232.)

## § 14.

The subject *Quo* [that by which][(a)] of sin *is the soul* [(b)] and its faculties [(c)] although *the body* and its [(d)] *members* sometimes, and indeed *secondarily*, pertain to it.

a) Others call it *partial* and distinguish *a primary,* or *πρῶτον δεκτικὸν,* and *a secondary*. They acknowledge the former as properly so called and will not deny that the latter is *less properly* so called.

b) From which, as from a principle, sinful acts arise and in which, as in immanent acts, they persist; similarly,

omissions of prescribed acts are referred to the same. In it are the habits of vice and the privation of virtues. Thus, through the soul, sins affect man.

c) The intellect, the will, and the sensitive appetite, which will be shown more fully below from the special doctrine of original and actual sins. In the meantime, it should be noted that these faculties are, without a doubt, capable of reason, and thus of morality and sin.

d) Namely, through the soul, which is in the body and whose organs are the body's members; which itself will also be taught more distinctly below.

## § 15.

*The consequence* of every sin [(a)] is *guilt* [(b)] *and punishment* [(c)] properly [(d)] so called, both *temporal* [(e)] and *eternal.*[(f)]

a) Others, some with the added *term 'formal,'* call it the *consequence* of sin. And they, indeed, consider sin not *absolutely and in itself* (for it must be admitted that the formal sin is *ανομία* [lawlessness]*),* but *relatively* and in relation to the subject which it affects and to which it gives its designation. And so indeed, *guilt* can be called the *formal aspect of sin;* for through it a man is constituted before God as unjust, a son of wrath, and guilty of eternal damnation. See *Musaeus*, *De Peccato*, Thesis XIV. The *latter* view, however, by which guilt is called the formal consequent of sin, agrees more openly with us.

b) For insofar as sin *is inconsistent with the rational nature* and makes it *culpable*, that is, *guilty.* For although the term *'guilt'* has a *broader* meaning and is sometimes used with the addition *'guilt of punishment*,' which is certainly rightly distinguished from guilt or the guilt of blame, as is also distinguished here in the thesis; nevertheless, *fault* and *guilt simply* so called, or the *guilt of fault,* do not differ. For *guilt,* formally speaking*,* is *a certain relation resulting from sin considered in relation to the rule of moral rectitude, or the law;* and *guilt* (distinct from guilt of punishment, which is otherwise called guilt simply, or guilt of fault) formally implies *an obligation by which one, under sin and through that very sin, is bound, so that he is truly and properly called a sinner.* However, this obligation itself is also a relation to the law or rule, resulting from sin, by which a man is constituted guilty of sin. Nor is there any apparent difference between the guilt of sin and the culpable or guilty of fault. Therefore, we have here briefly called the guilt of guilt, as it were, by a single name. Cf. *Musaeus, Tract. de Convers*. Disp. III. chap. II. § 47. 48. p. 124. 125.

c) Insofar as sin, in its very violation of the law, also involves an *offense* against God, the lawgiver and supreme Lord, and thus makes the offending person *worthy of punishment*, or incurs *an obligation to undergo* punishment.

d) That is, a loss or evil, which is contrary to the inclination of the subject, incurred on account of fault, and to be endured in order to vindicate the guilt and make amends for the injury inflicted on another (and here indeed on God). Hence the *paternal chastisements* of the pious must be carefully distinguished from what are properly called *punishments*.

For *these* are inflicted on the faithful *either* to crucify the lusts of the flesh, *or* to test their faith, love, patience, and constancy, *or* to bear witness to religion and the true doctrine, and thus to celebrate the glory of God and Christ, and *not* to vindicate guilt and compensate for the injury done to God. But this last is proper to *them*, and indeed absolutely necessary. Hence, in the doctrine concerning *the cross and afflictions,* authors rightly distinguish *χόλασιν* or *παιδείαν* (i.e., chastisement inflicted for the sake of amendment or correction), *δοκιμασίαν* (i.e., the testing of , or probation), and *μαρτύριον* (i.e., a testimony of his own evil given to another) from *τιμωρία* (i.e., proper punishment, by which satisfaction is made to the offended honor of a superior).

> LUTHER: "The thief turns around and accuses himself and confesses his sins, but hopes that he will enjoy the Lord Christ, so that his sins will not harm him in eternal life. Thus, a completely different person is made of him, and *his shameful death, which he well deserved, now becomes a service to God,* so that from then on he suffers not as a murderer, but as a true saint; for he dies in true confession and heartfelt trust in the grace of God through Christ, and he lets his sin be deeply regretted by his heart." (*Hauspostille*. Tom. Hal. XIII, 741. sq.)

e) Certain things concerning the *soul,* e.g., the *withdrawal of* God's *favor*, as *sins* are said to *separate between God and the* sinning *man*, or *to cause him to hide his face from them, Isa. 59:2,* from which on the contrary arises the *wrath* of God *from heaven against all impiety and injustice of men, Rom. 1:18,* by whose force men *are* even *given over to a reprobate mind,* so that they fall into various vices, *ibid. verse. 28.,* or they certainly *shudder and flee from* God as from *a consuming fire, with which they cannot dwell, Isaiah 33:14.* Certain things, however*, are from the body,* e.g., the hardship and heaviness of *toils*, from which come fatigue and want; and also various *diseases* and *pains*, and finally *death* itself, *Gen. 3:16-19; Rom. 6:23.*

f) Not only for some, but *for every* sin, as is fitting for an offense against the eternal law and the divine majesty. See *Matt. 12:36,* where it is said that *men at the day of judgment* (when their final *justification,* or salvation, and *condemnation* to eternal punishment will be decided) *will have to give an account for every idle word* (*ἀέργον*), that is, for every *word that lacks either a justifiable necessity or a pious purpose,* as *Gregory* the Great explains in his *Morals*. See *Jerome,* and from both *Gerhard* on this passage, p. 648.

## § 16.

Sins, by which the human race is stained, are usually distinguished I. into *actual* and (a) *habitual.* II. Actual sins again into those which involve *a real act*, and those which involve *an omission of an act.*(b) III. Habitual sins into those that are *innate* (c) or (d) original, and those that are *acquired*.(e) IV. Both kinds of habitual sins are distinguished into vicious *habits properly* so called, and *a lack* of the habit that ought to be present.(f) For since in man, whom revealed theology

finds as its subject in the posterity of the first parents, before he actually sins, an innate sin [g] is discovered, therefore the more specific doctrine of sin is commonly presented in this way: first, concerning *original sin*, or that which has its origin from the carnal [h] origin or birth of a certain man; then, concerning *actual sins*, which arise in a man already existing through subsequent proper acts.[i]

a) For although some distinguish the terms *"sin"* and *"vice"* so that the *former* denotes acts and the *latter* denotes dispositions or moral faults, nevertheless *usage* has long since made it so that the name "sin" is taken not only for the *act* but also for the *habit* of sinning, and *vices* themselves are called *sins.* Hence some speak of *sins in the act* and *sins in the habit. 'Ανομία* [lawlessness] certainly occurs in both, and thus the formal character of *ἁμαρτία* or sin. Cf. *Musaeus, Tract. de Conv. Disp*. IV. cap. I. § 2. p. 243.

b) We will see this division below in chapter III.

c) Or a propensity to evil acts, which has the force of a habit; which we will show is born with us, chap. sq. II.

d) *Not* on account of the origin of the first men (for theirs was holy and very good, according to what we have said about the divine image), *but* of the others, who descend from the first through carnal generation.

e) Or the inclinations contracted by repeated acts of sinning toward similar evil acts, and these fixed and difficult to change.

f) We rightly refer the lack of habitual righteousness, whether innate or acquired, to habitual sin, in the same way that omissions of prescribed acts are referred to actual sins. Cf. *Musaeus*, *De Convers.* Disp. III. cap. I. § 7. 8. p. 100. 101.

g) Which is now supposed: to be proven in chap. sq. II.

h) For this is the way the term "*original* sin*"* is commonly understood. However, the fact that the fall of the first parents itself is sometimes called the *originating* sin of origin and is distinguished from *that which is originated* does not pertain to the present discussion, because it cannot itself be considered a habitual sin, but holds its place among actual sins in its own way, although it was the original cause of sin; as will be said shortly.

i) Others distinguish between the *first* sin and the *sin derived from the first.* They subdivide each; the *former,* indeed, into the *first* sin *absolutely,* which is the apostasy of the angels, and the *first in the human race,* which is the fall of the first parents; they distinguish the sin derived from the first into *original* and *actual.* However, I do not think they will deny that the first sin, both because it is absolutely so and because it is the first in the human genus, is, by the force of the word and its meaning, actual.

## § 17.

It can be described [a] as sin, taken *abstractly*, which is the absence of [b] conformity with the law, of an action [c] of a rational

creature [(d)] that fails in its acting, or even the omission of an act, adhering to a habit or its absence, and therefore [(e)] culpable and deserving of punishment, both temporal and eternal.

a) A little more fully than if you were to call it merely *ανομία*, so that you embrace at once all the other points that have been handed down thus far.

b) For this, in the proper case, implies.

c) As its *material*; to which also refer what is said about the habit and its absence; see § 2.

d) To which, as to the efficient cause and subject, it must be ascribed, according to § 8.

e) Which are the consequences of sin when viewed abstractly.

## § 18.

Sin, when viewed *concretely,*[(a)] can be described as the action or omission of action,[(b)] a habit or lack thereof, of a rational creature,[(c)] which conflicts with the law [(d)] of God and renders the rational creature culpable and deserving of punishment.[(e)]

a) In that latitude in which it extends to various species, to be indicated shortly. Although it is thus necessary, in the very description, which they require to be general, to state *disjunctively* those things which pertain to the species of sin themselves, since no single common name is available that would encompass both entities and non-entities.

b) To which it must be ascribed partly as a cause, partly as a subject; see § 8, 9.

c) Which constitute the material of sin; see § 2.

d) In which consists the formal element of sin, 1. c.

e) These are the consequences of sin; see § 13 for more on this.

# Chapter II. ^

ON ORIGINAL SIN.

## § 1.

That original sin exists, although reason from its own principles cannot know it with certainty and distinctness,[(a)] is nevertheless indicated most clearly in Scripture.[(b)]

a) For it will *either* suspend its judgment, *or* if it dares to define anything, it will deny it and will suppose that *men are born* by nature *indifferent*, although

it has perceived in the sensitive appetite a certain inclination alien to the judgment of reason; see *Mus.* Dissertation on the Insufficiency of Natural Light, contra Ed. Herb. § 27. p. 22. 23. and *Henr. a Lith.* Disp. Inaug. held under our supervision, in which he presented a comparison of the Synopsis of Natural Theology with the revealed, Sec. V. § 33. sqq.

SMALCALD ARTICLES: "This hereditary sin is such a deep and dark corruption of nature that it cannot be understood by any human reason, but must be acknowledged and believed from the revelation of Scripture." (p. 310.)

ROLLIUS: "The *material* of original sin is not unknown to reason, since by experience itself it is established that men are carried by a certain natural impulse toward what is evil and are accustomed to the study of virtue with great difficulty. Hence that of the poet: 'I see and approve the better; I follow the worse.' Its *formal* reason, however, entirely escapes him, since it can be known by no one without divine revelation that the inclination to evil is derived from the fall of the first parents, has the nature of true sin, and therefore makes man liable to eternal damnation." (See Fecht, *Syllog. controvers*. p. 112.)

b) See first of all *Romans 5:12*, where it is said that *death came upon all men because in one man*, Adam*, all have sinned* or have been *constituted sinners*. For although the word *αμαρτάνειν* elsewhere denotes the act of sinning, it must nevertheless be admitted that it is also taken here of those who, by reason of age and the lack of the use of reason, do not sin in that way, indeed, who, the first man having fallen, did not even exist. Therefore, to say that all sinned in Adam is not the same as to say that all imitated Adam's sin by similar acts, since rather it is expressly stated in verse 14 that death (which entered the world through sin) *also passed to those who did not sin according to the likeness of Adam's transgression.* Therefore, it must be said that all sinned in one, insofar as, by his sinning, it came about that all who were to naturally descend from him would contract the necessity of being born with sin and thus, on account of their own sin, would be subject to death at birth. Conf. ad *Ephes. 2:3,* where, when it is said that *all* men *by nature are children of wrath*, the cause of this guilt is presupposed, namely, that all by nature (not only *truly,* but *by nature,* which is certainly more, or by the condition of their corrupt nature) are sinners. For to be *a son of wrath* is the same as being subject to divine wrath and worthy of punishment, to be inflicted by God, the avenger of the law, on account of the violation of the law. Therefore, a man cannot be a child of wrath by nature unless he is by nature, or through the corruption of his nature, defiled by sin. But it is also said in *Genesis 6:5 and 8:21*, "*Every imagination of the thoughts of the human heart is only evil continually*." which, although it may seem to formally denote secondary acts or actual sins, nevertheless indicates by the *universality* of the *subject* and the *time* that *the* very *faculty* of thinking, which is in humans, is so *depraved* by the corruption of its nature that *it cannot* even exercise an act of good or holy thought, but is *most inclined* to evil acts of thought.

SCHERZERUS: "Although *ἐφ' ᾧ* is sometimes *causal* and may denote 'on account of which,' here*,* however*,* it must be rendered 'in,' according to the *context,* the *antithesis*, and the distinction of the sinners (for some 'did not sin in the likeness of Adam's transgression'

v. 14., i.e., as Smalcius explains, in their own person or immediately, whom nevertheless the apostle teaches have sinned. Therefore they sinned in the person of another, i.e., Adam) the anti-Socinian collegium p. 264 proves." (*System, th. L. de peccato* § 7. p. 147.)

GERHARD: "The other objection of the Pelagians was this: The phrase *ἐφ' ᾧ*, in whom, all have sinned Rom. 5:12, is to be explained thus: because of which all have sinned, i.e., death passed upon all because they imitate Adam by sinning. We answer: Augustine, in Book 6 against Julian, chapter 12, disapproves of this version and takes the word ὡ as a relative; but the matter comes to the same thing. For whether you take *ἐφ' ᾧ* as a causative or as a relative expression, nothing is taken away from the truth. Varinus, Budaeus, and Suidas prove by examples that the particles *ἐφ' ᾧ* are sometimes used to signify the reason. Hence Dr. Luther also rendered it causatively in his German translation. The sense will therefore be: Death has passed upon all men, because all have sinned, i.e., because Adam, the parent of the human race, representing the person of all posterity who descend from him by carnal generation, sinned, he who, having been created in the divine image, had received those gifts not only for himself, but also for the entire posterity. Nor does Augustine reject this version, but rather that new and distorted sense which Pelagius sought to carve out of it. But if you interpret the particles *ἐφ' ᾧ* in a relative sense, it will follow likewise that in Adam, the first parent of men, as in a mass, all have originally sinned, just as the apostle declares (1 Cor. 15:22): "In Adam all die." (*L. de pecc. orig*. § 63.)

ANTITHESES.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of the *philosophers,* outside the Church. Hence Seneca ep. 69.: 'You are mistaken if you think that vices are born with us; they came upon us, they were instilled.' 2. Of the *Pelagians,* who hold: a. that no sin is transmitted to men from Adam through generation; b. that no one is condemned for Adam's sin; c. that no sin is remitted to infants in baptism, since they have none; d. that Adam's sin is transmitted to men not by any other means than by example. . . 4. Of *certain Scholastics,* who teach that original sin is guilt in us, not a stain or blemish, and who likewise define original sin by the imputation of Adam's sin alone. . . 6. Of the *Calvinists,* some of whom directly deny original sin, such as Zwingli, in his book on baptism, Opp. I, p. 89. 90. and in the confession presented to Charles V and published in the year 30 of the last century [1530], article 4, and in the commentary on Romans 5, and those who excuse him, teaching: 'Original sin is not properly a sin, but only a disease and an effect of sin.' Others indirectly, and indeed by hypothesis, saying that the children of the faithful are born holy, and that they are in the covenant of grace and sons of God, even before they are baptized, which hypothesis being posited, original sin itself is removed. . . 7. The *Socinians,* who hold original sin to be a mere fable. . . 8. *Arminians* in apol. c. 7. and in specimen 7. against the men of Leiden, as well as Adolphus Venatoris, asserting: 'That sin is and is original, involves a contradiction in the adjective.' Also: 'That infants are simple and stand in the same state in which Adam was before the fall.' . . 9. Of the *Anabaptists,* who contend that original sin was completely removed from human nature by the death of Christ, so that infants under the New Testament are not born in sins, but are entirely innocent and immune from vices, and do not need the baptismal wash in infancy." (L. c. q. 8. f. 999.)

HOFMANN: "Nor does Scripture teach that there is sin and death, or what the concept of sin and death is, nor that sin and death are hereditary, but rather traces both back to the first moral self-determination of man. . . We need no more a specific statement that all men are sinful by birth than that all are mortal by birth. But the Scripture also

> teaches neither one nor the other, neither that all men are sinful and mortal—for it would have to teach the latter just as well as the former—nor that sinfulness and mortality are inherited with human nature. Everything that can be brought forward to prove such a doctrine of Scripture is merely a reminder of *a self-evident fact."* (*Schriftbeweis*. I, 425. 441.)

## § 2.

Moreover, original sin imports [(a)] *partly* a privation [(b)] of original righteousness, *partly* an inclination [(c)] of the whole nature to evil.[(d)]

a) As the opposite of original righteousness or the divine image. For the nature of this sin cannot be more rightly known than by making a comparison with the opposite, in whose place it succeeded.

b) This pertains to that *death*, or the lack of spiritual life and of all active powers required for the exercise of the vital acts in conformity with the divine law. And this death is attributed to men, insofar as *by nature they are children of wrath*, *Eph. 2:1 and 5; Col. 2:13.* For just as original righteousness, since it was present in the faculties of the first man's soul, animated and instructed them to live the life that is according to God, and to elicit and exercise within himself spiritually good acts and motions, so, deprived of that original righteousness, man is like a dead man, a being destitute of all the powers necessary to elicit and exercise vital acts and motions within himself, being destitute of the powers for spiritual acts and motions. Compare, *Musaeus*, *De Conv*. Disp. IV. chap. I. § 10. p. 427. It also pertains to original sin, taken for the lack of original righteousness, that it is said in *Romans 8:10 ff. that all Jews and Greeks are subject to sin; just as it is written in Psalm 14:3 ff.: There is none righteous, not even one* (and so they all lack the righteousness they ought to have had). *There is none who understands, there is none who seeks God*. (Thus, a right understanding of God and divine things, and their investigation, are denied to all.) *There is none who does good, not even one.* (Therefore, all lack moral goodness and the practice and strength to perform morally good acts.)

c) For the same carnal man, who, because of the deprivation of spiritual life, is like *one dead,* is in another sense called *living* and very *active*, but to a life *alienated from the life of God (Eph. 4:18),* to the *life of this world and to the gratification of the desires of the flesh (ch. 2:3).* For the faculties of the soul are by their essence vital faculties, and when they are deprived of original righteousness, although they lack the powers necessary to establish a life according to God, they are not themselves, with respect to their vital being and their power to elicit vital acts and motions, lost or abolished; they therefore pursue another course of life, entirely different from the first; see *Mus.,* 1. c. § 11. p. 247. 248. With respect to this evil inclination, Paul writes in *Romans 8:7*: *Τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός,* i.e., *that which the flesh,* or the carnal man, as he is born, *thinks,* wills, and desires, is *enmity against God.* Which certainly declare a habitual propensity

toward evil things adhering to us from our very origin in every man. And in *Romans 7:17 and 20, sin dwelling* in us is mentioned, in v. 21 *an evil thing lying beside (κακόν παρακείμενον),* verse 23 *the law* that is *in the members, waging war against the law of the mind*, etc., which in verses 7 and 8 was called *ἐπιθυμία, concupiscence.* It is understood, however, *not only the inferior power of appetite, which is from the sensitive appetite, but also the inclination of the will to evil, and even the rash proneness of the intellect itself to judge perversely of spiritual things, and it embraces the evil thoughts that suddenly arise. Hence and the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, art. II. p. 55. among other things understands concupiscence to be that which seeks not only the pleasures of the body, but also carnal wisdom and righteousness, and trusts in these goods, despising God, etc.,* see *Mus.,* l. c. *de Pecc*. th. XLIV. That the men of Jena *do not* teach that *original sin is, strictly speaking, a mere privation, nor do they exclude corrupt concupiscence from original sin,* he shows in the same place in the *Ausführliche Erklärung* Q. XXXI, pp. 229–230.

d) *Both* are, however, *a reason for sin: first*, that man is deprived of the powers he ought to have had to perform acts suitable to himself, and thus is unfit to do what the law commands; *second*, that his faculties are inclined toward what the law forbids, or what is contrary to the law.

## § 3.

Specifically, on the part *of the intellect* it imports *the* total *privation of* the original spiritual light, so that it can *neither* rightly [(b)] know God, *nor* perfectly [(c)] prescribe the manner in which God is to be worshipped, *nor* embrace with firm assent those things which have been divinely revealed;[(d)] it also brings *a proneness* of the intellect to *rash and false judgments* about spiritual matters,[(e)] indeed even in those things subject to the light of nature, a certain impotence [(f)] in the knowledge of God and in the ordering of life.

a) See *Eph. 5:8,* where men, such as they are by nature before regeneration or are born, are called *σκότος* or *darkness*. And the abstract is used for the concrete to intensify the meaning, so that they are called darkness, that is, very, or fully darkened, lacking all spiritual light. Compare *chapter 4, verse 18,* where they are said to be *ἐσκοτισμένοι τῇ διανοίᾳ, darkened* in *mind,* namely *because of the ignorance that is in them,* as is immediately explained.

b) Such as He is, and as He ought to be known by us in this life, not only according to His essence and attributes, but also according to His persons.

c) For God must be worshipped as He is; and in the state after the first fall, divine worship consists in pleasing God. But the intellect, corrupted by the fall, fails in both of these.

d) See *1 Cor. 2:14,* where the *animal man* is spoken of, that is, such as he is according to the condition of the soul left to itself (for he is opposed to the *spiritual,* that is, one who has the Spirit of God, which is conferred only by a special operation of God,

according to verse 7 and 10 and 12.), it is said: *He does not perceive, he cannot understand, the things of the Spirit of God,* or *the mysteries* which *God has revealed through His Spirit,* according to verses 7 and 10. Cf. *Mus.,* Disp. IV. cap. I. § 30. sqq. p. 260. sqq.

e) Thus it is said in the same place, that *spiritual things are foolishness to a man*, or are judged by him to be foolish, absurd, etc.

> FORMULA OF CONCORD: "Although human reason, or the natural understanding of man, has a certain obscure spark of knowledge of Him remaining, that there is a God, and holds a certain particle of the law (Rom. 1:19): nevertheless, that reason is so ignorant, blind, and perverse, that even if the most brilliant and learned people in this world read or hear the gospel about the Son of God and the divine promises of eternal salvation, they are nevertheless unable by their own powers to perceive, understand, believe, and judge them to be true. Rather, the more diligently they labor in this matter to investigate and comprehend these spiritual things with the keenness of their own reason, the less they understand and believe, and they consider all of it to be foolishness and mere nonsense and fables, until they are enlightened and taught by the Holy Spirit." (p. 689. Sq. [*Trigl.* p. 883])

f) Such, I say, is the result, that the intellect, in its reasoning and investigation of the natures, causes, and properties of things—and even concerning God Himself and divine matters—errs no less in directing its actions and governing its life, and misapplies the principles of natural light to draw false, indeed impious, conclusions. Compare, *Mus.,* Disp. IV. *de Convers*. cap. I. § 25. p. 257.

## § 4.

On the part of the *will*, original sin consists in the *lack* (a) of original *holiness, or* of the powers to love God above all things and to carry out what the intellect has rightly dictated, (b) *and also* in the right restraint of the appetite, since the will on the contrary (c) *is inclined* toward sinful acts.

a) Or the inability *to will and to accomplish* spiritual things, as in *Phil. 2:13.* For when both of these are attributed to *God* entirely, and we are therefore commanded to *work out* our *salvation with fear and trembling*, it is certain that this is denied to our natural powers, and we are warned not to render ourselves unworthy of, and be deprived of, the grace with which we have been endowed. *Death through transgressions,* the opposite of spiritual life, indicates *the* same *weakness* of the will. *Eph. 2:5*; cf. § 2, note *b.*

b) For the will does not fail or go astray only when the intellect has erred in its knowledge, but also when its knowledge is right. Of course, good is not only spiritual but also naturally such, that is, honorable, and is usually joined with various troubles and difficulties; therefore, the will is all the more alienated from it and is almost torpid or languishes in pursuing it, even if human teaching and practice have brought some improvement or perfection. *Musaeus,* 1. c. § 26. p. 258.

c) For it is by its nature a desiring faculty, and when it abhors the true good, it is carried all the more vehemently toward the apparent, especially when stimulated by the movements of the sensitive appetite; cf. *Mus.,* 1. c. § 26. 27. p. 258. 259. Because of this inclination toward wrongdoing, man, as he is by nature, is called *a slave of sin* (*Rom. 6*:13), *and sin is said to reign in his mortal body to obey it through his desires (v. 12). 14.,* which, since it cannot of itself act in holy things, is on the contrary carried away into what is evil, as if it ought to act thus or its will were being bent by a higher command. This is also that *πώρωσις,* or *a certain calloused hardness of heart, Eph. 4:18,* by which men *are inclined to carnal security, to contempt and hatred of God, to distrust in God and confidence in temporal things,* according to the interpretation of *Gerhard*, Isag. LL. Disp. XXIV. c. III. *de Pecc*. Orig. § 7. p. m. 879.

## § 5.

On the part of the *sensitive appetite*, there is *a privation of the obedience* due to the higher faculties,[(a)]and it rushes headlong against what is pleasing to the senses, even though it is forbidden by divine law, by a kind of impulse, *whether* not awaited *or* rejected by the judgment of reason.[(b)]

a) For the *inferior* faculty ought certainly to conform *to the superior ones,* not these to it. See what we have said above on the image of God, P. I. chap. IV. § 11. Cf. *Rom. 7:18–19,* where *Paul* says *that in* his *flesh there dwells no good thing;* and that he *does not do the good which he wants to do.*

b) See *Rom. 7:8.* For although *concupiscence*, in a *broader* sense of the word, diffuses itself through all the faculties of man, it is nevertheless *specifically* referred to the sensitive appetite; and for this reason, in verse 23*,* it is rightly said to wage war *in the members against the law of the mind*.

## § 6.

Therefore, although the *power of acting* of any faculty, or to tend toward objects, when considered strictly and in itself, is not *sin*,[(a)] yet because it is carried *ἀνόμως* [lawlessly] toward objects, it is *rightly* called *sin*.[(b)]

a) For thus it is something positive and only the material of sin. *That corruption of nature, which includes the proneness and impulse of all the soul's powers toward evil, we call a positive quality, not as if any power to act in itself and by itself were sin, but because that power to act in man is only prone and ready for sin; Meanwhile, we do not forbid that a subtle distinction be made between the power to act itself and the vice of that power, just as a distinction is made between the act itself and the vice of the act:* these are the words of *Gerhard,* T. II. LL. § 88. p. 402. Cf. *Disp. Isag*. XXIV. cap. III. thes. 10. p. m. 880. 881. To which plainly correspond the words which *Musaeus* wrote in Disp. IV.

*de Convers*. § 7. p. 245: *a propensity to evil* is called *sin, not insofar as it is a positive entity and a certain principle of action, but insofar as it is deprived of the due perfection and is a principle of evil action.*

b) Speaking concretively, of course. Hence, if anyone refers it to the *formal* aspect of original sin, it must be understood as the *form of the whole*, or the entire quasi-essence of original sin. Thus, *taken concretely, original sin is something positive, on account of an innate habitual proneness toward the object to which it is inordinately drawn, which it connotes in the manner of a subject; but taken abstractively and formally, it is a mere privation,* as is taught in the *Ausführliche Erklärung* Q. XXXI, pp. 231 ff. This, however, was the ancient view of our own school. In 1619, *testimonies by Philipp Melanchthon and Martin Chemnitz,* as well as by *Aegidius Hunnius and Leonhard Hutter,* were published in two quarto volumes*, which show that every sin, even if it is not pure privation alone, but in respect of its material element is often also a corrupt habit, a positive quality, etc., as the Apology of the Augsburg Confession most rightly teaches, yet with regard to its formal element speaks not of anything positive, but of privation.* Where, among other things, it is taken from *M. Chemnitz's LL. Theol. Cap. de Causa Peccati, Resp. ad arg. Manichaei*, after inculcating the distinction between *the material and the formal,* and applying it to the present matter, *appear* to say, he says, *that these things are thorny and more suited to the subtleties of dialecticians than to theological simplicity; but because created things must necessarily be distinguished from sin, which is a disturbance of the divine order, such things are rightly and usefully taught.* From *Hutter's Lectures*, however, it is noteworthy that, in defending the Philippian definition, by which *sin* is defined through *privation*, he brings forward this argument of the adversaries in third place: *Whatever lessens the atrocity of sin should not be taught. Privation lessens the atrocity of sin. Therefore it should not be taught.* He replies, however, that *in the minor proposition a false hypothesis is taken for certain and indubitable, from which a begging of the principle emerges. For,* he says, *the voice of privation does not lessen, but rather exaggerates the atrocity of sin, and shows what a calamity and what an immense damage the human race has received from this privation. However, there are serious reasons why the term 'privation' must be retained in the definition of sin, namely, to discern the difference between created things and the privation of things, which is not created but originates from the devil.* These and more can be seen in the *Loci Theologici of Hutter*, published the same year with a preface by the Faculty. Theol. Witteberg, ed. p. m. 308, 309. And if further conforming testimonies are desired, those which *Grauer, Gerhard, Himmel, Hoepfner, and Kromayer* have adduced may be seen in *Musaeus's der Ausführlichen Erklärung*, p. 234 ff. However, those 11 proposed chapters were also repeated by *Grauer* and *Kromayer* elsewhere. *The latter,* indeed, in his *Cent. QQ. Illustr. Coroll. 1. Disp. ult*., has these words: "*Sin of origin, formally, is not something positive, but materially, when these terms are used correctly and not vulgarly." Here,* however, in *Theol. Aphorist*. L. VIII. Aphor. X, he writes: *The Apology of the Augsburg Confession indeed retains Anselm's definition that sin is the lack of original righteousness, but it adds concupiscence. Yet concupiscence itself is also considered, either as an inclination to its object, or as a deviation from the norm. For if by the deprivation of the connatural good to the original righteousness of those who lack it—that is, the absence of what is due (the Papists, however, hold that original righteousness was some kind of supernatural good, by which reason*

*the pious confessors understood the sin of origin to be mitigated*)*—a great corruption is understood to be implied, then we could be content with Anselm's definition. Whatever the case may be, in the distinctions posited from the beginning of the discussion, we agree that if sin is considered metaphysically and in the abstract, it is a privation; but if ethically and in the concrete, it can be called a positive something.* In the preceding, he had said that those who hold original sin *to be a positive something* use *concrete expressions, by which a stony heart is meant (Ezek. 36:26, and that which is born of flesh is flesh in John 3:6, is said to be urged;* but *this opinion of the positive properly so called is called by some a twig or of the splinters of Flacianism, because it is defended with the same arguments, which suffer from a confusion of the concrete and the abstract.* This *Kromayer,* from whom and from the preceding *Gerhard* and *Hoepfner,* whom he quotes, and we note this finally, that the consideration *of the positive*, taken with strict exactness, belongs to *metaphysics*, which rightly arrogates to itself the duty of distinguishing between being and non-being, positive and privative, so that, if you call sin *positive* when viewed formally, Hoepfner warns that this is done *in a catachrestic sense*. Therefore, if we are here led to *entity, moral or ethical*, it must nevertheless be admitted that the metaphysics exactness ought not on that account to be despised; nor do privations, which have a relation partly to the subject they morally affect, and partly to the form they negate or exclude, cease to be privations because of this relation, nor, against the doctrine of metaphysics, and yet as it were *with strict precision,* should they be transcribed into the class of positive beings.

CARPZOV: "As *Flacius* himself later sought to defend in various writings, what had once slipped out in the heat of debate..." so his followers spared no effort, becoming far harsher, more shameless, and more absurd than the master himself, nor did they fully understand the mind of their teacher, who, if he had wanted to correct his language from the start, . . . would never have caused such a stir and the orthodox could have easily agreed with him. For he did not consider man *absolutely* or in his absolute substance, but *concretely* and with his state, and by essence and essential form he did not understand the substance itself, as it signifies a thing subsisting by itself and is opposed to accidental predication *), but that essence which belongs to man, not by which man is, but *by which he is such or corrupt*, namely, an accidental form, which with the absolute subject constitutes a concrete being and is essential to the corrupt man, so that, as long and as far as he is corrupt, corruption or viciousness cannot even in thought be separated from him." (*Isagog. in libb. eccles. luth. symb*. p. 1160. sq.)

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*) CRUSIUS: "That in which we think nothing further than something which, if it exists, must necessarily subsist in another, is called an ens praedicamentale." (*Entwurf der nothw. Vernunftwahrheiten.* Ontologie. C. III §20. p. 32. sq )

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Manichaeans,* who, according to Augustine, held that certain evil substances originated from God, which by their very nature are sin itself. . . 2. Of *Matthias Flacius Illyricus and his followers,* of Johann Coelestinus, professor at Jena, and of Cyracius Spangenberg, dean of Mansfeld, as well as of M. Christoph Irenaeus, court preacher at Weimar, asserting that original sin is the very human substance, the very substantial form of man, the very heart, and the very rational soul, so that after the fall there is no longer any distinction left between the substance and nature of man and between sin." (L. c. q. 10. f. 1022.)

CARPZOV: "Some theologians, when they taught that sin is not merely a privative, but also a *positive thing*, . . . wanted to indicate that there is a twofold privation in original sin. One is the absence of good, the other the presence of evil, or a moral defect or conflict with the law of God; so that human nature is not only not just, but also unjust, not only not holy, but also wicked; as this is explained in the Apology, ch. 4, p. 99 b. For in the intellect not only is there a lack of light, but also the utmost blindness and corruption, so that it even regards the mysteries of faith as foolishness; in the will not only is there a lack of rectitude, but it also cannot bring about any good action and is by its nature inclined to evil; the sensitive appetite is inordinately drawn to objects and opposes itself to the dictates of right reason, etc. Otherwise, sin *in itself* is not a positive thing." (*Isag*. p. 1173.)

APOLOGY OF THE AUGSBURG CONFESSION: "Not only the old Fathers, such as Augustine and the like, but also the most recent teachers and Scholastics who had any understanding, teach that these two things together are original sin, namely the privation and the evil lust. For thus says St. Thomas, that 'Original sin is not only a lack of the first righteousness, but also a disordered desire or lust in the soul. Therefore it is,' he says, 'not only a pure lack, but also *aliquid positivum* [something positive].'" (Art. 2. p. 82.)

## § 7.

The *remote efficient* cause of original sin:[(a)] the devil;[(b)] the *proximate* cause the first parents, Eve [(c)] and *especially* Adam.[(d)]

a) Indeed, *no physical* efficient cause of original sin, *formally* considered, is given, since in this respect it is a privation, as we have seen; rather, there is a *deficient* cause, or one which by failing or sinning caused men to be born without original righteousness and with a corrupt concupiscence. See *Ausführliche Erklärung* Q. XXXV. p. 305.

b) This is why the devil is called a *murderer* and the *father of lies (John 8:44).* For he could not have been the cause of *human slaughter* or death unless he were also the cause of the sin introduced into the human race, since men were immortal before sin, but death entered the world through sin. He is also the *father of lies*, who by lying led men astray from faith and the obedience due to God, and thus gave cause for the corruption that followed. Indeed, that insidious speech, which is attributed to the serpent in *Genesis 3:1 ff.*, must be attributed to Satan, of whom the serpent was an instrument; from which Satan himself derived the name of the serpent. See *2 Corinthians 11:3; Isaiah 27:1; Revelation 12:9.*

c) Who*, having been seduced* by the devil*, became a transgressor,* so that in memory of the first woman deceived by Satan (who, by sinning, through her persuasion induced the man to sin, from which the corruption of the entire human race arose), no woman should be permitted to preach publicly in the church. *1 Tim. 2:14.*

d) See *Rom. 5:12,* where *one man,* Adam, is declared the cause of sin as the common parent of the entire human race and its root and active principle, since *through him* sin came into the world.

## § 8.

But the first parents, and above all Adam, are the cause of original sin, by virtue of their *fall*.(a) For by this act they rendered themselves unworthy (b) of the further bestowal of the divine influx necessary to preserve original righteousness in themselves and to transmit it to posterity (c) and rather fit to have it withheld from them by just judgment, so that it could no longer be imparted by natural generation (d) to their descendants—those born of parents deprived of original righteousness—but that lack of righteousness and the proneness of all their faculties to evil would be born with them.(e)

a) What others call the *proximate and adequate* cause of original sin, others call the *causality*, or the reason, by which the first parents became the actual cause of original sin.

b) Whether *they merited it,* or *moved* and *impelled* God as judge.

c) For this was the *covenant* God entered into with the first humans, to whom, out of His undeserved goodness, He had co-created the divine image, so that they might use it, as a *natural* gift and not merely a *personal one*, and, by their constant obedience, both preserve it and, with God's cooperation, transmit it to their children and other descendants.

d) Indeed, the first parents, when they sinned, immediately lost *by act* the infused or original righteousness which they had hitherto possessed in act; but for their as yet non-existent posterity, they lost by *potential* the same righteousness, so that it would not be conferred on those born thereafter (which some have perhaps said is the loss of the *right* or *faculty* of acquiring original righteousness); However, the posterity of Adam, all and each, are deprived of original righteousness when they are born of parents destitute of original righteousness and afflicted with concupiscence. Hence, those who say that the *proximate cause* of original sin, as it is perceived to be *propagated* to individuals, is *the* very *carnal generation—which is joined with the disordered concupiscence of the parents, or which is from the lust of the flesh and the lust of the man,* according to *John. 1*, *13.,* from which it comes that *what is born of the flesh is flesh, John 3:6.,* and that men, *being formed and warmed in sin*, are born sinners, *Psalm 51:7,* so that no one *is born clean from an unclean birth*, *Job 14:4.*

e) However, to argue more subtly: *How* could God have *imputed* the fall of the first parents to their descendants, who did not yet exist, so that on that account they too would have to be born deprived of original righteousness and as sinners? It is *not necessary*, *nor* perhaps *wise.* For it is sufficient that *ὅτι* [the that] has been revealed, even if *πώς* [how] is unknown.

> QUENSTEDT: "Distinguish between the natural head and the moral head. Adam, insofar as he was the natural head of the human race, infected all the members, and thus from him by propagation the inherent evil passed into the entire posterity; in the latter capacity, insofar as he was the moral head, representing the entire posterity, only by imputation was it derived to posterity that he himself sinned." (L. c. P. II. c. 2. s. 2. q. 7. f. 998.)

THE SAME: "Question 7.: Whether the sin of Adam is truly and justly imputed to the entire human race by God? ... The controversy here is, ... whether that first act, insofar as it was a sinful and transmissible act, is so appropriated and imputed to us, as if we ourselves had stretched out our hand to the forbidden evil and sinned. . The first sin is considered 1. *on the part of Adam himself,* who by the single violation of the law involved all posterity in guilt, and then in condemnation, then involved the penalty, insofar as his will was the interpreter of the wills of all those who, as Scripture speaks, were in his loins or thigh, or who were hidden in his seminal power, whose sin had already become, by interpretation, their own, so that they are born with the absence of the due perfection inherent in them. The will of Adam, I say, was considered our own, not formally, but interpretively. For the first man had the wills of all his posterity located in his own will, as it were, from which, contrary to the given law, he declared his own mind and that of his posterity for himself and for them. 2. *With respect to God, as judge,* who by the right he possesses punishes the highest crime of lese-majesté even in posterity, as it were, in the fallen Adam, a lack of original righteousness as such, and thus most justly imputes the sin of Adam to them for damnation." (L. c. q. 7. f. 993. sq.)

HEERBRAND: "Is original sin one's own, or another's? It is both, one's own and another's. It is *another's* in the sense of its first origin, because we are not its first authors, but it came to us from elsewhere. It is *proper* and is called such, because it clings to us and is not merely imputed, nor do we learn it by imitation; but it is innate in us and implanted in our nature, to which it adheres." (Compend. th. p. 310.)

ANTITHESES.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Pelagians,* who hold that it is in no way permissible for God to impute the sins of others. . . 2. Of the *Socinians.* For thus Socinus in Book IV, *de serv. Christ*, and in the *praelect. theol*, chapter 4, where he denies that the sin of Adam is imputed to those who do not sin by that reason, as Adam did. . . 3. *Arminians,* such as John Arndt, Corvinus, who says: 'In Adam we did not fall, except by imputation.'" (L. c. q. 7. f. 995.)

HOFMANN: "We do not need an artificial assumption, such as that all who descend from Adam were in him, or that he sinned as the federal head of the human race, but we remain with the simple fact of that unity of the human race, by virtue of which each individual is not only a member of the race, but also its beginning. The individual did not commit the sin of Adam; rather, because the originator of the race committed it, it is the sin of all who descend from him. In this sense, we have called it in our doctrine of self-determination not merely that of the first created, but that of man." (*Schriftbeweis*. I. 491. sq.)

VILMAR: "One should not have identified this word *reatus* [guilt/liability] with the older and sharper Latin word *culpa* [fault/guilt], as the imprecise and, in its use of words, especially in rhetorical synonymy, often downright frivolous Latinity of the 16th and even more so of the 17th century did. century did: *culpa* denotes the authorship; and this can only belong to the first parents, not to their descendants. From this mixing of *culpa* and *reatus*, in which the Apology of the A. C., and then the Formula of Concord, participated, the concept of imputatio, imputation, also followed at the beginning of the 17th century, which strictly taken, corresponds merely to the concept of culpa... Accordingly, a distinction was made between an imputatio *mediata*—the imputation of guilt on account of transmitted sinfulness (defectus *and* concupiscentia)—and an imputatio *immediata*—the imputation of Adam's sin in and of itself. To this latter, the imputatio immediata,

the question now arises: how can a foreign guilt be imputed to me? and to this question, *so* understood, a sufficient answer cannot, of course, be given. . . The *imputatio immediata* can be justified in no other way than by the doctrine of the preexistence of souls, which were already in existence before Adam and, at his fall (or even before), were present and immediate participants, just as if they were there." (*Dogmatics*, I, 370 ff.)

# § 9.

And indeed that *fall* of the first parents was accomplished by the *external* act of eating the fruit of the forbidden tree against the express law of God,[(a)] which, however, was preceded by several *internal* sinful acts: in the *intellect,* indeed, a doubt about the truth of the divine threat, and soon after, fuller unbelief;[(b)] in the *will,* an disordered inclination toward a greater likeness with God;[(c)] in the *sensitive appetite*, a disordered movement, tending toward an object pleasing to the senses,[(d)] even though forbidden.

a) For *the Lord God had* indeed *commanded the man,* saying: "*You shall not eat from the tree of the good and evil," Gen. 2:17;* but in *chapter 3:6 and 11* it is written: "*The woman took of the fruit* of that tree *and ate, and she also gave to her husband with her, and he ate."*

b) See *Gen. 3:3 and following* up to verse 6, where we are taught that Eve, first of all, remembered the divine law and the added threat, but then, *when* that serpent *was at work,* it taught her something else, for example: "*You shall not die; your eyes will be opened*, etc.," had listened and believed; whereas the man *had obeyed his wife's voice*, v. 7., or had preferred the flattering voice of his seduced wife to the divine prohibition and had despised the authority of God.

ANTITHESIS.

HOFMANN: "The biblical narrative of the sin of the first-created teaches us that it was an object of the physical world at which his sinful desire and action were directed. His will did not oppose the will of God in such a hostile manner that he did not want what God willed simply because God willed it, or so that he knowingly willed the very opposite of what God willed. . . For if we set aside what sin becomes by opposing the grace of God, it is essentially a desire to possess the world in a way that God has not permitted man to possess it, either in general or for this particular man—a desire to remove the limit of one's possession of the world. In a word, it is *ἐπιθυμία* [desire]. . . It is rightly said that the entire course of life which has sprung from the first sin is most comprehensively designated by the name of self-love; but it is less correct to call self-love the root of sin, from which the first sin itself also sprang. Neither the account of the Fall, nor the Pauline passage discussed above, agrees with this: both make it clear with what good reason sin has also been called the love of the

creaturely rather than the Creator, or as sensuality. Not to will in contradiction to God was, according to Scripture, the beginning of human sin, and is continually the beginning of its manifestation, but rather to will the world for its own sake in contradiction to God; and the serpent's seductive promise that they would become like God, knowing good and evil, that is, what this contrast is, changes nothing, since it makes man desire not self-deification, but godlike knowledge and dominion over the world. This, however, is not the selfishness of an ego that sets itself against God and all that is God's, but that of an ego desiring what is created by God in a way contrary to God." (*Schriftbeweis*. I, 411. 413. 414. sq.)

c) For Satan, in *Genesis 3:5*, had promised through the serpent that the first humans would be כֵּאלֹהִים, *like God;* and the woman, seeing that the *tree* was *desirable for understanding, took of the fruit, verse 6.* Thus, the woman's will more eagerly desired that apparent good, promised by Satan, which was nevertheless false and not to be obtained by that means.

d) Loc. cit. *v. 6. The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was desirable to the eyes.* Therefore, kindled by the desire to enjoy it, she took and ate.

## § 10.

*God*, however, even if as a just judge He denied the fallen first parents the influx necessary to preserve and propagate original righteousness,[a] yet He *cannot* be said to be *the cause* of the fall or of original sin.[b]

a) For just as *all the evils* of punishment, according to *Amos chapter 3, verse 6,* are so, and thus the *deprivation of original righteousness*, considered as a *punishment*, could be said *to have been inflicted by God.* However, God could certainly have taken away that gift, which He had given to men in the first creation by the power of His goodness, after the intervening sin of men, by virtue of vindicative justice, since men had rendered themselves unworthy of that gift and all divine benefits. Cf. *Meisner, Consid. Theol. Photin*. chap. V. p. 701. 702.

b) For He severely *forbade* the fall: *He gave the strength* to *prevent* sin; yet *He* neither *impelled* nor *determined* the first parents to fall, although as *a universal cause* He could not but concur in the material act of it. And thus it is clear that God *neither* intended the fall of the first parents, *nor* the original sin which followed from it, either *directly* or *indirectly*.

LUTHER: "St. Augustine says: God is so good that He does not permit evil to happen unless He intends to bring about something better from it. He let Adam fall; but from this came such great salvation, that God became Man and our Savior, and thereby honored human nature immeasurably more than the devil had dishonored it through the Fall; as St. Ambrose sings: ‘O blessed fault, which merited to have such a Redeemer!' Not that He loves or is fond of evil (otherwise He would not strive for good, but would let evil remain and increase), but that, to the annoyance of evil and the devil, He might show His goodness all the more richly for His own praise and honor." (*Preface to Dr. U. Rhegii's Exposition on Psalm 52 Ps*. Anno 1541. XIV, 186. sq.)

# § 11.

The Subject *which* [(a)] of original sin are *all* men [(b)] descended from the first parents by *carnal generation* [(c)] and in their own way the *first parents* themselves.[(d)]

a) Or that which is designated by this sin as *a sinner*, and incurs guilt and the penalty of sin.

b) See *Romans 5:12,* where it is expressly stated that *all* men *have sinned, and that through sin* (by which all are defiled) *death has passed upon all, even those who did not sin in the likeness of Adam's transgression,* or, who did not imitate the sin of Adam by an actual and voluntary transgression, are nevertheless subject to death because *they sinned* in *Adam* and thus inherit original sin from him. And already before *this, in chapter 3, verse 19*, the apostle had said that the whole world was *subject to God's* judgment. But no one is guilty except on account of sin; hence sin falls upon infants from their very beginning. Similarly, what Christ says in *John 3:6:* That which *is born of the flesh is flesh*, and *that which is born of the Spirit* is *spirit*, is nothing other than that all men, and individually, as they are by carnal generation, are excluded from the kingdom of God and thus infected with sin from their very origin. For nothing, except sin, separates men from God and the kingdom of God.

ANTITHESES.

HOFMANN: "So long as the 'I' is still becoming, one cannot say, just as one can later, that it is the subject of sin; rather, it becomes so in proportion as it itself becomes, as it begins consciously to determine itself, or rather to let itself be determined by original sin." (*Schriftbeweis*. Ed. 2. I, 562.)

PIUS IX.: "We declare, pronounce, and define: the doctrine which holds that the most blessed Virgin *Mary*, in the first instant of her conception, was by a *singular grace and privilege* of almighty God, in view of the merits of Christ Jesus the Savior of the human race, preserved immune from all stain of original guilt, is revealed by God and therefore to be firmly and constantly believed by all the faithful. Wherefore if anyone should presume to think in their heart otherwise than as We have defined — which God avert — let them know and furthermore be aware that they are condemned by their own judgment, have suffered shipwreck in the faith, and have departed from the unity of the Church." (1854, Dec. 8)

c) And thus we exclude *Christ* as man from the company of those who are stained by original sin, namely because he was not born in the flesh. And notably the angel says to Mary in *Luke 1:35: "The Holy One to be born of you will be called the Son of God."* Likewise in *Hebrews 7:26.* Christ is called *ὅσιος, ἄκακος, αμίαντος, κεχωρισμένος ἀπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν* [holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners].

J. AD. OSIANDER: "It is objected: 'in whom all sinned' is not to be extended to the entire human race. . . Christ Himself would have to be considered a sinner and it would have to be said of him that he transgressed in Adam, because He was in him. They are therefore called sinners, not because they were truly made sinners

by the transgression of Adam, but because they were made subject to death as if they were sinners. . . I deny the consequence. 1. Or it must be said that Christ was born not by the power of the primeval blessing, and thus naturally was not in Adam when he sinned, but by the power of the subsequent promise, which presupposes the fall, Gen. 3:15. Or 2. Since Christ is openly called the son of Adam (Luke 3:38), a distinction must be made between Adam as he was the *natural head,* from whom the entire human race was to be propagated (Acts 17:26), and as he was the *moral head* of the whole human race, from whose merit or demerit the fate of all posterity, whether happy or unfortunate, depended; in the *former* way, because Christ, as a child, partook of flesh and blood, *Christ* was the son of Adam in him, as both stock and head; in the *latter* way, however, he was *not* in Adam; but in the latter way a legal covenant was established with Adam, so that, if he did not observe the law, he would sin in his own name and in the name of all posterity. Thus, however, Christ is not subordinated to Adam as one descending from him, but is set over against him as the second Adam." (*Colleg. theol.-system*. P. III. Loc. 7. th. 9. p. 116. sq.)

d) Insofar as that corruption, which is in us and is called original sin, truly took place in them after the fall. See *Gen. 3:7.* For that *knowledge* of their *nakedness* implies a sense of disordered and shameful concupiscence newly contracted. Hence the lack of original righteousness can be entirely inferred. It must be admitted, however, that this corruption, strictly speaking, could *not* be called *original* sin *with respect* to the *first parents* themselves, because it was not present in them from the origin of their nature, nor from the beginning of their existence.

## § 12.

The subject "Quo" [*by which*] of original sin, *primarily* [(a)] is the soul with its faculties [(b)] — intellect, will, and sensitive appetite; *secondarily* and consequently, however, [(c)] the members of the body are also rightly referred to it.

a) Whether it is that by which original sin is communicated to man, or in which original sin *formally and immediately* inheres. Otherwise, it is called the *proper* subject, in Greek *πρώτον δεκτικόν*.

b) Namely just as the opposite original righteousness, in whose place, having been taken away, original sin has succeeded. Compare here §§ 4, 5, 6. And *Ausführl. Erklär*. L. VII. Q. 40. p. 312 ff. Likewise also *Balduin*, *Comm. in Ep. ad Ephes. cap. 4.* P. II. Aphor. 7. p. m. 923: The *subject,* he says, of *original sin is indeed the whole man with all his powers*; *yet its principal seat is the mind, which the apostle also commands to be renewed first,* verse 23. *For the mind dominates the whole body, and from its corrupt dominion the corruption of the other parts in man also easily follows.* Likewise H. *Eckard,* Tom. II. *Disp. Giess*. Dis. XII. § 90. p. 435., having said that the *whole man, according to his whole being, and all that he is, that is, each individual human being, both body and soul, is the proximate subject* (he means the subject *of which*) of original sin, to the objection of some, *that the body, because it is a brute thing, is not capable of sin and therefore cannot also be a subject,* to those who object in this way, he says that to those who object thus *this one statement of a certain philosopher easily suffices*; namely, *that sin cannot in itself reside in the body, but only insofar as it has communion with the soul. The body,* he says, *is not*

*in itself guilty of sin, but constitutes the other part of human nature.* Again, in § 94, p. 438, about to show that the soul is the primary subject of original sin, he argues as follows: *That which was the subject of original righteousness is also the subject of original unrighteousness. For the habit and its opposite privation refer to the same subject. But not the body only, but principally the soul was the subject of original righteousness. For the whole man was created in the image and likeness of God, whose chief parts, however, were held by the soul, most illustrious by the light of knowledge, wisdom, and science, and by a study of holiness and a love of truth. Therefore.* In the same way, *Cundis*, *Not. ad Comp. Hutt*. Loc. VIII. Q. VI. § 3. p. 579. and *Joh. Frieder. Koenig, Comp. Theol. Posit*. II. § 84, 85. p. 78, 79. expressly taught that the *primary recipient* or *subject of original sin is the rational soul, and the secondary is the animated body.*

c) For just as in the state of integrity the *body* became a participant in original righteousness through this, serving the soul as an *instrument* for works of holiness and righteousness, so also the sin of origin diffuses itself to the *members* of the body, as *though they were weapons of unrighteousness*. Thus *Cundis*, 1. c.: *"The secondary subject of Original Sin,"* he says, "*is the body." Hence St. Paul says in Romans 7:19: "For I do not do the good that I want, but I practice the very evil that I do not want." Hence it is that the members of the impure man are called the members of a harlot, 1 Cor. 6:15. Likewise, sinners are said to have eyes full of adultery (2 Pet. 2:14), and in Rom. 3:13-15 they are described as having a mouth, lips, a throat, and feet—all of which are instruments of that original wickedness.* That, just as in the state of integrity, impassibility and immortality pertained to the bodies of the first parents, so now a certain *morbid quality* appears in our *bodies*, by which they themselves have become subject to various diseases and calamities and to death itself; this *does not* so much *formally* pertain to *the essence* of original sin itself as it *follows* from it, as its *effect.* As also C*undis*, 1. c. Q. VII. p. 180, reckons *bodily diseases and temporal death* among the *effects* of original sin, which are *merely punishments,* not *punishments and sins at the same time.* Cf. *Gerhard, Disp. Isag*. XXV. cap. VIII. § 3. p. 896

## § 13.

The *effects* (a) of original sin are various evils: on the part of the *soul,* indeed, the defect of free will (b) in spiritual matters and its weakness (c) in natural matters; actual sins,(d) many in kind and number;(e) the privation of grace and the opposite, wrath (f) of God; on the part of the *body,* diseases (g) and other sufferings (h) and temporal death itself;(i) *finally also*, eternal death or damnation.(k)

a) Or, as a *consequence*, that sin, as an evil of guilt, by the just judgment of God, follows in the form of a punishment or as *something deserved*, and can certainly follow by the force of divine justice.

b) Or that man, infected by original sin, lacks the strength to act rightly concerning the spiritual good, just as he possesses the strength to act in its opposite. For in this present matter, the term *free will* is taken to mean the *requirements* both of the *intellect* and

of the *will.* to perform *spiritually good* acts, that is, acts that are and rightly relate to *purely spiritual matters,* i.e., matters removed from the senses and the light of reason, and which are hidden in God, who is a spirit (although they are also presented by Him through revelation), or even to matters subject to reason in their own way, but to be treated in a certain spiritual manner. Thus *we deny that* in a man infected with original sin, before he is reborn, there are any powers of the intellect or will such that, apart from a special grace of the Holy Spirit and the bestowal of new and supernatural powers, the will can determine itself to the good in spiritual matters. Indeed, the *intellect* itself is so corrupted and as it were blind that it cannot present or commend to the will spiritual goods for it to embrace as it ought. And although the doctrine of faith is proposed to the intellect in the Word sufficiently and clearly, so that nothing is lacking for it to be apprehended, nevertheless, by its own powers the intellect cannot provide the firm and true assent of faith. Therefore, although it is said elsewhere that freedom is *radically* in the intellect, here you might say the *flaw* is *in the root*, hindering freedom in such matters and excluding it. For the *will* not only cannot be moved by *its own* powers to the good, which is distinctly proposed to the intellect and apprehended by it, but it is also of *itself more alienated* from spiritual goods, *being more prone* to carnal, temporal, vain, and perishable things. Nor can it, by its own powers, be moved by an efficacious act toward the good things that are distinctly proposed and apprehended by the intellect, but only subsists in the *omission* of the act, it does not extend to the *exercise* of a fitting act, nor can it (and thus it is not *free with the freedom of specification* or *of contrariety),* or it even averses itself from what it ought to pursue, and so exercises an act *other* than *and contrary* to the one that ought to have been performed. (And thus it is shown that it is *not free by the liberty of specification or of contrariety.)* Compare the Disp. of *Musaeus* on Free Will, held in 1642 under the presidency of *Dilherr*, which is found in the *Dilherrian Disputations*, Vol. II, No. XVI, pp. 442 ff.

LUTHER: "Free will after sin *is a thing by title only,* and while it does what is in it, it sins mortally." (Proposition 13, Heidelberg, 1518. See Luther, *Works in Latin Pertaining to Reformation History*, ed. H. Schmidt, Frankfurt, 1865, Vol. I, p. 388.)

GERHARD: "The rational soul has two faculties: The mind and the will; the former, by knowing, discerning, consulting, and judging; the latter, by choosing and rejecting, each performs its proper function; from the combined action and cooperation of both powers arises that which is commonly called *free will,* which is the faculty of mind and will; so that *"arbitrium"* pertains to *the mind, and "liberum"* to *the will*." (*L. de lib. arbitr*. § 2.)

THE SAME: "*Freedom* is assigned to the will, first, with respect to the manner of acting, because it is such that the will, insofar as it is a will, acts freely, that is, it is not compelled or violently carried away by an external motion, nor does it act solely from a natural instinct, but of its own accord or by an internal principle of motion, it either embraces or rejects something. In this sense, free and voluntary are synonyms, and to say that the will is not free is the same as if one were to say warm without heat. This *freedom* is called *freedom from coercion*, by which it is meant that the will cannot be forced to do anything against its own inclination. Likewise*, freedom from necessity,* insofar as necessity is taken for coercion and violence (not, however, for immutability). . . *This freedom,* since it is a natural and essential property implanted by God in the will, *was not lost through the Fall.* The substance of man has not perished;

therefore neither has the rational soul; therefore neither has the will; therefore neither has essential freedom of the will. The will is an essential power of the soul, and the soul is nothing other than its own essential powers or faculties; therefore, with the soul remaining, its essential powers, intellect and will, also remain. Conversely, the power to will freely and without coercion is essential to the will; therefore, since the will remains, that power also remains. . . *In this sense and respect, we firmly believe and profess with a clear voice that free will in man has remained even after the fall;* so much so that, with Augustine (*De libero arbitrio*, 3), we say: 'that he who denies free will is not a Catholic.' Therefore, cast aside the tragic accusations leveled against our churches by Bellarmine in his preface to the books on free will, as if we were to abolish the freedom of will, abolish nature itself, violate nature itself, and profess ourselves not merely like beasts, but utterly beasts devoid of reason." (L. c. § 4—7. 8)

THE SAME.: *"The whole question is about the freedom of the object* around which the will is occupied, that is, about the freedom of rectitude: whether, that *power* being equally disposed toward good and evil, man after the fall is still endowed with it. .. For we confess that something of freedom remains with respect to the works which are just in moral, political, and economic justice, which pertain to the lower hemisphere, as Dr. *Luther* speaks. Indeed, a man not yet born again can in some way govern an external locomotive faculty; he can command the external members by the dictate of right reason; can in some way perform civil justice and avoid the graver external sins, which conflict with external discipline; indeed, he can even hear and meditate on the Word of God externally; yet in the meantime, that freedom is more often than not undermined by both external and internal hindrances. . . The whole question, therefore, is about a *spiritually good object*, about works that are righteous in spiritual righteousness and that pertain to the upper hemisphere, about spiritually good motions, whether man by himself and his own powers can initiate those spiritual motions, accept the grace offered, and perform something pleasing to God; which we *flatly* deny. . . Nor is the question about the *natural* actions of the soul, such as hearing, reading, or meditating, which in their own way can be called spiritual *metaphorically*, because they proceed from the soul, which is a spiritual essence; for we acknowledge in these a certain freedom of choice: a man can read, he can not read; he can hear, he can turn away his ears; but the whole question is about movements properly called spiritual, such as: to know God aright, to hear and read the Word of God with fruit." (L. c. § 32.)

QUENSTEDT: "The upper hemisphere in its scope comprehends purely spiritual or internal sacred things. .. To this hemisphere we also refer: to go to the temple to receive instruction from the preached word, to read and hear the word of God with a view to profit, to be held by the desire for instruction from the Word; all of which are works of prevenient and beginning grace." (L. c. P. II. c. 3. s. 1. th. 29. 30. f. 1888. sq.)

THE SAME: "Bellarmin's argument is this: 'If man does not possess free will for works of piety and even for conversion to God, then all the commandments, exhortations, incentives, etc., for works of piety and conversion will be in vain.' I answer: 1. These sayings of Scripture from Zechariah 1:2: 'Turn to me,' Joel 2:12: 'Turn to me with all your heart,' Deut. 10:16: 'Circumcise the foreskin of your heart,' Ezek. 18:31: 'Make yourselves a new heart,' Matt. 11:28: 'Come to me,' etc., *indeed show what our duty is*, *but not what our strength is;* that is, they signify not what men can do in their conversion, but what God demands from them on the basis of their obligation. They press our debt, not our power and ability. The precepts are not a measure of our strength, but a rule of duty. We do not learn from the law what we can, but what we *once* were able to do... 3. These testimonies of God urge the right of God, i.e., what God can justly demand from His debtors. For the

right of God as a creditor against His indebted debtor is not lost, even if the latter cannot pay. God justly demands from man by the law what man unjustly lost through Adam's fall. God teaches by precepting, commanding, and exhorting what man ought to be, what he once was, and what he has lost. 4. *God often commands those things which He wishes to effect in us,* and thus they are not only His imperative commands concerning what ought to be done, but also His operative and efficacious means by which God accomplishes what He commands. It is not in vain that a man in chains is commanded to run, if by that very command his chains are loosed. It is not in vain that a blind man is commanded to see, if by those very words with which this is commanded, the eyes of the blind are opened. For the words of God effect in us what they command us to effect. God commands what He wills, but He also gives what He commands. And it is a familiar expression in Scripture to say that we do those things which God does through us. For with His word, the Spirit of God adds His efficacy; God often commands those things which He wishes to accomplish in us, and He crowns and rewards His own works in us. Deut. 10:16. God says, 'Circumcise the foreskin of your heart,' but in 30:6 it is declared who performs this: 'The Lord your God will circumcise your hearts.' It is indeed said in Ezekiel 18:31: 'Make for yourselves a new heart and a new spirit,' but lest anyone should think this is of our own choosing, God Himself says through the same prophet (36:26): 'I will take away the heart of stone.' 5. These very exhortations are not merely legal, without grace, but are evangelical, effective, persuasive, and drawing. When the Lord invites and says, 'Come to me,' etc., by inviting He admonishes, stirs up, and confers grace, so that we may come. 6. When God enjoins and commands conversion, He wills that men do not resist it maliciously. . . 7. Although conversion itself is not in our power, the external use of the means is, in a way, within our power. For a person can frequent the temple and hear the external preaching of the word, by which God wills to be effective." (L. c. s. 2. q. 2. f. 2013. sq.)

THE SAME.: "An argument from the precept to the ability — N. V. C. [*non valet consequentia*] — or from the command of God to human power, from duty to obedience, does not hold; it is a theological rule. Thus God says to Abraham Gen. 15:5: 'Lift up your eyes to heaven, and number the stars, if you are able to number them.' (This is not the sense of the Hebrew text) by which certainly, rather than the possibility, the impossibility of numbering the stars is not obscurely hinted at. Thus in Isa. 42:18 it is said: 'Hear, you deaf, and look, you blind, that you may see'; whether you understand here natural or spiritual deafness and blindness, an impossible thing is nevertheless commanded. So Christ commands the dead daughter of Jairus and says: 'Little girl, get up!' (Mark 5:41; Luke 8:54). To Lazarus, buried and already stinking: 'Lazarus, come out!' (John 11:43). and Peter said to the deceased disciple: 'Tabitha, rise!' Acts 9:40. Who from this will conclude that either these corpses had the ability to rise and to vivify themselves, or that Christ and Peter addressed them in vain or commanded impossibilities? It is not tyrannical to command impossibilities and to obligate to things that are not within our power. A creditor justly demands a debt from a debtor who has nothing, Matthew 18:28, and God through the law and legal precepts most justly demands from men, His debtors, that which they are obligated to do. The dead were not commanded in vain by Christ and Peter to rise, because with those commands the power to rise was also conferred. Such, therefore, are not God's compulsions, exhortations, and invitations in vain, because they are an effective instrument of the Holy Spirit and a kind of stimulant, by which He breathes into and confers new strength upon the man dead in sins, and wishes to work conversion in him by His grace, provided that he himself does not contumaciously resist or place obstacles to His operation." (L. c. s. 2. q. 2. f. 2014.)

J. AD. OSIANDER: "Just as a ship is said to turn, not actively, but neutrally, because it is turned by the sailor; so conversion is indeed attributed to man, yet it does not truly belong to man, but is the action of God alone." (*Colleg. th*. V, 63.)

ANTITHESES.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* A. Of those sinning *in excess:* 1. *Pelagius and the Pelagians* . . .; for among the chief dogmas of Pelagius and the Pelagians were these: that man does not need the grace of God, but that by his own free will he can believe the gospel and perform all things necessary for salvation; that a man, by his natural birth and not yet converted to God, can by his own free will avoid all sins, overcome the gravest temptations, love God, and perfectly keep God's law. . . 2. Of the *Semi-Pelagians*. . ., (who) asserted. . ., that something must be left to free will; that prevenient grace is not always necessary for the performance of spiritual acts. . . The other error was concerning the *cooperation* of man with God, not from a power added to nature, but from a natural power. . . 3. The *Scholastics,* who followed in the footsteps of Pelagius; for they contend that man, by his own natural powers, can know the true and highest good, dispose himself, prepare himself, and apply himself to grace, avoid any mortal sin, keep the precepts as to the substance of the acts, and love God above all things, etc. . . 4. The *Papists,* especially the Jesuits. For thus they assert in the Council of Trent, Session VI, Chapter 1: 'Free will (in unregenerate men) is by no means extinguished, though weakened and inclined by its own natural powers.' In Chapter 5 of the same session, they anathematize those who hold the contrary. They hold, however, that the free will of man, weakened and inclined in its powers, is moved and excited in conversion by God, and, once moved and excited, cooperates by assenting to God who excites and calls, in order to dispose and prepare itself to obtain the grace of justification, as stated in Canon 4 of that session. . . 5. The *Socinians,* who teach a. in general, that an unregenerate man, with the approach of external divine revelation, can in spiritual matters do and perform those things which pertain to the internal assent to the divine word, conversion to God, knowledge, and faith. . . b. In particular, they teach concerning the intellect of the unregenerate man that it possesses such a perfection of powers that, if the divine things contained in the gospel are presented to it, it can, without special help from the Holy Spirit, perceive them and assent to them. . . 6. The *Arminians,* who are not far removed from the Pelagian heresy. . . For they attribute not *a whole,* but at least *a partial energy* to divine grace in converting a person, and they attribute the cause of faith partly to the grace of God in Christ, and partly to man and his free will. . . 9. Of the *Lutheran synergists*, who posit some *synergeia,* or cooperation of human forces with grace, in the work of conversion. . . The seeds of this synergistic error were sown quite prolifically by *Philip Melanchthon* in his various writings and books. For whereas in the original edition of Article 18 of the Augustana, Pelagianism concerning the powers of nature in spiritual matters and Semi-Pelagianism concerning *the cooperation* of the human will were openly condemned, in the same article of the altered and adulterated Augustana he writes explicitly: 'We *are helped* by the Holy Spirit in producing spiritual righteousness in us.' Likewise, in the earlier edition of the German Apology of A.C. we read: 'Free will and reason can do *nothing* in spiritual matters,' and a little later: 'To be regenerated, to be renewed inwardly in heart, mind, and senses—that is the work of *the Holy Spirit alone*.' But in the corrupted edition of the German Apology we read: 'We nevertheless affirm that free will and reason in spiritual matters can do nothing *alone* (allein)." And a few lines later: 'To be regenerated inwardly, and to be renewed in heart and senses, to believe and fear God, this is the work of the Holy Spirit.' Here the exclusive particle *(*"alone," "solus") is omitted, which is present in the earlier edition. then the negative *('nothing'),* which in the first edition denies all *power* (*'δυναμιν'*) to human forces, is restricted in the later corrupt edition by the added particle *'solum,'* which means, for example, that free will can do *nothing* in spiritual matters *alone*. By this very thing, everyone sees that the synergistic error is established. In the *Loci Communes* of Philipp Melanchthon, published two years after the death of blessed Luther and inserted into the body of doctrine, the definition of free will, which Luther reproved in Erasmus as erroneous,

is this: 'Free will in man is *the faculty of applying oneself to grace;* i.e., he hears the promise and tries to assent and casts off sins against his conscience.' Likewise, these words are also found, which not obscurely confirm synergism: '"I cannot," you say, "obey the voice of the gospel, hear the Son of God, acknowledge the mediator."' Philip replies: *"Yes, you can in a way*, and when you rely on the voice of the Gospel, you are helped by the God you ask for it," etc. In the Ordination Examination, in the article on free will, he establishes *three causes of conversion*, saying: "These causes concur in conversion: The Word of God, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father and the Son send, to kindle 'our hearts, and *our will consenting and not resisting* the Word of God.' Philipp Melanchthon's successors later stubbornly insisted and incrusted the idol *of synergeia (cooperation) by* Dr. *Johann. Pfeffinger.* . . Dr. *George Major* also professed the cooperation of the unregenerate man with the Holy Spirit and the Word of God in the conversion of man to God. . . Finally, the chief champion of this error was *Victorinus Strigel, . . .* Dr. *John. Stoesselius. . .* 10. Of the *Innovators,* who also contend, that free will, when stirred up by the Holy Spirit in the act of conversion, can cooperate with him. . . In *Johann Latermann's Exercitationes de Praedestinatione*, held under the presidency of Dr. *George Calixt* at Helmstedt*,* these are the paradoxes, thesis 32.: 'Now that the grace of God is offered, so that *when offered it is in man's power, by it to provide* what is necessary for conversion and salvation*,* and, if he wills, not to provide it, we demonstrate in this way.' Also, thesis 33.: 'All,' he says, *‚if they wanted to, could convert themselves*'... And th. 34.: *'It is in man's power to will to convert himself* and not to will to convert himself.' Th. 35: 'Man *converts himself freely.'* And finally th. 42.: 'For if exhortations are not in vain, as they certainly are not, *everything will depend at the same time on the cooperation of man,* i.e., on a man freely operating in the virtue of grace, freely believing, freely persevering.' To these words of Latermann, the theologian of Strasbourg, in his judgment on the disputations and acts of John Latermann, p. 8, notes: 'He says nothing that Bellarmine, Gregory of Valencia, Becan, and others did not also say and assert, who, however, have been declared guilty of Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism by the great consensus of theologians. He says nothing that the synergists did not say.' . . B. Of *sinning in defect:* Of the *ancient heretics,* who defended a Stoic and fatal necessity, such as *Simon Magus, Marcion, Hermogenes, and the Manicheans;* to which also belong the Calvinists, who strive to introduce a certain absolute necessity depending on their absolute decree." (L. c. f. 2000—2006.)

KAHNIS: "With Augustine, our Confession has also acknowledged that man, who has freedom in purely human matters, can perform *humanly good* works (A. C. Art. 18; Formula of Concord p. 640, 657.). But this human good is to have nothing to do with the *spiritual good*. *However, this chasm is contrary to Scripture* (!), experience, and the nature of the case. Scripture teaches most explicitly that the Gospel builds upon this human good. (Acts 10:35 [!]; 1 Pet. 3:1 [!] John 3:21 [!]).. . It is an indisputable fact that the rapid spread of Christianity in the classical world can *only* be explained *by* its *preparation* for Christ, which in turn presupposes a point of contact for Christianity in the natural man." (*Die Luth. Dogm*. III, 310.)

THE SAME: "The scriptural doctrine that through Adam's fall sin has gained dominion in all men, *exaggerates* Augustine into a doctrine of the *total death of the natural man to good* and of the mass condemnation, which is against Scripture as well as against Tradition and Christian experience. Scripture teaches and experience testifies that *in the natural man there is an inclination toward the true, the good, and peace*, which, though it is not able to break the powerful pull of the flesh downward, can nevertheless

be a *point of contact for grace*. With the same dualistic, hasty leap with which Augustine immediately exaggerated the conflict reigning in natural humanity between the divine and human wills into *the complete unfreedom* of the latter, . . . Augustine now also taught that it is *grace* alone that brings the wholly unfree will to salvation. . . The renewing power of grace takes on a saving form in man *only by setting all his powers in motion and driving them to cooperate."* (L. c. II, 137. sq.)

THE SAME: "Melanchthon had, through the doctrine of the *cooperation of the human will in appropriating salvation* (*Synergism*), entered upon the *right,* evangelical, and at the same time truly traditional path of preserving the substance of Augustinian doctrine without its excesses." (L. c. 539.)

HOFMANN: "The Apostle speaks (Rom. 2:14) of the case where *Gentiles,* without a law, a revelation of the demanding will, do what the divine will revealed in Israel demands, and says of such an act on their part that it is *φύσει (by nature*). . . So highly does the Apostle esteem it (Rom. 2:14.) for possible that one, by virtue of this law, might be able to act in accordance with the divine demand, though only in particulars, so that he suggests that perhaps on the day of judgment, from the thoughts awakened by the testimony of the conscience, a *self-justification before God* might arise, which can be graciously accepted by Him who exercises His judgment through Jesus Christ, the Mediator of grace." (*Schriftbeweis*. I, 494. 495. sq.)

LUTHARDT: "As for the attitude of the will toward grace in conversion, orthodox dogmatics in general, following the Formula of Concord, has *one-sidedly* emphasized the *divine* factor in conversion (*conversio transitiva*). The Formula of Concord usually (!) allows the activity of the proper will to enter only *after* conversion." (*Compendium of Dogmatics* 1868, p. 204.)

THE SAME: "Martensen speaks of an imparted grace, which, identical with essential freedom, comes to a breakthrough within the natural will in the surrender to grace. § 204. p. 336. The more decided church theologians do indeed reject *this* synergism, but nevertheless demand (as Thomasius, Harless, Frank, etc.) that not only be the *active behavior in conversion* emphasized on the basis of the inwardly liberating influence of sanctifying grace, but also that the possibility of a *preparatory state* for sanctifying grace be recognized *on the basis of the general effect of God through the conscience*, etc." (L. c. p. 135.)

NOTE. QUENSTEDT: I. *Freedom of contrariety* is that which is found *between two or more specifically different acts* (for the term 'contraries' here is to be taken more broadly), when the will is not determined to a certain species, e.g., to good alone or to evil alone, but can either choose or reject the other; it can will one and not the other; willing and unwilling are contraries. It is also called *freedom of specification*, or with respect to the species of the act, because it is not determined to a certain species of act or object. — II. There is the *freedom of contradiction*, which concerns the *same object* proposed to one's mind between contradictory terms; when, for example, one can act on a given object or not, and can will or not will. To will and not to will, to act and not to act, are contradictory opposites. It is also called the *freedom of exercise,* because it pertains to the very execution of the act, or because, after the will has already been determined to a certain species of act or object (i.e., good or evil in general, or in particular, this or that good or evil), it nevertheless remains free

in its execution, so that it remains the same single act, to which it is determined, it can will and not will, act and not act; e.g., when virtue and vice are proposed, and in the election a conclusion is reached: I want virtue, I do not want vice; this is then called the *freedom of contrariety and specification*. But when a single object (e.g., virtue, temperance, fortitude) is proposed, one can choose it or not, want it or not, and this is then called the *freedom of contradiction or of exercise* by the Scholastics. Both freedoms are connected in Ecclesiasticus 15:14 ff." (L. c. s. 1. th. 12. f. 1080. sq.)

c) For although we do not deny that some freedom remains for man after the fall concerning things subject to reason, as the *Augustana Confession* teaches in *Article 18,* so that reason can recognize a certain difference between good and evil in created things, and from that, the will is moved to pursue the former and to shun the latter, and thus also, just as one can know *God* from creation, so to love God, as the author of nature and of natural goods, and also to love *one's neighbor*, *whether* for the virtues with which he excels, *or* for the utility that can be expected from him, *or* for the fellowship of nature or kinship, *or* for some other conformity founded in nature; However, nowhere are these active powers in man after the fall such that they do not at some point necessarily suffer a failure. For both the intellect in judging often errs, and the will, together with the sensitive appetite for pursuing the good known by the intellect, often grows weak or languishes and, on the contrary, leans so strongly toward the opposite evil that it not infrequently, with reason protesting in vain, bursts forth into wicked acts. Cf. *Mus., Tract. de Conv*. Disp. IV. cap. I. § 25. 26. 38. p. 257. 259. 266.

APOLOGY A. C.: "Nor do we indeed take away the freedom of the human will. The human will has freedom in choosing the works and things which reason in itself comprehends. It can in some way bring about civil righteousness or the righteousness of deeds, it can speak of God, offer God a certain external worship through outward action, obey magistrates and parents, and in choosing an external occupation, can restrain itself from murder, adultery, and theft. Since reason and judgment concerning things subject to the senses remain in human nature, so too do the choice of those things, and the freedom and ability to practice civil righteousness. For this is what Scripture calls the righteousness of the flesh, which the carnal nature—that is, reason by itself—effects without the Holy Spirit. Although the power of concupiscence is so great that people more often give in to evil passions than to right judgment. And the devil, who is effective in the ungodly, as Paul says (Eph. 2:2), does not cease to incite this weak nature to various sins. These are the reasons why civil righteousness is rare among men, as we see that not even the philosophers themselves have attained it, who seem to have sought it." (Art. 18. p. 218.)

d) For just as *David* attributed the source of the adultery he committed to original sin, *Ps. 51:7,* and *Paul* attributes the sins he actually commits to the sin dwelling in him, *Rom. 7:17.*

e) For although man is *not* determined by the corruption of nature to a certain *individual* act of sinning, but exercises any he does freely, so that he could have refrained; nevertheless, he is *confusedly* determined to *some* acts of sin, so that although he does not necessarily commit this one or that one individually, he cannot but commit some acts of sin. However, the variety of actual sins which proceed from

the original corruption, as to their species, may be seen from the catalog *of the works of the flesh, Gal. 5:19, and Mark 7:21-23.* It is therefore no less surprising that sins of the same kind, when repeatedly committed, should spring from the same root.

f) For men are said to be *by nature,* or by the condition of a corrupt nature*, τέκνα ὀργῆς* [children of wrath]*,* i.e., liable to divine wrath, which implies the withdrawal of divine favor, with the opposite effect, like vindicative justice.

g) Certainly, a morbid quality arose, with the removal of the gift of immortality, and indeed that accurate *κράσις* [tempering] of humors and bodily vigor, as a punishment for the fall and hence for the sinful corruption that arose in all human beings. And diseases, the forerunners of death, are sometimes called by the name of death itself. See *2 Cor. 1:10.* Hence, it is not amiss to suppose that in the threat of death, which preceded the fall, they were also included.

h) Of course, those calamities which afflicted the very first parents after the fall, according to *Genesis 3:16 ff.,* were in their own way transmitted to their posterity, along with and because of original sin.

i) For temporal death is said to have spread through sin to all men, Romans 5:12, 14. And in chapter 6, verse 23, *it* is called *the wages of sin*, that is to say, just as soldiers' pay, both food and money, used to be given to soldiers, so sinners, having followed the camp of Satan, receive death as their wage.

> HOLLAZ: "Although the first parents did not immediately meet with bodily death at the moment of their fall, they were nevertheless at once made *debtors of death*, since this is the wages of sin." (*Exam*. P. II. c. 3. q. 9. p. 513.)
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> LUTHER: "The Lord forbade Adam to eat anything, otherwise he would have died; not that it was in the nature of this tree to kill, but because it had been so pronounced by the Word of God, which gives its efficacy to all creatures and also preserves them from degenerating, so that certain species are kept in infinite propagation. Thus it was done by the Word, that the rock in the desert gave forth most abundant waters, that the bronze serpent would heal those who looked upon it, etc. In this way this one tree, or that certain species of several trees in the middle of paradise, killed Adam, not because it was disobedient to the Word of God, not indeed by its nature, but because it was so defined by the Word of God. We should think the same of the tree of life as well, which God commanded Adam to eat whenever he wished to restore his strength; by the virtue of the Word, the tree provided this. It seems very ridiculous to reason how one apple could have been so noxious as to have lost the entire human race through an almost infinite succession, and that to eternal death. But this was not the virtue of the fruit; Adam did indeed sink his teeth into the fruit; in reality, however, he sank his teeth into a thorn, which was the prohibition of God and disobedience to God. This is the true cause of evil, namely, that one sins against God, neglects His command, and obeys Satan. Thus the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a good tree, which bore the most noble fruits. But when a prohibition is added, and man does not obey it, it becomes more harmful than any poison. Thus, because it is ordained by the Word of God, 'You shall not steal,' whoever touches another's property sins. In Egypt, when the Jews were commanded to ask for silver from their neighbors and to take it with them, it was not a sin; for they are excused by the command of God, to whom obedience is due in all circumstances. A suitor, when he loves a maiden and desires her for a wife and takes her, does not commit adultery, although the law forbids concupiscence. For marriage was divinely instituted, and is a command for those who cannot live chastely without it. The same is true of

these trees: the tree of life vivifies by the power of the Word that promises and thus ordains; the tree of the knowledge of good and evil kills by the power of the Word that forbids. It has, however, the name of the knowledge of good and evil, as Augustine says, because after Adam sinned in it, he not only saw and experienced what good he had lost, but also into what misery he had been cast by his disobedience. Therefore, it was a good tree in itself, just as the commandment that was added was also good, so that it would be for Adam a tree of divine worship, in which he might prove his obedience to God even by external work. But because of the subsequent sin, it becomes a tree of curse." (Ad Gen. 2:9.)

ANTITHESIS.

DELITZSCH: "The tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a tree of blessing according to its purpose, but was it also so according to its *nature*? In other words: is the death threatened to man to be understood only as a consequence of the transgression of the prohibition accidentally attached to this particular tree, or as a consequence of the forces at work in this tree? It seems to me that the latter is the sense of the narrative. For the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was not chosen only when God gave the prohibition, but it stands from the very beginning (v. 9) as the tree of decision in the garden; already in v. 9 one notices that it forms a contrast to the tree of life that stands in the midst of the garden. This one, however, shares life by virtue of the nature with which it was created (3:22), *so the tree of the knowledge of good and evil will also bring about death by virtue of its nature.* But by virtue of the nature God created in it? Death is, as we know from Genesis 1, not something originally willed by God; therefore, the power of death in this tree will also be nothing creatively ordained by God. Now, if we remember that *man's paradisiacal calling* is *directed toward overcoming the evil that has entered creation*, it should not surprise us that in Paradise itself there is a tree which God did create, but which the power of the evil one has taken possession of, whose fruit places man in relation to the evil one and therefore kills, and which, so that man would not fall into the fellowship of the evil one and thus into death, it is surrounded by the divine prohibition." (*Die Genesis*. Lpz. 1852. p. 107. sq.)

k) On which we have spoken above, P. I. chap. VII, especially § 15, note e. Cf. *Rom. 5:18.* And this eternal damnation is brought about by the original sin, as a *sufficient and adequate* cause, in all those in whom it is not expiated through faith in Christ. Compare the *Ausführl. Erklärung* Q. XXXVIII. p. 307.

## § 14.

The *properties* of original sin are 1. *Tenacity* or stubborn adherence [(a)] throughout the whole life. 2. Natural *propagability* from parents to children.[(b)]

a) For Paul, already converted, confesses that *sin dwells in him* as a guest who can never be expelled, *Romans 7:17.* He is speaking of the *concupiscence* he had mentioned in *verses 7 and 8.* And he openly attributes to it, as its name, so also the formal reason or concept of sin properly speaking. Compare *Heb. 12:1,* where it is called *ἁμαρτία εὐπερίστατος, a sin firmly adhering to* us and *encircling us from every side,* and therefore not easily cast off, except along with the very body, or like a burden tied to us that we cannot put down.

APOLOGY A. C.: "Augustine says: 'Sin is remitted in baptism, not so that it is not there, but so that it is not imputed.'" (Art. 2.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis*:... 3. Of the *Papists*, who recall the Pelagian dogma from hell; for concerning the relics of original sin after baptism, or about the concupiscence which remains in the baptized in this life, the decree of the 5th Session of the Council of Trent has it thus: 'If anyone denies that by the grace of Jesus Christ our Lord, which is conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, or even asserts that not the whole of that which has the true and proper nature of sin is taken away, but says that it is only blotted out and not imputed, let him be anathema.'" (L. c. q. 12. f. 1037.)

b) This is what Christ says in *John 3:6: "That which is born of the flesh is flesh,"* that is, whoever is born of carnal or sinful parents is himself also carnal and corrupt by sin. To which the words of *Job chapter 14:4,* respond*: Who will make a clean out of an unclean?* That is, no one will show a clean person born of an unclean parent. And the words of *David in Psalm 51:7: 'Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity, and in sin my mother conceived me,*' indicating that the contagion of sin *is actually transmitted through carnal generation.* However, just as the transmissibility of original sin from parents to children is rightly held, so it may *be sufficient* to know *that the first parents, by their fall, merited that all their posterity would be born in the same state in which they themselves were after the fall, in body and soul.* However, *how the soul contracts that evil, while preserving its faith, can be unknown, because the Holy Spirit did not will to reveal this by certain and clear testimonies,* which are the words of *Chemnitz,* P. I. LL. CC. *de Pecc*. Orig. fol. 236. He, however*,* followed the footsteps of *Augustine*, who, having treated the question of the origin of the soul and the contracted stain of original sin in Ep. XXVIII to Jerome, in the following Epistle, XXIX, making mention of the former*,* said, relates that something had been said elegantly, which applies quite aptly to this matter. *When a certain man had fallen into a well, where the water was so deep that it held him up rather than drowned him, and kept him from speaking rather than choking him, another man came up, and seeing him, said in admiration, "How did you fall in here?" But he replied, "Please, think about how to get me out of here, not how I fell in." Thus, since we confess and hold by the catholic faith concerning the guilt of sin, as though it were a well, that even the soul of a little infant must be delivered by the grace of Christ, it is enough for us to know the way by which it is saved, even if we never know how it fell into that evil.* This is *Augustine*, loc. cit. However, just as the *origin of the soul* has been investigated more thoroughly in theological schools, so those who embraced the doctrine of the soul's *propagation through the lineage* have explained the transmission of original sin through carnal generation *differently, and likewise* those who held the doctrine of the soul's *creation*. And indeed, when it is established that *original sin, in itself,* taken *abstractly and formally*, is a *privation* or lack of original righteousness, and thus that by the very fact that it is not a positive entity, but a mere privation, it does not recognize an efficient cause by whose real and positive influx it is produced, it also immediately appears that the *mode of propagation* is established *negatively,* since it consists in the non-production of the opposite form, original righteousness, or that, when the soul is efficiently produced, original righteousness is not simultaneously produced in and with it. Thus, then, those who hold to the propagation of the soul through the *lineage* seem to indicate that since parents, as

secondary causes, produce and impart to their offspring a rational soul as if it were their own, with God, as the first cause, providing the general concurrence, for this reason the very same individuals, whose souls had already lost original righteousness in the first parents, cannot in the act of generation transfer to their children, or propagate, the original righteousness of which they themselves are deprived, but that they bequeath a soul deprived of original righteousness and thus corrupted by sin, just as God also provides His concurrence to the propagation of the soul to the offspring, but not to the propagation of original righteousness. Those who hold to the *creation of souls*, however, believe that original sin is propagated in this way: that when the first parents, by their fall, incurred the guilt of losing original righteousness and truly lost it, by their own fault and by the just judgment of God, God now denies, in the production of the souls of offspring, the influx to co-produce original righteousness, which otherwise, if men had remained in the state of integrity, would always have concurred in the act of generation, creating the soul with original righteousness. For after the fall, committed by the common parent of the human race, it is no longer necessary for any man, at the generation of his offspring, to require the concurrence of the first cause to produce original righteousness with the soul of the offspring, since a connatural effect is not more perfect than its cause. But if, on the other hand*, original sin, in itself,* when considered *abstractly and formally*, is said to be *not a mere privation, but* a *positive* entity*,* which requires to be produced and propagated through the real and positive influx of an efficient cause, then certainly a significant *difficulty* appears *on both sides*, whether either you posit that the soul is propagated from parents by traduction, with God nonetheless concurring as the first cause, *or* whether you posit that it is immediately created by God. Compare *Mus., Ausführl. Erklärung* Q. XXX. and XXXV. p. 301. sqq. In this very difficult and doubtful matter, Augustine's modesty, which prefers to *ἐπέχειν* [suspend judgment], is to be preferred.

## § 15.

The original sin, which is the deprivation of original righteousness,[(a)] through the fall of Adam [(b)] propagated to all men [(c)] through carnal generation,[(d)] corrupting intimately the very nature of man and all the faculties of the soul,[(e)] making them inept for pursuing spiritual good, yet prone to all evil, and thus subjecting them [(f)] to divine wrath and eternal death, unless the forgiveness of sins intervenes through the merit of Christ, apprehended by faith.

a) Which in the proper case signifies. And see § 2, etc.

b) As the meritorious cause or causality of a moral efficient cause; see § 7 and 8.

c) Who are the subject of *Quod* [that which]; see § 11.

d) Those which *partly* pertain to the efficient cause of original sin, as it is in each individual, according to § 8, note *d, and partly* denote the property of this sin in itself considered; see § 14.

e) Indeed, capable of morality; which are the subject of the primary Quo, "by which"; see § 2 ff. and § 12.

f) In which the effect of original sin consists; see § 13.

## § 16.

It is an accident of original sin that in some it *reigns*, [c] in others it *does not* [d] *reign.*

a) For by *its own nature* it tends to exercise dominion over all; but since *by the grace of God* it is frequently prevented from reigning, we therefore say that *both* of these things happen to it *accidentally*.

b) That is, to that depraved and innate concupiscence. Certainly, in the style of Scripture, the *reigning* and *not reigning* is attributed to the sin that dwells within us, which is innate to us (not equally to second acts, or voluntary actual sins). See *Rom. 6:12.* Although *habitual* sins, *acquired* by frequent actions, can also be said to dominate or reign in a person, so long as they are not diminished but remain strong and stimulate the commission of actual sins.

c) He has the man subject to his impulses, like a master has a slave by his command, or a king a subject. Compare *Romans 6:16-17.*

d) When its motions are resisted and thus its dominion is taken away, although it itself remains, so that the man, made freer, *does not walk according to the flesh but according to the spirit (Rom. 8:1),* or if anything evil is done, it does not do so so much of its own will as the sin that dwells in it does, against his will, just as a servant does something against his master's will, or a subject against the king's.

# Chapter III. ^

ON ACTUAL SINS.

## § 1.

An actual sin, *by the force of the term*, is a sin which is completed by some *act*, either by *doing*. But *as to the matter* itself, it must be admitted that actual sins are to be counted [a] not only those which are committed by *doing*, but also those which are committed by *not doing*.

a) For just as some *laws* are *about doing things,* others *about omitting them,* so sins, which are contrary to the laws, are committed in two ways: some by doing what the law forbids, *others* by failing to do what the law commands.

## § 2.

Thus, actual sin is described as an action or omission of action,[(a)] contrary to eternal law [(b)] of God.

a) Thus the *material aspect,* which is signified in the right case, is indicated, and it is presented as two disjunctive elements.

b) This is *formal*, which pertains to actual sin, not insofar as it is something actual, but insofar as it is constituted in the being of sin and is distinguished from acts and omissions of acts, whether right or indifferent.

> GERHARD: "Some things are *sins in themselves*, while others are ***κατ'*** *ἀλλο, on account of something else.* Thus, when unbelievers steal, commit fornication, kidnap, etc., these are sins *in themselves and by the nature of the act*; but when they cover their neighbor's nakedness, help them, etc., these acts in themselves and by their nature are not sins, but they become sins *because of something else*: because the person is not yet reconciled to God, because such works do not proceed from a pure heart, because they are not directed toward the glory of God. The use of this division is manifold. Dr. *Luther* said*: 'The just man* sins *in every good* work'; Bellarmine strongly objects to this; but observe, the good works of the regenerate are not called sins *in themselves and as to the substance of the act,* for they are worship most pleasing to God and a sweet-smelling savor before Him; but because sin *cleaves* to the regenerate who do good works and because those very good works *are not perfectly good,* Therefore, in this respect, it is most truly said that the just man sins in every good work and that the good works of the regenerate are sins, namely**,** *κατά τί (in a certain respect)*, because of the adhering corrupt concupiscence and the manifold imperfection, on account of which God could reject the very good works of the regenerate, if He were to require them by the strict standard of the law, and hence it is that Isa. 64:6. . . pronounces." (*L. de pecc. act*. § 104.)

## § 3.

The efficient cause of actual sin [(a)] is the sinning man, insofar as, while the positive act to which *ανομία* [lawlessness] adheres is the physically efficient cause, by this very fact the adhering *ανομία* becomes the *moral* cause,[(b)] and insofar as he fails to do what he ought to have done, by this very fact he entirely imputes the *ανομία* of that omission to himself.[(c)]

a) We are here considering actual sin, not just any sin, but that which falls under the subject of theology, that is, the wayfaring man.

b) See above, chap. I, §§ 8 and 9.

c) For although the *omission* of a precepted act, in itself considered, is nothing but a *negation*, and therefore is not regarded as something positive and actually producible, nevertheless man is judged its cause, *partly* because he is the cause of some action which is impossible with the action prescribed by the law, which ought to have been done here and now, *partly,* because man sometimes in himself elicits an act of will to omit the prescribed act, especially an external one.

# § 4.

God in no way [b] is the cause of actual sin as such,[a] or can be said to be.[c]

a) As we have warned above about sin in general, chap. I. § 10.

b) *Neither* by obliging through His precept to perform a vicious act, *nor* by immediate or mediate persuasion, whether hidden or manifest, inducing to such an act, *nor* by a special positive influx bending, determining, or necessitating one to it, *nor* by directing man's action to the object from which it formally and in itself has its character as sin. For all these things must be absent from Him who is not a cause of sin, as such.

c) Therefore, we also consider that the scandalous phrase, "that *God is the cause of sin per accidens*," should be avoided, along with *Musaeus*, *Ausführl. Erklärung* Q XXXIX, p. 310.

> MUSAEUS: "Those theologians and philosophers who have disputed this phrase (that God is the accidental cause of sin), have explained their opinion, namely that they do not understand it as a 'cause of sin per accidens *on the part of the cause*,' but as a 'cause per accidens *on the part of the effect,*' and that in this formula the addition 'per accidens' is a foreign term and implies a negation of a true cause; that the assertion: God is the accidental cause of sin on the part of the effect, is no other than this opinion: God is the accidental cause of sin on the part of the effect' has no other meaning than this: that God is not the cause of sin itself, but only of the effect, with which sin is connected contrary to God's intention and without any influence on his part. . . Whatever it may ultimately be, this much is certain: the phrase is scandalous." (*Ausführl. Erklärung der Jenaischen Theologen.* Jena 1677. p. 309. sq.)

> LUTHER: "Regarding the evil that God does, what are you arguing about? You are idle, I see, in the midst of such great stirrings of Satan. He has no need of a work, nor is there a work to dispute about, but it is an omission of God's work. For we do evil things because he ceases to work in us and allows nature to act in its own wickedness, which it does. Otherwise, where He Himself works, nothing but good follows. And this omitting of God is what Scripture calls hardening. For evil cannot be made, since it is nothing; but it comes about when good is not done or is hindered." (*Letters* ed. by de Wette. II, 181.)

> THE SAME: "The reader must be warned about the peculiarity of the Hebrew. For thus it is read in Hebrew: 'And the bones which you have crushed will rejoice.' There is, however, a great difficulty here as to why the prophets, with singular diligence, observe this, pronouncing evils to come from God himself, when it is true that God does not in himself do evil, but uses instrumental means. For thus in Job the Lord says, 'You have constrained me to afflict him without cause,' Job 2[:3}, even though the story clearly shows that the devil set the house on fire, killed the children, and persuaded them to despair and to murmur against God. These, I say, are truly the devil's works, and yet the Lord says, 'I afflicted him.' In the same way, David also says here: 'You have broken my bones,' when yet God did nothing other than withdraw His hand and His Spirit, and leave David to be exercised by the fiery darts of Satan. . . Such an instrument or means is also the law, by which sins are accused and condemned. However, God uses these means in order to humble us and take away the presumption of our own works, so that we may simply learn that we live by the grace and kindness of God alone. But let us return to the argument: Why are these things attributed to God, when He does not properly do them, but uses His means—Satan kills, the law accuses—and yet the sacred

> Scriptures attribute both to God? The reason for this is that we may be kept in the article of our faith, that there is only one God, so that we do not, like the Manicheans, make several gods. For they posited two principles, one of which was good and the other evil; in good things they ran to the good God, and in bad things to the evil God. God, however, wants us to have confidence in Him alone, both in good times and in bad; He does not want us to be like those of whom Isaiah says, 'For the people turneth not unto him that smiteth them.' [Isaiah 9:13] For this is the tendency of our nature: in sudden terrors and dangers, it turns away from the true God, because it believes He is angry, just as Job said, 'You have become cruel to me.' But this is to fashion another god and not to remain in the simplicity of faith that there is one God. For God is not cruel, but is the Father of consolation. But because He withholds help, our hearts, ever prone to idolatry, soon make an idol of an angry god out of Him. This is what the prophets want to prevent when they say with one voice, 'I am the Lord, who creates good and evil,' so that we do not think that when the sun is blocked by clouds, the sun has been completely removed from the world, or has been turned from its bright body into a black and dark one. For the sun retains its light, but we are hindered by the clouds from being able to see it. Thus God is good, just, and merciful, even when He strikes. Whoever does not believe this departs from the unity of faith, that there is one God, and fashions for himself another god, who is unlike Himself, now good, now evil. But it is a special gift of the Holy Spirit to believe that God, when He sends evil, is propitiable and merciful." (On Ps. 51:8. Exeget. opp. lat. Cur. Irmischer. Erlang. 1847. Vol. XIX, 104. sqq.)

## § 5.

Other causes of actual human sin are found both *outside* the person and *inside* him. The devil and the world, that is, things and people, are content in this world; *within him* are ignorance of the intellect, affections or passions, or movements of the sensitive appetite, and the malice of the will.

## § 6.

The devil is the cause of human sin [(a)] insofar as *partly* he proposes to the man objects which might invite him to sin,[(b)] *partly* persuades himself,[(c)] or supplies the counsel for carrying out the crime,[(d)] *partly* by stirring up certain imaginations in the phantasy, or even by altering the humors and passions in the sensitive appetite,[(e)] by which men are induced to sin.

a) See *John 8:44 and 1 John 3:8.* For when evil men and slanderers, as such, are said to be *from the devil* as *a father, and to obey the desires* of their *father* when they sin, it is indeed said that the devil contributes something, and indeed a great deal, to those sins in the manner of a cause. Cf. *2 Cor. 4:4,* where it is said that *the god of this world has blinded the minds of unbelievers, lest the light of the gospel should shine upon them.* He is therefore the actual and malicious cause of their opposition, which they raise to the Holy Spirit and to the Word that would bring faith. And *in Ephesians 2:2,* it is said that *the same Spirit is said to ἐνεργεῖν, to work effectively in the sons of disobedience,* in unbelieving men, with respect to various *offenses and sins, παραπτωμάτων καὶ ἁμαρτιῶν, in which*

they *walk and converse in the lusts* of their *flesh*, *doing what pleases the flesh and the mind.* Cf. *Acts 5:3,* where the *lie* of Ananias is attributed to *Satan, who filled* his *heart.*

b) Thus in *Genesis 3:6*, Satan, lurking in the serpent, is said to have presented to Eve the fruit of the forbidden tree, by which Eve's appetite was objectively moved to desire, and so that an external act of eating would follow.

c) Thus, in chapter 1, verses 4 and 5*,* by *an argument* from *the useful,* or from the fuller conformity with God and the more excellent dignity that would follow, Satan *commended* the act of eating that fruit to Eve and *persuaded* her to take it. Cf. *1 Chronicles 21:1,* where it is mentioned how Satan *incited David* to *number the people.*

d) See *John 13:2,* where it is indicated how the devil not only induced Judas to betray Christ by arguments suited to persuade him, but also taught him *by what means* that act could be accomplished without hindrance and at a convenient time *(εὐκαιρῶς)*; which is *the counsel of a counselor*. Cf. *Luke 22:3 and 6.*

e) The example of Saul belongs here, whom Satan *disturbed* and in whom he stirred up a kind of frenzy to cast a spear at the innocent. See *1 Sam. 16:15 and chap. 18:10-11.* Although dreams from the devil, by which men are tempted to sin or do sin, may not inappropriately be referred to this category.

## § 7.

Meanwhile, the devil *does not necessitate* or immediately determine the human will to sin,[(a)] but men *of their own accord* consent [(b)] to the deceiver.

a) See *James 4:7,* where it is said that men can *resist the devil,* who incites them to sin, *so that he may flee* from them. But he who can be thus resisted does not himself necessitate sin. Cf. *Ephesians 6:11-13; 1 Peter 5:9.*

b) Certainly, people could *resist the principalities,* at least those who are *upright* or *capable of being governed,* so that they would not be led by Satan into grave sins or become his slaves, although once they *consent* to him or *submit* their necks to his yoke, they can easily be precipitated into worse or into the extreme and, as if *captured alive*, be led about according to his *will*, *2 Tim. 2:26.* To which belong what we have said about *the most spiritual obsession*, in Part I, Chapter III, § 51, p. 136.

HUELSEMANN: "Are the ways in which Satan acts merely moral persuasions concerning the pleasant, the useful, the hateful, etc., as in the temptation to robbery; or are they also physical, both through the intrinsic determination of the intellect, will, and affections, and through the extrinsic locomotion of the body, hands, and feet? See Feurbohn's *Tr. de pecc. in Sp*, ch. 2, and Meisner's *Anthropology*, Dec. I, D. 3, q. 4, th. 4, which you should read with caution. It seems to us that the matter can be resolved by a distinction between reigning and non-reigning sins, to which resistance is made daily. For in the case of those who are enslaved, it is clear that the devil not only works through persuasions and suggestions, but also through the determination of the will, as is shown by the words and examples of robbers, *murderers,* sorcerers, and others, whom the devil leads captive to his own will. 2 Tim. 2:26. (*Praelect. F. C.* p. 356.)

H. KROMAYER: "Nor *does* he (the devil) *compel* men to sin by suggesting evil thoughts, but only persuades and incites them, to whom they can also resist by God's grace, if they will, and meet him with pious prayers." (Th. pos.-pol. II, 140.)

## § 8.

Men, who are called by the name of the world, become the cause of another's sin by supplying, persuading, advising [a] and, with their example,[b] inviting to sin.[c]

a) These things they have in common with Satan. Hence the world is called *Satan's bride*, and impious men, or those of the world, are called the *instruments of the devil*. See on the seductions of these, *Prov. 1:10.* Compare the examples of *Jeroboam (1 Kings 15:26), Solomon's concubines (1 Kings 11:3),* and the false prophets who persuaded Ahab to wage an unjust war, instigated by Satan *(1 Kings 22:21 ff.; 2 Chronicles 18:9 ff.).*

b) And so it is said that *scandals* come, *Matthew 18:6–7,* which are themselves sins, and the proximate cause or occasion for sinning, by which men are *offended* in the course of this life, so that with respect to their actions they are *either* drawn away from good, so that they act more sluggishly or not at all, *or* are led to evil, which they would not otherwise commit, *whether* knowingly and willingly *or* through imprudence. Cf. *Wis. 4:11-12.*

CRUSIUS: *"Offense"* here means something like a stumbling block, something one can trip over, be harmed by, or fall into; hence one also says of that which brings one into misfortune that it has become an offense to him (1 Pet. 2:7). In the moral sense, therefore, offense means something by which one becomes angry or can easily become angry. This meaning of the word is not to be confused with another, in which to be offended means to be angered, and to offend another means to provoke him to anger, Matthew 23:16. In this broader sense, offense is divided into giving and taking. A *taken* offense is an occasion for error and sin that one takes from the words or actions of another, not through that person's fault, but because one is oneself deceived and judges poorly. For example: Matthew 11:6; John 6:61. But a *given* offense is a cause of sins or errors which one gives to others by what one teaches, speaks, or does, in such a way that a moral fault can be attributed to us, by which we become partakers in the sin of another, Matt. 18:6. f. It happens either by *sinning* oneself, or by failing to exercise *prudence*. In this way, one can cause offense not only by what is evil, but also by the misuse or *careless use of permitted things*, Romans 14:13ff. To judge correctly about causing offense, among other things, the following rules of caution must be observed, a) One must be careful not to neglect one's express duty under the pretext of not wanting to cause offense to others. . . b) In particular, one must not act contrary to the truth, speaking one way one time and another way another, because one pretends that one does not want to offend anyone. . . c) One must not allow the yoke of human ordinances or erroneous teachings be placed upon Christianity under the pretext of accommodating the weak so as not to offend them. The weak in this case are those who do not yet have sufficient knowledge,

but who nevertheless have a good Christian heart and whose purpose is to live for God, Romans 14:1-7. . . But the presumptuous and proud spirit, and the domineering ruler of consciences, is not weak, but is a dangerous and harmful man, against whose enterprises divine truth and Christian liberty must be defended, Gal. 5:1. Therefore Paul himself withstood Peter, who nevertheless thought entirely in harmony with him (Acts of the Apostles. 15:10), when he once, in the practical application, had been too hasty, and because of the arrival of certain zealous advocates of the Jewish law, would not be found eating with the Gentiles, which others could very naturally interpret as him thereby confessing a fault and approving the claim that it is necessary for salvation, to combine belief in Jesus Christ with the observance of the Jewish ordinances, and to place a part of righteousness in these as well, Gal. 2:11-12. Paul himself, however, was willing to yield to the weak in this, showing patience with their ignorance, and, seeing their good heart and hoping for their growth in goodness, let nothing detract from his love for them and gladly avoided the occasion, where something controversial might have arisen, which they would not yet have known how to handle, and where divisions were to be feared, or where the uninformed party, with a doubtful conscience, had imitated others out of timidity, thinking that a Christian does not need to be exact about everything. . . d) One must be careful not to cause others to sin through the careless use of innocent and permissible things, because of the weakness of their knowledge or understanding. This can happen in various ways. Sometimes, others, out of fear of man, out of deference to more prominent people, or to avoid shame, do something against their conscience that they do not consider permissible. Those whom they follow may have a different conscience and may also be in the right, but they should refrain from exercising their right where it becomes a stumbling block to others, 1 Cor. 8:9–13; 10:23, 33. Furthermore, if opinions are divided on a matter, and the example and reputation of one person moves another to imitate him, then that person not only causes a scandal if the matter is a real sin, and thus leads the other into sin, but even if it was not a sin, he still causes this person to stumble if he performed the act under such circumstances that it could have made it seem probable to him, that he nevertheless considers it a sin, but is of the opinion that one may knowingly commit small sins, or at least sins of this kind, and that it is not necessary in Christianity to be exact about everything, and deserves praise and imitation therein, because he has the presumption that he understands the matter better." (*A Brief Outline of Moral Theology*. II, 1557–1562.)

BALDUIN: "Whether those Lutherans who live in the papacy must necessarily abstain from meat on Fridays, so as not to offend the weaker brethren in the papacy? Ans.: By no means, because the rule of Paul deals with such weak brethren, who are brothers, i.e., who in the other articles of the Christian religion are *of the same mind* as we." (See Dedeken's *Thesaurus Consiliorum*, Appendix, f. 202.)

LUTHER: "What God does not forbid, but leaves free, should remain free for everyone, and no one is to be obeyed who forbids what God wills to be free; rather, everyone is obligated to act against such prohibitions with words and deeds and always to do the opposite in defiance of them Gal. 2:5. . . Well then, since they will not listen to reason and with violence have sought to obstruct and suppress this divine freedom, they shall in turn, in defiance of their mad violence, see and hear everything that most deeply grieves and most bitterly angers them. . . I also took a nun to wife, although I could

> have refrained and had no particular reason, except that I did it to spite the devil with his scales, the great lords, princes, and bishops, who are mad enough to think that 'spiritual' persons ought to be free. And I would gladly cause even more offense, if only I knew more that would please God and displease them. . . But that some weak people also get angry about this is not our fault, but the fault of the tyrants who prevent the Gospel from reaching them and teaching the weak; therefore, they must answer for it. Even if it comes to the point that Christian and divine freedom is to be suppressed or dishonored, it is more to be defended than that of the weak. For God's Word matters more than the whole world." (Letter to N. 1526. Opp. Hal. T. X, 962. sqq.)

c) However, it sometimes happens that pious people, who are also weak, provide a scandal to others through certain sins, though not so great.

## § 9.

The things of the world, which are subjected to our senses, objectively move [(a)] the sensitive appetite and the will to sin.

a) See *1 John 2:15 ff.,* where we are forbidden to *love* the things *that* are *in the world*, because from them are born *the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life.* Cf. the example of David, who, upon seeing Bathsheba's naked body, was inflamed with lust, *2 Sam. 11:2.*

## § , 10.

Within man, the efficient cause of actual sin is his own corrupt nature or, to speak abstractly, his own innate perversity, consisting in the lack of original righteousness and the depravity of concupiscence.

Thus *from within, out of the heart of men,* proceed *evil thoughts, adulteries, fornications, murders, etc. Mark 7:21–23.* And in *Romans 7:17*, Paul says that *he* does *not* do the things that are done against the law, but *that the* original *sin*, or the evil *concupiscence*, *dwells* in him. Compare *Galatians 5:19,* where the *works of the flesh*, which proceed from carnal concupiscence, are variously enumerated. Compare above, chapter II, § 8, note *d. e.*

## § 11.

Specifically, ignorance on the part *of the intellect* [(a)] is a cause of sins, insofar as it excludes the knowledge that would otherwise have impeded the sinful act.[(b)]

a) Whether it is that by which one does not know what one could and ought to have known, and so acts ignorantly in a way that is contrary to the law, which one would not have done had one known;

in which case the act that arises from ignorance is undoubtedly a sin. Or even that which *precedes the will* in such a way that a person is ignorant of what he could have known about a certain matter, or at least was bound to know; from which it differs *from the accompanying ignorance,* when one does not know what one is doing, yet so that, if one knew, one would still want to do the same; and *from* the *consequent* ignorance*,* which is *either affected,* that is, such that one simply willed to be ignorant of what one could know, *or crass,* when one, through one's own negligence, is ignorant of what one could and should have known. Meanwhile, ignorance itself is a consequent of the will, from which sin proceeds, and is a sin*,* whether it is *affected* or *crass*.

HOLLAZ: "*Antecedent* ignorance is the cause that a man wills something which he would not have willed, had he known. Such ignorance is when one is ignorant of what he could have known in this or that matter, and was not bound to know, and it coincides with *invincible* ignorance; e.g. when a man in battle, about to kill an enemy, kills his brother, whom he neither knew nor could have known was involved in that battle." (Exam. P. II. c. 4. q. 16. p. 545.)

DANNHAUER: "Ignorance of the fact diminishes the sin and excuses from a certain species of sin, not from every sin. Judah's intercourse with Tamar is excused from the crime of incest, not from that of fornication." (*Liber conscient*. I, 107.)

b) Thus, as a kind of removing and preventing impediment, just as Paul says in *1 Tim. 1*:*13*, he became *a persecutor* because he lacked the knowledge of the true religion; which, had he possessed it, he would not have suffered to be led to persecute the true faithful.

## § 12.

On the part of the *sensitive appetite,* the cause of sins is the passions or *affections,*[(a)] insofar as they *partly* distract or impede the will, so that it tends *either* more sluggishly *or* not at all toward the objects commended to it by the intellect,[(b)] *partly* they disturb the imaginative faculty and thus draw the judgment of the intellect itself *and*, through it, the will toward sensible goods,[(c)] *partly* finally, if they are very vehement, by their own weight, as it were, they cast down the will toward a sensible good, against the dictate of reason.[(d)]

a) See *James 1:14.* For *concupiscence*, in that passage, denotes a sin innate in us, but when it is said *to conceive,* it signifies disordered movements, or the passions arising from them, which are themselves also sins, yet at the same time are the causes from which further arise the *sins* so-called *κατ' εξοχήν* [preeminently], or external sinful acts, and these even more grave, precipitating a man from the state of grace into the guilt of *death.* And to this belong the discussions of the philosophers concerning *incontinence* and its species, their *precipitancy and weakness*, and their acts.

QUENSTEDT: "The word 'act' and 'actual' here is not taken strictly, not only for external *works* and sins of commission, but broadly, so that it also includes internal vicious *motions,* both first and second, as well as sins of omission." (Th. did.-pol. P. II. c. 2. s. 1. q. 40. f. 923.)

b) For example, when a sudden *fear* prevents a man from performing an act of fortitude or profession of faith, as Peter, who was to walk on the waters to Jesus, but *being terrified by a stronger wind,* lost heart in the act commanded by Christ, *Matt. 14:29-30, 34.* Likewise, the *fear* of the Jews *caused* him to *withdraw* from the company of the Gentile converts, *Gal. 2:12.*

c) Thus, the *affection of love* is said to *'blind the wise understanding*.'

d) To this belong the things that are taught in the schools of philosophers about the closest connection between the sensitive appetite and the rational appetite, i.e., the will. And experience teaches how love or anger, when more vehement, sometimes degenerate into fury or madness.

## § 13.

On the part of the *will,* the cause of sin is *habitual malice,*[(a)] by which one, knowingly and willingly,[(b)] prepares himself to sin.[(c)]

a) It is acquired by repeatedly committing sinful acts; or, where, apart from ignorance of the intellect and passion of the sensitive appetite, and rather by prior deliberation, the evil is freely chosen, and the act committed is not immediately followed by sorrow and repentance.

b) For indeed, evil men can also commit sins out of a certain passion. However, in this place they are considered insofar as, although they sin *with* affections, they do *not* sin equally *from* passion or a more vehement affection, *but* from a freer will.

c) See *2 Tim. 3:1 ff.*, where the apostle presents a long catalog of the sins of malice.

## § 14. ^

As far as Satan [(a)] is concerned, men, who are in this world [(b)] and our corrupt [(c)] nature and its own [(d)] affections lead us into sin [(e)] are said to *tempt* [(f)] us [(g)] *whether* concerning [(h)] spiritual things, *or* [(i)] worldly things, *by flattering* [(k)] or *terrifying.*[(l)]

a) On which we spoke above in § 6.

b) See § 8.

c) According to § 10.

d) See § 12.

e) Or, in the manner of a cause, they contribute to our sinning, *whether* they achieve their end unhindered *or*, when hindered by our resistance through grace, the sins to which we are impelled are not committed.

f) That is, *to test* whether they can do anything against us; to try to draw us away from the true God, His true worship, and the way of salvation, *whether* a *direct* intent on the part of those who attempt it can be ascribed, *or* at least *an indirect one.* On the other hand, *God* is also said to tempt *men,* when He tests their faith, obedience, patience, etc., or provides an

opportunity or even a command to issue certain documents (which is certainly done for a good purpose), and *man* is said to tempt *God,* when he questions God's Word, promises, commandments, threats, as well as the perfections of His knowledge, wisdom, goodness, justice, and power into question and rashly demands that they be proven by certain demonstrations, and *a person* is said to tempt *another* for his own sake (and perhaps for a lawful purpose), or for the public good, or for the benefit of the one he tempts, when he tests the strengths of the mind or body, inclinations, pursuits, and progress. But these are foreign to the present matter.

DANNHAUER: "Augustine, in his *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, book 1, chapter 14, and Ep. 121, ch. 11, explains it excellently: 'It is one thing to be led into temptation, another to be tempted.' For no one can be proven without temptation, either to himself or to another. Therefore, here (Matt. 6:13) we do not pray that we may not be tempted, but that we may not be brought into temptation, as if someone who must be tested by fire were not praying that he might not be touched by fire, but that he might not be consumed by it. For although God does not in Himself lead us into temptation, He yet permits, says Augustine, him whom He has deserted with His help, by a most hidden order and on account of his merits; for He often judges him worthy of being deserted and of being led into temptation for manifest reasons. Jerome, on Matthew 26: 'It is impossible, he says, for the human soul not to be tempted, which is why in the Lord's Prayer it is said: 'Lead us not into temptation,' not to reject temptation altogether, but to ask for the strength to endure temptations.' And when Christ says: Watch and pray, that you may not enter into temptation, this is, that temptation may not overcome and conquer you and hold you within its snares." (*Hodosoph*. p. 486.)

QUENSTEDT: "The apostle here (James 1:18) speaks not of those temptations by which the faith, constancy, and patience of the godly are tested, but of those by which man is solicited and instigated to evil or sin, and James affirms that these do not proceed from God. For τὸ *πειράζεσθαι* [to be tempted] here is the same as to be incited and tempted to sin. In another sense, a father tests a son, a master a servant, a husband a wife, a teacher a disciple, to explore, sharpen, and kindle their talent, affection, and zeal. 'In another sense,' says Augustine (Book 1, Chapter 2, *de consens. ev.*, Chapter 30), it is understood that there is a temptation of which it is said: 'God tempts no one,' and another of which it is said: 'The Lord your God tempts you, to know if you love Him,' Deut. 13[:3]. The former is seduction, the latter is probation." (L. c. P. IV. c. 10. s. 1. th. 2. f. 1432.)

g) For this is what we ask of the Father in the Lord's Prayer, *that He not lead us into temptation,* i.e., that He not permit us to be tempted more severely by the devil, the world, or our own flesh than we can sustain and overcome by the strength of grace, and likewise, that He not forsake us when, fighting alone, we would otherwise have to succumb, etc. That *threefold* temptation is therefore assumed, from which even the *faithful* and *pious* are not immune, much less the *faithless* and *impious,* whose flesh is more vigorous, the world more familiar, and Satan more near.

h) For example, to infidelity, atheism, heresy or heterodoxy, superstition, distrust, despair, or on the other hand, to hypocritical faith, to vain presumption about one's state of grace or spiritual perfection, all of which revolve around spiritual objects: God, His Word, supernatural goods, or the evils opposed to them.

i) To which pertain the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, according to *1 John 2:16.*

k) By presenting temptations that are pleasing, that stir up inordinate love, hope, and joy. Thus, under the pretext of acquiring a great good, some are induced to attempt things that are beyond their own powers and calling;

under the pretext of justice, diligence, magnanimity, simplicity, liberality, recreation, peace or quiet, or salutary tranquility, men are led to acts of cruelty, avarice, pride, ignorance, prodigality, intemperance, carnal security, etc.

l) By presenting what is adverse, what generates fear, flight, and sadness. Just as by the singularity or novelty of a calamity, the delay of help or deliverance, threats, deceitful messages, etc., even those who seemed to be of a strong mind are diverted from their honorable purpose, or are thrown into distrust, despair, private vengeance, suicide [*αὐτυχειρίαν*], and similar things.

## § 15.

But also, *previous* sins are wont to be a cause of subsequent sins, *partly* in that they incline to similar sinful acts,(a) and *partly* in that they drive away the grace by which, when it is gone, men fall into graver sins.(b)

a) For acts commonly leave behind certain dispositions, inclining to other similar acts, and when repeated often, they generate a habit.

b) And so they are called a cause, insofar as they remove an impediment.

## § 16.

The subject of actual sins, *which*, by denomination, is the man himself who sins.

## § 17.

Subject *which* (a) is the *faculties* of the human soul, which are the principles of human actions:(b) *intellect*, *will*, and *sensitive appetite*.(c)

a) Or that by which sins, as sins, affect a person.

b) And thus *Lawlessness (Ανομία)*, adhering to the act, refers to the same subject from which the act itself, as from its principle, effectively depends.

c) By reason of the *voluntary aspect*, all actual sins subjectively pertain to the will, insofar as they are *either* commanded by it *or* approved by it. *Secondly*, the members of the body are also said by some to be the subject of certain actual sins, which are conveniently called the *organs* of those sins by others.

## § 18.

The effect of actual sin is *partly* (a) a certain disposition of the will, by which it is inclined to perform other acts

in a similar manner, and, if these are repeated more frequently, a confirmation of the will in evil; and *partly* [(b)] the guilt of blame and punishment, both temporal and eternal.[(c)]

DANNHAUER: "I. Every sin, *even the smallest* and most venial, even in the regenerate, *is* by its nature and in itself *mortal, legally,* by the rigor of divine justice, Deut. 27:26; Matt. 5:22; Rom. 6:23; Gal. 4:21. James 1:15; cf. Augustine, Book 2 of Confessions, ch. 4. II. Every sin, *even the greatest,* e.g., that of the Ninevites, is *evangelically,* by its outcome under the condition of repentance, 1 John 1:9, on God's part *venial.* III. Every sin *in the unregenerate, even the smallest,* is *actually deadly,* because the wrath of God remains unremitted, John 3:36. The unregenerate, however, is not only a Turk, a Jew, but also the circumcised Saul, David, the 'man of death,' 2 Sam. 12:5, 7. IV. No sin of *infirmity* in the regenerate *actually brings death*." (*Hodos. phaen*. 4. p. 195.)

a) Namely, if actual sins are considered according to their *material aspect*. Cf. what we have said in § 15 and note *a.*

b) Insofar as actual sin, by reason of its *formal nature*, implies a disagreement with the rational nature and with the law of God, it not only defiles man and makes him culpable, but also moves God, whom it offends, to inflict punishment.

c) And this also applies to *every* sin, however slight it may seem. See *Matthew 12:36,* and cf. Part I, Chapter I, § 15. That certain sins are *venial* is *accidental*, as will be said shortly.

## § 19.

Actual sin is, however, divided I. according to the *cause of the efficient agent* into *voluntary* and *involuntary.* Voluntary is that whose cause is a full and deliberate will, determining itself to the sinful act of its own malice, not hindered either by ignorance of the intellect or by a more vehement passion.[(a)] Involuntary is that whose cause is not a full and deliberate will, but rather unaffected ignorance,[(b)] or a more vehement passion,[(c)] which nevertheless has not entirely deprived the person of the use of reason and occurs without any fault on their part.[(d)]

a) See above § 13. Hence, sins are called *deliberate (proaeretica),* sins of *malice*, etc. Otherwise, however, any actual sin pertains to the will as its subject, according to what we said in § 17, note c, and in this sense every actual sin could be called voluntary; but here voluntary is understood in the *preeminent sense (κατ' ἐξοχήν).*

HOLLAZ: "*A voluntary sin* is considered both in relation to conscience and in relation to the purpose of the will. I. A sin *against conscience* is fourfold. For it is committed either against a *right* conscience, when a man in acting or omitting does not follow, but despises, the dictate of conscience in agreement with divine law; or against an

*erring* conscience, when a person in acting or omitting deviates from the dictate of a conscience imbued with error; or against a *probable* conscience*,* when one sins against the dictate of the intellect, which, for probable reasons, advises that something should be done or omitted here and now; or against a *doubtful* conscience*,* when one does or omits what one doubts should be done or omitted. He who sins against the dictate of a *right* conscience sins most grievously... He who follows a *mistaken* conscience *in a matter that is in itself shameful* and forbidden by law sins, whether he acts in accordance with his conscience or against it. For example, if a Persian had once been persuaded that the sun was a God to be adored, he would have sinned by adorning the sun, because he gave religious worship to one who is not the true God; he also sinned by not worshipping, because he acted against the dictate of his conscience and thus, as far as it was in him, he willed to act against the law of God, who gave us conscience as a guide for our actions. ... But one who follows an *erroneous* conscience in an *indifferent matter (adiaphora)*, which is neither commanded nor forbidden by the laws, sins when he acts against it; he does not sin when he acts according to it. For example, at the beginning of the New Testament, some Christians thought it was not permissible to eat things offered to idols, or meat sacrificed to an idol, even though an idol is nothing in the world (by reason of the divinity and divine power which the pagans ascribed to it). They would have sinned by eating against their conscience, however erroneous it was; they would not have sinned by not eating, because they would have followed their conscience as their guide. See 1 Cor. 8:7. If someone today were to decide that it is illicit for a Christian to serve in the military, he sins by serving; he does not sin by abstaining from service. He sins against a *probable* conscience who neglects the safer course. For example, a doctor sins by using a desperate remedy to cure a desperate disease. For although it may happen that the patient recovers with the same treatment, it is not safe; for it may happen that the patient's life is extinguished by that violent medicine. He sins against a *doubtful* conscience who embraces either side of the contradiction, whatever it may be. For example, if a man bound to the Augsburg Confession were a guard to a papal prince and were in doubt whether it were licit for him to accompany the prince to a papal mass, or illicit. He would sin both by accompanying and by not accompanying. Because 1. whatever is not of faith (i.e., whatever is undertaken with a wavering mind) is sin, Romans 14:23. 2. Because he wills some evil; for since he perceives some evil in both options, whichever he chooses, he will have inclined toward evil. Therefore, the matter must always be settled either by his own prudence or by the counsel of wiser others, so that he does not remain longer in doubt and his mind does not hang in the balance. — A voluntary sin, when considered *in relation to the intention of the will,* is twofold. For it is one thing to sin *from mere malice* and a completely free will, and another to sin from a will inclined *by force*, *fear*, and the dangers of the circumstances. . . The betrayal of Judas, by which the Lord Jesus was delivered into the hands of his enemies, was a sin of a purely voluntary nature, committed from mere malice and a completely free will. . . Peter sinned by denying Jesus three times. That the sin was not simply voluntary, in that Peter did not deny Jesus out of mere malice and a completely free will. . . Yet Peter's sin is not to be extenuated as it is by certain Romanists." (*Exam*. P. II. c. 4. q. 10—12. p. 542. sqq.)

GERHARD: "Some sins are *our own,* while others are the *sins of others* in which we participate. The foundation for this division is found in the following places of Scripture: 1 Tim. 5:22: 'Do not participate in the sins of others' (by rashly ordaining them to sacred ministry, whose learning and life have not been sufficiently examined). Eph. 5:7: 'Do not become partakers with them,' v. 11: 'Do not participate in the unfruitful works of darkness.' Rom. 1:32: 'Who not only do these things, but also approve those who do them.' 2 John 11: 'He who says 'well done' to seducers shares in their evil deeds.' Rev. 18:4: 'Come out of her, my people, lest you share in her sins.' The ways in which one participates in the sins of others are included in these verses:

I counsel, command, consent, provoke, praise,
I do not expose the fault, do not punish, do not reprove
I do not stand in the way, but I command and defend the actions of others.

All these ways can be reduced to two general headings. For we are made partakers of another's sin either by commission or by omission. I. By *commission*, when we are either the authors or helpers of another's sin, and this 1. either *by consent and approval*, when we approve of what is done by others with our vote (Acts 8:1. Rom. 1, 32.); 2. by *counsel,* when we are both authors and advisers in the commission of evil (2 Sam. 16:23. John 11:49.); 3. by *command* and *order,* when we either follow the decrees of superiors in committing evil, or we command others to do evil (Exodus 1:16 ff.; 2 Kings 11:15; Matthew 2:16; John 19:16.); 4. or by *excusing* and *defending*, when we defend the evil deeds of others (Isa. 5:20; Ezek. 13:18.); 5. or by any participation in the *crime and* its *profit*, as when we allow ourselves to receive a share of the gain from theft (Ps. 50:18), etc. II. By *omission*, when we neglect our duty to rebuke and punish sins, which is done through untimely silence, connivance, and excessive leniency (Ezek. 3:17–18; 33:7; Isa. 58:1), etc." (*Loc. de peccat. actual*. § 89.)

b) See above § 11. And these are called by the special name of sins of *ignorance,* to which the words of David in *Psalm 19:13* belong*: 'Who can understand his own errors?'* (that is, no one understands.) *"Cleanse me from my hidden faults,"* that is, from those which are unknown to my intellect or memory, which I have not regarded as sins; such as, first and foremost, those cases where ignorance is involved, either of the *exactness* of divine law or of certain circumstances of an action, which, if we knew what we are ignorant of, we would not do. For on the contrary*, accompanying,* indeed*, consequent* ignorance*,* which is *affected*, does not make the sin involuntary, but voluntary. That consequent ignorance, however, which is not affected, in a manner diminishes the voluntary *character*, even though it does not make the action entirely involuntary.

c) See § 12. These sins are called sins of *weakness,* not in opposition to sins of temptation, but in a somewhat *broader* sense, with reference to the weakness of our own powers, *partly* to guard against the affections that arise in us, and *partly* to overcome those that have arisen and with which we have struggled for some time.

d) Involuntary sins are especially concerned with *sudden* disordered movements that proceed from concupiscence, as from a necessity of corrupt nature, without the consent of the will; which some are accustomed to refer to original sin itself for this reason. Hence, perhaps, the question can also be decided: *Whether actual sins fall upon infants*. However, it is very difficult to always and accurately distinguish involuntary sins from voluntary ones in practice. See *Musaeus*, *Tract. Germ, de poenit. contra Stengerum* Part. II. cap. II. p. 173. and P. III. c. IV. p. 499. sqq.

BALDUIN: "In the formula of prayers that precede baptism, mention is made of the sins committed by the person to be baptized himself: 'And those which he himself has added thereto'; the question is, whether the minister of the church can omit those words in the baptism of infants, since infants do not appear to sin actually? . . . A distinction must be made between the deliberate action (προαιρετικήν)*,* which is joined with deliberate purpose, and that which is proper to original sin, which you might call *φυσική*, because it arises from corrupt nature and, as a vicious effect, flows from original sin as its perverse cause. Actual sin, which is committed from

deliberate choice (proaeresi) and a deliberate purpose, is not present in infants, because they are still deprived of the use of reason, Deut. 1:39; Jon. 4:11. However, actual sin, of the kind that usually accompanies original sin, whose root is never idle but always produces vicious actions, should not be denied to be present in infants, even though they are unaware of it. For its indication is anger, impatience, reluctance toward good, disgust, and similar evil motions, to which infants are subject even before the years of discretion. . . Furthermore, these words also refer to the proairetic act which in adults follows baptism. For in baptism, not only is the original sin remitted, but all those sins with which a man can be polluted throughout his entire life. That is why baptism is called a covenant of a good conscience with God (1 Pet. 3:21), because there is no sin that can trouble our conscience for which remission has not been accomplished in baptism." (*Tract. de cas. consc*. lib. IV. c. 8. q. 3. p. 1065—67. cf. *Hollaz* Exam. P. II. c. 4. q. 7. p. 540—42.)

ANTHITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Papists*, as Bellarmine and others, who deny to infants all actual sin, even that of omission. Bellarmin writes that it is most absurd for infants to have actual sin, at least of omission, since (as he had said a little earlier) infants are not bound to actually have faith and the fear of God. . . 3. The *innovators.* For Dr. G. Calixt and Hornejus, in part II. *apol. contra Buscherum* q. 8. p. 217 sqq. deny that infants have actual sins immediately after birth and before the use of reason. 4. *Zwingli* and *the Papists,* who from their false hypothesis that nothing has the nature of sin unless it is committed by one who knows and wills, decree that actual sins do not attach to infants. 5. Of the *Socinians*, who assert that infants are neither apt nor born to sin, and therefore cannot sin." (L. c. q. 14. f. 1053.)

## § 20.

Actual sins are divided into two, according to the material aspect, namely sins of *commission* and sins of *omission*. The *former* are those that consist in positive acts contrary to a negative precept. The *latter* consist in the negation or omission of an act prescribed by an affirmative precept.

See above §§ 1 and 2.

HOLLAZ: "Although in a sin of *omission* there is usually some illicit positive act, either an interior one of the will, such as the will to omit what has been commanded, or an exterior one, such as the operation by which one is prevented from doing what he is bound to do: nevertheless, such a positive act is not always or necessarily required, but *the very act* of *not doing what has been commanded* is a sin." (*Exam*. P. II. c. 4. q. 26. p. 552.)

## § 21.

Furthermore, III. sins are divided according to the object [(a)] into sins *against God*, *against the neighbor,* and *against the sinner himself.* The former are those which immediately and directly concern God;[(b)] the latter, those which immediately concern the neighbor;[(c)] and these which are directly directed at the person of the sinner himself.[(d)]

a) For the *immediate object of* sin*,* that is, the thing about which sins *directly* concern themselves, the apostle divides the opposite good acts conformable to the law in such a way that he says some are to be done *godly* (εὔσεβῶς), others *justly* (δικαίως), and finally others *soberly* (σωφρόνως)*,* in *Titus 2:12.* For elsewhere, *piety* (ἡ εὐσέβεια) denotes the entire divine worship of both tables, and conversely, every sin is committed against God, which implies an offense against Him. Some refer to this the distinction of actual sins into *carnal,* which include those committed against oneself and one's neighbor, and *spiritual,* which are committed against God.

b) They correspond to the sins of the *first table* of the Decalogue, just as the latter two types, taken together, correspond to the sins of the *second table*. Therefore, they pertain to sins against God: acts of *idolatry, blasphemy*, *superstition*, etc.

c) Such are the sins by which the neighbor's *person, reputation,* or *property* is harmed, e.g., *murder* or bodily *injury*, *insult, slander, theft, fraud*, etc.

d) For example, *fornication* (through which a person is said to *sin against his own body, 1 Cor. 6:18.* In a special way, because he abuses his own body against himself and turns it into the material for illicit pleasure, making it the member of a prostitute; which the context of the passage indicates); *drunkenness* (harmful to health, and thus indeed sinning against one's own body, yet not in the same way as fornication; because what the drunkard abuses is something outside the body, wine, beer, etc.); *suicide* (in which one is injurious and violent to one's own life itself) etc.

## § 22.

By reason of the fourth (IV) degree, sins are divided [(a)] into sins of the *heart*, of the *mouth,* and of *action.*

a) According to others, sins are divided into *inchoate* (in the heart) and *consummated* (in word and deed), into *internal* and *external* sins. For here we are considering the sins of the heart, mouth, and deed insofar as they are *subordinated* to one another*;* thus they differ both in the *degree of* internal and external *acts* and *in the degree of culpability*. On the other hand, it must be admitted that a certain sin of the heart can be graver in guilt than a sin of the mouth or of the deed, just as habitual hatred toward an innocent neighbor, or a long-nurtured intention to harm, is a graver sin than a harsher response to an injury inflicted on an innocent person, or even an excess in zeal for his protection, or a slight wound inflicted unintentionally. On the sins of the heart, mouth, and deed, see *Matt. 5:21-22, 28; chap. 15:19.*

> KROMAYER: "There are *degrees* of sin, or not all sins are equal. This thesis (*θέσις*). . . is opposed to the Stoics and Jovinians, who contended that all sins were equal, that to kill a slave and a master of the household, indeed a rooster and a human, were equal. . . Besides the fact that, according to Augustine, it is against all human reason, it is also refuted by the following scriptural passages: 1. from Matthew 23:24, where some sins are compared to a camel, and others to a gnat; 2. from Matthew 7:3, in which some sins are compared to a beam, others to a speck; 3. from John 19:11, where Christ says to Pilate: 'He who betrayed me

to you has the greater sin'; 4. from 1 Timothy 5:8.: 'Who does not provide for his own, and especially for his own household, has denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever'; 5. from 2 Pet. 2:20., that the latter state is worse than the former, and that it would have been better for such people not to have known the way of righteousness; 6. from Luke 12:47, that a servant who knows his master's will and does not do it will be beaten with many stripes; 7. from those places which speak of degrees of punishment after this life, such as Matthew 11:24. . . Cicero, in the *Paradoxes*, depicts the Stoic view that to sin is to cross the lines. . . But we answer by conceding the equality of sins only insofar as they transgress the prescribed norm of the law; . . . but we establish unequal sins insofar as one sins more than the other, . . . We grant that every sin is deserving of the curse, death, and eternal damnation, but, since there are degrees of sin, so too there will be degrees of punishment in the life to come." (*Th. posit.-pol*. I, 516. sqq.)

## § 23.

By the reason of the fifth consequent, V., sins are divided 1. into *mortal* or deadly,(a) which are imputed to the sinner in the second act unto death,(b) and *venial*, or which, though worthy of death, are not imputed to the sinner as death;(c) 2. into *crying* [sins], or those which, even when men are silent, are wont to move God to public vengeance,(d) and *not crying out*, or those which God often tolerates and dissimulates in His long-suffering;(e) 3. into *remissible* sins, or those which, just as they by their nature do not exclude repentance, so too they can and tend to be remitted,(f) and the *unforgivable* sin, or that which by its very nature is such that it is never forgiven.(g)

a) For otherwise *every* sin is *in itself mortal,* that is, worthy of death; *none is venial,* in itself worthy of pardon or remission.

KROMAYER: "There is no sin that is venial by its nature. Here a middle path must be followed between the Papist Scylla and the Calvinist Charybdis. The opinion of the Papists is that there are some sins which are venial by their nature, such as those which are such by their kind, namely idle words; some by surprise, such as sins of precipitancy; some from the imperfection of the act, such as a second-degree movement of sin; some from the triviality of the matter, such as the theft of a single obol or a pin. They do not wish for a penance to be given for these, unless it is taken only for the displeasure of the act, nor for them to be necessarily expressed in a special enumeration of sins, nor for satisfactions to be imposed for them. The remedies prescribed for them, however, are the formation of the cross, the beating of the breast, the sprinkling of holy water, the episcopal or even priestly and monastic blessing, the use of the Eucharist, the Lord's Prayer, and whatever other prayers there may be. . . . The Calvinists, on the other hand, hold that all the sins of the elect, however enormous, even outside the state of penitence, are venial not only as to their possible but also as to their actual outcome, while all the acts and deeds of the reprobate — even temporal sins — are mortal. In which certain ones agree with us, that not by their own nature, but by the merit of Christ, certain sins, or rather the sins *of certain ones* (for this distinction flows from the distinction of persons, who are either in the state of grace or outside of it) are established as venial; in this, however, they are absent from us, that they

indiscriminately declare all the sins of the elect, even though they are for a time placed outside the state of repentance, by the example of David, to be venial sins with regard to the actual outcome." (L. c. p. 511. sq.)

LUTHER: "The works of men, that they may always appear specious and good, are nevertheless likely to be mortal sins. . . The works of the righteous would be mortal, were they not, through pious fear of God, feared as such by the righteous themselves. . . Then are they truly venial sins before God, when they are feared by men to be mortal. . . A man who thinks he can attain grace by doing what is in himself adds sin to sin, so that he becomes doubly guilty." (*Heidelberg Disputation*. 1518. See Opp. lat. varii argum. ad reformationis hist. pert. Vol. I, 387. sq.)

THE SAME: "Peter denied Christ and was almost lost. *He does fall from grace*, but yet does not lose all reflection. . . Because he remains in the Word, he does not fall into eternal disfavor, but does true repentance." (Ad 1 John 3:23. Opp. Hal. IX, 1178.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of the *Scholastics and Papists*,... who hold that certain sins are in themselves and by their nature venial or deserving of pardon, do not conflict with the law of God (or are not committed against it, but rather besides the law of God), cause a stain not in the soul, but in the sensuality, and thus merit only a temporal punishment, which itself is nevertheless easily remitted. . . 2. Of the *Socinians,* who hold that in the New Testament not any act of sin, but only a vicious habit or the practice of sinning excludes men from the kingdom of God. . . 3. Of the *Arminians*, who teach the same; for thus in their confession, ch. 7, sec. 6: 'Some sins,' they say, 'are such that they deserve to be called lighter failings rather than crimes, by which a man is not excluded from the hope of eternal life according to the gracious covenant of God and His fatherly goodness.' . . 4. Of *certain Calvinists*, . . . who reject the use of these terms and the question as Papistic. 5. Of the *Anabaptists,* who utterly explode the distinction of sin into mortal and venial, and sneer at it as a scholastic invention retained by Luther." (L. c. q. 13. f. 1048.)

b) And to this belong the sins of the *regenerate*, which *shake off faith;* but *all* sins of the *unregenerate.*

GERHARD: "Scholars in general embrace mortal sins within the scope of the *sevenfold* number, and for the sake of memory include them in the word *Saligia,* signifying: pride, avarice, lust, anger, gluttony, envy, and sloth. Indeed, Toletus, Jesuit, rightly warns in his *instruct, sacerd. tract. de pecc. mort*.: 'It would be more correct to call them capital than mortal, since there are many other sins that are truly mortal.' (L. c. § 102.)

c) For the one who sins does not on that account cease to be a believer, and thus remains in a state of grace. And such sins are *partly* involuntary motions of believers, and *partly* sins committed by them out of ignorance or passion, which are accompanied by sorrow and repentance.

d) Such are principally four that are numbered: *homicide, Gen. 4:10; sodomy,* or a lust most alien to human nature, *Gen. 18:20; the oppression of the innocent,* e.g., of subjects by tyrants, *Ecclus. 3:7;* and also of widows, orphans, and the poor, *Exod. 22, 23, 27, the denial of due wages, James 5:4,* though not excluding other, graver sins committed in wanton license.

f) As if by *connivance.* For so *ὑπεριδών* is said in *Acts 17:30.*

g) And to this all sins belong, except for that which is called a *sin against the Holy Spirit.* For even *mortal sins,* which, when committed, are imputed to death in the act, *can* nevertheless *be forgiven* afterward*,* because they can be retracted and expiated through repentance and the faith that can follow.

h) Namely, because it is in *itself*, and *insofar as* it is *such,* joined with final impenitence. And this is what is called a *sin against the Holy Spirit;* of which we must now speak in somewhat more detail.

## § 24.

Actual sin, the gravest of all, which is called sin against the Holy Spirit,[(a)] consists [(b)] in the malicious [(d)] denial of heavenly truth already acknowledged [(c)] and in a blasphemous [(e)] and persistent [(f)] attack [upon it].

a) The reason for the designation, taken from the *object,* which is the *Holy Spirit, metonymically* in this place, considered in respect to the office which He exercises through the ministry of the Word in converting the hearts of men; such a sense of the word is also found in *2 Cor. 3:8,* so that sin against the Holy Spirit is a sin committed against the office and ministry of the Holy Spirit and the heavenly truth revealed through it. It is also called elsewhere a *sin unto death,* by a designation taken *from its effect*, because it most certainly brings about death or eternal damnation, *1 John 5:16.* Compare our Disputation held at Heidelberg last year, 1688.

> DANNHAUER: "One can sin against the Holy Spirit in various ways: by grieving it (Eph. 4:30), by tempting it (Acts 5:4), by the sacrilegious selling of it (Acts 8), by resisting it (Deut. 29:18; Acts 7), by provoking it (Isa. 64:1), and by quenching it (1 Thess. 5:19); but by such acts the enormous and consummate crime against the Holy Spirit is not absolved. These are sins partly tolerated by the Holy Spirit through divine forbearance, and partly also actually remitted (Acts 13:18), but this is irremissible, because it is the *office* of the heavenly Holy Spirit (John 5:.., a hindrance… Matt. 12·31–32, not only is the *thing* that is to happen denied, but also that it is *possible;* just as in the opposite member, where the sin against the Son of Man is remitted, it must be understood of power, not of act, because to many who sin against the Son of Man it is not remitted." (*Hodos. Phaen*. XI. p. 709. sqq.)

b) The foundation for the doctrine on this sin is found in *Matthew 12:30 ff., Mark 3:28, and Luke 12:10.*

c) Whether that doctrine has been once approved by the assent of divine faith and public profession, or has only been so clearly perceived that the mind, being convinced, has nothing with which it can oppose the matter. In the former way those apostates sin against the Holy Spirit who deny and assail with insults the truth once acknowledged and believed, such as the author of the Epistle to the *Hebrews* describes (*6:4 ff.*). The latter class pertains to the Pharisees and scribes, who had never confirmed the doctrine of Christ with their own confession, but were nevertheless so convinced in their minds of its truth from the Scriptures and the miracles of Christ that they had nothing to oppose except insults. See the passages cited. Matt. 12:24. Mark 3:22; Luke 12:10; and cf. John 11:47-48; chap. 15:22; Acts 4:16-17; chap. 7:51.

QUENSTEDT: "To us, the opinion of those seems more probable who attribute the sin against the Holy Spirit *only* to those who are *truly born* again, justified, and renewed... Heb. 6:4-5. The sinner against the Holy Spirit is described: I. from a gracious illumination, which is not effected except by a *participation of the Holy Spirit*... II. From a taste of the heavenly gift and the virtues of the future age. A taste, I say, not a light and faint one, but a perfect one, joined with a change of the will to love God; for that taste is the taste of faith. . . III. They are called in v. 4. *'partakers of the Holy Spirit.'* IV. It is added in v. 6.: That such a sinner cannot *be renewed again into repentance.* Those who cannot be renewed *again* or a second time for repentance were previously penitent and consequently born again. . . The authority of many theologians is also added, e.g., Gerhard, Hutter, Lyser, Balduin, and Hulsemann, who attribute this sin only to the born again. Indeed, Scripture itself describes the sin against the Holy Spirit in such a way throughout that this description explicitly excludes the unregenerate. .. Some add here the example of Francis Spiera, of whom Sleidanus writes in book XXI, who in Venice before the papal legate denied the truth in the year 1548. But he is by no means to be considered a blasphemer of the Holy Spirit in this case, because 1. he did not fall away from the papacy out of malice, but out of weakness; not of his own accord and willingly, but was persuaded by friends. 2. He did not attack or blaspheme the doctrine of the gospel, but deeply regretted that he had fallen from the truth. Therefore, there was indeed *despair*, but *not blasphemy* against the Holy Spirit, as Meisner says; or, on the mere presumption of that sin—that he had renounced the known truth of the Gospel—he died in despair, refusing all consolation, as Maresius states, which is most likely true, provided he did not at last extricate himself from that anguish. Today, no one should rashly be accused of such a crime, since we should despair of no one. But in the time of the apostles, when the discernment of spirits, 1 Cor. 12:9, was one of the charisms of the Holy Spirit, such sinners could be recognized. . . Since by individual discernment today we do not certainly and indubitably know any sinner against the Holy Spirit before death, we cannot also know for whom in an individual case prayers are to be interrupted." (L. c. q. 16—18. f. 1060. sq. 1064. 1069.)

HUELSEMANN: "The sin against the Holy Spirit is committed by enlightened men, who are convinced of the truth of the faith and of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit." (*Breviar*. c. 5. § 16.)

QUENSTEDT: "Duration, continuation, and perseverance in this sin, or, which is the same, *final impenitence, is not the formal reason* or definitive essence of the sin against the Holy Spirit, so that in its absence this sin would not be definitively and essentially perfect, but is a common, indeed perpetual and inseparable, *accident* of it; that is, the very persistence is *extra-essential* [ἐπουσιώδης], not *essential* [οὐσιώδης], to this sin." (L. c. q. 17. f. 1066.)

d) Or as the denial and attack on heavenly doctrine is done "willingly", *ἑκουσίως*, *Heb. 10:26,* so that the principle of denial and attack is pure, naked malice. But those who deny the faith out of ignorance or fear of danger are not therefore sinners against the Holy Spirit, but can obtain the remission of sin. See the examples of Paul in *1 Tim. 1:13* and of Peter in *Matt. 26:70 ff.*

e) For in the passages cited *'word spoken against the Holy Spirit'* and *'blasphemy against the Holy Spirit' are used,* and therefore it formally implies an insulting statement by which the office of the Holy Spirit is impugned, e.g., when His doctrine or His miraculous works, which were done for the confirmation of doctrine, are ascribed to the power and operation of Satan, which the Pharisees did, *Matt. 12:24; Mark 3:22.*

f) And so by its very nature it is such that it cannot be remitted and is never remitted to anyone, according to chapters 11 of *Matthew* and *Mark,* namely, because by itself

and by its nature it blocks the way to repentance. Why, however, final impenitence is so closely connected with this sin is because people of that sort directly and with full malice oppose the means of conversion, and therefore God withdraws His grace from them and delivers them over to a reprobate mind. However, it is *difficult* to pronounce *a priori* and from the causes concerning a person still *living* that he sins against the Holy Spirit. Conf. *Musaeus's* special Disputation on this sin, held in the year 1668.

QUENSTEDT: "*The cause of the unforgiveness* of the sin against the Holy Spirit is impenitence and *final unbelief;* but the *singular* and proper cause for this sin is the *concurrence of the prerequisites* essential to it *a priori*, such as the malicious denial, opposition, blasphemy of the clearly and evidently recognized divine word, and the obstinate and persevering rejection of all means. Not, however, an absolute reprobation, or an omission of the passion, death, and satisfaction of Christ for sinners, to be offered to the Holy Spirit." (L. c. q. 19. f. 1070.)

ANTITHESIS.

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. Of Dr. *Balth. Meisner and Feuerborn,* who *also* attribute the sin against the Holy Spirit to the *unregenerate* (see acts of the synod of 1568). 2. Of *most Calvinists,* who assign that sin *only to the unregenerate*, holding that those who are truly regenerate and renewed cannot commit the sin against the Holy Spirit (see the acts of the Synod of Dordrecht against the Remonstrants); from these false hypotheses: a. that the reprobate are not truly regenerated, b. that those truly regenerated cannot apostatize or fall from the grace of God." (L. c. q. 16. f. 1061.) "*Augustine,* who in various places, especially in Sermon II on the Words of the Lord, Epistle 50, and the book *On True and False Penance*, chapter 4, describes the sin against the Holy Spirit by the sole final impenitence." (L. c. q. 17. f. 1066, sq.) 1. The *Calvinists*, who assign as the *cause* of the unforgivable sin against the Holy Spirit: a. the absolute reprobation of God or the absolute denial of saving grace, b. the absolute omission of the satisfaction of Christ's death for sinners against the Holy Spirit, and c. the absolute omission of a serious divine calling. . . 2. The *Papists,* who also bring forward three false causes of the irremissibility and unforgiveness of sin against the Holy Spirit. The first is the lack of merit for the remission of sins; the second is the omission of conversion in those who blaspheme the Spirit of God, since they are for the most part unconverted (Bellarmin says: 'Because such people are for the most part not converted, nor are such sins remitted'); the third is the lack of salutary repentance after this life. . . 3. The Episcopals, and Arminians, who hold that 'this kind of sin should be confined to the time of Christ in the flesh, confirming His doctrine by various miracles, or to the time of the apostles and the miraculous outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon them, so that after them there could be no place for it among Christians.' . . 4. *Socinians;* Socinus contends: 'Sin against the Holy Spirit is not simply irremissible.' (L. c. q. 18. f. 1071. sq.)

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